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ABSTRACT

Papers and responses from the 1978 annual meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society are reproduced in unabridged form. The keynote session centered on the character of a career in philosophy of education. Papers from general and concurrent sessions and invited papers are included. Three perspectives on the subject of the topical seminar, John Dewey, are presented. (JD)

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PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 1978:

PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING

of the Philosophy of Education Society

Indianapolis, Indiana April 14-17, 1978

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PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 1978:

PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH

ANNUAL MEETING

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

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I. Keynote Session: The Character of a Career in Philosophy of Education

(Keynote Session)

CAREERS WITH CHARACTER

JOE R. BURNETT
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I. The "Career" of 'Career'

The term "career" comes to us from the French, but derives ultimately from the Latin word for "road," *via.* In about 1534 the French gave their word for *via* more of a modern referent, that of a "race course" or "the space within the barrier at a tournament." It came to mean "a short gallop at full speed," and "a charge or encounter" on horseback. By roughly 1700 the English had made the word refer to the flight of a hawk in the art and sport of hawking. About 1803 the term began to acquire its modern meaning: "a person's course or progress through life (or a distinct portion of life), so of a nation, party, etc. (Now *esp.*) A profession offering opportunities of advancement. (1803)"[1]

II. What is the Problem?

I suspect that we are met to discuss "The Character of a Career in the Philosophy of Education" for any number of reasons, but most importantly is the reason that the well-known barriers at our type of tournament have been changed and, indeed, the rules of the tournament seem to have been changed. Or, to put it in the more more modern rendering, the profession in which we have seen careers defined and nobly advanced now seems in turmoil and opportunities seriously curtailed.

There are few jobs for our graduates, some of whom entered the profession at a time when placements of graduates into good jobs were fairly easy. Now the jobs are few, and they often stress shallow breadth and trivial concreteness of experience in the schools and communities, rather than the specialized, abstract, theoretical orientations of our programs of the past three decades.

The high aspirations of students have been blunted, if not in some cases absolutely destroyed. The profession is potentially weakened, if not directly now, then in the future by their frustration and loss. Those who persevere in education and who make of the crisis an opportunity for philosophical reflection perhaps can add to our understanding of how better to educate. And of course we who are secure must attempt to do this also.

Not only are new jobs for graduates few, there are fewer chances for upward, vertical mobility for those already in positions. For example, resignations and retirements in the profession often do not mean replacements. If they do mean replacements, the positions are often converted to junior status, which is good for recent graduates, but too often the positions are so redefined as to minimize high technical proficiency in the philosophy of education alone.

When there are departments or departmental components which have staff who are in their mid-years and are tenured, there is the pressure, real or imagined, to become "relevant" in the sense of the empirically familiar, popular, service-oriented, etc., on the basis of marketplace demands.

Too, there looms the spectre of the "end run" on tenure in given colleges and universities and state systems: the spectre, namely, that programs will be declared unnecessary or irrelevant for state certification or accreditation—and tenured positions therefore abolished.

So there is a malaise about the field, its practitioners, and the oncoming generation of practitioners. The malaise was connoted by one of my graduate students when he cynically paraphrased Whitehead, "The philosophy of education begins in wonder—and ends in unemployment."

There are practical things to do and there are theoretical things to do. Some of the practical things are fighting to see that positions are not allowed to lapse, that students get broadened-but-not-trivialized education and training in order to become more attractive for the right reasons, that public relations —and perhaps even legal actions—be undertaken when necessary to forestall legislatures which wish to remove philosophical perspectives from teacher training.

III. The Character of a Career

I would like to use my few remaining minutes to comment on the felicitous expression which our Chairperson coined to title our panel's topic. I emphasize the second word, "The *Character* of a Career," suggesting thereby the high moral worth of so many of the lives we have seen in our profession—the Deweys, the Hornes, the Antzs, the Kilpatricks, the Childs, the Counts, the Raups, the Axtelles, the Bodes, the Ulichs, the Hullfishes, the Andersons, the Broudys, the Bayles, the Smiths, the Stanleys. Now, *there* are careers with character!

And under it all there is the basic notion of profession which gives character to career: the notion that one dedicates and devotes his art and science to, as Bacon said, "the relief of man's estate." I, and some of you, have had the good fortune to know well, as scholars and persons, many of the people I earlier mentioned. Knowing both their careers and their histories, one knows that many of them were philosophers of education before they ever formally and institutionally became such. One knows that they would have been such had the formal and institutional channels available to them closed early on—as in some cases they indeed did, if but temporarily. The Great Depression, World War II, the witchhunts of the McCarthy era—these and other things traumatized many of their worlds and institutionalized lives. And we know that there were some other careers which were never resumed after such traumas.

At such a time, and on such an occasion as this, I think it not only honorific but wise to celebrate careers of great character in the profession; to think upon them, and, as it were, their example. They helped to define the course in which many of us became initiated and perhaps in which we have become too comfortable. Now we must emulate their courage and determination; and, we must strive for their vision. (I suggest that our exemplars' visions were many, but that their focus was upon a common object—one which probably is not very hard to state in general terms, and one which could serve to test the appropriateness of much of our current philosophizing.)

Defining a career in the philosophy of education in these difficult times certainly requires more than this last bit of pointing to our examplars, but I think it hardly can do without this.

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1. *The Oxford Universal Dictionary on Historical Principles.* Third Rev. Ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 265–66.

(Keynote Session)

THE NATURE OF A CAREER IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

JERROLD R. COOMBS
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The question "What is the character of a career in philosophy of education?" is, I think, somewhat different from the question "What is the nature of a career in philosophy of education?" To answer the first question one must somehow convey a sense of what the experience of having such a career is like. The latter question calls only for an account of the defining features of the career. Since neither my experience nor my descriptive prose is adequate to the first task, I will confine myself largely to the second. Following time-honored tradition as well as the precedent set by Professor Burnett, I begin by considering what we mean when we talk of someone having a career.

To have a career is to be committed to an enterprise which is seen as worthwhile in the sense of being worthy of a person's investing a considerable portion of his time and energy to it. We speak easily of careers in such things as medicine, law, teaching, and politics. Only ironically can we speak of a career in crime. A woman who regards the work of caring for a family as not worthy of a significant portion of her energies will not be said to have made a career of homemaking. When a form of activity seems unworthy of serious commitment by a human being we are inclined to say something like "You can't make a career of that." Having a job may be a part of having a career, but one does not have a career merely because his job involves him in a worthy enterprise. If he is not committed to the enterprise, then he has a job but not a career.

A second feature of having a career is that it involves having a role in an enterprise that admits of advancement of some sort.

That, I take it, is why one can have a career as a nurse, but not as a nurse's aide; in transportation but not in bus driving; as a sanitation engineer, but not as a garbage collector. In some careers, such as those in business or in the military, advancement takes the form of moving to more influential and responsible roles within the enterprise. In other cases, advancement comes in the form of increased recognition by one's peers or by the public.

We should not think, however, that all career advancement need come in one of these two forms. In the case of some careers, advancement takes the form of some sort of self development, that is to say, the development of one's talents, capacities or understanding. One may have a career in art though the only advancement possible is the development of one's talents and grasp of his medium. I am inclined to think that this sort of advancement is the only kind that *must* be possible in an enterprise if one is to have a career in it. Greater influence and responsibility within an enterprise is seen as career advancement in part, at least, because it is seen as allowing for increased exercise of one's talents, and thus for self development. There is an interesting relationship between thinking an enterprise a worthy pursuit for human beings and seeing an enterprise as one which admits of self development. Some enterprises are regarded as worthy of human commitment solely because they require the development and exercise of one's powers and talents. Something akin to the Aristotelian principle is at work here. The more scope an enterprise allows for the development and exercise of persons' capacities the more worthy the enterprise is thought to be.

Because some enterprises are constituent parts of other enterprises, it is sometimes possible to conceive of one's career in several different ways. A teacher may, for example, conceive of himself as having a career in teaching or as having a career in education. The more abstract one's conception of the enterprise in which he is participating, the more scope he has for change and development within his career. One who views his career as a career in teaching has less room for growth and development than a person who views himself as having a career in education.

It should be noted that a change in one's career is a very significant change in the life of a person since it entails a change in his basic commitments and likely is accompanied by a change in his view of himself. That a person's career is very closely tied up with his conception of himself is evidenced by the fact that an attack on a person's career is quite often seen by the person as an attack on him.

This cursory examination of the nature of a career suggests several important points to consider as we explore the dimensions of a career in philosophy of education. We might start by considering what it is precisely that one commits himself to in choosing such a career. To answer these questions, we must get clear about the nature of the enterprise we call philosophy of education. As you are well aware, persons calling themselves philosophers of education vary greatly concerning their views on this matter. There is, in fact, perennial debate concerning the nature of philosophy of education. But the pervasiveness of this debate should not lead us to conclude that philosophy of education is merely the name for a congeries of diverse activities. Despite their differences, persons in philosophy of education are, I think, in some sense committed to the same enterprise, however ill-defined and contentious its boundaries.

Borrowing from Gallie, we might say that philosophy of education is an essentially contested concept.[1] This is largely because philosophy is a normative concept. Doing philosophy, whatever that amounts to, is thought by its practitioners to be a worthwhile intellectual activity. Debates, which are ostensibly about whether or not a certain activity counts as philosophy of education, are quite often debates about whether or not the activity is intellectually responsible or worthwhile. It is precisely because we sometimes get genuine debate on these matters, as opposed to mere name-calling, that I think it possible in principle to view philosophy of education as a genuine enterprise. The trick is to characterize the enterprise in some way that encompasses at least the vast majority of activities typically called philosophy of education. I would prefer not to be among those who rush in where angels fear to tread, but the points I wish to make later require at least some rough characterization of the enterprise of philosophy of education.

Since "philosophy of education" is a normative notion, any account of the enterprise must, I think, be couched in language having a normative character. Briefly, what I want to suggest is that it makes at least some sense to regard Philosophy of Education as the enterprise of promoting rationality in educational thought. "Rationality" is, of course, a normative concept. To be rational as opposed to irrational, insane, silly, absurd, incoherent and the like is obviously a good thing. On this account, what counts as doing philosophy of education is contentious because what counts as being rational is to some degree contentious. Nonetheless, there is a core of determinate descriptive meaning to the term rational, and it is this core which makes possible the enterprise of philosophy of education.

To do philosophy of education is to use some elaborated conception of what it is to be rational in making assessments about what counts as rational, sensible, etc. thinking about education. What I am calling an elaborated conception of rationality includes sets of distinctions, techniques of analysis, kinds of arguments and the like which are regarded as worthwhile. One's elaborated conception of rationality must be justified in reference to the core meaning of rationality. This core can be explicated, at least in part, in terms of such things as adhering to the basic canons of logic and rules of language. Given any particular elaborated concept of rationality, it is unlikely we could distinguish clearly where the core ends and the elaboration begins. It is not clear to me, for example, whether such things as Leibniz's law and Occam's razor are parts of the core or parts of various elaborated conceptions of rationality. Our inability to draw clear boundaries in this matter should not be taken as grounds for concluding that there is no core of descriptive meaning to the concept of rationality, though this is what some proponents of "sociology of knowledge" would have us believe. We should, however, be on guard against thinking that our assessments of educational ideas are grounded in rationality itself rather than in a particular elaborated conception of it.

The commitment one makes in choosing a career in philosophy of education is not just a commitment to being rational in his own thinking about education; it is a commitment to *promoting* or promulgating rationality in thought about education. To have a career in philosophy of education is thus to be committed to some sort of teaching or publication.

Obviously there is much more to be said about the commitment one has when he makes a career of philosophy of education. I have attempted no more than a rough sketch of some essential elements of that commitment. Nor have I provided any serious defense of my views on the matter. Hopefully my remarks *will* provide the background for the points I want to make about the nature of advancement in a career in philosophy of education. To clear the ground a little, I want to rule out of consideration those types of advancement that have little to do with the nature of the enterprise. In this category are included increases in salary, promotion in academic rank, election to office in professional organizations, and the like. These sorts of advancements are not unique to a career in philosophy of education, nor are they necessary to having a successful career in the area. They are symptoms rather than the criteria of success.

I want to focus on the advancements that are in some sense intrinsic to a philosophy of education career; those which define success in such a career. Earlier I made the point that in most careers advancement has two aspects: it involves first the development of those talents of the person which are relevant to carrying out various tasks within the enterprise; and second, it involves the exercise of these talents in accomplishing more significant or difficult tasks within the enterprise. Advancement in a career in philosophy of education has not only these two aspects, but a third aspect as well, namely, the reshaping of one's conception of the enterprise of philosophy of education itself. Actually this is not a distinct aspect of advancement in philosophy of education because it is implicit in each of the other two. Any significant development of the talents and capabilities which are relevant to carrying out the enterprise of promoting rationality must involve the reshaping of one's understanding of what it means to be rational. That is to say, it must involve change in one's elaborated conception of rationality. New ways of arguing, new tools of philosophical analysis, were it possible even to conceive of them, would lack point were they not tied to a new conception of the nature of rationality.

Accomplishing more difficult tasks within philosophy of education also requires the reshaping of one's conception of rationality, for the more difficult issues in philosophy of education are precisely those which remain unresolved by persons working within current elaborated conceptions of rationality. A change in one's elaborated conception of rationality means at least some change in one's view of the nature of philosophy of education and the activities which are regarded as legitimate parts of it. Thus a successful philosophy of education career requires progressive revision of one's conception of the enterprise and its constituent activities. To have a truly distinguished career one must extend the concept of rationality in a way that is new to the profession yet defensible in terms of the core meaning of rationality.

It is worth noting that the continuing debate about what counts as philosophy of education may contribute to the advancement of the careers of those persons sufficiently open-minded to take it seriously. This is not to suggest that changes in one's conception of what it is to be rational come about primarily as the result of self-conscious reflection about one's concept of rationality. Such changes, I suspect, are mainly the product of sensing the limitations of one's conception when faced with a recalcitrant philosophical perplexity or of appreciating the force of some new twist in someone else's philosophical argument. Still, we should not overlook the salutory effect of having someone with a different conception of what counts as philosophy of education rub our noses in the questions we have failed to answer or chosen to ignore.

Advancement in a career in philosophy in education is not solely a matter of developing and using a more adequate conception of rationality in assessing educational thinking. It can also take the form of developing one's capacity to influence others to be rational in thinking about education. Since there are many possible ways of exerting such influence, not the least of which is by teaching, a career in philosophy of education gives scope for the development and exercise of a wide range of human talents.

Perhaps a brief comment on the character of careers in philosophy of education is in order. Each such career has its own, somewhat unique character. What sort of character it has is determined only in part by the nature of philosophy of education. It is determined as well by one's conception of the relationships between his commitment to philosophy of education and his other commitments; and by the social and political context in which he pursues his career. A person may, for example, view his commitment to philosophy of education as merely a part of his commitment to the improvement of education, the achievement of social justice, or the resolution of philosophical perplexities. Which view he takes will determine the problems he sees as important, the zeal with which he pursues them, and the talents he develops and exercises. Thus it will, to some extent, determine the character of his career.

The ways in which the social and political context affect the character of a career in philosophy are well known to all of us. From what Professor Burnett tells us, most of the recent changes in social context have worked to make philosophy of education careers less attractive in character. Certainly a career begun today will have a very different character from one which began in the salad days of the early 1960's.

One thing, I suspect, will remain constant. Because of the nature of philosophy of education, its practitioners will continue to be viewed by the power elite of education as either dangerous or superfluous. This, perhaps more than anything else, characterizes a career in philosophy of education. It is precarious.

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1. W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, 56 (1955-56): 169. Gallie characterizes such concepts as: "concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users".

AMAZONS, SPINSTERS, AND WOMEN: A CAREER OF ONE'S OWN

KATHRYN PAULY MORGAN
University of Toronto

> *"It is a strange experience for an individual who feels himself to be an autonomous and transcendent subject, an absolute, to discover inferiority as a fixed and preordained essence."*
>
> Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*

Consider the following social facts:

(1) *Time* magazine reports, "In her new book, *Lying*, philosopher Sissela Bok, the wife of Harvard President Derek Bok and daughter of Swedish Sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, traces the history of convoluted arguments on the subject."[1]

(2) The United Press International wires as follows: "Dr. Yalow was born in New York. She is married and has two children . . . Professor Rolf Lufe, a member of the Swedish Caroline Institute which awards the prizes, described Dr. Yalow as 'a woman of extraordinary sharp intellect—she's won all the scientific honors in the U.S. When I called her this morning to tell her she had won the prize it was only seven in New York and she had already been in the laboratory for a couple of hours, and before that she had done her cooking. She's a good cook too.'"[2]

(3) Of the seventy-four participants in the 1978 Philosophy of Education Society program, seven are women. Of these seven, two are presenting formal papers. The presiding officer of this session is a man; the president of Indiana University is a man.

What are we to make of these facts? How are they to be interpreted? In what follows, I offer one, of several possible, explanations. More generally, I address the philosophical issues of personal identity and the inherent pragmatic contradictions bound up with the concept of a woman philosopher.

In *A Room of One's Own*, Virginia Woolf remarks that, "Life for both sexes . . . is arduous, difficult, a perpetual struggle. It calls for gigantic courage and strength. More than anything, perhaps, creatures of illusion as we are, it calls for confidence in oneself."[3] It is precisely this confidence in oneself that women often do not have and find it difficult to sustain if they do have. Hence, a career in philosophy demands more of a woman than it does of a man. I will explain.

The structure of a career demands particular personality characteristics. These are often manifested early in the life of a child, and include the following: high intellectual ability, especially in mathematics; persistence and single-mindedness in channeling energy into specific tasks; extreme social, intellectual and familial independence; and a general sense of apartness from others. Such characteristics are optimally enhanced by a sense of adventure, activity rather than passivity, rationality, self-reliance and assertiveness. Coupled with the above and highly desirable for success are the characteristics of aggressiveness and ambition.[4]

Consider the basic socialization pattern of women.

As some have put it, female socialization patterns emphasize "excellence in intimate affiliation with substantial emphasis on adaptivity."[5] In other words, the socialization of young girls and women is directed towards inculcating those behaviours and personality characteristics which prepare them for support roles of various sorts. The positive aspects of the dominant stereotypes include a stress on personal warmth, empathy, sensitivity, grace, charm, compliance, dependence, and deference. More alarmingly, young women are also socialized into being passive, fearful, subjective, intuitive rather than discursive, illogical, and dependent upon others for a sense of self-identity and self-worth. In short, for many women, their identity is essentially an *ascribed* identity. Think of the identification of Sissela Bok. To such women, the predicates of autonomy and transcendence do not apply.

What does this divergence in career requirements and socialization requirements mean for the life of an individual, talented young woman? Or for a gifted wife and mother of school-age children? Or for the economically disadvantaged, bright, divorced woman? For all women? Essentially it means a series of dilemmas: pragmatic, emotional, and conceptual. It means continuous pain, feelings of self-alienation, faltering assessments of one's own self-worth. Consider some of these dilemmas:

As we saw, the qualities necessary for a successful career are antithetical to those necessary for successful socialization as a woman. One requires independence; the other dependence and deference. One requires emotional attachment; the other the development of empathy, sensitivity and compassion. And so on . . . One basic dilemma faced by every woman contemplating a career is this: If she conforms to the massive weight of complex social expectations for her as a woman, she will gain security and a sense of her own womanliness. She will not experience alienation nor will her sense of her own gender identity be called into question. These are not inconsiderable rewards. However, by the time she reaches late adolescence and early twenties, her horizons will have become significantly limited and her motivational structures formed to such an extent that whatever career potential she had has been severely undercut. Furthermore, if this has been through successful socialization, these limitations will be phenomenologically experienced as self-imposed, as having been freely chosen.[6] Nevertheless, this is, most often, her only option.

If, on the other hand, the young girl decides to cultivate those characteristics which will serve her in a career, she necessarily experiences a very lonely childhood involving massive alienation from parents, sibling, peers, and school. Needless to say, she invariably has an insecure sense of her sexual identity as a young woman, a feeling intensified by cruel and often bizarre ways in which adolescent males react to her. She worries about her womanliness, her adequacy as a female, and half believes the taunts about being a castrating bitch. These fears, these concerns, these taunts will follow her, haunt her in more sophisticated and subtle forms, for the remainder of her life if she pursues a career.

What if, despite the difficulties and the alienation, she *does* pursue a career? What if she pursues an academic career and is appointed to a legitimate position in the academy. Are the dilemmas, the pain, the alienation behind her? Has the career been worth fighting for? Follow me as I give a somewhat hypothetical, composite phenomenological account of the life of a woman with an academic career. Imagine you are an academic woman.

Consider some of the facets of your life:

1. *The Classroom*—What do you do and what ought you to feel when you discover that students are walking out of your classes at the beginning of term because you are a woman? When they say that that is their reason for leaving. What do you do when a student rails at your teaching assistant, complaining that it is "difficult" to take criticism from a clear-headed woman? And expects the assistant, also male, to commiserate with him. More generally, how do you cope, as a committed teacher, when it transpires that your intellectual authority is rejected because of your sex, that your very presence as a woman in the classroom derails the learning process which is the *raison d'être* for the classroom itself?

2. *The Wives*—The wives of colleagues, the wives of graduate students, wives-in-general. If you are a woman who has a genuine career in the academy, you present a threat. Very often, you will be the only woman or, possibly, one of two or three women in a given department. Invariably, any close alliance with male colleagues is seen as threatening to the wives of those colleagues and as suspect, as casting dark shadows "on your reputation." Wives of graduate students are often intimidated and so are other women whom you encounter. The upshot of these uncomfortable psychodynamics is that the academic woman is, on a day to day basis, often a very lonely person. The easy conviviality and collegial intimacy which permeates the lives of academic men is, in principle, denied her.

3. *The Marital Dilemma*—If the academic woman marries, there is likely to be a difference between her salary and that of a comparable single woman (a fact obscured by statistical surveys of universities which often group all women's salaries together). It is also less likely that she will be promoted, have tenure, receive grants, have committee involvements, and hold office in professional organizations.[7] The causes of these phenomena are complex. One is the *a priori* assumption that if a woman academic is married, she is less committed to her career. For a committed, ambitious woman, to undercut all the potential avenues of professional advancement may be too high a price to pay for a marital relationship and the dimunition of loneliness that marriage might bring.

But what happens if you decide not to marry? You often become stigmatized as an old maid, as a spinster, as an "embittered, dried up old prune." From a professional point of view, you are looked upon as emotionally unstable, as possibly a man-hater, or as a closet lesbian. All of these are powerful forms of stigmatization in contemporary society. For a woman who may, as a young girl and adolescent, have experienced insecurity about her womanliness due to her commitment to a career, these stigmas continue to erode her sense of her own identity. Potential avenues of advancement are open to you but they exact their toll at the profound level of personal identity.

In short, you are damned if you do and damned if you don't.

4. *Tokenism*—As the only, or the first, woman in a department—and many of us are—you soon discover that all your behaviour is symbolic, universalizable. Although you may experience yourself as an individual, you soon discover that you become hypostatized as Woman. Colleagues infer, using manifestly irrational patterns of inference, that on the basis of working with you, Professor X, they now know what it is like to "work with a woman." Similarly, you will often be asked to give "the woman's perspective." Both of these are generic considerations which trample upon and deny the *essential* variety of women (who were hired, remember, because of their independence) and the individuality of their responses. Becoming conscious of this tendency on the part of members of the academic community (staff and students alike), many women become acutely self-conscious about their behaviour and worry about acting in ways which will prejudice the cause of women. For many women, this publicity of every aspect of their life is deeply alienating.

All this and much more is part of the daily existence of women with academic careers. Given these stresses and these forms of alienation it is not surprising that many women decide to leave the academy. Some women perceive this early and do not pursue the doctorate though they are amply qualified. Others leave at various stages in their career. For many, it is a continuing temptation because society, in general, suggests unsubtly that they never belonged there in the first place. Such suggestions are sometimes valid, sometimes brutally stated. The latter occurs more often in times of economic stress and a depressed job market.

Having looked at the aspects of academic life which affect a woman on a day-to-day basis, let us now turn to the level of consciousness. Here I wish to explore the two stereotypes which are presently available to academic women. They have two options: the Spinster and the Amazon. The Spinster stereotype is old and familiar. It suggests (unfairly) a woman who is prim, proper, chilling and shrill.[8] More pervasively and powerfully, it conjures up the image of a woman who is barren, physically and symbolically; a woman who is sexless. It is a frightening stereotype and one which repels both women and men. It is often rejected in favour of the Amazon. But this is not entirely an easy choice. Simone de Beauvoir remarks that, "To be feminine is to appear weak, futile, docile. The young girl is supposed not only to deck herself out, to make herself ready, but also to repress her spontaneity and replace it with the studied grace and charm taught her by her elders. Any self-assertion will diminish her femininity and her attractiveness."[9] For many career women, this does not change.

Rosalyn Yalow is the paradigm of the new Amazon, the woman who can "have it all." She has a career; she has success; she has a marriage; and she has raised children. Voila! Therefore, it must be possible. The new Amazon operates according to the Liberated Game Plan. The LGP requires that, as a woman, you first establish your career, then marry, then have children. This sounds fine on paper but does not work out well in practice. (But the publicity about the Amazons never tells us that.[10]) Even if a woman establishes a career and is ready to marry in her early thirties, our present society is so structured that few men are available who are both appealing and unencumbered by previous unsuccessful marriages and offspring. Furthermore, given dominant patterns of male socialization, men are programmed to look for marriage partners who are either slightly beneath them in intelligence and earning power or, at best, equal. Even when a man's private convictions incline him to choose a partner who surpasses him in either or both of these areas, he is often deterred by the ridicule and pity he would have to endure from others. So the available population of men diminishes. And there are those career disadvantages to take into account . . . But the Amazon never tires, and is never permitted to tire. ("When I called her this morning . . . she had already been in the laboratory for a couple of hours.")

Suppose you now have a career; suppose you now have a marriage. The LGP calls for children. This leads to a further dilemma. If you have children before establishing your career, very often your career never gets established. Childless, competitive academics will advance faster and you will lose out. Suppose you wait. You can wait but your body can't. You approach your mid-thirties and your responsibly safe childbearing years are coming to an end. But it is precisely at this time that your career demands are likely to be heaviest: now is the time to capture those prestigious grants (which often have upper age limits and which thereby penalize women), to graduate your bright graduate students, to get your manuscript published. Moreover, if you are a philosopher, you know that, very likely, your most productive theoretical years are precisely those years in your mid- to late thirties.[11] So you are trapped. If you bear a child, you will often be charged with psychological neglect if you resort to day care. If you do not use day care but suspend your professional life for three years, this will be of great detriment to your career. Moreover, you will spend your potentially most exciting years as a philosopher engaged in the raising of a child (or children). These are very high costs. But, remember, the Amazons can do it!

Many actual women cannot. Yet if the only fall-back is the role of Spinster, many women try—only to fail. The result, for many women with careers, is an intense feeling of guilt, anxiety and inadequacy.

I have explored some of the reasons and circumstances which make it difficult for women to have careers. I will now focus more particularly on the area of philsophy. I believe that there are reasons endemic to philosophy which account for the even greater scarcity of women philosophers. One of these reasons is the history of philosophy itself. I shall cite two texts, but there are many to choose from.

In the essay *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, Kant writes, "The fair sex has just as much understanding as the male, but it is a beautiful understanding, whereas ours should be a deep understanding, an expression that signifies identity with the sublime. . . .Deep meditation and a long-sustained reflection are noble but difficult, and do not well befit a person in whom unconstrained charms should show nothing else than a beautiful nature. Laborious learning or painful pondering, even if a woman should greatly succeed in it, destroy the merits that are proper to her sex. . . . The content of woman's great science is humankind and among humanity, men. Her philosophy is not to reason, but to sense. Never a cold and speculative instruction but always feelings."[12]

Similarly, Hegel writes, "One sex (man) is at odds with itself, having personal autonomy on the one side and on the other the knowledge and will of free universality; it is the self-consciousness of thought as it conceptualizes and it is the willing of the objective final end. The other, woman, holding itself in unity, is mind as knowledge and will of the substantive externality in the form of concrete individuality and feeling. In relations regarding externality, the former is powerful and enterprising, the latter passive and subjective. Hence the male has his essential life in the state, in learning, and in the like . . . Women are certainly capable of learning, but they are not made for the higher forms of science, such as philosophy and a certain type of artistic creativity; these require a universal ingredient."[13]

What does it mean for the woman student of philosophy who aspires to become a philosopher, who takes pleasure in "deep meditation," in "long-sustained reflection," to read such passages? What happens when many of the finest minds among her philosophical "heroes" tell her not merely through the occasional misogynistic remark that they dislike members of her sex but who develop whole theories built on the dualisms, thought versus feeling, the objective versus the subjective, the universal versus the particular; devalue the second member of each of these dualisms, and then label them "female"? The basic argument against woman philosophers is put forward as an argument from nature, the conclusion of which is that an individual cannot both be a woman and a philosopher. If such a freak of nature should occur, it would be woman in appearance only, not a real woman.

Similarly, it comes as a great shock to an aspiring woman philosopher to be told that because of her nature as woman she will never exemplify the transcendental ego, pure consciousness, or pure practical reason. She is incapable of the universal, of that which is most essentially human, the hallmark of human nobility.

In short, her teachers, her intellectual mentors, and her discipline tell her that not only is she incapable of mastering the discipline but that she is also, by nature, incapable of existing as a transcendent, autonomous subject. She suddenly finds herself on the defensive, motivated to refute a theory not solely because of its theoretical inadequacies but because her very existence is at stake. While this can be an exciting enterprise, it can also be a depressing one. And it is the uncommon student who is sufficiently confident to say that the history of philosophy is wrong and constructed on unfounded patriarchal assumptions. Many women absorb the message rather than challenge it. And this is not suprising because it is a message which is reinforced by the entire socializing milieu. Again, the self-confidence which is crucial to succeeding at a career is eroded, and eroded from within the heart and practice of the discipline itself.

This has been only an attempt at diagnosis. Remedies are another matter.

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1. *Time*, (April 3, 1978), p. 64.

2. "Three US Researchers in Hormones Share Nobel Prize for Medicine", *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, October 14, 1977), p. 1.

3. Virginia Woolf, *A Room of One's Own* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1928), p. 36.

4. For a review of this literature, see Alice Rossi, "Barriers to the Career Choice of Engineering, Medicine, or Science among American Women" in *Readings in the Psychology of Women*, edited Judith M. Bardwick (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 72-82.

5. Ibid., pp. 75-76.

6. For an excellent philosophical analysis of this issue, see Sharon Hill, "Self-Determination and Autonomy" in *Today's Moral Problems*, edited Richard Wasserstrom (New York: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 171-186.

7. Rita James Simon, Shirley Merritt Clark, Kathleen Galway, "The Woman Ph.D.: A Recent Profile" in *Readings in the Psychology of Women*, op. cit., pp. 83-92.

8. Compare associations with the label 'Bachelor'.

9. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. H.M. Parshley (New York: Random House, 1974), p. 376.

10. See, for example, the feature story on Rosalyn Yalow by Elizabeth Stone, "A Mme. Curie From the Bronx", *The New York Times Magazine* (April 9, 1978), pp. 29 ff.

11. Harvey C. Lehman, *Age and Achievement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).

12. Immanuel Kant, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*. trans. John T. Goldthwait (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960) pp. 77-81.

13. G.W.H. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, reprinted in *Not in God's Image*, edited Julia O'Faolain and Laura Martines (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 289-290.

A CAREER IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION: THE GLORY, JEST, AND RIDDLE

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A career is a glorious job. On the whole it seems to require more education than most other kinds of jobs, and the word itself excites a sense of purpose, development, progress—a sense of the future. Someone with a career is often called a professional, is never called a laborer, and is likely to have some authority over some number of employees. Characteristic of all careers, including philosophy of education, is a need and an aptitude for planning. In fact, planning is integral to the very idea of a career, and to the education careers are built on.

The root image of "career" is an area designated for fighting in, racing around, or traveling along. It has just about the same meaning as "curriculum" which stands literally and figuratively for a course, or a career. To a schoolchild the curriculum is the main course of student life, providing opportunity for advancement toward graduation, some fighting, and a lot of racing around. A career means much the same to the graduate: a course of professional life or employment, which affords opportunity for conspicuous progress or advancement in the world, some more fighting, and much more racing around. The less-used verb form of career might be more to the point for young philosophers of education; it means "to take a short gallop."

Philosophy of education has been a university-level career opportunity for fewer than eighty years. Its growth in three quarters of a century has been less spectacular than the growth of other professions such as medicine, computer science, and the law, but it has kept a steady pace with the growth of public and higher education generally. Like public and higher education its growth is over now, and in some places pruning has begun. Philosophy of education appears to be a career opportunity of somewhat sudden and short bloom, like a single human life. Although it is presently a cold season for philosophy of education, as long as education is studied, valued, and pursued by our culture, there will be some room for us and work to do.

It has been a matter of auspicious convenience and good luck (let us all praise good luck) that a career in philosophy of education was open to me when I was a student. It was good luck because I am of the same postwar parturition phenomenon that populated our land with so many children who grew up and made education the big business that it is. It was convenient because in the late 1960's students began deep study of their own educations as political and social phenomena, and a philosophical focus on the good questions raised easily became an academic program. At the end of the 1960's craziness was mixed up with intelligence, Mescaline and My Lai shocked us all in their different ways, the passive amorality of simply "being" competed with passionate political and ethical battles staged from the major universities. Desperation was unavoidable while promises of mysterious and magnificent possibilities were made and half-believed. It was a time when trust was tenuous between generations, and that meant many of the richly rewarded and visible careers lost their appeal, mainly because they represented the established political milieu that caused the mistrust, and were therefore morally suspect. The choice of a career was a moral choice first, and a choice for security second. This was a fortunate circumstance for education, as many unusually able students chose teaching as a career during these ethically vibrant times.

As a means of creating sanity and a moral sense of things for myself, I concentrated on trying to find a suitable intersection for my personal life and the organization of ideas. The alternatives to finding such an intersection were to me equally repellant. A personal life that is not governed and shaped by organized thought, no matter what else it may be, is unattractive because it threatens sanity, and because it could hardly rise above the lowest operational level of short-term self-interest. Organized thought is crucial for the integration of personality and purpose; what is left without such order is a disintegration of severe consequence. This lack of ordering is a lack of integrity; it fractures a person so that one stands in fragments, figuratively beside oneself. (The Greek terms for this condition are *para* and *nous*, from which the modern word "paranoia" is derived.)

On the other side, full-time fiddling with the organization of ideas, preoccupation with the ordering of information, and bewitchment with the sublime symmetry of technical, logical forms can be a problem, too. One who is an expert in technique, for example in computer programming, but who knows nothing else is a fool. More than that he may be a menace to human life. One thinks of how the concepts of "problem" and "problem-solving" were corrupted by the language fetishes of the systems-analysts and operations-research technologists in Robert McNamara's war rooms, where "the best and the brightest" translated problems of all sorts into forms that suited the select, efficient problem-solving techniques at their disposal—all dominated by computer language restrictions.[1] The mechanization of their reason and their language did not allow for questions of truth or justice or for the recognition that conflicting interests may be in need of *accommodation* rather than a technically efficient *solution* that requires the elimination of one of the interests.

When the systems-operations type of organization in thinking achieves the status of instrumental omnipotence, then an artificially pure orderliness will dominate the minds of some people to the extreme extent that the lives of other people will be neglected, wasted, extinguished, and forgotten—not because they were deserving of such a fate, but because they were problems, technical errors in a system designed to eliminate error. Those engrossed in such a splendid game can lose all sense of human sensibility over which this kind of order has no immediate jurisdiction. Morality is thereby forsaken in a perverse ordering of things that will shortly forsake us all and forever.

Mind and morality must converge in every person. I believe that it is in the relations of biography and history, that is to say at the intersection of personal lives and intellectual organization —all within a social context, of course—that an understanding of mind and morality may emerge.

Such understanding, bred at the crossing of intellectual and ethical imagination, at the intersection of idea and individual, is what I take to be the purpose of philosophy and the point of education. So it is a matter of great convenience to me that there is a career combining philosophy and education, giving title to these interests so neatly. As a job that has become a career, it provides the warp and weft for my enduring contest with sanity and morality.

Aside from these personal considerations, there is something more general to be said about the character of a career in the philosophy of education in the winter quarter of the twentieth century. Everywhere philosophers of education are asked to give reasons for their continued claim on university resources, now that resources are scarcer. There is only one answer that seems to be adequate: that answer is to point out the urgent and serious problems of education which deserve the kind of discussion that philosophers are trained to provide.

Philosophers are problem parasites: we feed on them. No problems, no philosophers. A claim to our share of resources in the university must be based on evidence (1) that there *are* serious and urgent problems which deserve critical, systematic, normative discussion; and (2) that philosophers of education are the ones best qualified to provide such discussion. In this view, a career in philosophy of education is contingent on the identification of existing problems whose resolution is valued by those ultimately responsible for the distribution of resources. I want to suggest three problems of compelling educational and philosophical importance which together may recut the character of a career in philosophy of education.

First, there is the problem of an enthusiastic, ubiquitous, reductionist mentality that debases the temper of educational thought and policy. This mentality is easily inveigled by the charm of simplex propositions about complex matters, propositions that are conveniently translated into programs and even legislation that is grotesquely misleading with its single-cause explanations. Mencken recognized this type of mind in his observation that there is "a solution to every problem: simple, quick, and wrong." How many states have been beguiled by the merry band of prattlers who are promoting the Basic Minimal Competence Test as a solution to low achievement levels in high school graduates? These tests, insofar as they purport to guarantee quality of achievement as a requirement for high school graduation, are an educational sham. In New York, for example, the tests are administered upon or before entrance to high school, the presumption being that an elementary school education is sufficient preparation for passing the test. And when large numbers of students fail the tests, visions of political catastrophe pressure the "passing" standard down even beneath the level of mockery.

The IQ test score stands as a symbol of self-parody for the indulgent reductionist: an intelligence that is rendered down to a single cypher is indeed perfectly ironic. More exactly, such a view of general intelligence is incomplete. It is too simple. It fails to account for the interplay of measurable intellectual responses with other modalities of thought such as intuition and habit; and it seriously vitiates the idea of general intelligence by neglecting the contexts, the frames of reference within which it exists.

Jacob Burckhardt was exactly right when he said that ours would be a century of great simplifiers, tempting us away from complexity and toward the essence of tyranny. Those who are tempted to believe in the kind of desperately simple notions these examples represent, re-enact scenes in a legacy of cataleptic dogmas about human nature and society, each striving to control the chaotic abundance of life with a single idea.

The second problem is a new economic and political power in America that has made classical marketplace capitalism obsolete, and has left its straightline liberal supporters as well as its straightline Marxist critics sounding equally archaic, without persuasive arguments. This new social power is a reflection of large corporate-style organization in nearly all social agencies, and of education's role in certifying that organization by supplying the organizers. David Bazelon locates this new power in a New Class of educated, "non-property-holding individuals whose life conditions are determined by their position within or in relation to the corporate order. The essence of the matter is that they are unpropertied in their primary career line."[2]

"The propertyless New Class is most broadly defined as that group of people gaining status and income through organizational position. They achieve their positions—or at least they enter the race to achieve them—mostly by virtue of educational status."[3] Education, as much as the educated person, is a saleable product. It follows that the control of education, at the levels of entrance/exit requirements and curriculum content, is a new political power.

The importance of education has been transformed by the emergence of the New Class, and the political nature of education has been illuminated by its status as *the* entrance requirement for participation in organized status. Education has become a commodity, like property. Education is now partly a thing, and a thing of powerful consequence, created out of a new social perception. One who "has" education has power; those who have education's power also have opportunity to use that power to get more power—in the form of income, security, status. On this basis, the New Class is to be understood as a new political force that replaces the old capitalist/Marxist class divisions as the essential concept in social analysis. (The percentage of white collar jobs in the American workforce has risen from 37.5% in 1950 to 48.8% in 1974—that is, almost half of all working Americans have jobs that are directly related to educational attainment and managerial or administrative, information-processing work.)

Position is the New Class power and *planning* is the method of the powerful. Administration, management, and technostructuring are the controlling professions in the New Class, and in the political structure of America. They epitomize the characteristic that is common to all education—planning. Planning "is inherent in the educated person's activity—conceptualizing and thinking ahead, this is planning and this is what education comes to."[4]

To have a career in education is to be at once a member of this New Class and a shaper of its future. It is not only to live by planning, it is to teach planning. It is to deal with America's reformulation of education as a substitute for property in social and political regulation. It is to have a career of new political significance because the control of education (and of those who have become educators) now replaces the control of property as the dominant political and economic force in America. The large corporate organizations, not individuals, control property, and educated planners control organizations. Educators must now see themselves as sharing in the most important source of power in post-industrial America, and they must own up to the New Class content of the curriculum and the college degree. Philosophers of education, it seems to me, have a clear obligation to study and discuss the New Class phenomenon and its relation to education now and for the future.

The third problem is related to the second. It is the nature of planning and the relation of planning to education on the one hand and power on the other. If planning is inherent in education, and if the New Class political (economic) power is based on education, then this new political (economic) power is linked to planning in a way that must be more clearly understood.

The thousand or so corporations that control half of America's production provide us a lesson in the importance of planning. It is foolish to think that when billions of dollars are invested in developing something—a product or a service such as oil and gas supply—the investors will be content to let the eventual price of the product or service be set by the uncertain conditions of marketplace competition. They are not so contented, and they plan prices instead, on their own. Planning successfully at this mighty level means that huge corporations are potent political powers, no longer obviously outranked by government or free competition.

Philosophers of education would do well to study planning, not only as the method of the powerful New Class, not only as an educated person's most prominent style, but as an educative procedure of ambivalent value. Planning can make some things possible, but it may preclude others. Invention, discovery, surprise have an important place in learning that must not be overlooked in a zealous pursuit of the perfectly planned educational environment and program. Planning is a powerful intellectual instrument, and like most tools it can be used well or misused.

These then are three problems that seem most urgent and important to education: the reductionist mentality of too many policy-makers and researchers; the New Class phenomenon in American society; and the concept of planning in relation to power and education. A beginning career in philosophy of education cannot but encounter these problems and they will have considerable influence on the character of such a career for many years yet.

The identification of these three specific problems also provides some concrete examples as support for Cremin's view that:

> To be concerned solely with schools, given the educational world we are living in today, is to have a kind of fortress mentality in contending with a very fluid and dynamic situation. Education must be looked at whole, across the entire life span, and in all the situations and institutions in which it occurs.[5]

My focus is less panoramic than Cremin's and I think his does not attend to the particulars of mine, but we do agree on the necessity of considering education comprehensively in a broad public context.

One more thing must be said, given this set of problems. We face a threat presented by the enormous corporate structures which support and demand New Class education. It is the threat of anti-intellectualism *among the educated*. The traditional sources of anti-intellectualism in America—primitivism, evangelicalism, and radical egalitarianism—have been extended by the business society which prizes action over reflection, decision over extended dialogue, results over refinement, predictability over pensiveness, and contracts over culture.[6] If the education of the New Class is mostly anti-intellectual in this manner, it may well squeeze out all education of an older sense, *viz*., initiation into the culture of the best that has been thought and written in the world, so that one may participate in that culture and thereby preserve it for yet one more generation. This older notion of education is itself part of the cultural sensitivity which it is education's purpose to protect. Without it, the quality of life and the freedoms upon which it depends are themselves threatened. It would seem, therefore, that philosophers of education must never forget, regardless of the demands of present times and current issues, that the principal concern which should guide their understanding and give shape to their work is the intersection of an individual's quality of life and the ethical organization of ideas which makes it possible to protect and develop that life.

This is not merely the problem of anti-intellectualism, it is no less than the problem of freedom in education. Concern with that problem is the gist of a career in philosophy of education.

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1. Joseph Weizenbaum, *Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1976), pp. 228-80.
2. David T. Bazelon, *Power in America: The Politics of the New Class* (New York: The New American Library, 1967), p. 308.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 332.
5. Lawrence A. Cremin, *Public Education* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 59.
6. Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), *passim*.

(First General Session)

ON THE THEORY OF THE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE

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No doubt philosophers of education will welcome the current wave of interest among college deans in the problem of how best to articulate the liberal arts curriculum. Some may even dare to contribute to it. If so, a likely starting point is a reconsideration of Paul Hirst's theory of the forms of knowledge—surely the most provocative treatment of liberal education to be found in contemporary philosophy of education.

The liberal arts curriculum is conventionally divided, like Gaul, into three parts—humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Unfortunately, this taxonomy has imperfections. Is history to be listed among the social sciences or the humanities? Is psychology a social or a natural science? And what of the so-called "formal" sciences, logic and mathematics? Logic is typically classed as a branch of philosophy, and hence among the humanities; but its close relative, mathematics, usually ends up among the natural sciences, despite its nonempirical method. Something must be amiss somewhere in a taxonomic scheme which can find no fully comfortable place for mathematics!

Hirst's seven "forms of knowledge" are intended to supplant the standard three-areas scheme. Each "form" represents a discipline or a class of disciplines, and together they comprise the content of a liberal education. Hirst's list of these forms, which has undergone some revision since he first proposed it a dozen years ago,[1] now stands as follows:

1. *Mathematics.*
2. *Physical science.*
3. *Interpersonal understanding.* (Here Hirst includes those disciplines which seek to explain human behavior "in terms of

intentions, will, hopes, beliefs, etc."[2] Into this category fall at least portions of the work done in history and the human sciences—fields which, in earlier versions of his scheme, Hirst had been inclined to list as separate forms of knowledge.)

4. *Religion*.

5. *Literature and the fine arts.* (Religion and art Hirst admits as forms of "knowledge" "only in so far as they involve expressions that have the features of true propositions."[3])

6. *Morals.* (This is a somewhat special case, because "no specialized subdivisions of this [discipline] have been developed," and because moral questions tend to arise "alongside questions of fact and technique," giving rise to fields of study which blend the moral form together with the others.[4])

7. *Philosophy.*

These forms of knowledge, Hirst says, may be distinguished by reference to the following features:

> 1. They each involve certain central concepts that are peculiar in character to the form. For example, those of gravity, acceleration, hyrdogen, and photosynthesis characteristic of the sciences; number, integral, and matrix in mathematics; God, sin, and predestination in religion;[5] ought, good, and wrong in moral knowledge.
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> 2. In a given form of knowledge these and other concepts that denote, if perhaps in a very complex way, certain aspects of experience, form a network of possible relationships in which experience can be understood. As a result the form has a distinctive logical structure. For example, the terms and statements of mechanics can be meaningfully related in certain strictly limited ways only, and the same is true for historical explanation.
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> 3. The form by virtue of its particular terms and logic, has expressions or statements (possibly answering a distinctive type of question) that in some way or other, however indirect it may be, are testable against experience. This is the case in scientific knowledge, in moral knowledge, and in the arts, though in the arts no questions are explicit and the criteria for the tests are only partly expressible in words. Each form, then, has distinctive expressions that are testable against experience in accordance with the particular criteria that are peculiar to the form.
>
> 4. The forms have developed particular techniques and skills for exploring experience and testing their distinctive expressions, for instance, the techniques of the sciences and those of the various literary arts. The result has been the amassing of all the symbolically expressed knowledge that we now have in the arts and in the sciences.[6]

Hirst admits that there are unclarities in these features, especially as they apply to the more problematic of the forms of knowledge. He requires, for instance, that a form of knowledge have characteristic expressions that are somehow testable against experience. This may be a simple matter in the sciences, in logic, and in mathematics, where either empirical or deductive tests are the very name of the game. But what are the analogous tests for, say, the arts? Hirst recognizes the problem here, and admits that in the arts "both what the tests are and the ways in which they are applied are only partially statable. (Some would in fact dispute the status of the arts as a form of knowledge for this very reason.)"[7] To defend himself in this dispute, Hirst develops an elaborate theory of art as language, or at least as a language analog, in which it is perfectly natural to "make statements." We do, after all, speak of the artistic "statements" made by productions even in nonliterary media. For Hirst, these statements must somehow be testable—even if we are not always sure just how.[8]

Commentators on Hirst's work have not always agreed about the specific items on his list of the forms of knowledge. One, James Gribble, has argued in particular that literature does not belong on the list, because it fails to meet Hirst's own criteria for inclusion; but literary criticism, says Gribble, does belong on the list.[9] Another writer, John Wilson, has his doubts not only about the esthetic form of knowledge, but about religious and moral knowledge as well—where "many would deny that 'knowledge' was an appropriate word at all." At any rate, says Wilson, even if morals may be counted as "knowledge," questions remain as to whether it is a special *form* of knowledge in Hirst's sense, or whether it is only a *field* of study.[10]

But these criticisms are not radical. They challenge only the details of Hirst's scheme. They do not try to show, for instance, that the whole idea of forms of knowledge is somehow wrongheaded; nor do they suggest that the forms are fundamentally unsuitable for use as building-blocks of curriculum. So far, then, it seems reasonable to think that whatever criticisms might be made to stand up against Hirst could be accommodated by some modest tinkering with his theory. Its general outline continues to look promising.

What Hirst's forms of knowledge have in common, he claims, is that they must be learned from a master, and by immersion—not self-taught or studied from without. Philosophy, for example, must be learned by philosophizing; just studying the history of philosophy is not enough. Each form of knowledge must be taken on its own terms, not filtered through the intellectual apparatus of some other form. There is no other way to grasp what the individual forms of knowledge are really like.[11]

It is an appealing picture. For one thing, it promises a conception of liberal education built on the solid bedrock provided by an understanding of the nature and structure of knowledge itself. By insisting that the parts of the curriculum be distinguished by their formal characteristics, rather than by relatively naive notions of subject-matter boundaries, Hirst has produced a far more penetrating picture of the disciplines and their role in liberal education than we can hope to get from any elaboration of the standard three-areas view. What Hirst has seen is that there is a trap hidden in the mainstream concept of a discipline, which is a curious mixture of subject-matter and method, of field and form. But what sort of mixture—and which is the primary criterion of distinction? On logical grounds, one or the other criterion must take precedence, to cover cases of conflict. It is folly to pretend that the choice need not be made.

In emphasizing form over field, Hirst avoids the logical difficulties associated with the naive subject-matter criteria by which the disciplines are customarily, if crudely, distinguished.[12] He also responds admirably to the concern for an emphasis on method in general education, as enunciated for example by Daniel Bell.[13] And he gives us grounds for hope of surviving the knowledge explosion; for though the sheer quantity of knowledge may continue to expand exponentially, there is no convincing evidence that the number of *forms* of knowledge is apt to multiply correspondingly, if at all. Hirst's saving insight is that knowledge involves both form and data, and it is the data which are exploding. By anchoring ourselves to forms we may escape the shock.

A few Hirst critics, though, have raised objections which rather cloud this seemingly rosy picture. One of these, D.C. Phillips, in a 1971 paper to which Hirst (uncharacteristically) has not so far responded, asks questions which seem to me both fundamental and telling. A few of these are raised also in a 1972 paper by Elizabeth Hindess, to which Hirst has replied.[14] But Phillips' arguments are more persuasive.

Phillips regards the forms of knowledge as (here he borrows a phrase from Stephen Toulmin) "a formal and frozen abstraction" —or rather, as Phillips puts it, "*seven* formal and frozen abstractions," where a much more fluid, flexible, and dynamic account of knowledge is required.[15] Not only are the forms themselves obscure: the criteria by which Hirst distinguishes them are at least equally so. In what sense are the "distinctive expressions" of the arts, of religion, or even of mathematics "testable against experience"? ("Experience" is, after all, one of our most richly ambiguous words.) In what way, moreover, are the expressions "distinctive"? And what is distinctive about the tests themselves, which allows Hirst to use them as criteria by which to mark off one form of knowledge from another? What does it mean to suggest that a form of knowledge has "concepts that are peculiar in character to the form?" Aren't *all* concepts different from one another—whether they come from one form or from different ones? How, then, are differences between concepts *within* a form to be accounted for? Are there different *kinds* of differences —one kind occurring between forms, the other within? To take the scientific "form" in particular—what is the "peculiar character" of its concepts?

> What "peculiar character" have the following in common: atoms, molecules, pressure, volume, mean kinetic energy, mass, temperature, gravitational constant, line of electrical force? Despite the fact that these all come from a narrow field of science—physics—it is difficult to say what they have in common. Some of the concepts are applicable to "matter in motion," but some are abstract and mathematical in nature; volume and temperature fall within the range of experience of the man in the street, but lines of force are pure theoretical constructs with no physical reality at all. Hirst's task becomes even more difficult if the scientific perspective is broadened to include: geological ages, ions, fossils, genes, mutation, natural selection, Planck's constant, population, homothermy, anti-cyclone, Equator, species, heat, sex, and dielectric constant. Apart from the fact—one that Hirst cannot refer to—that these concepts all appear in the field of science, they do not appear to have any "peculiar character" in common. Neither do some of these scientific concepts appear to differ markedly from some concepts in other fields. For example, the concepts of historical periods and geological ages, which come from two different "forms of knowledge," seem to have more in common than do the concepts of geological ages and dielectric constant, which are drawn from within the one form.[16]

Further difficulties arise when the concepts are said to "form a network of possible relationships" providing the form with its "distinctive logical structure." Can it really be said conclusively, given the present state of scholarship in philosophy of science, that all science has but one logical structure? Can that be said, even, of mathematics, which includes both algebra and geometry—for what have they, structurally, in common? Does philosophy have a unique structure, common to all its branches and to the works of all its recognized practitioners? Do literature and the fine arts? Do the world's religions?

As for the techniques which supposedly unify the individual forms of knowledge and distinguish them from one another, Phillips protests that "an enlightened investigator in any field of endeavor will use any methods that can be shown to be useful in that particular field."

> Some scientists, together with historians, seek out remnants of material and records from the past to serve as sources; some scientists and historians, too, and not only artists, use imagination; workers in natural science, human science, history, and even philosophy, carry out "crucial experiments" of one kind or another; mathematical techniques are not only used by mathematicians, but they have penetrated the natural and human sciences, and historians now are using them; observation is an important technique in natural science, human science, and history, and there is a sense in which an Austin or a Wittgenstein can be said to observe how words are used in given communities.[17]

The point of Phillips' objection is to insist on a less "frozen" view of "the nature of knowledge." He approvingly quotes Hans Reichenbach: "[T]he human mind is not a rigid system of categories into which it packs all experience, but. . .the principles of knowledge change with its context. . . . We hope that in any future situation our minds will be flexible enough to supply methods of logical organization that can cope with the given observational material."[18]

Phillips is not the only Hirst critic to suggest that the forms-of-knowledge theory is too rigid—that it paints knowledge as too fixed and static. Elizabeth Hindess makes much the same point, and Hirst's response is worth quoting:

> If of course the question I am supposed to have answered is about the categories which all knowledge and experience must necessarily take, or logically could take, I must insist I have neither asked that question nor ventured an answer to it. . .I have never considered the categories I have outlined, as those to which all learning for all time, logically must conform. At present all learning is within these categories; that is all I think one can say.[19]

Hirst takes the "structure of knowledge" to be a historical accident, a purely contingent matter. And in so doing, he implicitly admits that the structure may change—and with it, the requirements of liberal education. The forms of knowledge may be stable enough to withstand the force of the knowledge explosion, but they are not fixed for eternity somewhere in the firmament.

That caveat may thaw Hirst's allegedly "frozen" picture of knowledge at least a little; but it does not dispose of Phillips' objections. Phillips' chief point, after all, is disarmingly simple: Hirst's key terms are unclear. What is meant by the "peculiar character" of the "concepts" associated with the respective forms of knowledge? What is meant by Hirst's repeated references to the "logical structure" of the forms? By what criteria are we to judge whether an alleged form of knowledge "tests against experience" its "distinctive expressions"—and what are the latter anyway? What might it mean to say that a discipline or form of knowledge has certain characteristic techniques or methodological commitments? None of these questions is necessarily impossible; but all are complex. There is need for more work—much, much more—than Hirst has so far done. His theory as it stands is radically unclear.

But it might still be said, almost plausibly, that even with Phillips there is no fundamental denial of Hirst's thesis. All that has been shown is the need for more work. Personally, I am inclined to think that so much more work is required that we might despair of ever getting it done. But in principle, at least, some brave and prodigious philosopher might still save Hirst's theory.

I wish, therefore, to raise yet another objection—one sufficiently close to the heart of Hirst's view as to render it a total loss. It is an objection which has been hinted at, but never fully exploited, by the Hirst critics I have mentioned.

Of all Hirst's key terms, none is more complex or more fundamental to his purpose than "knowledge." But his use of this concept is a rather special one—and philosophically somewhat primitive.

For Hirst, the clarification of "liberal education" is almost wholly a matter of the clarification of "knowledge." This in itself is open to question—a point to which I shall return.

First, though, it must be noted that Hirst treats "knowledge" itself in far too simple a way, with the result that huge portions of it are omitted from his curriculum. In 1949, Gilbert Ryle distinguished "knowing how" from "knowing that," and performed a reductio ad absurdum on the objection that "knowing how" is really just an especially complicated case of "knowing that." We "know that" Columbus discovered America and "that" three plus two are five; but we "know how" to ride a bicycle or play the cello. It would be absurd—Ryle decries it as an "intellectualist legend"—to claim that playing the cello is just a matter of going through some set of "know that" propositions internally, and then dumbly following one's own instructions in manipulating the bow and instrument. No cellist ever stops to think, "Let's see—if I hold the bow just so, and position my fingers properly, and then if I move the bow in thus-and-such a manner across the strings, I shall produce a C-sharp." What nonsense! Any cellist who actually followed such a procedure would be recognized at once as a rank beginner who certainly did not "know how" to play the cello. And we would recognize the cellist's lack of know-how even if all the propositions referred to were correct. The know-how involved in playing the cello is a perfectly clear case of "knowing," but it is not an intellectual (i.e., propositional) sort of knowing. All this is familiar to readers of Ryle.[20]

But Hirst explicitly requires that *all* forms of knowledge be propositional!

> The domain of knowledge I take to be centrally the domain of true propositions or statements, and the question of there being logically distinct forms of knowledge to be the question of there being logically distinct types of true propositions or statements. Certainly we speak not only of knowing truths but also of knowing people and places and knowing how to do things. Detailed analysis suggests, however, that there are in fact only two distinct types of knowledge here, that in which the objects of knowledge are true propositions and that in which the objects are practical performances of some kind, knowledge of people and places being reducible to complexes of knowledge of these two types based on certain specific forms of experience. Taking this to be so, *and not in this context being concerned with practical knowledge*, the question of distinguishing autonomous areas of knowledge does reduce to distinguishing types of true propositions.[21]

This is a fundamental error. And it leads Hirst to snarl himself in needless controversy. Even his forms of knowledge, though he takes them to be complexes of true propositions, are surely more than that; indeed he can hardly deny it himself, when he notes that the forms have their characteristic techniques and methods. What, after all, does it mean to talk of the "technique" of a proposition? There may be some sensible way to use this sort of locution, or at least one resembling it, if we interpret it to refer to techniques for *arriving* at true propositions; but surely to arrive at true propositions takes know-how as well as

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propositions themselves. Surely skill is involved at the very heart of any intelligible concept of a discipline. What else could be the point of tagging them with a name like "discipline," with its suggestion of competent performance? What else could be the point of emphasizing method?

Hirst's insistence on the model of the true proposition gets him into special difficulty with the arts as a form of knowledge, and also with religion and morality. He admits that "many who claim that we have religious knowledge also consider the beatific vision or communion with God far more important than that knowledge. In morality, knowing what is one's duty is surely secondary to actually doing it . . . . In art, enjoyment may be more important than anything else."[22] Strange—that Hirst should so freely acknowledge that only the less magnetic aspects of art, religion, and morals belong in the curriculum!

It is a consequence of Hirst's insistence on the propositional model that he must claim that "in the fullest sense, art is a language." In support of this claim, he points out that in art,

> whether we are talking about painting, poetry, opera, sculpture, the novel or ballet, the observable features are used as symbols, have meaning, can be seen as making artistic statements and judged true or false . . . . This is to take "Guernica," *Middlemarch*, "Fidelio," or a Haydn Symphony, as a statement expressing a truth we can properly be said to know. Certainly we think of these works as symbolic expressions having meaning, which, like sentences making statements about the everyday world, are put up for public assessment. What is expressed in works of art, as in more usual statement forms, can be original or second-hand, profound or trivial, subtle or crude, true or false.[23]

These points are almost convincing—but not quite. Everything is what it is and not another thing. Language is often a superb metaphor for art, but that is not to say that art *is* language.

And even if art were a language, it would hardly be so impoverished a language as the one Hirst pictures, restricted to the statement of true propositions. Natural languages are far richer. "Damn it!" and "Ouch!" are perfectly clear expressions in English; but they cannot be held to be either true or false, and they are not propositions. Art at the very least should be conceded sufficient expressive power that it might say "Damn it!" and "Ouch!" occasionally, instead of sticking tediously to propositions. It may be, in fact, that the propositional form of most linguistic statements is what makes language seem so pallid and one-dimensional by comparison to art. The emotive punch of art may be the characteristic which makes it so important to us—and which makes language insufficient.

But I would go further than to say merely that art may make emotive as well as propositional statements, and ask whether it must always make any kind of statement at all—at least in anything like the linguistic sense of "statement." It is by no means clear that art invariably, or even often, has such a linguistic mission. At any rate we do not usually think of art, and do not use it, as we do language. For one thing, languages may be translated into other languages with at least some reasonable precision and intelligibility. But how would one even begin to translate Picasso's "Guernica" into French or Mozart's "Masonic Funeral Music" into German? The very idea is bewildering. It is tempting to conclude that it is, strictly speaking, nonsense.[24]

If Hirst's theory leads him into an implausible account of art, it fares no better with religion and with morals—and for much the same reasons. Hirst is interested in the place of "moral knowledge"—i.e., true propositions concerning conduct—in liberal education. But might not the cultivation of moral conduct itself, as distinguished from the quest for true propositions *about* moral conduct, be among the concerns of liberal education? On logical grounds alone it seems to me that the answer must be yes, since one cannot explicate "liberal" without the vocabulary of ethics. If liberal education thus entails moral education, and if, as Hirst says, *doing* one's duty is more important, when the chips are down, than *knowing* it, then any curriculum which is described entirely in terms of "the nature of knowledge" is bankrupt as moral education and truncated as liberal education. In limiting itself to moral "knowledge," in fact, the best it can provide will not be moral education in the strict sense at all, but rather a specialized study of a related theoretical matter, perhaps in the realm of moral philosophy or psychology.

Knowledge is just not a sufficent basis for liberal education. That is the most fundamental point which Hirst's theory misses. It is a point which, by the way, was not lost on the old-fashioned liberal arts colleges, with their elaborate (if sometimes unsophisticated) attention to character training and to the creation of a certain sort of college community of students and faculty. Colleges have long understood that the liberally educated person is not merely knowledgeable, even in the broadest sense of "knowledge." Education, and especially liberal education, aims not just at knowledge (and a fortiori not just at propositional knowledge) but at the cultivation of valued dispositions as well—*habits* which mark a person of good character, of creative spirit, of critical intelligence. At least since Aristotle, Western civilization has recognized the need for the cultivation of proper hapits as part of the task of education. The greatest weakness in Hirst's view lies in its departure from that tradition.

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1. The original version appeared in Hirst's "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge," in *Philosophical Analysis and Education*, ed. Reginald D. Archambault (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965). It now appears as a chapter in Paul H. Hirst, *Knowledge and the Curriculum* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), in which several other chapters also serve to refine, defend, and adjust the theory.
2. Hirst, *Knowledge and the Curriculum*, p. 86.
3. Ibid., p. 87.
4. Ibid., p. 46.
5. Here it might be objected that not all religions do in fact employ the concepts of "God, sin, and predestination." Furthermore "number, integral, and matrix" do not appear in all branches of mathematics, and "gravity, acceleration, hydrogen, and photo-synthesis" by no means appear in all the sciences. Presumably Hirst is trying to suggest not that these concepts must be universal within their respective forms; only that they do not appear outside them.
6. Hirst, *Knowledge and the Curriculum*, p. 44.
7. Ibid., p. 45.
8. See chapter 10 of *Knowledge and the Curriculum*. This essay first appeared as a paper, "Literature and the Fine Arts as a Unique Form of Knowledge," *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 3:3 (1973).
9. James Gribble, "Forms of Knowledge," *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 2:1 (1970).
10. John Wilson, "The Curriculum: Justification and Taxonomy," *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 17:1 (1969), pp. 38-39.
11. Hirst, *Knowledge and the Curriculum*, pp. 47-53.
12. See Hirst's critique of the Harvard report on *General Education in a Free Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), in *Knowledge and the Curriculum*, pp. 47-53.
13. Daniel Bell, *The Reforming of General Education: The Columbia College Experience in its National Setting* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).
14. Elizabeth Hindess, "Forms of Knowledge," *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain*, 6:2 (1972); and Hirst, "Forms of Knowledge—A Reply to Elizabeth Hindess," *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain*, 7:2 (1973). Much of the Hirst response appears also in chapter six of *Knowledge and the Curriculum*.
15. D.C. Phillips, "The Distinguishing Features of Forms of Knowledge," *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 3:2 (1971).
16. Ibid., p. 31.
17. Ibid., p. 34.
18. Hans Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1953), p. 59; quoted by Phillips, p. 30.
19. Hirst, "Reply to Hindess," p. 267.

20. Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1949), especially chapter two, "Knowing How and Knowing That."

21. Hirst, *Knowledge and the Curriculum*, p. 85. My emphasis.

22. Ibid., p. 152.

23. Ibid.

24. I suppose it could be objected that since we can write Mozart's music into a score, there is no reason in principle why we could not also write it (albeit tediously) into English. It would be an uneconomical translation, but in some sense it might count as a translation. Having granted that, there is no reason in principle why we could not also develop a notation system for the translation of "Guernica" into English—perhaps employing some sort of photo-scan of the painting. But this objection does not worry me. Even if there is a certain impoverished sense in which such notation systems might lead to a "translation," it would never be a translation we could use as we would an English translation of *War and Peace*. We would have to translate the notation back into its original form before the work would have its original artistic impact.

Response to Smythe

WANTING SUBSTANCE, BAD FORM

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Paul Hirst's writings on Forms of Knowledge and related matters, as bound up in the volume *Knowledge and the Curriculum* (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1974), are what we tend to characterize as "seminal" in nature. Like most seminal work they contain several ideas which are interesting—most of which are offered to us as in need of serious consideration and development upon reflection. And, again like most seminal work, most of these ideas turn out upon reflection to be confused, inconsistent, and not so clearly worthy of the reflection we have invested in them. This is made most evident in Mr. Smythe's paper, not so much by anything that Mr. Smythe has discovered of Mr. Hirst, but instead in the rather extensive reference to and quotation from the sensible and judicious offerings of D.C. Phillips. Indeed, I am rather hard put to find any original, critically significant, or for that matter, critically responsible contribution to our thinking about the forms of knowledge business that might be attributed to Mr. Smythe himself.

Mr. Smythe's paper begins with a detailed outline of Hirst's forms of knowledge. He presents Hirst's rationale in the intent to reclassify realms of knowledge and to redefine liberal education as other than merely the usual collection of the traditional academic disciplines. There is appropriate reference to Hirst's concerns both for how thinking proceeds as well as for the substance of that thought, i.e., the content in the several forms. We are let in on Hirst's worries about the lack of clarity and problematic character of his schemata and his uncertainty regarding their adequacy to cover and to place the variety of elements that ought to be included in the idea of liberal education.

Subsequently, we are presented with extensive documentation of specific difficulties in this regard. These are given us as borrowed from the critical work of others, most notably from Professor Phillips and also from James Gribble, John Wilson, and Elizabeth Hindess. Smythe's contribution here seems to be of the cut-and-paste editorial sort intermixed with gratuitous comments about how significant the criticisms are and how decisive or not they may be in their challenge to Hirst's position. Gratuitous observations about the limitations of critics by their attention to detail as against the importance of more general or central critique are puzzling to say the least. What else is there to criticize except specific detail? Where is the independent crucial and general critique?

Mr. Smythe finally gets around to what purports to be his original contribution to the discussion in the last few pages of his paper. Unfortunately, he has not confronted Hirst's analyses or arguments directly, but instead has offered a series of rhetorical questions and a challenge to Hirst's model of propositional knowledge as the central core of liberal education. There is a difference between challenge and argument or demonstration. I hold no special brief for Hirst's positions as they are advanced. Indeed, as I have suggested, I don't think they will work. But, I must insist that they are advanced with considerable sophistication and erudition that cries out for equal sophistication and knowledgeability in critique. There is a crushing lack in these respects in Mr. Smythe's treatment.

Now, for that treatment. Mr. Smythe makes a major issue over Hirst's attempt to apply delivery of propositional knowledge as the criterion of legitimacy for any form of knowledge. Mr. Smythe is apparently concerned that one must choose between knowing how and knowing that as essential defining criteria. Why one must choose is not made clear to us. At any rate, if as Hirst is ready to admit, knowing how is often the business of learning how one thinks about and with (that is, has adopted as part of one's mental structure) the propositions in some area or other, the issue seems either inconsequential or at best confused as an attack on the Hirst position. The content of the propositional apparatus of the chemist has more to do with how a chemist thinks than any special method of tinkering in the experimental laboratory mode. That (the latter) sort of tinkering is common to several forms of thought. There may be in that sense only a couple of forms insufficient to distinguish any areas of concern or interest and worthy of their application in and of themselves. Hirst is probably right in emphasizing content as defining characteristics of forms of thought whether as knowledge how or as knowledge that, however confused and unclear his efforts in that direction might be. Mr. Smythe has certainly not clarified matters in this regard.

Mr. Smythe's treatment of Hirst's positions with regard to religion, aesthetics, and morality are virtually unintelligible in light of Hirst's discussion of these topics. To treat the discussion of symbolism and language in artistic expression and communication as tantamount to the translation from one natural language to another, e.g., French to English, is to miss the point of the discussion of esthetics entirely. Perhaps much of this disducssion is not going to take us far, but it must be dealt with directly in its own terms and arguments.

Hirst does not ignore the issue of artistic expression of feeling. Why does Mr. Smythe not deal *directly* with Hirst's views on this topic in so many words? Hirst does not deny the emotive punch of art, the artistic sense of understanding or immediate communication of recognition or the place of knowing how in art (see especially p. 154, op. cit.). As for religion, some discussion of Hirst's meanderings regarding the legitimacy of propositional knowledge in religion is worthy of detailed discussion. It would, after all, be useful to know what Hirst has to say about the place of religion in the liberal education curriculum. Is it a repository of propositional knowledge or an artifactual repository of belief and valid argument masquerading as propositional knowledge? Do we teach religion as the history, sociology, psychology thereof?

With regard to moral education are we concerned to teach or to preach? Mr. Smythe may consider it unthinkable, but I know of at least one liberal educational institution where the faculty declined responsibility for endeavoring to encourage commitment to morality as part of its mission. And in his *Defence of Philosophy*, Ralph Barton Perry, the Harvard Philosopher and perhaps the leading American exponent of liberal education in the first half of the present century said (more or less) that 'It is not the business of the philosopher to make men good, it is the business of the philosopher to know the good and to let people know it so that they might act on the knowledge as they will.'

Hirst himself has said

> The concept of liberal education I outlined on the basis of the forms of knowledge, was explicitly stipulative, it being suggested that knowledge and understanding alone should be the aim but across the range of the different forms of knowledge we have. The importance of such a concept is, I think, considerable, but its limitations have to be recognized. As was originally pointed out, such a liberal education cannot be regarded as providing a total education. It explicitly excludes all objectives other than intellectual ones, thereby ignoring many of the central concerns of, say, physical education and the education of character. Even the intellectual ends it seeks are limited. Linguistic skills, for instance, are included only as tools for the acquisition of knowledge in the different forms, and the skills of a second language are therefore completely excluded. To equate such an education with 'general education' is also unacceptable if that is taken to be everything a total education should cover other than any 'specialist' elements. The lack of concern for moral commitment, as distinct from moral understanding, that, it seems, to imply, is a particularly significant limitation to the concept's usefulness. Nevertheless, it emphasizes, by drawing them together, precisely those elements in a total education that are logically basic, and the exclusion of all logically secondary considerations gives it importance at a time when the ends of education are often looked at pragmatically. (op. cit., p. 96)

Now, what is logically basic, Hirst tells us, is not to be equated with either what comprises education in general or the idea of general education. We might properly argue, indeed, I wish we had argued, about what elements in education are logically basic. Still, it is plainly evident in this quotation that Mr. Hirst has a clearer critical grasp of his position than has been presented in the paper at hand.

A PLEA FOR INCOMPETENCE*

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On June 19, 1975, the Texas Legislature passed law proscribing the mandating of competency-based education as the sole means of teacher certification.[1] This paper develops one line of argument presented concerning that bill, namely that the sole mandate situation that (existed in Texas and) still exists in many states violated the First Amendment academic freedom rights of teacher education faculty. In the first section I develop a characterization of C/PBTE. The second section briefly describes the mandate situation, and the final section takes up the constitutional argument.

I. Competencies and Knowledges, Count Nouns and Mass Nouns, Accountability and Pseudo-Science

The title of this paper is mildly humorous because one who is in favor of the doctrine(s) of C/PBTE is not merely in favor of competent teaching. Presumably both the pro and op-ponents of C/PBTE value good teaching; C/PBTE is of interest only if it has *distinctive* educational ideas.[2] If C/PBTE is not distinctive, then the sole mandate situation places arbitrary power in the hands of the State, and puts teacher educators in a position where they do not know for what they might be punished.[3]

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*The focus on the word "competencies" and something of my approach in Section 1 is in debt to some remarks of Leonard Waks, though the formulations are my own. Conversations with Richard Angelo and Tom Tomko have been helpful. An earlier draft of this paper was read at the meeting of the Middle Atlantic States Philosophy of Education Society.

In seeking to determine its distinctive ideas, we need to pay careful attention to the question, "What *kind* of a theory is C/PBTE?" Some of the clearly relevant categories are philosophical and scientific theories, theories of evaluation, curricular content and teaching method. That C/PBTE falls into several of these categories is evident from a reading of the movement's literature, lending special weight to widely cited statements by influential spokesmen.[4] We will not, however, achieve a deep understanding of C/PBTE positions by attending only to the formulations proferred by its backers. This is because C/PBTE advocates are relatively unconscious of their own assumptions built into the claims they make and the concepts they employ. Once these assumptions are brought out, we can get a clearer and more integrated view of C/PBTE which will provide us with the distinctive position about which constitutional issues may be raised.

C/PBTE without competencies is like chess without the king;[5] the concept of a competency is central to understanding C/PBTE. Since C/PBTE language pervades current educational talk, the word "competency" hardly bothers our ears and contrasts between good old-fashioned competence and the neologism "competencies" are hard to make.[6] It will be helpful to begin by considering another, though less common C/PBTE usage, viz., "knowledges." The so-called ordinary concept of knowledge, much studied by philosophers, would universally be agreed to be the concept of something that may be possessed by individuals to a greater or lesser degree, thus Jones might be said to be more knowledgable than or have more knowledge than Smith in a given area. Knowledge, however, cannot be counted; we cannot meaningfully ask "How many knowledge does x have?" Knowledges, if they exist, are intended to be just the sort of thing that is countable; here we can evision a future in which our subtle judgments about the relative knowledge of two candidates will be set down succintly, "x has 54 and y but 28." Now, for better or worse, the logical behavior of "competencies" parallels that of "knowledges"; indeed, competencies bear the same relationship to competence as knowledges do to being knowledgeable. Competencies, whether or not their presence can be determined by quantitative methods, must be countable. For example the Pennsylvania Dept. of Education had thousands of them which were subsequently reduced to twenty two.[7] In understanding the difference between "competence" and "competencies" we might take as our slogan, "'How much' competence but not 'how many'; 'how many' competencies but not 'how much.'"

These are not merely verbal games. The concepts of "competence" and "competency" fall neatly into the grammatical categories of mass noun and count noun.[8] A mass noun, such as "smoke" does not have what has been called a principle of individuation, that is, there are no criteria for counting units of whatever is referred to by mass nouns. There may be some smoke here and some over there, but it does not follow that therefore there are at least two smokes; rather there are bits of smoke scattered about.[9] Count nouns do have a principle of individuation, there is not some lesson plan or pipe in this room and some in another, but there are generally reliable ways of knowing how many of each of these exist.

C/PBTE seeks to replace "competence" with "competencies." Judgments to the effect that a particular person is a competent teacher or more competent than another person are understood as translatable into talk in which there is only mention of numerable competencies. In addition it is assumed that if person A's competent teaching (or math, or quadratic equation teaching) is translatable into A's possessing competencies $c_1 \ldots c_n$, then any other person who is competent at teaching (etc.) will also possess $c_1 \ldots c_n$, and that only those who possess $c_1 \ldots c_n$ are competent teachers, etc.). It is supposed, then, that a kind of task-analysis can be given of competent teaching and its divisions such that competent teaching of this or that is to be identified with specific acts of the teacher performed up to a certain standard.[10] Now whether this project, this revision if you will, is rationally defensible is not my present concern; the point is that I have identified a basic philosophical assumption that underlies C/PBTE programs. I call this assumption "philosophical" because it is a statement about what *sorts* of things exist, like "there are sense data," or alternatively, a statement asserting that certain things fall into certain categories like "pleasure is a sensation." Even if we invoke contemporary analytic characterizations of philosophy as being talk about what may intelligibly be said, C/PBTE assumptions may be classified as philosophical. Following Strawson,[11] we may think of the C/PBTE position as being a *revisionary* metaphysical thesis, not attempting to explain the ways in which we actually think about the world, but trying to give us a different picture or conceptual set, perhaps like the metaphysical set we get from changing "The sky is blue" to "The sky blues."

Although the motivation of C/PBTE backers is irrelevant to our immediate interest, it will throw light on the connection between the metaphysical view and the educational movement if we reflect that *countable* teacher competencies have an attraction for educational politicians who seek public *accountability*. Thus the conversion from competence to competencies trades a mass noun for a count noun to further the prospect of accountability.

Without the philosophical assumption C/PBTE's better known educational positions can hardly get off the ground, they draw much of their support from these assumptions about what competent instruction is like. Someone who did not think of competence as reducible to a number of distinct things, and who recognized that competence in teaching might be possessed in a number of different ways, no one of which was necessary and some of which might be unanticipated would be skeptical of C/PBTE's educational recommendations. For such a person it might not appear reasonable to pre-specify what we are looking for since it might look different from case to case. And in the absence of the idea that good teaching must be understood in terms of the possession of a set of necessary and jointly sufficient competencies, the recommendations that we should teach aiming only at our pre-specified objectives and that we should evaluate solely in terms of whether or not they have been achieved lose much of their support.

Further constraints on C/PBTE positions regarding curriculum, evaluation and method derive from the fact that C/PBTE contains a strong strain which insists that the competencies be of a certain sort, namely that be measurable, behavioral or observable. This strain can be traced at least to the behavioral-objective taxonomic days and is still found in the most authoritative definitions of C/PBTE.[12] On this view there could be no legitimate competencies (and no legitimate evaluation of) such as "sound judgment," "clear exposition," or "sensitivity to children's needs." While these might be regarded as acceptable competencies in some softened versions of C/PBTE and while state competency boards might accept programs containing such competencies, there are at least two strong reasons for insisting upon the inclusion of this behavioralist strand in C/PBTE. First, there is an entire body of literature, continuing to the present, which ties the hopes of the competency movement to the development of a science of human behavior to be generated by the educational research community. This heralded science whose laws would connect teacher and student behavior is invariably held to contain those restrictions on scientific vocabulary normally associated with a behaviorist approach, roughly that the referents of terms must be measurable or observable. Second, to the extent that C/PBTE backslides from its behaviorist assumptions, it does so at risk to the cogency of its own claims, for many of the proclaimed advantages of the C/PBTE approach rest on the goods of efficiency and accountability which supposedly result from the measurable character of the competencies.[13]

C/PBTE also contains a distinctive position on teaching method. C/PBTE advocates sometimes deny that they are advancing a particular teaching method, and claim that the teacher may use any method that will achieve the desired competencies. But some methods seem ruled out. For example, the teacher who has the students read a play and then allows goals to emerge from class discussion would be faulted for failure to publicly pre-state goals. This shows that even if C/PBTE does not have a distinctive teaching method of its own, that its constraints on evaluation and curricular goals must seriously limit the application of some teaching methods. Also, the behavioral science orientation of C/PBTE leads us to doubt its liberality on teaching method, we cannot presume that this liberality would extend past the time when general laws connecting teacher and student behavior are discovered. Again, computer-assisted instruction, programmed learning and the use of technological gadgetry are certainly distinct styles or methods of teaching and advocacy of their employment is certainly in the mainstream of C/PBTE thought.

What has been said up to now should establish that C/PBTE programs rest on a revisionary metaphysical assumption which blends neatly with commitments to the development of a measurable science of human behavior. These two work together to support *distinctive* theories of evaluation, curricular content and teaching method and practice of the latter theories is claimed to be productive of distinctive educational and social benefits.

II. Mandating C/PBTE

State mandates of C/PBTE follow a pattern neatly examplified by the Texas case, which will serve as a paradigm.[14] In Texas, on June 28, 1972, the sixty some institutions engaged in teacher education received the *Texas Standards for Teacher Education Certification* indicating that the State Board of Education had approved new program approval standards that:

> establish a new intent and direction for instituting a competency performance based program of teacher education. . .establish a five year transition period. . .for the development and implementation of the new programs with the requirement that any new programs approved for an institution after 9/01/72 be competency/performance based. . .All presently approved programs must be converted to competency/performance based programs by 9/01/77.

The Texas Standards proceeded to stipulate a series of action dates for the transition to C/PBTE, and to create a State Commission for Professional Competencies of thirty members and Local Cooperative Teacher Education Centers. The Commission was to identify a system of competencies for the various categories of teaching performance and the LCTEC's would serve to advise the institutions on matters regarding teacher education and certification. In Texas, the mandate was accomplished by the State Board of Education with requirements set on a time table and machinery created to implement the requirements. In other states, the pattern is basically followed; the State Education agency does the mandating, sets a time table (sometimes much more flexible) and engages faculty, state officials, teachers and the community in the task of writing competencies. In no state that I know of have explicit sanctions for non-compliance been stated.

III. Constitutional Argument

In order to show that the sole mandates of C/PBTE violate the First Amendment academic freedom rights of teacher education faculty it will be necessary to review the concept of academic freedom and the development of constitutional cases establishing academic freedom rights. I now turn to these matters.

The American concept of academic freedom is commonly said to be the heir of the German conception of *Lehrfreiheit*, but it is also usually admitted that there are important differences between the two, both in connection with the political and institutional circumstances in which the academic profession is practiced and also because academic freedom in America developed in connection with the emergence of scientific investigation as a major research activity of professors.[15] An early definition of academic freedom states that it is:

> the freedom of the teacher or research worker in higher institutions of learning to investigate and discuss the problems of his science and to express his conclusions, whether through publication or in the instruction of students, without interference from political or ecclesiastical authority, or from the administrative officials of the institution in which he is employed unless his methods are found. . .to be clearly incompetent or contrary to professional ethics.[16]

Later definitions of academic freedom differ in some respects from Prof. Lovejoy's but they are unaminous in affirming the central core of academic freedom, namely that college and university teachers ought to be free from governmental or church interference in their investigations and teaching to communicate their findings to their colleagues and to their students.[17]

The reference to communication in the last sentence may serve as a connection to the most commonly cited justification for the protection of academic freedom, namely that the exercise of these freedoms in communication makes an important contribution to the common good.[18] One reason for the popularity of "common good" justifications is a tradition which sees academic freedom as part of the civil liberties, including free speech and association, guaranteed by the First Amendment. These freedoms in turn, find their classic philosophic defense in the liberal utilitarians, particularly in J.S. Mill. It must be pointed out, however, that while the A.A.U.P. and the philosophic theorists of liberalism are accorded respect, and have power of moral suasion,[19] that their pronouncements have no constitutional standing. Indeed, as late as 1955, Prof. Fritz Machlup remarked that, "In the United States, academic freedom is not a right that professors or students have under the Constitution or under any law of the land."[20] In the past twenty years, however, constitutional developments have established academic freedom as a First Amendment right and specified the character of that right. Those developments, which are crucial to the C/PBTE sole mandate case will now be reviewed.

The first instance in which academic freedom was recognized as a constitutionally protected right occurred in Justice Douglas' dissent, concurred in by Justice Frankfurter, to the Adler v. Board of Education decision (1952).[21] In this decision, which upheld New York's Feinberg Law providing for the removal from the public school system of teachers advocating the unlawful overthrow of the government, Justice Minton's majority opinion declared that the state and school authorities had "the duty to screen the officials, teachers and employees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society."[22] Justice Douglas' dissent held that:

> The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression to everyone in our society. All are entitled to it and none needs it more than the teacher.
>
> The public school is in most respects the cradle of our democracy. . .the impact of this kind of censorship in the public school system illustrates the high purpose of the First Amendment in freeing speech and thought from censorship. . .The very threat of such a procedure is certain to raise havoc with academic freedom. . .This system of spying and surveillance produces standardized thought, not the pursuit of truth.[23]

While Justice Douglas' dissent speaks to a case regarding public school employees, later decisions make it clear that academic freedom applies in the first instance and with less restrictions to college and university teachers. Two further remarks about this case are appropriate. First, we should observe that the first mention of academic freedom as a constitutionally protected right appeals to the purpose of the "pursuit of truth" or as we might call it the "discovery of knowledge." C/PBTE programs tend to think of teacher and teacher educators as involved not so much in the *discovery* but in the *dissemination* or *distribution* of knowledge. This reflection may help to explain why C/PBTE advocates, who view teacher training as the development of practitioners who distribute goods or benefits, are not sensitive to academic freedom issues. Second, it is significant that in the Adler case it was neither the content or method of teaching that Justice Douglas saw as being restricted, but the *a*professional activity of teachers.

In the same year as Adler, in Wiemann v. Updegraff, the Supreme Court stuck down a loyalty oath requirement challenged by Oklahoma A&M faculty. The statute was invalidated on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds because of its lumping together innocent and knowing membership in "subversive" organizations. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence, joined by Justice Douglas, said in part:

> To require such an oath, on a pain of a teacher's loss of his position. . .penalizes a teacher for exercising a right of association. . . such joining is an exercise of the rights of free speech and free inquiry.[24]
>
> . . .
>
> To regard teachers—in our education system, from the primary grades to the University—as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to indulge in hyperbole. It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens. . .They (teachers) cannot carry out their noble task if the conditions for the practice of a responsible and critical mind are denied to them.[25]

The Weimann case resembles Adler in that the rights of association and free speech held to be restricted do not directly involve activities such as publication or teaching, but are seen as indirectly affecting these academic activities through the stifling of non-academic activities.

Five years later, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,[26] academic freedom was recognized as a constitutional right in Chief Justice Warren's opinion, in which Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan concurred. A contempt conviction against a professor who refused to answer questions about the contents of his lectures was reversed. In addition to what had already become an almost commonplace paean to academic freedom and decrying the "strait-jacketing" of intellectuals, Chief Justice Warren stated:

> No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is this true in the social sciences where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes. . . .We do not conceive of any circumstances where a state interest would justify infringement of rights in these fields.[27]

Chief Justice Warren's remarks bear pertinently on the state mandating of educational practices derivative from social scientific theories. We can begin to see one irony of the C/PBTE mandates; that although it was the growth of the scientific temperament that spurred recognition of the need for academic freedom, that nonetheless C/PBTE would curtail that liberty in the name of science.

The opinion of Chief Justice Warren in the Sweezy case included the right to lecture among academic freedom rights: "The State Supreme Court thus conceded. . .that petitioner's right to lecture and his right to associate with others were constitutionally protected freedoms which had been abridged through this investigation."[28] The right to lecture is re-affirmed in Barenblatt v. United States.[29]

In the series of decisions just referred to, academic freedom moves from mention in a dissenting opinion to a concurrence in the majority opinion and eventually to a majority opinion. In addition, academic freedom, earlier conceived as the freedom of academics to join groups and make public statements in their non-academic lives, comes to include the specific right to lecture, a right that could not be construed simply as a civil liberty available to all citizens. Following these decisions, one legal scholar remarked that "The interest in academic freedom stands forth as a recognized constitution right."[30]

In 1967, the high court struck down another university loyalty oath in Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents. The Court held: "Our nation is deeply commited to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."[31]

Further refinement of the constitutional protection of academic freedom has occurred in Federal Courts since 1969 and where such cases have tended to limit the range of academic freedom of secondary school teachers, they have done so by contrast with the case of college and university teachers. Lower Federal Courts have begun to support teachers' claims to freedom to teach *within their subject matter area.* In Keefe v. Ganakos (1969)[32] a high school teacher was saved from dismissal resulting from his use of an *Atlantic Monthly* article containing the word "mother-fucker." The Court granted that some regulation of classroom speech is "inherent in every provision of public education" but held that the teacher was pursuing a valid educational purpose and viewed with alarm "the general chilling effect of permitting such rigorous censorship."[33]

In a similar case in 1970 a Federal Court defended a high school teacher's use of a Kurt Vonnegut story on the grounds that her actions did not "materially and substantially interfere with reasonable requirements of discipline,"[34] and that the reading was not inappropriate for high school juniors. This message of this case is clear, that high school teachers, not to mention college professors, are supported by the First Amendment in choosing their classroom materials subject only to their appropriately pursuing valid educational purposes and maintaining classroom discipline. Admittedly, the determination of what is a valid educational purpose and who is to be empowered with the right to make such judgments (the courts?) will sometimes be difficult or worse[35] but much of what the C/PBTE mandates would forbid is hardly controversial in the way that, for example, the claim of a teacher to be pursuing a valid educational purpose by administering L.S.D. to her students so that they might see "inner experiential" truths certainly would be.

Mailloux v. Kiley (1971) is important in asserting that academic freedom rights include the choice of a teaching method. Chief Judge Wyzanski observed:

> The Fourteenth Amendment recognized that a public school teacher has not only a civil right to freedom of speech both outside[36] and inside[37] the school house, but some measure of freedom as to his in-classroom teaching.[38] The last two cases cited upheld two kinds of academic freedom: the first is the substantive right of a teacher to choose a teaching method which in the Court's view served a demonstrated educational purpose.

Judge Wyzanski relates the freedom to select a teaching method to the "central rationale of academic freedom."[39] While Mailloux was concerned with secondary schools, the Judge held that the right to choose a teaching method was, if anything, more extensive for college teachers. Secondary school teachers, he said, "do not have the independent traditions, the broad discretion as to teaching methods nor usually the intellectual qualifications of university professors."[40]

None of the cases cited above precisely parallel the state mandates of C/PBTE as the sole means of teacher certification. It is sufficient in the present instance to show the the substantive evils created by the mandates consist in a suppression of academic freedoms protected against interference from sources and of a character significantly similar to those found in the cases we have reviewed.

There can be no doubt that the freedoms interfered with by the C/PBTE sole mandates are precisely those central to the academic freedom rights which the Constitution protects. Teacher educators' *right to lecture*, which involves the choice of subject matter, has been compromised by the fact that the mandate requires subscription to one set of ideas. That such mandates establish a "pall of orthodoxy" is evidenced by one situation in Texas regarding which we are told that those faculty who were not philosophically compatible with C/PBTE ideas "found employment elsewhere."[41] We are led to ask whether faculty working within mandated C/PBTE programs are allowed to disagree with C/PBTE ideas, or if allowed, may they do so only by using a C/PBTE approach, or only extramurally? The right to lecture, of course, does not refer to lecturing as opposing to conducting discussions, it is fundamentally concerned with the choice of subject matter. Since C/PBTE's distinctive theories place constraints upon what are acceptable formulations of goals, and since these purportedly formal requirements will rule out any objectives not capable of formulation in the appropriate mode, the choice of certain educational goals is not open to faculty. In addition, the sole mandate situation violates Chief Justice Warren's strictures in Sweezy that the especially inconclusive character of social scientific theories should make us particularly apprehensive about the infringement of academic freedom rights in these areas.

Given the argument of Section I that C/PBTE does have distinctive positions on teaching method it is clear that the sole mandate situation violates the right of faculty members to choose a teaching method affirmed in Mailloux. This is so even if C/PBTE's preferences for certain teaching methods are not explicitly mandated. If teacher educators must state their objectives in competency/behavioral form and if they are to be evaluated in terms of their success in reaching these objectives, then methods more appropriate to other contents will be inhibited.

Proponents of C/PBTE may reply that we have misconstrued state educational agencies' requests that faculty identify the role competencies for each position for which certification is given. They would insist that such directives are simply queries asking faculty to state their goals, or to make explicit the program directions that have previously been unselfconsciously pursued. One simple reason for rejecting these innocuous construals is that the competency approach is hailed by its advocates as revolutionary[42] and as promising impressive educational and social benefits. It is beyond reason that anyone would believe that faculties, adjudged to be performing poorly, might suddenly show remarkable progress by simply making explicit the goals that they previously had been seeking. Both the history of the C/PBTE movement and our analysis in Section I support the claim that these requirements are substantive. And C/PBTE is on equally bad ground if these directives are not substantive; we repeat, if C/PBTE is not distinctive then the sole mandate situation places faculty members in a position where they do not know for what they could be punished.

The *source of interference* with these freedoms is government action through state departments of education which corresponds to government institution of loyalty oaths and investigations of subversive activities. The *character* of the interference is reminiscent of the loyalty oath cases in which the state's pursuit of a legitimate purpose, viz., protecting itself from subversion, was held to be conducted in an unconstitutional manner. Here, state agencies have a valid purpose in seeking to promote effective education, but they may not do so in a way which violates constitutionally protected freedoms.

Interestingly, what are apparently the most striking and distinctive features of the C/PBTE sole mandates—those aspects which make the sole mandates look different from some of their predecessors—both provide us with an opportunity to achieve a greater clarity about the concept of academic freedom, and, consequently, I shall maintain, enable us to see the sole mandate situations as among the clearest inhibitions of academic freedom. The C/PBTE sole mandates do not seek to control speech or advocacy regarded as politically dangerous in terms of incitement to rebellion or destruction of religious faith. Nor do the mandates aim to stifle obscene language or teaching that is socially or economically controversial. Rather, the mandates strike at the heart of much traditional, respectable, inoffensive, even non-political, academic speech. Every one of the academic freedom cases cited above deals with utterance or teaching that is "farther out" and less clearly protected than what is here threatened. This makes the C/PBTE mandates at once more serious and more puzzling; more serious because they strike at the core and not the periphery of constitutionally protected freedoms; more puzzling because the perceived dangers and the motivations of the state agencies are not evident.

While it is perhaps intuitively true that the right to lecture and to choose a teaching method seem to be at the heart of the concept of academic freedom, we should remember that these rights have only recently been recognized and then mostly by Federal Courts. The early and more prominent academic freedom cases have involved the rights of professors to join associations, be free from loyalty oaths and speak in public, most centrally, on political matters. Thus the better known academic freedom cases have involved academics in non-academic or *a*professional pursuits. Recent writing of Searle,[43] Pincoffs,[44] and Van Alstyne[45] helps to clarify this difficulty. They identify two traditions of thinking about academic freedom, a "special theory" of academic freedom and a "general theory." According to the special theory, academic freedom is a special subset of First Amendment freedoms but is distinguishable from other First Amendment freedoms, such as freedom of speech, association, etc. On this way of looking at the matter academic freedom is *not* simply a matter of extending to academics those First Amendment freedoms to which all are entitled. Those freedoms may be called civil liberties, they are being exercised when a professor joins a political group, or speaks publicly, but academic freedom does not protect the professor outside of the academy. This is not to say that he is unprotected, the Constitution guarantees him these civil liberties. On this conception, academic freedom seeks to take account of the purposes, competence and the institutional setting of the professoriate. Professors are to "pursue the truth unhindered" by employing their educated abilities according to norms internal to their disciplines and to the "search for truth" (intellectual integrity, honesty, etc.) In order to do this, professors must be free from the insecurity that would be created if retention of their job were conditioned on their holding the proper political ideology. With this freedom comes the responsibility, in their academic work, of submitting themselves to the professional judgment of their peers. If the reader is suspicious of the lofty character of these remarks, he might reflect whether he expects politicians to footnote their ghost writers, or to suggest evidence which raises a possible challenge to their positions. Not all activities involve the search for the truth; for example, though one ought not to lie in filing an application, it is permissable to keep one's worst foot backward.

The "general theory" is that "professors and students have the same rights of freedom and inquiry, freedom of association and publication in their roles as professors and students that they have as citizens in a free society, except insofar as the mode of exercise of these freedoms needs to be restricted to preserve the academic and subsidiary functions of the university."[46,47] It is impossible to fully argue the merits of these two conceptions in this space. It should be clear, however, that there is nothing particularly *academic* about the concept of academic freedom contained in the general conception. We should also note that when, under the general conception, we treat professors' political activities as falling within their academic freedom that the suggestion is not far behind that professors should be expected to apply academic standards to their public performances, and punished if they fail to do so adequately.

In the cases we have discussed, it is almost normal to confuse the special and general theories. Nonetheless, the general theory is more entrenched, particularly in the better known cases. If, however, our argument is correct, the special theory is most fundamental to academic freedom, and the C/PBTE sole mandate cases present threats to *academic freedoms* and not civil liberties.

Our puzzlement as to the motives of state educational agencies can be resolved by recalling Camus' adage that every serious intellectual sometime wishes to become a gangster and make the world good by force. We are puzzled by the mandates only if we liken them to attempts by a group of Shakespearian scholars to have their particular interpretations enshrined as infallible doctrine. When we understand, however, the motives of educational and social reform and the demands for public accountability that animate C/PBTE mandates, our puzzlement is resolved. The suppressions involved in the sole mandate situation are every bit as politically based as those of the loyalty oaths. Although the harms to be avoided, or the benefits sought may differ, the means employed are equally unconstitutional. The sole mandate cases should teach us that interference with academic freedom can originate not only in reactionary attempts to deny "subversive" views a hearing but in the well intentioned actions of progressive thinkers who take (too) seriously the liberal conviction that the road to social reform is through educational revolution.

Finally, let us note that those teacher-educators opposed to C/PBTE and to its being mandated have for some years been carrying on a responsible critique mainly of the educational but also of the social-political claims made by C/PBTE. Only in rare instances has this critique evoked response, and the growth of C/PBTE has not been noticeably checked. Further, legislative movements for accountability, and the beginnings of retrenchment have inevitably caused some of the critics to join competency-based education and work from the inside, while others have despaired. This paper pursues constitutional questions in the hope that this new line of argument will succeed where others have failed. In taking this tack, however, it is important to remember that state C/PBTE policies were mandated against the opposition of and without consultation with sizable and respected segments of the teacher-education community. They were not consulted about the institution of C/PBTE mandates and they could not find forums in which their animadversions could be heard. This is to suggest that an investigation of the conditions of the making of state educational policy is every bit as important as the argument of this paper.

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1. House Bill no. 1238, Texas House of Representatives, Corresponding Senate Bill. To be accurate the Bill forbids the mandating of "any particular pedagogical method, whether expressed in terms of behavioral or performance objectives, competencies or other explicit assessment devices."

2. My approach to the understanding of C/PBTE thus differs from one which treats "competency-based education" as a kind of slogan that may be interpreted more or less as one wants. Thomas F. Green's "Teacher Competence as Practical Rationality," the Presidential Address of the 1976 Philosophy of Education meetings, takes the latter strategy. Professor Green wishes to develop competencies such as 'practical wisdom.' The fact that there is a certain humor attached to Professor Green's proposals indicates that there is indeed a set of distinctive C/PBTE positions.

3. In this case the sole mandates might be argued to be unconstitutional in terms of impermissable vagueness. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents (385 U.S. 589 (1967) at 604.)

4. The C/PBTE literature is immense. One indispensable source is the *PBTE Series* (Washington, D.C., American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, 1971.) Another relatively influential text is Benjamin Rosner (ed.), *The Power of Competency Based Education* (Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1972). We can also mention W.R. Houston and R.B. Howsam (eds.) *Competency Based Teacher Education Progress, Problems and Prospects* (Chicago, SRA, 1972).

5. Sometimes the distinction between competency and performance based education highlights the difference between attempts to produce *teacher* competencies (competency) and student behaviors (performance). The two views make considerable difference in evaluation and the formulation of accountability programs but do not affect the argument of this paper. For an analysis of ordinary meanings of 'performance' see Kingsley Price, "The Sense of 'Performance' and its Point," *Philosophy of Education 1974: Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*.

6. But see Fowler's *Modern English Usage*, 1923 edition which says that where "competency" means "competence" it is acceptable; otherwise, says Fowler, it is a barbarism.

7. *Pennsylvania's Competency Based Education Program* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Education Agency, 1972).

8. There is a discussion of 'mass terms' in W.V.O. Quine, *Word and Object* (M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960). Quine says that Jesperson's "mass word" is well entrenched in linguistics.

9. Consider that "milk" is a mass term and that "How many milk?" is (without special context) incoherent, but then, milk may be bottled and we can ask "How many bottles of milk?" C/PBTE does not seek simply to bottle competence, "bottles.' of a sort, exist-propositions, courses, subject matters. The revisionary claim I find is that "competence" is like "apple" in possessing a built in mode of dividing its reference. See Quine, op. cit. p. 90.

10. No writer that I know of has claimed that teaching as opposed to competent teaching can be identified with specific acts.

11. P.F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (New York, Anchor Books, 1959).

12. See note 4 above.

13. This point is important. We must keep in mind that C/PBTE's distinctive educational approaches are alleged to have distinctive benefits. As soon as its advocates weaken the distinctiveness of the educational approach, we may ask whether they are still prepared to proclaim the same benefits.

14. Though in some states a 'soft-sell' approach is employed in which the requirement is referred to as a recommendation and where educators and non-educators are convened to co-operatively give shape to a C/PBTE program. To Pennsylvania the highest state educational officials have denied that C/PBTE is mandated, but I can prove that it is. See my unpublished "Talk to the Professional Standards and Practice Commission of the State of Pennsylvania," April, 1976.

15. See for example, R. Hofstadter and W. Metzger, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States.*

16. Arthur Lovejoy, *Academic Freedom* (Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 384, 1930).

17. Two examples of other definitions: "Academic freedom consists chiefly in the absence of, or protection from, such restraints or pressure. . . as are designed to create in the minds of academic scholars (teachers, research workers and students in colleges and universities) fears and anxieties that may inhibit them from freely studying and investigating whatever they are interested in, and from freely discussing, teaching and publishing whatever opinions they have reached" (Fritz Machlup, "On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic Freedom," 41 A.A.U.P. Bulletin 753 (1955)). The A.A.U.P. 1940 *Statement of Principles*, accepted as authoritative in the academic world, asserts that: (a) the teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and the publication of results. . .(b) the teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to his subject. . .(c) the college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned profession, and an officer in an educational institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen he should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in the community imposes special obligations."

18. Though other moral-philosophical justifications can be given. For a non-consequentialist justification see John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1972).

19. The A.A.U.P., the American Historical Association and the American Politic of Science Association and other professional associations have all passed strong resolutions condemning the sole mandates.

20. Fritz Machlup, "On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic Freedom," 41 A.A.U.P. Bulletin 753, 755 (1955).

21. Adler v. Board of Education (342 U.S. 482 (1952)).

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid. at 508-11 passim.

24. Wiemann v. Updegraff (343 U.S. 183 (1953)).

25. Viewing teachers as priests may not be conducive to making claims about student rights. For a view of the university as the temple of the intellect and a defense of the claim that "In the temple, as its servants know, there are no students' rights, except the right to be well taught. A university is. . .an intellectual aristocracy," see Phillip Rieff, *Fellow Teachers* (Delta Books, New York, 1972).

26. Id., 350-351.

28. Id.

29. Barenblatt v. United States (36 U.S. 109 (1959)).

30. Cowan, "Interference with Academic Freedom: The Pre-Natal History of a Tory." 4 Wayne Law Review 205 (1958). See also Milton Konvitz, *Expanding Liberties: Freedom's Gains in Postwar America* (Viking Press, 1967).

31. Keyishian v. Board of Regents (385 U.S. 589 (1967)), at 603.

32. Keefe v. Ganakos (418 F. 2d. 359 (1st Cir. 1969)).

33. Id. at 362.

34. Parducci v. Rutland, (316 F. Supp. 352 M.D. Ala. (1970)).

35. At least two sorts of questions figure here: (1) is it an *educational* purpose (does it involve knowledge, understanding, skill or taste?; and (2) is it *valid*; morally, politically, educationally?

36. Pickering v. Board of Education (391 U.S. 573).

37. Tinker v. Des Moines, see note 19.

38. Keefe v. Ganakos and Parducci v. Rutland, cited above.

39. Mailloux v. Kiley (448 F. 2d. 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971)).

40. Id. at 1392.

41. Caseel Burke, *The Individualized Competency-Based System of Teacher Education of Weber State College* (AACTE, PBTE Publication No. 2).

42. See Stanley Elam, *CBTE: What is the State of the Art*, cited above.

43. John Searle, *The Campus War* (New York, World Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 184-191.

44. Edmund Pincoffs, "Introduction" to *The Concept of Academic Freedom*.

45. William Van Alstyne, "The Specific Theory of Constitutional Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberties" in volume 404 of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (1972).

Response to Goldstone

C/PBTE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM, AND GOLDSTONE'S PLEA

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I suspect that many of us here share negative views of C/PBTE. And our opposition may encourage us to find compelling some arguments about C/PBTE which are not as strong as we take them to be. That is, we may find convincing some arguments which fail to convince C/PBTE advocates, even if those advocates are as open-minded and subject to reason as we like to believe ourselves to be. This is a long-winded way of saying that an appropriate response to Peter's paper would be given by a supporter of C/PBTE, one who could perform the role of the adversary as described by John Stuart Mill in *On Liberty*. For a person to do justice to arguments, Mill asserted,

> He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them. He must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form; he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of; else he will never really possess himself on the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty.[1]

Not being a C/PBTE advocate, I am not confident that I can marshall the "most plausible and persuasive" arguments in this response. Yet the job to be done is clear enough: Mill described it as follows:

> So essential is this discipline to a real understanding of moral and human subjects, that if opponents of all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and supply them with the strongest arguments which the most skillful devil's advocate can conjur up.[2]

Now I am not the most skillful devil's advocate, but I will use my limited skills to question Peter's arguments. I am not so presumptuous that I expect to provide Peter with the opportunity to exchange error for truth, but I do hope to at least give him the "clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error."[3]

I shall limit my questions and comments to Parts I and III of Peter's paper. The majority of my remarks will be on Part I. There are two reasons for this. First, the Constitutional argument rests heavily upon the characterization of C/PBTE given in Part I. Second, I know virtually nothing about Constitutional law and will require little time and space to demonstrate my incompetence.

In the first paragraph of Part I Peter asserts that:

> C/PBTE is of interest only if it has *distinctive* educational ideas. If C/PBTE is not distinctive, then the sole mandate situation places arbitrary power in the hands of the state, and puts the teacher educators in a position where they do not know for what they might be punished.

The latter claim is repeated in Part III, and both of the claims appear important for much of the argument which follows. But I am not clear either about what these claims mean or how Peter sees the two claims hanging together. Part of my perplexity stems from a suspicion that there is a subtle equivocation on the term "distinctive." In the first use, "C/PBTE is of interest only if it has *distinctive* educational ideas," there seems to be a suggestion of something like a uniqueness criterion. That is, to say that C/PBTE has distinctive educational ideas suggests that the ideas are unique or new or distinct from all other educational ideas. Or to put this in a slightly different way, the ideas of C/PBTE would not be distinctive if they are simply old ideas and old practices clothed in a new terminology.

The second use of the term, "If C/PBTE is not distinctive, then the sole mandate situation places arbitrary power in the hands of the state," does *not* suggest this uniqueness notion. The conditional would make little sense if by "distinctive" we meant "unique." Rather, the second use seems to mean something like "clear," i.e., we would describe the power of the state as arbitrary not because of the absence of unique educational ideas, but because we do not know or cannot tell what the educational ideas *are*. To oversimplify, the "uniqueness" notion of "distinctive" would not make sense in the second conditional since non-uniqueness would not lead to arbitrary power. And the "clear" notion of "distinctive" would not make sense in the first conditional since a lack of clarity would not lead to non-interest. Indeed a lack of clarity would be sufficient to attract the attention of many philosophers.

Even without the equivocation, the two conditionals taken together are puzzling. As I understand it, the conditionals are:

1. If C/PBTE is of interest, then it has distinctive education ideas.
2. If C/PBTE does not have distinctive educational ideas, then sole mandate places arbitrary power, etc.

And the contrapositive of the first conditional is:

3. If C/PBTE does not have distinctive educational ideas, then it is not of interest.

And a conjunction of the consequents of the second and third conditionals (which have a common antecent) gives us:

4. If C/PBTE does not have distinctive educational ideas, then (a) it is not of interest, and (b) it places arbitrary power in the hands of the state, etc.

Now as a practical matter there seems to be something wrong here, for we would normally take the truth of (b) to be sufficient to deny the truth of (a). It may be that I have misinterpreted Peter's intent here, but I do believe that this section of his paper is in need of further clarification.

But all of this may be irrelevant since Peter thinks that C/PBTE *does* have distinctive educational ideas. To find those ideas, he says, "we need to pay careful attention to the question 'What kind of theory is C/PBTE?'" Now this question presupposes that C/PBTE is some kind (or kinds) of theory and is not just an unstable assortment of educational practices recommended by C/PBTE advocates. In a footnote Peter says that his approach differs from one which treats " 'competency-based education' as a kind of slogan that may be interpreted more or less as one wants." I don't know about the "more or less as one wants" part, but I shall attempt to show later some of the difficulties involved in establishing a necessary connection between C/PBTE and a particular theory such as behaviorism.

To return to Peter's argument, he says that to understand the distinctive ideas of C/PBTE, we must look for the assumptions which are built into the concepts and claims of advocates. And these advocates, he remarks, are "relatively unconscious of their own assumptions." Now I take it that these assumptions are what Ennis calls "implicit logical assumptions," assumptions which are logically necessary if C/PBTE is to be a reasonable view.[4] And to demonstrate what these assumptions are, Peter uses the distinction between count nouns and mass nouns. The mass nouns "competence" and "knowledge" are replaced, he says, with the count nouns "competencies" and "knowledges." I find this a useful distinction, and I take Peter's view to be that the basic C/PBTE assumption is what some have called a "displacement hypothesis" rather than a "reduction hypothesis." That is, I take Peter's argument to be that the C/PBTE assumption is one of a substitute language, *not* the assumption that non-performance or non-behavioral language can be reduced without remainder to performance or behavioral language.

Now this may be a plausible interpretation of a theoretical assumption of C/PBTE. Indeed I believe that it *is* a plausible interpretation of some varieties of behaviorism.[5] But plausible or not, is such an assumption necessary for C/PBTE? I am not at this point convinced that it is. I do not see why advocates of C/PBTE could not accept an assumption of reductionism rather than displacement, even though I believe that assumption to be false. In short, although the revisionary thesis of "displacement" seems to me to be plausible, it does not seem to me to be necessary. Indeed *neither* the reduction nor the displacement assumption seems to me to be necessary.

Let me attempt to sketch out another possibly plausible assumption. The displacement assumption, as I understand it, would be reflected by simply replacing central mass nouns with central count nouns, e.g., "competencies" replace "competence." And the reduction assumption would be that talk about mass nouns such as "competence" can be reduced without remainder to talk about count nouns such as "competencies." Now, why cannot C/PBTE advocates reject both assumptions and argue that they are merely searching for count nouns which can be used to talk about the parts of or characteristics of the mass nouns? They might admit that there is some linguistic awkwardness in using terms like "competencies" and "knowledges." It does seem awkward, if not strange, to say that the characteristics or parts of competence are competencies or that the characteristics of knowledge are knowledges. And, as Peter's example shows, the parts or characteristics of "smoke" are not "smokes." But let us examine this example further. To say that "smoke" is a mass noun and that the parts of "smoke" are not "smokes" is not to say that one cannot talk intelligibly about the parts or characteristics of smoke without assuming either displacement or reduction. We can and do. We often want to talk about the various particulates in smoke, for example. And it seems possible to me that *some* advocates of C/PBTE may simply want to talk about the parts or characteristics of competence just as employees of E.P.A. wish to talk about the parts or characteristics of smoke.

There is another element in the first section of Peter's paper which bothers me. It is that he sees a very close tie, perhaps a necessary connection, among C/PBTE, the accountability movement, the behavioral objectives movement, and a strict psychological behaviorism. Now although I'm not certain just what Peter sees as the nature of the connection among these movements, it does seem that his view is that the connection is somewhat stronger than some sort of simple compatability. I intend the comment which follows more as a question than as a criticism. Although I agree with Peter that *some* of the C/PBTE literature indicates a close tie of behaviorism and the other movements mentioned above, it also seems to me that some of the literature and much of the appeal of C/PBTE is not tied in any explicit way to strict behaviorism. Indeed it seems to me that much of the appeal is profoundly anti-theoretical, not just anti- nonbehavioral. It is no doubt obvious that I haven't worked out clearly in my own mind what bothers me here. Perhaps it is only that it seems an error to me to elevate what may be no more than a popular but simpleminded educational fad by linking it with a rather sophisticated social science theory which may rely on a rather complicated revisionary metaphysical assumption. Whether or not a particular metaphysical claim is silly, not every silly position is to be viewed as a revisionary metaphysical assumption.

Let me try to illustrate the foregoing point with respect to the behavioral objective business. Peter says that such things as "sound judgment" or "clear exposition" are ruled out except in some "softened versions" of the movement. And of course most of us do know or know of some behavioral objectives advocates who indeed would rule out such things. But there is a possible alternative position which could be acceptable to at least some behavioral objectives advocates. This position is that behavioral objectives are merely specifications of some possible evidence which would warrant our belief that the non-behavioral objective had been achieved. That is, behavioral objectives can be seen as the consequents of a series of conditionals, each of which has as its antecedent the non-behavioral objective. Thus suppose we have as our non-behavioral objective "clear exposition." We would then explicate this notion in a series of conditionals.

1. If the student (or teacher) has developed the capacity for clear exposition, then X (X = behavioral objective).
2. If the student (or teacher) has developed the capacity for clear exposition, then Y (Y = behavioral objective).

Now I don't know how many, if any, advocates of the behavioral objective movement *do* take this position, but I do not see why they *could* not. And if any do take this position, I do not see that they are necessarily committed to behaviorism. And it appears to me that a comparable case could be made concerning C/PBTE.

Let me turn now to Part III of Peter's paper. In this section he argues that the sole mandate violates the First Amendment academic freedom rights of teacher education faculty. Because I know so little about Constitutional law, I will merely raise a few general questions about this part of the paper.

First, I find the distinction between a general and a special theory of academic freedom very helpful. And I think that I understand Peter's argument that: "the special theory is most fundamental to academic freedom, and the C/PBTE sole mandate cases present threats to *academic freedoms* and not civil liberties." But now my question. Just how much of the Constitutional argument given by Peter does in fact offer strong support for a Constitutional defense of the *special* theory? Perhaps a more careful reading of Peter's paper would answer this question, but it seems possible that a quick reading may suggest that The Constitutional argument is stronger than it is in fact. Perhaps all I am saying here is that my understanding of the argument might have been facilitated had the general-special distinction preceeded the review of court cases.

A second question is prompted by Peter's discussion of Justice Douglas' dissent in Adler v. Board of Education. Peter points out that Douglas was concerned with the pursuit of truth; with what we might call the discovery of knowledge. And he says, "C/PBTE programs tend to think of teachers and teacher educators as involved not so much in the *discovery* but in the *dissemination or distribution* of knowledge." I think that Peter is correct about this, and also about his judgment that this helps to explain why advocates of C/PBTE are not sensitive to academic freedom issues. I would make an even stronger claim, i.e., the vast majority of teachers and teacher educators *see themselves* as concerned with distribution rather than discovery. And I suspect that this may result partially from the fact that we are dealing with occupational training and credentialing as well as with education.

Now if I understand Peter's argument, it is *not* that the state is not justified in setting standards for occupational credentialing. It is rather that the state does not have the right to interfere with colleges and universities in ways which violate the academic freedom of teacher education faculty. And so my question: Is there an unresolved tension between the right of the state to set standards for occupational credentialing *and* the academic freedom rights of those who teach in the institutions which prepare persons for credentialing? And if this tension does exist, can it be resolved without taking from colleges and universities the credentialing function and perhaps the training function as well? This seems especially important at this time, since many teacher organizations are already arguing on other grounds that colleges and universities are not the most appropriate settings for the *occupational* training of teachers prior to their credentialing.

My final question concerns a statement in Peter's closing paragraph. He says: "This paper pursues constitutional questions in the hope that this new line of argument will succeed where others have failed." My question concerns Peter's intent here. Does he intend the force of his argument to be that (1) sole mandates are likely to be struck down in the courts, or (2) the *argument* that some mandates may be struck down in the courts may be an effective argument in preventing or repealing sole mandates, or (3) both of the above? I am reminded of Justice Holmes oft-quoted definition of 'law': "The prophecies of what courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."[6]

We can prophesy what the courts will do either because we think the courts *will* do it, or we can prophesy what the courts will do in order to prevent those with legislative authority from putting prophecies we don't like on the statute books. Peter may be suggesting either or both of these, and it seems to me that each of the two "prophecies" suggests a strategy. The first strategy would point us to the courts; the second to state legislators and state departments of education. Is the argument intended for lawyers or lobbyists or both?

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1. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1947), (Edited by Alburey Castell), p. 36.

2. Mill, p. 37.

3. Mill, p. 16.

4. Robert H. Ennis, *Logic in Teaching*. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 398-401.

5. See Brenda Munsey Mapel, *An Analysis of Selected Critical Literature on B. F. Skinner and Its Relation to Education*. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1975.

6. In "The Path of the Law" in Julius J. Marke (Ed.) *The Justice Holmes Reader*. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1964), p. 43.

KOHLBERG'S PLACE IN A THEORY OF THE LEGITIMATE ROLE OF VALUE IN PUBLIC EDUCATION*

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As parents and the general public have in recent years become increasingly insistent upon the responsibilities of the public schools for the development of students' moral beliefs, educators have taken increased interest in the several accounts of moral education or values education that are currently available to them. Each of these accounts—including values clarification, the cognitive-developmental approach, value analysis, and the confluent curriculum—makes distinctive recommendations about what is to be taught and how the teacher is to proceed. It is not always clear precisely what is at stake in deciding to implement one of these approaches rather than another or upon what grounds one may legitimately make such a decision. The purpose of this essay is to sketch an ethical theory of the role of value in public education in which Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive developmental approach to moral education will have an important place.

Before adumbrating this ethical theory, it is necessary to have a general idea of what Kohlberg is recommending to educators. In this brief discussion, I shall attempt neither to provide a detailed explication of Kohlberg's psychological theory nor to deal with all or even the most important of the philosophical issues which that theory raises. Rather, I will be concerned to reinterpret the broad features of Kohlberg's theory in light of an understanding of the nature of morality in general and of public morality in particular.

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Briefly, then, Kohlberg's psychological theory provides an account of the way in which human beings develop the ability to reason about moral issues. Further, Kohlberg claims that there is a correspondence between what makes a later stage of moral reasoning more developmentally adequate than an earlier one and what makes it more formally adequate.[1] Specifically, the developmental criterion of differentiation corresponds to the formal criterion of prescriptivity and that of integration to universality. The full realization of the developmental criteria marks the endpoint of moral development in the same way that a full realization of the formal criteria marks the attainment of the formally ultimate moral position.[2] Finally, Kohlberg argues that a moral position characterized by principles of justice is formally ultimate and that the adoption of such a position marks the last stage of moral development. Moreover, Kohlberg claims that justice is the *only* ultimate value and that, therefore, morality has strictly to do with issues of justice.[3] Indeed, Kohlberg believes that this conclusion is necessitated by liberal moral philosophy.[4]

Now, the terms "morality" and "justice" are hardly synonymous in ordinary usage, and it is, unfortunately, tempting simply to reject Kohlberg's recommendations for education out of hand on account of the narrowness of his understanding of morality. If we were to modify Kohlberg's overworked example of Heinz, the man who has to decide whether to steal a drug in order to save his wife's life, such that Heinz's stealing the drug clearly implies that someone else who needs it will die, we might want to say that stealing the drug fulfills Heinz's moral obligation to his wife but, assuming that the mechanism for distributing the drug is fair, that he is unjust in doing so and is, therefore, obligated to accept whatever sanctions a well-ordered society might place upon his actions.[5] As this example suggests, justice is only part of what is included in the concept of morality.

A brief examination of this concept can help us to understand precisely what aspects of moral reasoning Kohlberg has been studying.[6] I do not intend here to analyze in full detail our applications of this concept but simply to note that it has manifold and apparently disparate uses. For even if we are to stipulate that morality has in general to do with the proper treatment of persons, it becomes clear that what we mean by morality depends in part upon the nature of the relationship to which it is applied. Two important dimensions of relationships in this regard are the extent to which they are intimate or impersonal and the extent to which they are symmetrical or asymmetrical. Now, given any particular situation, there is no reason to suppose that the morally correct course of action for individuals in intimate and asymmetric relation is necessarily identical to that for those impersonally and symmetrically related. Thus, as the reconstructed example of Heinz suggests, an action can be both moral and immoral at the same time depending upon the characteristics of the relationships which exist in particular situations.

In claiming that only that reasoning which invokes fully universalizable values is truly moral, Kohlberg is stipulating an identity between "morality" and the morality of impersonal and symmetric relationships. Kohlberg argues for the correctness of this stipulation by importing impersonality and symmetry into the formal criteria for morality.[7] In contrast, our brief analysis suggests that the degree to which these qualities are relevant to any particular relationship determines the appropriateness of the full application of the formal criteria of universality and prescriptivity. Indeed, full universalizability of moral principles becomes an issue only when impersonality is the relevant description of a relationship.

Kohlberg is probably correct in maintaining that the concept of justice presupposes the existence of impersonal and symmetric relationships, but, as the revised Heinz dilemma shows, he is mistaken in supposing that the far broader concept of morality does so. In taking such a position, Kohlberg is claiming that except insofar as it is possible to treat an intimate relationship as if it were impersonal, moral reasoning can give one no assistance in selecting right actions. Thus in the original Heinz dilemma, stage 6 reasoning holds it to be irrelevant to moral decision that the person whose life is at stake is Heinz's wife. In fact, the existence of such relationships is for Kohlberg always to be irrelevant from the moral point of view. However, our basic notions of morality tell us, first, that to treat all relationships as if they were impersonal is inappropriate if not immoral and, second, that to insist within intimate relationships and in situations where no justiciable good is at issue that one action is as reasonable or as moral as any other is itself unreasonable and probably morally reprehensible. If one is to take Kohlberg seriously here, one must be prepared to dismiss both the complexity of moral life and the possibility of maturity within intimate relationships.

Thus Kohlberg's psychological studies have given us an account of the way in which individuals come to be able to reason about relationships which are impersonal and symmetrical, the way in which we acquire a *public* morality. And his insistence that questions of action which arise in relationships which do not have these qualities, which are to some extent *private*, are not moral questions is sheer stipulation on his part. Despite his claims to have studied morality in general, we find that Kohlberg has really helped us to understand only one special branch of moral development. But, as we shall see, this understanding is of particular application when we come to consider the role of value in public education.

As previously noted, Kohlberg has gone beyond stipulating the identity of morality and public morality. He has suggested that the only value in a public morality is that of justice. Kohlberg's argument for this position, however, is far from persuasive. In particular, he argues against the universality of benevolence as a moral principle on the ground that it does not provide a moral resolution of problems in which interests conflict.[8] However, a similar complaint might be levelled against the principles of justice—they give us no guidance about how to act toward one another when our interests do not conflict. Here, too, we find that Kohlberg is engaged in stipulation: "Most social situations are not moral, because there is not conflict between the role taking expectations of one person and another."[9] The existence of conflict may be a condition of the application of principles of justice, but it is simply not a feature internal to the concept of morality. We just do make moral decisions about how to treat others when interest is not at issue. Just as the nature of the relationship between individuals is relevant to moral decision, so, too, is the nature of the situation in which the decision is to be made. At least two situational features are relevant in this regard: the extent to which the situation involves a conflict of interest and to which it involves a mutual undertaking. Kohlberg insists, apparently by linguistic fiat, that when neither mutual expectations nor actual conflict exist, moral questions do not arise. It is precisely in these situations, however, that the value of kindness plays a part. Thus a universalizable formulation of benevolence, like a similar formulation of any other value including justice, *is* a value in a public morality.

Given this understanding of what aspects of morality Kohlberg has undertaken to study, his recommendations for moral education in public schools should come as no surprise:

> In addition to having more definite aims than values clarification, the moral development approach restricts value education to that which is moral or, more specifically, to justice. This is for two reasons. First, it is not clear that the whole realm of personal, political, and religious values is a realm which is nonrelative, i.e., in which there are universals and a direction of development. Second, it is not clear that the public school has a right or mandate to develop values in general. In our view, value education in the public schools should be restricted to that which the school has the right and mandate to develop: an awareness of justice, or of the rights of others in our Constitutional system.[10]

Such a conclusion is, I shall argue, unnecessarily restrictive, but at least it reflects Kohlberg's recognition that, though almost anything might be taught in public schools, the claim that something should be taught (and taught in a particular way) needs to be justified according to public standards. Kohlberg, unlike many other proponents of moral education, is working the right territory. However, simply stipulating an equivalence of morality to justice does not provide an ethical justification for including justice in the curriculum. It is to the problem of justification that we next must turn.

Questions of what subject matter and what methods may be used in public schools are inextricably linked to the issue of how a well-ordered society may legitimately influence its members. For, as we shall see, public schooling involves a very special sort of intentional societal influence. It must be noted at the outset that this issue is far narrower than that of how one human being may legitimately influence another. We are concerned here specifically with how an agency of the societal collective, i.e., a public institution, may affect an individual. In this section I shall explicate the framework of a liberal ethics of institutional influence implied by what I understand to be the fundamental premise of liberal political thought—that the legitimate purpose of collective public action lies with the advancement of its members' individual ends (as opposed to the advancement of ends which transcend individual interests).[11,12] I will then examine the sorts of values education in public schools which may be justified within that framework.

Two implications of the central liberal assumption are of particular importance in this discussion. First, the premise deals with a very limited range of collective action—what I have called public collective action. The defining characteristic of the collective which undertakes this action is that the relations among its members are essentially impersonal and symmetrical. Thus the claims of members upon the activity of the collective are presumptively equal since this mode of relationship provides no pre-established order of importance for the ends of particular individuals.

The basic liberal premise also implies that collective public action is to be justified in terms of its effects on the collective's members' abilities to achieve their personal ends and, by extension, that collective public action is obligatory for both the individual and the group only when individual action toward those ends is in some sense inadequate or ineffectual. (Here I do not imply that collective action may not be voluntarily undertaken on other grounds.) For the collective is designed to augment individual action in the pursuit of private ends. If individual action is sufficient to any particular end, collective coercion of an individual who values that end is unnecessary since the individual will take the necessary action himself. More important, collective coercion in these cases may contradict the legitimate purpose of the collective; it runs the risk of forcing individuals to pursue ends which they do not value for themselves. There are at least two situations in which collective public action becomes obligatory in this way. One arises when individuals come into conflict over the disposition of resources instrumental to the achievement of their personal ends. Here the role of the collective is to establish principles and procedures whereby such conflicts may be resolved. It is sometimes asserted that obligatory collective action (in effect, public coercion) is limited by basic liberal assumptions solely to cases where such conflicts over the use of instrumental resources exist. Those who hold this position have assumed that agreement about ends and the means of their achievement will presumably lead rational individuals to undertake voluntarily the individual or cooperative action necessary to the attainment of those ends and that collective coercion is therefore unnecessary in these cases. However, the work of contemporary decision theorists has helped us to understand that even when such agreement exists, individual action may in some cases be ineffectual in producing the goods needed to achieve those ends. Here, then, collective action also becomes obligatory.

In particular, Mancur Olson in *The Logic of Collective Action* has demonstrated that, by and large, an individual will not, if he is acting rationally, voluntarily participate in a cooperative enterprise merely for the sake of the common good which it generates.[13] Within a certain range of the distribution of the common good derived from such a cooperative organization, it can be shown that it is not rational for an individual, regardless of whether his motives are selfish or altruistic, to contribute his fair share of the costs of maintaining and operating the collective. A common good is by definition something such that once it is brought into existence no one in the society may be denied the benefit of that good. If the common good in question benefits each individual of a large group approximately equally, each person may argue that his failure to pay his share of the cost of procuring the good will noticeably affect neither the group's ability to secure the good nor his own or others' access to it. The resources conserved by means of an individual's non-participation in the maintenance of the organization may be employed to secure a non-collective good which benefits either that individual himself or someone else. Yet, of course, if each individual may argue in this fashion, all may do so with the result that the good will not be achieved. Thus, unless the large group has some way of compelling individuals to participate (or unless it has some non-collective good which may be distributed on the basis of participation), it will not organize itself in order to secure that which is in everyone's interest. In these cases it is consistent with the basic liberal premise for the collective to act coercively.

These two characteristics of the liberal ethics of collective public action—the presumptive equality of individual claims on the collective and the requirement that collective coercion be justified in terms of its effects on the abilities of individuals to achieve their personal ends—together imply that collective coercion, when undertaken, must be justified in terms which are public to the membership of the collective. For any collective action involves the disposition of resources upon which each individual has a presumptive claim, and thus the demonstration that a conflict of individual interests has certain features and has accordingly been resolved justly or that a particular good is indeed common to the collective must be made in terms accessible to individuals who stand in impersonal relationship to one another. Thus, the legitimization of coercive institutional action lies with the institution's ability to demonstrate that such action is in fact in the best interests of the members of the society. Such a demonstration depends in turn on the invocation of palpably common values and common information, for institutional actions must be justified on the grounds that the good which such actions seek to achieve is in principle universally recognizable by all members of the society and that the circumstances in which the action is taken are described in terms which may be verified to any member of the society. Institutional actions, in short, must be grounded upon what may be known to be valuable and to be true.[14] I would in no way wish to maintain that non-universalizable values or perceptions either do not exist or are not important. But what I do wish to claim is that societal or institutional coercion should not be predicated upon such values or beliefs.[15]

This account of legitimate institutional action has clear implications for the activities of public schools. Public schools are coercive public institutions for at least two obvious reasons: they extract mandatory fiscal support through taxation and they require children to attend. As coercive institutions their policies and activities must be justified in terms of universalizable values and beliefs. Though I will not dwell on this issue here, I have argued that education as initiation into forms of rational thought and expression can be understood to be a special sort of common good—what John Rawls has termed a primary social good; as such, education in this sense becomes collective obligation.[16]

But, more to the point of this discussion, public schools exert a special kind of influence on members of society. Non-educational collective action is largely concerned with the disposition of resources instrumental to the achievement of individual ends; here the values and beliefs of the members of the collective are in a sense taken as given. They are things to be inquired after, reasoned about, and taken into account in the process of deciding whether certain courses of collective action ought to be undertaken. They are viewed as important determinants rather that as products of collective action. Public education involves, of course, the disposition of resources, but, in addition, it reflects a conscious effort on the part of the collective to shape the values and beliefs of individual members. We embark on this enterprise in the conviction that we are obliged in principle to justify in public terms the effects of our action to those individuals whose values and beliefs we shape. In other words, we must defend our collective influence on the substance of the values of others on the ground that they are to the best of our knowledge universalizable in principle. What we ask to be believed should be demonstrably true; what we ask to be valued should be demonstrably valuable. Our powers of observation or reasoning may fail us; we may be proven wrong. But the liberal ethics of collective action recommended in this essay implies that we must confine our direct and coercive influence over individuals' values and beliefs to issues where there is a right and a wrong to be proved among persons who stand in impersonal relation to one another. In short, public school personnel must, in their institutional relationships with children, confine their influence to things which may be known.

In light of this sketch of a theory of legitimate institutional action, Kohlberg's cognitive theory of moral development takes on special significance. As I have argued, the only legitimate way in which public schools may influence children's values (or the values of anyone else who has no choice but to be in school) is through affecting either what they know to be true or valuable. The quasiempirical arguments about whether psychoanalytic, habit-formation, or cognitive theories are more effective in producing moral behavior change in children are beside the point for the purpose of establishing policy and educational practices for public schools. The simple fact that public schools are coercive public institutions, are instruments of public policy, implies that *nothing other than a cognitive theory can form an acceptable basis for moral education in America's public schools.* For the values to be taught must be universalizable, and they must be taught in such a way that they are taken up as knowledge.

Values do have significant and relatively obvious cognitive dimensions: first, in that the principles of rational inquiry are themselves important values; second, in that the principles of justice and benevolence are products of rational thought; and, third, in that artefactual expressions of non-universalizable values do lend themselves to rational study and discussion. Thus Kohlberg's approach to moral education must be integrated into a broader conception of the legitimate role of value in public education. A theory of educational justice and the theory of legitimate institutional action explicated in this essay form the ethical core of this boarder theory of value in public education.

The implications for educational practice of this theory reflect the three cognitive dimensions of value suggested above. I would like to offer some brief and preliminary comments about these practical implications.

As remarked earlier, I have argued that education as initiation into rational forms of thought and expression is what John Rawls has called a primary good—a good the distribution of which any principles of justice are designed to regulate. As a result, all educational institutions and *a fortiori* public schools in a well-ordered society have a primary responsibility to distribute education according to the dictates of justice. Principles of rationality as rules of evidence, of inference, and of correct description constitute a minimal conception of non-negotiable human good for individuals in a well-ordered society. A complete account of the appropriate distribution of this good and of the methods of legitimate initiation into rationality from this viewpoint has not yet been fully developed. Nevertheless, it is clear that this initiation involves the participation of children to some extent in the major modes of disciplined thought and expression represented by the sciences, mathematics, and the humanities. Moreover, it is important to remember that public education's commitment to cognitive methods applies in this area as elsewhere; what is knowable must be taught in such a way that it becomes known. In establishing instructional policy, educators in public schools need to pay particular attention to those, including cognitive psychologists, who can help us understand how children come to know how to be rational.

The second area of public responsibility for children's values lies with stimulating the development of public moral judgment. Kohlberg and his associates have been devising materials and methods, based upon Kohlberg's psychological theory, for meeting an important part of this responsibility, that is, for developing in children a sense of justice. Though I have argued that a cognitive theory of moral development is the only appropriate basis for public moral education, certain features of the published materials and school programs with which Kohlberg has been associated lead me to question whether he has hit upon the correct theory even for the limited sphere in which he has chosen to operate.[17] First, some of the proposed techniques may have a significant and not particularly beneficial impact upon children's understanding of intimate relationships. On the one hand, the effect may be to stereotype those relationships;

children are often asked to identify with individuals described simply as friends, as if friendship were a monolithic phenomenon. On the other hand, the effect may be to mislead children about the appropriateness of those relationships; children sometimes conclude as a result of these activities that, for example, everyone ought always to treat others as friends, as if friendship were the kind of relationship it is possible or appropriate to have with everyone. These effects are, no doubt, unintended, but they are not surprising in light of the insensitivity of Kohlberg's theory to private morality.[18]

Second, at least in practice Kohlberg's approach to moral education does not integrate children's development of rationality with their development of a sense of justice. As Kohlberg himself has concluded, rational thought and expression are prerequisites for and not products of moral discussion.[19] Nevertheless, little explicit attention is given in published descriptions of curriculum design for Kohlberg's school programs and in teacher training materials for using this approach to the way in which opportunities for moral development are to be related to instruction in these necessary prerequisites in other segments of the curriculum. Third, although Kohlberg has found an examination of the work of moral philosophers to provide significant guidance for his psychological theory, that theory precludes the use of this material in moral instruction at least until students are in college. It seems reasonable to suppose, however, even with relatively young children that exposure to and discussion of sophisticated arguments would be an important resource for stimulating the development of similar sophistication in students. At the very least, it seems hasty to rule out experimentation with such materials on theoretical grounds. My final concern is with the curriculum's relationship to what Kohlberg believes to be the substance of stage 6 morality—namely, Rawls' two principles of justice.[20] In the first place, it is by no means clear that these two principles represent the correct solution to the problem of the treatment of individuals in impersonal relationships; at best, they are still highly controversial. Next, even if the two principles do prove to be correct, they are almost certainly incomplete, even by Rawls' own admission.[21] Given these problems, one must be concerned that Kohlberg's apparently wholehearted conversion to Rawlsian justice will unnecessarily limit the scope and sophistication of the curriculum which may result from his current efforts. The problem of justice is, indeed still a problem. Rawls may have offered what Kohlberg believes to be a satisfactory solution to that problem, but honest and justifiable teaching of public morality, like good teaching of physics, will treat current solutions tentatively.

Despite these reservations about Kohlberg's theory and pedagogical approach, however, the fact remains that Kohlberg and his associates are responsible for the most extensive and sustained research to date into the development in children of a sense of justice. Any attempt to fashion more adequate materials and instructional techniques, based perhaps on alternative cognitive theories, will need to take account of and to rely on Kohlberg's findings and experience in this field.

As we have seen, Kohlberg has neglected an important area of public moral judgment—the development of benevolence—in the mistaken belief that benevolence is not morally universalizable. Once the misunderstandings that surround this value have been cleared away, once we recognize that it is not a substitute for justice or equivalent to the self-serving philanthropy of industrial magnates, we can see that it is what arises from the application of the liberal commitment to respect for persons to situations where the interests of individuals are not at stake. Benevolence involves the ordinary kindness and even courtesy of individuals toward one another as human beings, the absence of which in public schools may, to a large extent, be at the heart of much of the public outcry for values education. Because benevolence in this sense is a public value, pubiic schools may concern themselves with its development.

The third component of legitimate public involvement in values education concerns itself with the cognitive study of the artefactual expressions of human values which are not universalizable to individuals in impersonal relationships. Studies of literature, history, the arts, and the social sciences constitute traditions in which human values in general may be studied objectively, not necessarily dispassionately but rather with regard for what is demonstrably the case. The critical and sympathetic reading of a novel, for example, is not the mere exchange of grunts of pleasure or dissatisfaction; it includes, among other things, making explicit what the novel says and does to provoke a reader's approval or disapproval, the description of certain public and observable qualities of the artefact. We seem to have lost sight of the reasons that these subjects may be and have been included in the curriculum, with the result that with increasing fiscal pressures on public schools many of them are in danger of elimination or serious de-emphasis. Educators and the public need to be reminded, especially in light of the great concern about values education, that these subjects represent the ways in which the public school may deal legitimately with the vast range of human values aside from rationality, justice, and benevolence, that they are not simply methods for the delectation or entertainment of students.

The apparent unwillingness of many contemporary proponents of values education in public schools to engage in a serious discussion of the ethical acceptability of their recommendations is little short of astonishing. One would assume that those who concern themselves with the development and expression of human value would be especially sensitive to the need to justify the coercion of other human beings which all such recommendations represent. In an attempt to fill this gap and to bring some order to the public debate over values education, I have in this essay developed an account of the liberal ethics of institutional coercion in light of which these proposals may be judged. This theory suggests that the societal collective may legitimately influence the values of individuals only along their cognitive dimensions and, further, that the research of cognitive psychologists including that of Kohlberg plays a justifiable, indeed a necessary role in our attempts to understand and to fulfill our collective responsibilities for the development of children's values. However, it should be clear that Kohlberg does not, despite his protestations to the contrary, tell us everything we need to know in order to design effective school programs which take account of the full range of our responsibilities in this area. For help in understanding the development of rationality and of benevolence and the study of publicly accessible expressions of other values we must turn to other branches of psychology, pedagogy, and philosophy.

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1. Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," in *Cognitive Development and Epistemology*, ed. Theodore Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 183-85.

2. Ibid., pp. 213-18.

3. Ibid., pp. 218-22.

4. Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," in *Values Concepts and Techniques* (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1976), p. 25.

5. Cf. Robert W. O'Connor and Victor L. Worsfold, "Kohlberg's Developmental Stages as Ethical Theories: Some Doubts" in *Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*, ed. Brian Crittenden (Edwardsville, Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society, 1973), particularly pp. 123-24.

6. Kohlberg rejects appeals to ordinary language since they are supposed to represent a codification of stage 4 conventional morality. Yet it is difficult to imagine that the language of stages 5 and 6 incorporates the stipulations that Kohlberg makes. Cf. Kohlberg, "Is to Ought," p. 226.

7. Ibid., p. 215.

8. Ibid., p. 220.

9. Ibid., p. 192.

10. Kohlberg, "Cognitive-Developmental Approach," p. 27.

11. I do not assert that the notion of transcendent ends is meaningless, merely that such ends are inappropriate to the justification of collective public action. This assumption may be understood as an application of the doctrine of respect for persons to the subject of collective action.

12. Two observations about what I will not attempt in this essay are in order. First, I will not develop a fully drawn theory of public collective action. This premise specifies only the point or purpose of such action; a full theory will consider the legitimate means and ends of collective action as well. While certain means and ends may be inconsistent with this purpose and thus ethically proscribed, the determination of legitimate means and ends is, in my view, not simply a matter of deduction from this premise but of judgment, from an appropriate point of view, among those not inconsistent with it. This larger task is inappropriate to this essay largely because its conclusions follow from the specified purpose alone.

Second, I will not here attempt the justification of this premise. I assume that the premise, especially as elaborated in the text, has some *prima facie* plausibility. A full justification of it requires an analysis of the grounds of this plausibility and, equally important, an examination of the ethical acceptability of the range of means and ends consistent with it. The ultimate justification, then, must await the development of the full ethical theory. Thus the conclusions I draw in the text are conditional upon the ultimate justifiability of this initially plausible starting point.

13. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), particularly pp. 5-65.

14. I do not think it necessary to mire the argument at this point in murky issues of cognition; this analysis only presumes that it makes sense to say that individuals in impersonal relationships may see that certain courses of action are valuable much as they see that a heap of earth and stones is a moraine. Of course, the analysis of seeing offered by many philosophers and psychologists in the liberal tradition may be irremediably defective. Nevertheless, one is not necessarily obliged to resolve, dissolve, or dismiss the multitude of problems associated with a concept before making meaningful use of it in ethical theory.

15. I take this account of the liberal ethics of public action to be extremely general, for while it rules out ethical systems predicated on the priority of transcendent collective ends, it does not specify the principles of justice according to which public action is to be taken for the advance-

ment of individual ends. This framework, then, is not inconsistent with Lockean rights-based theories, with various sorts of utilitarianism, with Rawls' approach to justice, and even with certain versions of Marxism where class solidarity is viewed as a temporary (and non-impersonal) means of attaining individual autonomy.

16. Cf. my "The Connection Between Education and Justice," in *Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education* Society, ed. Ira S. Steinberg (Urbana, Illinois: Educational Theory, 1977), pp. 235-42.

17. See Kohlberg, "Cognitive-Developmental Approach," pp. 33-35 and Peter Scharf, "The Developmentalists' Approach to Alternative Schooling," in *Values Concepts and Techniques* (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1976), pp. 121-29 for discussions of two experimental high school programs based on Kohlberg's research. See also Douglas P. Superka, *et. al.*, *Values Education Sourcebook* (Boulder, Colorado: Social Science Education Consortium, 1976), pp. 37-53 for a review of published instructional and teacher training materials utilizing the cognitive-developmental approach.

18. I am indebted to Lynn DeJonghe for drawing my attention to this problem.

19. Kohlberg, "Is to Ought," pp. 185-188.

20. Kohlberg, "Cognitive-Developmental Approach," p. 25.

21. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 303.

AN ACT-THEORY ALTERNATIVE TO RATIONALISTIC MORAL EDUCATION

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to provide an ethical act-theory critique of the most prominent rule-theory account of moral development, that of Lawrence Kohlberg, and secondly, to argue for an alternative act-theory interpretation of "cognitive moral development" as a goal of moral education. Kohlberg's educational account of moralization combines a cognitive-developmental psychology with an ethical rule-theory. An adequate educational theory of moral development would require an effort of this sort to integrate a sound psychology of moral development with a sound moral philosophy. However, in claiming that an adequate theory of moral education integrates these two types of moral theory, I am not suggesting that the tasks of moral psychology and moral philosophy are conducted independently of one another until integrated by an educational theory. This is not true of the act-theory based psychology to be defended in this paper, nor is it true in the case of Lawrence Kohlberg's moral psychology. This paper explicates Kohlberg's philosophical commitment to an ethical rule-theory and assesses its impact on both his psychological and his educational account of moral development. In so doing, my purpose is to clarify the issues between this prominent rule-theory account of moral education and the act-theory alternative developed in this paper.

Normative Ethics: Act-Theories and Rule-Theories

The primary task of a normative ethical theory is to enable persons to make justified singular moral judgments. *Rule-theories* suppose that moral rules are required to justify singular moral judgments, that a necessary part of the evidence one must have to make a warranted moral judgment is a moral rule.[1] In contrast, *act-theories* hold that moral rules are *not* a required part of the evidence justifying the singular judgments falling under them. Rather, justified singular moral judgments can be made merely on the basis of the particular facts involved in a given moral dilemma, general considerations (i.e. moral rules) are not required.

Although (according to act-theory) moral rules are not required for *justifying* a moral judgment, they are nevertheless an extremely important part of moral deliberation. They are moral generalizations derived from summarizing our knowledge of the particular factors which have warranted past moral judgments. "Summary" moral rules are "starting points" for subsequent deliberations, and are implicit in our "spontaneous" identification of certain factors as relevant to resolving present moral dilemmas. However, they do not define our reflective identification of *all* the relevant factors. It is always possible to recognize *novel situational factors* as relevant to a justified resolution; factors which are not adequately covered by a present structure of summary moral rules (no matter how "generally" adequate it might be).

The issue of the nature of moral rules is the question of whether valid moral rules (whatever they are thought to be) are constitutive rules or summary rules. If moral rules are taken to be constitutive rules, then they are thought to *define* moral reasoning. They would be a set of a priori rules which could not admit of exception. If an exception were admitted to a set of rules which are regarded as constitutive, then the set would necessarily have to be regarded as inadequate. "Constitutive" moral rules purportedly identify all categories of facts which are relevant to making a justified moral judgment. Thus, if a justification were given for a certain moral judgement which did not fit into one of these defined categories of morally relevant reasons, then it would be *logically impossible* to regard it as a "moral" justification.

On the other hand, if a structure of moral rules is composed of summary rules, then they could admit of exception. They would *summarize* the content of moral reasoning but would not purport to *define* (a priori) moral justification. Thus, if a justification were given for a certain moral judgment which did not fit into one of the identified categories of (ordinarily!) relevant moral reasons, then it would still be *possible* to call it a "moral" justification. Given that a set of summary rules "summarize," but are not exhaustive of, possible moral reasons, the fact that certain considerations do not fall neatly within some preferred structure of morally relevant categories (such as "don't steal," "don't kill," "don't lie," "maximize freedom," "maximize equality," etc.) does not rule out their being identified as "moral grounds" for resolving a novel moral dilemma.

Depending on their assumptions concerning the nature of moral rules, normative ethical theories can be divided into rule-theories and act-theories. According to rule-theories, *there are valid constitutive moral rules,* while according to act-theories, *all valid structures of moral rules are summary rules.* Lawrence Kohlberg is a rule-theorist, believing that his stage 6 justice structure defines moral justification. The stage 6 structure is taken to be an a priori criterion for distinguishing *justified* moral judgments from *unjustified* moral justments—there are no exceptions.[2]

In contrast, ethical act-theorists, e.g. John Dewey, contend that all moral rules are summary rules, none are constitutive. There are no moral rules which are a priori criteria for distinguishing those facts which are always morally relevant from those which are never morally relevant. Valid summary moral rules help us identify facts in a situation which are likely to be morally relevant. But actually identifying the particular facts which bear on a justified resolution of a moral disagreement must be done situationally.

According to act-theory, actual moral disagreements do not rest on disagreements about moral rules (the satisfactory resolution of which would require getting agreement about the validity of certain moral rules). Rather, the sources of actual moral disagreements are disputes over the true features of particular situations.[3] Thus, for every actual moral disagreement (or dilemma) there is a set of disputed facts which is the source of the moral disagreement. The actual identification of the set of factors which bear on a justified resolution of a moral disagreement must be done situationally. Since there are no a priori criteria for identifying these relevant facts, parties to a dispute would have to use a method of contextual moral inquiry to identify those factors whose truth is at issue. In a later section, the "method of hypothetical agreement" (as it is called by its creator, Bernard Rosen[4]) will be proposed as such a method.

Meta-Ethics and Cognitive-Developmental Psychology

Following Dewey, cognitive-developmental psychologists have assumed that "man is by nature an active organism." Thus, a developmental moral psychology would assume, but would not have to explain, the existence of the first (identified) structure of moral judgment.[5] Rather a developmental account would *begin* with the first structure of that activity which researchers are able to identify, and the theoretical task would be to explain "changes in that initial structure," as well as changes in any subsequent structures. By analyzing the responses of children to a series of moral dilemmas, Kohlberg (following Piaget) identified a "first moral structure." Then by presenting these same and related dilemmas to such subjects at regular intervals through adulthood (and analyzing their responses) Kohlberg concluded that there are five additional structures which emerge. His data purportedly showed that the sequence of the six identified stages is invariant and culturally universal.

In addition to the above, there is one other assumption which must be made explicit in order to understand cognitive-developmental accounts of moral development. Namely, it is assumed that there are objective criteria available for assessing the philosophical adequacy of each identified moral stage as a mode of resolving moral dilemmas and disagreements.[6] Thus, Kohlberg adopts the particular meta-ethical criteria which (he believes) provide moral philosophers with a "neutral" basis for determining the better of competing normative ethical theories (e.g. Kantian ethics versus Deweyian ethics). As a result of examining the sequence of structural changes in light of these purportedly objective criteria, he concludes that each new structure is a more adequate method of resolving moral dilemmas than were the previous structures. From stage 1 through stage 6, each structural transformation is toward increasingly more adequate normative ethical theories.[7]

Given their ethical assumptions, together with their "data to be explained," we can now formulate the question asked by cognitive-developmental psychologists as follows: *Given that each successive change in an individual's structure of moral deliberation is toward a more (philosophically) adequate structure, how and why do such changes occur?*

According to Kohlberg, each new normative structure is to be explained as a function of transactions between an individual's previous structure and the objective features of the moral dilemmas actually arising in his social environment. An individual's present moral structure is said to be implicit in his deliberation about present moral problems. However, Kohlberg also credits persons with the potential for recognizing cases in which their present structure is an inadequate basis for resolving a present moral dilemma. Specifically, Kohlberg's account assumes that it is possible for individuals at stages 1 through 5 to deliberate about the objective features of particular moral dilemmas, with a degree of *independence* of their present moral structure. (The possibility of objectively examining and judging the soundness of proposed moral arguments, including one's own, is the possibility of doing moral philosophy.)

Kohlberg's assumption that persons can (sometimes) recognize morally relevant features of dilemmas with a degree of independence of their present moral structures is part of his (phychological) explanation of their construction of new and better structures. According to Kohlberg, individuals at the first five stages can, upon reflection, recognize the inadequacy of their own proposals for resolving specific moral dilemmas.[8] Through a process in which they confront and recognize the greater adequacy of alternative proposals for resolving moral problems, individuals ultimately construct a new structure of moral norms which cover those arguments "perceived to be better" than their own. Given that it is possible for individuals at the first five stages to recognize "as better," a moral argument not yet covered by their present structures, then those structures could not be said to *define* their present "perceptions of moral reasons." It would be logically inconsistent to hold that an individual could appreciate justifications not yet covered by his present moral structure, while holding that his present structure *defines* his perception of moral justification. If a given normative structure were to function as a definition of moral judgment, it would not merely summarize an individual's past moral reasoning (and his "unreflective" response to present dilemmas), it would exhaust his perception of all possible sound moral reasons.

Given the assumed hierarchal nature of cognitive stages, the capacity to recognize that a proposed argument is better than one's own spontaneous proposal could not be sufficiently explained in terms of an individual's present moral structure (since that present structure doesn't cover the "better" argument). Rather, it would have to be explained in terms of the "yet to be constructed" new structure which the individual is "building." An adequate understanding of the process whereby an individual "stands apart from his own present structure of moral rules" and assesses whether a particular judgment based on those norms is as warranted as is a judgment made on some other basis, presupposes sound meta-ethical criteria. Moreover, the fact that individuals tend to prefer philosophically more adequate justifications over their own spontaneous proposals is evidence that sound meta-ethical criteria are implicit in their assessment process.

As noted earlier, Kohlberg's psychological account assumes that some such "objective" criterion is operant in an individual's active reconstruction of his present moral stage.[9] He claims that the "deep structure" of this process parallels the "deep structure of systems of normative ethics."[10] However, the difficulty with the purportedly "neutral" meta-ethical theory Kohlberg adopts as a basis for interpreting the greater adequacy of each successive stage, is that it is hardly neutral! The meta-ethical criteria which he identifies as the "deep structure" of moral philosophy turn out to be criteria acceptable to only one part of moral philosophy, namely ethical rule-theory. Use of "formalistic" criteria such as "universality" would not be equally acceptable to ethical act-theorists such as John Dewey. While the formalistic meta-ethics presupposed by Kohlberg might well be a "neutral" basis for assessing the adequacy of competing normative rule-theories (e.g. Kant's, W.D. Ross's, and Kohlberg's own Kantian-Rawlsian view), it would be a "loaded" criterion if one of the competitors were an act-theory. For example, in a philosophical examination of the act-theory of John Dewey and the rule-theory of John Rawls, exclusive use of "formalistic" criteria would seriously bias the outcome against Deweyian normative ethics.

Kohlberg does not seem to appreciate that there are other meta-ethical theories besides formalism which cognitive-developmental psychology might have used to interpret the sequence of cognitive moral change. For example, adoption of pragmatic meta-ethics would also enable us to interpret and justify developmental psychology's basic assumption that individuals are rational; that they are "natural moral philosophers" capable of philosophical assessment of their singular moral judgments. Like formalism, pragmatic meta-ethics would enable us to demonstrate that a later emerging post-conventional morality (of some sort) is more adequate than was a prior conventional moral stage. However, the implications of such an account would be radically different from those of a formalistic account regarding such basic matters as what it is for individuals to be "rational," or what it is for them to make "philosophical assessments" of singular moral judgments, or what it means to say that a given post-conventional morality is "better" than a given conventional morality. Finally, a pragmatic account would require an essentially different view of "cognitive moral maturity" from the formalistic formulation Kohlberg calls stage 6.

Assuming that C-D psychology's data on the development of moral judgment can be given a pragmatic meta-ethical interpretation, we could then challenge Kohlberg's conclusions about the nature of that process. We could just as well argue that a pragmatic, rather than formalistic, criterion is the "deep structure" of cognitive moral development. Inevitably, a metaphilosophical criterion of some sort must be used to interpret the process of cognitive moral development, but the existence of viable alternatives ought to be acknowledged. John Dewey's psychological account of moral development incorporates a pragmatic meta-ethics and an ethical act-theory. In contrast, Kohlberg's psychological account is based on a rationalistic meta-ethics and an ethical rule-theory.[11]

A major goal of this paper is to criticize Kohlberg's philosophical interpretation of moral development and to defend an alternative pragmatic interpretation. A fundamental conflict between these two sorts of interpretations focuses on the question of whether or not the structure of a "highest" normative stage is to be described as a *definition* of sound moral judgment. As an ethical rule-theorist, Kohlberg assumes that an adequate normative ethical theory is a definition of sound moral judgment. Consequently, any structure he identifies as the highest stage of moral judgment would presumably define sound moral judgment (for those who attain that stage). In accepting this assumption about a "highest" stage, Kohlberg closes off the possibility of further progressive reconstruction of stage 6. If the stage 6 structure were the definition of moral justification, it would have no exceptions. Given that (according to Kohlberg's psychological account) the "intuitive" recognition of valid exceptions to one's own present structure is a necessary condition for one's building a better structure, a "true" stage 6 person could not possibly build a better "stage 7."

An assertion that a particular normative structure *defines* sound moral judgment could be interpreted as either an empirical claim or as a philosophical claim. I believe that Kohlberg is making both sorts of claims about stage 6. In order for him to justify the philosophical claim he would have to show that the stage 6 structure is the best of all possible moral structures (since it purports to be *the* definition of sound moral judgment). On the other hand, justification of the empirical hypothesis would require data showing that persons known to have acquired this "highest" structure do not in fact perceive exceptions to their present structure. If the stage 6 structure defines the subsequent moral reasoning of those who attain that stage, then, by hypothesis, they would not acknowledge any cases in which some proposed consideration would be a better basis for resolving a moral dilemma than would their own "spontaneous" stage 6 proposal. If, on the other hand, such subjects sometimes accept the validity of exceptions to their present stage 6 structure, then it would be empirically false that the stage 6 structure defines their perception of sound moral reasoning.[12]

As noted above, Kohlberg's assumption that sound moral reasoning has a certain a priori normative structure entails that at the highest stage of moral judgment, an individual's moral norms would no longer be open to revision in light of further moral experience. Whereas Kohlberg's account assumes that the epistemological relationship of the first five moral structures to the particular judgments falling under them is a posteriori (i.e. these structures are subject to revision in light of subsequent moral experience), stage 6 is purported to be a structure of constitutive moral rules. Hence, the epistemological relationship of the stage 6 moral structure to the particular judgments falling under it is a priori. If C-D psychology accepts that the structure of a highest stage of moral judgment is a priori, then it would not, indeed could not, entertain the question of its possible reconstruction in light of subsequent moral experience.

Because of his meta-ethical assumptions, Kohlberg portrays the whole of cognitive moral development as a quest for the "true" definition of moral judgment. In claiming that stage 5 is better than the first four moral stages, he means that it is a priori better. Similarly, he argues in terms of formalistic criteria (i.e., universality, correlativity of "rights" and "duties," etc.) that the stage 6 structure is a better definition of moral judgment than either of a person's first five "attempts to construct such a definition." The fact that valid exceptions to each of the first five normative structures can be identified is taken to mean that none of these "attempted definitions" is *the* definition of moral justification. Finally, in arguing that his "preferred definition" (in terms of Rawlsian Justice) is the best of the alternative definitions proposed by formalistic moral philosophers, he means that it is a priori best (on grounds that it better fulfills the established formalistic criteria for the acceptability of normative ethical theories).

Kohlberg's exclusive employment of formalistic meta-ethical criteria presupposes the belief that a formally best normative ethical theory is *the* best normative theory. Acceptance of this presupposition would mean that Kohlberg's own claims about the philosophical superiority of stage 6 would not be open to a posteriori counter-arguments. (A successful a posteriori challenge would presumably be a case in which a moral judgment implied by the stage 6 structure is acknowledged to be "counter-intuitive.") In contrast to Kohlberg, some ethical rule-theorists reject this presupposition and openly acknowledge that their proposed definition of morality is subject to a posteriori challenges. For example, W.D. Ross[13] is a rule-theorist, yet he denies the sufficiency of a merely formal justification of a normative ethical theory. According to Ross, the fact that a given normative structure better fulfills formal criteria, does *not* entail that it is the best moral theory. On the contrary, he contends that his own proposed definition of moral reasoning is subject to correction if found to be inconsistent with our mature intuitions about particular cases. Ross's proposed definition was itself the result of explicating the grounds found to be implicit in clear cases of justified moral judgment. Although Ross's hypothesis that there are six basic categories of moral reasons (i.e. six prima facia moral rules) is *about* the a priori structure of all justified moral judgments, the hypothesis itself is not treated as a priori. He assumes that his hypothesis about *the* definition of morality is (in principle) a posteriori. In contrast, Kohlberg's hypothesis about the a priori structure of sound moral judgment is treated as an a priori hypothesis, subject to merely formal counter-arguments.

Because he acknowledges the insufficiency of a merely a priori determination of the best definition of morality, Ross's meta-ethical theory is closer to the pragmatic position being defended in this paper than is Kohlberg's ethics. Kohlberg's position is that the stage 6 structure is *the* definition of sound moral judgment solely because it is the formally best normative ethical theory. A posteriori cases showing that this stage 6 structure implies some admittedly "counter-intuitive" moral judgments would appear to be irrelevant.

Pragmatic Meta-Ethics and Cognitive-Developmental Psychology

Our discussion thus far has centered on issues in moral epistemology as they relate to certain issues in cognitive developmental theory of moral judgment. The goal has been to compare meta-ethical formalism with meta-ethical pragmatism as contrasting bases for cognitive psychology. I'd like to extend this analysis a bit further by pursuing the alternative interpretations given by each of a psychological phenomenon already explored above: namely, the fact that individuals sometimes favor resolving moral dilemmas on the basis of reasoning not yet covered by their present moral norms. According to Kohlberg's data, individuals tend to prefer moral arguments at a stage or so higher than their present stage.

A pragmatic interpretation of this phenomena would coincide with Kohlberg's formalistic analysis on at least one crucial point. Namely, both would presuppose that an adequate ethical analysis of an individual's acknowledging a "better" argument "as better"—when it is not yet covered by his present moral norms—would entail our referring to a structure of norms which does cover that "better" argument. However, in contrast to pragmatic ethics, Kohlberg's analysis presupposes that a sufficient philosophical account of these valid "exceptions" (to the norms of a given moral stage) requires not merely our referring to a "higher" structure of norms which would cover those particular justifications, but rather reference to a "highest" structure of norms, one which would cover all possible moral justifications. Thus, Kohlberg's philosophical explanation of the resolution of dilemmas not adequately resolvable at given lower stages refers to a certain definition of moral justification, that is, the stage 6 structure. Pragmatic accounts of this phenomena in terms of a "higher" structure of norms would in no way imply that the structure in question is the best of all possible normative structures.

Kohlberg's account grants that persons from stage 1 through 5 can *recognize* exceptions to their present structure—even when they cannot yet fully articulate why a proposed argument "perceived to be better" than their own spontaneous proposal, is better. As noted above, giving a sufficient philosophical account of the inadequacies of one's own present normative ethical structure would be possible only after one had constructed a more adequate structure of norms. However, one can acknowledge the relative inadequacy of one's own argument without yet being able to explain why it is less adequate. Again, Kohlberg's psychological account assumes that subjects can "intuitively" identify particular examples of "better moral reasoning" even though they have not yet constructed a normative structure enabling them to explain (philosophically) why those "better reasons" are better.

In order for Kohlberg (who is presumably at stage 6) to be able to give a sufficient philosophical explanation of the possible exceptions to his stage 6 structure, he must have already constructed a stage 7. Yet Kohlberg's actual construction of a stage 7 (according to his own psychological account of cognitive reconstruction) is contingent on his retaining the capacity to recognize particular cases in which another proposal for resolving a dilemma is better than his own spontaneous stage 6 proposal. However, given the merely formal grounding of Kohlberg's claim that stage 6 defines moral justification, he does not even grant the possibility of identifying such a posteriori exceptions to his present structure.[14] Hence, for Kohlberg, the question of opening his present stage 6 structure of norms to correction on the basis of further moral experience is "inconceivable." Stage 6 is not an a posteriori structure, rather it is a structure of constituive moral rules specifying what it means to judge morally.[15] "Stage 6 is what it means to judge morally. If you want to play the moral game, if you want to make decisions which anyone could agree upon in resolving social conflicts, stage 6 is it."[16]

Since pragmatic ethical theorists assume that any structure of moral norms consists of summary rather than constitutive rules, it follows that it is always possible to identify a posteriori exceptions "to the rules." If such an exception were encountered, a present structure of norms would be open to revision to make it a more adequate summary of particular justified moral judgments. It is precisely this possibility of revision based on particular, novel features of moral situations which rule-theorists like Kohlberg explicitly rule out—by describing their preferred structure of moral rules as a "definition" of morality.

Given normal science, we might have expected a psychological account of cognitive moral development to leave open the question of the possible reconstruction of a "highest" identified stage. As argued above, the explanation of Kohlberg's not doing so was his adoption of a rationalistic epistemology.[17] In contrast, if pragmatic assumptions were the basis for a philosophical interpretation of the sequence of cognitive development, the possible revision of a "highest" identified structure would be taken for granted. Pragmatic meta-ethics would enable cognitive-developmental psychology to accomplish a presumably requisite task, i.e. to understand how the later emerging post-conventional structures are better than earlier conventional and preconventional modes of resolving moral problems.[18] However, on the basis of pragmatic assumptions, a philosophical defense could not be given for a claim like Kohlberg's that a certain post-conventional structure is the *definition* of moral reasoning (and hence by implication, the best of all possible systems of moral norms).

Moving to a related point, it now becomes obvious why a pragmatic interpretation of cognitive moral development would necessitate very different conclusions from Kohlberg's about the nature of "mature moral judgment." If a pragmatic argument were used to establish that a certain normative structure is better than others, it would be inconsistent to then argue that this "best" structure is also a *definition* of justified moral judgment. A presupposition of pragmatic meta-ethics is that the identification of an exception to one of the normative ethical structures being assessed is at least logically possible. Given this presupposition it would be incoherent to argue that a "pragmatically" best structure is also the "definition" of moral justification. Put in terms of stages, it would be incoherent to argue that a "pragmatically" highest stage is also the "definition" of moral judgment.

A pragmatic philosophical interpretation of moral stages would presuppose the existence of a logical distinction between each emergent structure of moral norms and the singular moral judgments falling under them. A pragmatic argument that a given normative structure is better than another would be based on an appeal to the particular justified judgments purportedly summarized by such structures. Thus, it must be logically possible to identify exceptions to such a structure in order for its adequacy to be tested by appeal to particular cases. For example, suppose we were considering the hypothesis that Kohlberg's stage 6 structure is better than W.D. Ross's structure of 6 prima facia moral rules. The soundness of this hypothesis could be assessed on the basis of each structure's consistency with particular justified moral judgments (purportedly covered by each), only if we assume that it is possible to identify such judgments without thereby implying one of the two competing structures. Once a certain structure is identified as the *definition* of moral judgment and, by implication, implicit in every justified moral judgment, then trying to demonstrate its inadequacies by appeal to particular counter-examples becomes problematic. There would then be an a priori prejudice against a theorists' acknowledging proposed exceptions to his preferred normative theory. In identifying something as a "justified moral judgment," the theorist would be implying that it is consistent with the very normative structure in question. Unless it is acknowledged that a preferred structure of moral rules and the particular cases falling under it are logically independent, it would be an a priori impossibility to identify an exception. A theorist's preferred structure of moral norms could be successfully challenged by appealing to her perceptions (or, if you like, her "intuitions") about particular dilemmas only if we assume that her perceptions are somewhat "neutral" in such matters.[19]

An Act-Theory Analysis of Moral Education

We have shown that the contrast between ethical act-theories and rule-theories over the question of whether moral principles are generalizations (as opposed to universals) results in essentially different accounts of moral maturity. This in turn results in different interpretations of the goals of moral education. According to act-theory, moral maturity isn't just coming to employ increasingly more adequate moral principles, it also involves employing such principles as summary rules. If we grant the possibility of finding justified exceptions to any structure of moral rules (based on novel features of particular moral situations), then our concept of moral maturity would have to include reference to individuals' remaining sensitive to the possible relevance of particular features of moral situations which are not adequately covered by their present moral norms. Moreover, it would have to include some notion of what it is to be competent in analyzing the particular features of moral situations—novel and otherwise.

On the basis of these act-theory assumptions about moral maturity, we can formulate two primary goals of moral education. The first is that persons come to employ all moral rules as summary rules, meaning that they can recognize exceptions. The second goal is that they acquire a sound method of contextual moral inquiry, a method enabling them to identify the morally relevant particular factors in a moral dilemma and make manifest their relation to a justified singular moral judgment. Although the scope of the present paper does not allow a full development of this approach to moral education, I will attempt a brief explication in terms of its goals.

Moral Rules as Summary Rules—In the course of classroom discussions of moral issues, moral rules are frequently voiced to explain why a given moral judgment is made. According to act-theory, a goal of moral education is to bring students to appreciate that the moral rules which generalize the factors warranting some of their singular moral judgments, will not adequately cover all similar situations. They are to be brought to appreciate that even valid moral rules can admit of exception based on unique features of given moral dilemmas.

Through a process in which students are encouraged to identify the moral generalizations which can be drawn from their particular moral judgments, and are then encouraged to question whether the thus identified moral rules cover all similar situations, students can be brought to appreciate that their present moral rules are not universals. If a structure of moral rules were thought to hold in all cases without exception, then there would be no need to remain sensitive to the subleties of particular situations which might have warranted making an exception to a rule, or in modifying a present structure of moral rules. Since any given problem falling under a present structure of moral rules might turn out to be one of its exceptions, judgers must always be sensitive to the possible relevance of situational factors (which are not yet covered by their moral rules).

A Method of Contextual Moral Inquiry—The other goal of moral education is that students come to employ a valid method of contextual moral inquiry. Training students to use the "method of hypothetical agreement," developed by Bernard Rosen, would accomplish this task. For every actual moral disagreement occurring between our students, the presumption is that we will be able to find two singular hypothetical statements about which they will agree. The goal of using Rosen's method is to arrive at two hypothetical statements identifying the particular facts which all parties agree are sufficient for making each of the two conflicting moral judgments. For example, students who disagree about whether abortion-on-demand for pregnant women is an immoral social policy, might nevertheless agree about the following two *hypothetical* moral statements:

(a) *If* the fetus is not a person
Then abortion-on-demand is not morally wrong.

(b) *If* the fetus is a person
Then abortion-on-demand is morally wrong.

The students can agree about two such hypotheticals and yet continue to disagree about both the antecedent facts (i.e., whether the fetus is a person) as well as the singular moral judgment (i.e., whether abortion-on-demand is morally wrong). What is it then that the students agree on when they reach a "hypothetical agreement"—given that they might continue to disagree about both the antecedent facts as well as the consequent judgment? They agree that the truth of the particular facts identified in each of the antecedents, is sufficient grounds for the moral judgments identified in each of the consequents of the two hypotheticals.[20] For example, regarding the above two hypotheticals concerning abortion-on-demand, if one of the students is still unwilling to accept the sufficiency of the two antecedents as they stand, he would then tell us what more would have to be added. He might then require us to make the following addition to hypothetical (b) before he will agree to the sufficiency of the pair:

(b_1) *If* the fetus is a person, and/or[21]—the mother's mental, physical, or economic health is not seriously endangered,
Then abortion-on-demand is morally wrong.

Using this method to structure classroom discussions of moral issues, we would always begin with a perceived moral dilemma or disagreement. (An issue could be raised about which students are likely to disagree or students could themselves identify an issue about which they disagree.) Students would then express their positions on the identified issue and explain why they hold those views. As two opposing views emerge in the course of class discussion, the teacher would attempt to capture that disagreement in the form of two hypotheticals:

> (1) "*If* this act is a case of A, B, and/or C, *then* this act is morally wrong;" however, (2) "*If* this act is a case of D, E, and/or F, *then* this act is not morally wrong."

This process is likely to produce two very complex hypotheticals by the time all the disputing parties (whether two students or a whole class) are satisfied that the hypotheticals do in fact reflect all the relevant issues. Yet, no matter how drawn out the process, eventually two hypotheticals can always be found which all the disputing parties will agree are justified.[22]

When this stage of "hypothetical agreement" has been reached, the teacher and students can then focus their attention on the disputed facts which have now been identified as the source of their moral disagreement. While there seems no clear way of tackling moral disagreements thought to rest on a disagreement over basic principles, disagreements thought to rest on factual matters can be systematically confronted. If individuals identify the source of an actual disagreement as a disagreement over "basic" values or moral principles, further discussion of that issue is likely to be seen as pointless. In contrast, once a given moral dispute is identified as rooted in a factual disagreement, there are rational methods which the disputants are likely to accept for resolving the disagreement. There tends to be wide agreement that disputes about particular facts are to be dealt with scientifically. Thus, once the factual disputes underlying a particular moral issue are identified (using "the method of hypothetical agreement"), the parties would probably then agree on the particular methods for rationally resolving those factual disputes.

The method of hypothetical agreement is a teachable mode of resolving moral dilemmas which does not require educators to accept in advance, certain basic moral principles. In contrast to Kohlbergian moral education, whose goals require accepting that mature moral reasoning conforms to a Rawlsian principle of justice, teaching the method of hypothetical agreement presupposes no such *definition* of the content of adequate moral reasons. Given that there is not broad agreement among moral philosophers about a definition of moral reasons, use of the method of hypothetical agreement would enable educators to avoid begging that question (in favor of any one such definition). The method is procedural, and merely provides a system for explicating the particular considerations which are relevant in a given situation calling for moral judgment. Its use leaves open the question of whether the particular considerations which justified the given moral judgment are but *instances* of general considerations (i.e. moral principles or rules) as rule-theorists assume. Although the method was developed by an ethical act-theorist[23] (as a mechanism whereby justified singular moral judgments could be made without presupposing any certain a priori moral principles), the method itself does not presuppose act-theory.

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1. Thus, a sufficient justification for a singular moral judgment would require our knowing the relevant set of moral rules, along with knowing that the *particular facts* fall under them. Knowledge of the particular factors is necessary in order for us to recognize a given dilemma as an *instance* covered by the relevant moral rules—and to thereby be able to derive a warranted singular judgment.

2. Other rule-theorists make a more limited claim. For example, W.D. Ross regards his proposed definition of morality as merely an a priori criterion for distinguishing morally relevant grounds from non-morally relevant grounds. Ross's position is that there is no a priori criterion for distinguishing justified singular moral judgments from unjustified moral judgments. Ross acknowledges the relevance of situational variables in determining which of his six basic categories of moral grounds have priority in cases wherein they confilct. Thus Ross's position is much closer to an act-theory view than is Kohlberg's.

3. To avoid a possible confusion, act-theory does not say that moral disputes are merely factual disputes (the so-called "naturalistic fallacy") but rather that particular moral disputes are *grounded* in particular factual disputes. The autonomy of morality is preserved. Moral disputes are about moral judgments, about the "moral rightness" of certain acts, about "moral duties" and "moral rights." My position is not that moral claims are *logically* equivalent to scientific claims, but rather than singular moral claims are justified by appeal to *particular* factual matters—rather than by appeal to *general* factual matters as rule-theorists suppose.

To further clarify this, let us grant that there is a logical distinction between moral claims on the one hand, and scientific (factual) claims on the other. *Both* rule-theorists (e.g., W.D. Ross, J. Rawls, or L. Kohlberg) and act theorists (e.g., J. Dewey) contend that moral judgments *are justified* *by appeal to factual claims.* The difference between them is that rule-theorists believe that they can specify, a priori, the basic *types of facts* which are relevant to justifying singular moral judgments. On the other hand, act-theorists believe that any specification of types of morally relevant facts constitutes a set of a posteriori generalizations about the types of factors which have tended to be relevant to making justified moral judgments.

4. For a fuller philosophical account of the sort of act-theory adopted in this paper and of the method of hypothetical argreement see: Bernard Rosen, "Rules and Justified Moral Judgments," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XXX No. 3, March, 1970, and "A Meta-Theory for Ethical Theories," *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 1975.

5. This does not mean that the first structure cannot be explained. For example, genetics or some other branch of psychology might take on that task. Rather all that is implied by this assumption is that such is not the task of developmental moral psychology.

6. An analogy with Piaget's study of cognitive scientific development might help to clarify the nature of this epistemological assumption. In explaining his data showing structural changes in the growing child's mode of resolving scientific problems, Piaget assumed that there were valid objective criteria available for assessing the relative adequacy of each of the emergent scientific structures. Thus he used the philosophical criteria thought to be employed by the scientific community to assess the relative merits of competing scientific theories (e.g. to show that Einsteinian physics is better than Newtonian physics).

7. A psychological account of how individuals develop new modes of moral judgment does not necessarily presuppose that the later structures are more philosophically adequate than their predecessors. For example, a structural transformation could be explained as a function of contingencies of reinforcement with no implication that the new structure provides a sounder moral basis for judgment (than did the former structure). However, suppose purportedly sound philosophical criteria are applied to each of the emergent structures (as did Kohlberg), and it is found that the later structures are also more philosophically adequate. Then psychology would have to explain not merely how and why a structure changes, but also how and why a structure changes into a philosophically better moral structure. A psychologist like Kohlberg explains this by asserting that individuals are "natural philosophers." That is, not only can an individual recognize that another justification is better than one he himself would "spontaneously" give, he *prefers* the better and reconstructs his present structure accordingly. On the other hand, if a psychologist tended toward behaviorism he might claim that an "adequately resolved" moral dilemma is itself a positive reinforcer (or else a means to attaining reinforcement), and this fact is what explains an individual's development of increasingly more adequate modes of resolving moral problems.

8. Kohlberg's research supports this hypothesis. That is, individuals tend to regard as inadequate examples of reasoning which are at stages lower than their present stage, and to give their highest rating to examples of reasoning at a stage (or so) higher than their own present stage.

9. L. Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development," *Cog-*

nitive Development and Epistemology, T. Mischel (ed.), Academic Press, New York; 1971, p. 224.

10. Kohlberg apparently arrived at this position in the following way: he adopted what he thought to be the "neutral" meta-ethical criteria employed by philosophers in determining whethe one normative ethical theory is better than another. Given that applying these philosophical criteria to his identified stages showed that each successive structure better fulfills those criteria than did the previous ones, Kohlberg concluded that these very criteria must be implicit in the process of constructing each new structure. In short, by successfully applying the purportedly neutral criteria of moral philosophy to the observed sequence of structural changes, Kohlberg inferred that the "deep structure" of cognitive moral development parallels the "deep structure" of moral philosophy.

11. Both "post-conventional" rul-theorists (like Kohlberg) and "post-conventional" act-theorists (like Dewey) would agree that "conventional morality" is not an *adequate* way of resolving moral problems. However, in grounding their agreement each would be implying radically different things about conventional and post-conventional morality because of their basic differences regarding the nature of moral judgment and moral justification.

12. Suppose we were to find such a person. If Kohlberg responded by claiming that the fact that such a subject accepts the validity of an exception to his present structure means that he had not really attained stage 6, then we would be warranted in concluding that Kohlberg's apparent "empirical" hypothesis about the stage 6 structure being "the" definition of stage 6 moral reasoning is, after all, unfalsifiable.

13. W.D. Ross, *The Right and The Good*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, Inc., 1930.

14. I would of course claim that it is possible for any man, Kohlberg included, to recognize exceptions to his present structure. The fact that Kohlberg mistakenly (in my view) believes that he cannot do so might, however, explain the psychological fact that he does not do so.

15. If there were exceptions, they would have to be identified by means of an a priori argument establishing that some other definition better fulfills the formalistic criteria than does his own stage 6 structure.

16. L. Kohlberg, pp. 217-218.

17. What is so puzzling about the "philosopher" Kohlberg's a priori stance in ethical theory is that, as a developmental psychologist, he assumes the possibility of structural transformation "upward" for all but stage 6. It just seems "unscientific" for him to rule out even the possibility that a "higher" stage 7 might be constructed by his a priori claim that a "true" stage 6 person could not acknowledge particular cases wherein their present structure is inadequate. Why doesn't he at least leave open that logical possibility?

18. As well as enable us to show why a given post-conventional morality is better than certain alternative post-conventional moral theories.

19. Because ethical rule-theorists believe that sound moral reasoning is defined by a best structure of moral rules, they tend to assume that a philosophical hypothesis about *the* best such definition could not be successfully challenged a posteriori, by appealing to our mature "intuitions" about proposed counter-examples. If each theorist's own preferred structure of moral norms did in fact *define* his own present moral deliberations,

it would in effect rule out his recognition of potential counter-examples. Appreciating this psychological difficulty, ethical rule-theorists tend to assume that formalistic criteria must be used to decide the best of competing definitions of morality.

20. The following scheme shows this strategy:

A. 1 (a). If this x is *not F, Not Y*, or *G*, then this x is *not M*.
1 (b). This x is *F, Y*, or *G*.
2 (a). This x is *F, Y*, or *G*.

Therefore 3 (a). This x is M.

B. 1 (a). If this x is *not F, not Y*, or *G*, then this x is *not M*.
1 (b). This x is *not F, not Y*, or *G*.
2 (b). This x is *not F, not Y*, or *G*.

Therefore 3 (b). This x is *not M*.

21. The "or" in the above hypothetical is the "inclusive" sense of the word. This means that if at least one of the conditions contained in the antecedent is sufficient for the consequent, then the hypothetical would be true. Thus, to agree to a hypothetical whose antecedent is a series of disjuncts is to agree that *at least one* of the antecedent conditions is sufficient for the consequent. The two hypothetical statements resulting from a given moral negotiation may include some antecedents which some of the disputants believe to be untrue or irrelevant. But they can still agree that the two hypotheticals are sound if at least one of the antecedents in each hypothetical is taken to be sufficient for the consequent.

22. For example, consider the following explication resulting from using the method in an actual dispute among students over the legalization of marijuana:

(a) *If* legalizing the use of marijuana would:
1. increase the number of heroin addicts greatly, and /or
2. increase organized crime, and/or
3. weaken the ability of the country to produce,

then legalizing the use of marijuana is not morally justified.

(b) *If* legalizing the use of marijuana would:
1. not increase the number of heroin addicts greatly (because there is no link between marijuana use and subsequent heroin addiction), and/or
2. lead to a loss of income for organized crime, and/or
3. stop the erosion of respect for law which results from large numbers of persons using it, and/or
4. pose no more medical danger to persons than alcohol,

then legalizing the use of marijuana is morally justified.

What the method makes explicit about this particular disagreement over the legalization of marijuana is that it rests on a disagreement about particular factual matters, and could be resolved by simply resolving those factual questions. Thus, the moral dispute need not be considered to involve a disagreement over "matters of moral principle." (This example is from Bernard Rosen, Ohio State Unviersity.)

23. Bernard Rosen, "A Meta-Theory for Ethical Theories," *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 1975.

Response to Bull and Mapel

RATIONALISM IN KOHLBERG'S MORALITY AND MORAL EDUCATION

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Many people are now familiar with a problem encountered in studying Lawrence Kohlberg's thought, namely, that his major public statements are often simpler and more forthright than some of his (a) lesser public statements and (b) views expressed in private conversation. In the present context we are concerned primarily with Kohlberg's major publications which, after all, are having the predominant impact on ideas about morality and moral education. Reference to lesser articles and private conversations may be useful in showing how we can go beyond the official Kohlbergian position but insofar as they are inconsistent with the official position they cannot be used to divert criticism away from it. (The "official position," by the way, should not be confused with the "original position"!)

We know, for example, that Kohlberg has from time to time discussed a possible 7th stage of moral development. However, Brenda Mapel in "An Act-Theory Alternative to Rationalistic Moral Education" rightly concentrates on stage 6 as the capstone of Kohlberg's scheme (while making reference to stage 7) since for all practical purposes stage 6 is the final stage in Kohlberg's official position. Again, some of us may have had discussions with Kohlberg about the relation between justice and benevolence. But Barry Bull in "Kohlberg's Place in a Theory of the Legitimate Role of Value in Public Education" rightly takes Kohlberg to task for his official position that morality and moral education are, in the end, concerned only with justice.

Our task here is not to engage in lengthy debate about what

Kohlberg *really* thinks at this very moment. Rather we must examine the soundness of certain influential ideas that are consistently and with good reason identified with Kohlberg.

I. Excessive Rationalism: Emphasis on Stages

Personally I have no use whatever for moral (or cognitive or religious) stage theories of the Kohlberg type. I am willing to accept that particular individuals go through stages of development in different areas of their life. But I do not think that one can talk either of generalized stages or of universal stages. If I have a criticism of Dr. Mapel's extremely valuable paper it is that she appears willing to leave intact the broad outlines of the moral stage theory. However, one can only do so much in a single paper.

Dr. Mapel makes the very interesting observation that while stages 1-5 are seen by Kohlberg as inadequate and to be superseded, ideally, by stage 6, they already share some of the unfortunate features of a closed, rule-oriented, universalistic stage 6 morality. They, like stage 6, are overly rationalistic. Particular moral judgments should rather be made in accordance with the merits of the particular case.

This means that, even at the earlier stages, students subjected to a Kohlbergian moral education are schooled in a rule- or principle-oriented approach to morality rather than an act-oriented approach. For those who, like Dr. Mapel and myself, favor an act theory of morality this is a matter of concern. From the earliest grade levels students will be biased toward a broadly mistaken view of morality.

II. Excessive Rationalism: Emphasis on Universality

As Dr. Mapel points out from her act-theory perspective, which I accept, there is no such thing as a universal moral rule or principle, even at the highest level of moral insight, and it is a mistake to point children in the direction of ever-increasing universality. Dr. Mapel agrees that moral rules may often be useful devices for organizing one's experiences and thoughts, but only if one expects and indeed systematically seeks out exceptions to them. Once again there is a serious objection both to the Kohlberg ideal of moral development (stage 6) and to the approach to moral problems fostered in children along the way.

It might be objected that many moral rules or principles are indeed universal: how can one deny, for example, that justice is always a good thing or that murder is always wrong? However, the reply of an act theorist is that even where moral rules appear to hold for all people at all times, this is only true by definition. Justice is what is required of one in situations in which issues of the justice-type are raised; and murder is unjustified killing of another human being. But these definitions beg the question. *What* is required of one when justice-type issues are raised, and *when* is killing unjustified? Any descriptive definition of justice or murder will leave room for exceptions to the corresponding rule, and any evaluative definition leaves the rule open to the kind of shift in one's moral rule-structure that Dr. Mapel describes. In either case one should not expect the rule or principle to hold for all people at all times.

III. Excessive Rationalism: Emphasis on Principles (or Rules)

Rationalism in morality and moral education results from becoming bewitched or mesmerised, in the manner described by Wittgenstein, by a particular model of moral problem-solving. One becomes a prisoner of one's own images and can only conceive of the process in terms of applying principles (or rules). In fact many different elements can and do have a legitimate place in moral decision-making: emotions, attitudes, dispositions, intuitions, reflexes and conscience feelings, as well as several more clearly cognitive elements of which principles or rules are only one. It is true that emotions, intuitions and so forth are often judged and modified in the light of principles. But equally principles are often tested and modified by emotions and intuitions. The influence is mutual, and it is difficult to see on what basis one could argue that principles are the higher court of appeal. Human nature and human life are simply not like that.

Among cognitive elements, principles often provide useful initial direction in approaching a moral decision. Because, as we have already noted, one must often make exceptions to principles or make adjustments to one's rule-system, principles (or rules) cannot be followed unquestioningly. However, they can render a decision situation more manageable, clarifying various plausible options that we must consider. Just as a plan of action often serves a useful function in an enterprise even if we finally decide to modify or abandon it, so a principle or rule often serves a useful organizing function even if we do not finally act in accordance with it.

The fundamental problem with principles is that they generalize and stereotype, when in fact each case must be judged on its merits. Rule theorists have often conceptualized dealing with the particular case simply in terms of determining which rule applies. But in fact no rule may apply; or several conflicting rules may apply; or the rule(s) may have to be modified or abandoned; or one's rule-system may have to be adjusted. Rules and cases stand in a relationship of interaction and mutual modification.

It should be noted that I have not been concerned here to distinguish between principles and rules and have used the two terms almost interchangeably. There are useful distinctions to be made between principles and rules but they are not relevant to the present discussion. It might be thought that principles can be universal in a way that rules cannot, either by virtue of being more general or because they can have exceptions built into them. However, the same objections apply: even the most general principle of morality may have to be set aside or modified in the face of a particular instance. Furthermore, a retreat to vaguer and more general principles in the pursuit of universality does morality a disservice, since one needs specific rules and principles in dealing with many of the concrete problems of everyday life. The reduction of morality to a handful, or a fortiori to *one*, very general moral principle as the basis for judgment is the ultimate in impotent moral rationalism. We need a rich fabric of moral principles and rules and, as Dr. Mapel has pointed out, much else besides.

IV. Rationalism in Political Theory and Educational Practice

Barry Bull in his useful paper "Kohlberg's Place in a Theory of the Legitimate Role of Value in Public Education" raises important questions about what should and should not be taught in schools. We must share his concern about "the apparent unwillingness of many contemporary proponents of values education in the public schools to engage in a serious discussion of the ethical acceptability of their recommendations."

Mr. Bull maintains on the one hand that Kohlberg's preoccupation with justice as the single ultimate principle of morality leads to serious neglect of the other major principle of public morality, namely, benevolence. In his moral theory, then, Mr. Bull finds Kohlberg to be too narrow. On the other hand, however, Mr. Bull feels that in his pedagogical practice Kohlberg is too broad in that he moves into areas of personal morality—friendship, for example—that are not the legitimate concern of public schools, and also takes stands on matters that should rather be left open to continued cognitive attention. Mr. Bull is taking Kohlberg to task, quite reasonably, for being inconsistent. He recognizes and endorses Kohlberg's commitment to liberal politics and morality; he recognizes and endorses Kohlberg's commitment to a cognitive, rationalistic approach to morality and moral education; but he feels that in practice Kohlberg is not always faithful to his own position.

A detailed examination of the compatibility of Kohlberg's pedagogical practice with his political and moral position would not be useful at this point. My concerns here are somewhat more general, and besides Kohlberg has not developed a pedagogy in a systematic and comprehensive manner. I take Mr. Bull's chief concern to be to underline the liberal, rationalist position and to steer Kohlberg and the rest of us away from any pedagogy that is contrary to that position. There is need, however, to raise questions about Kohlberg's and Mr. Bull's liberal, rationalist approach to politics and educational policy. In doing so we can draw on some of the points made in earlier sections of this paper.

Liberalism in politics may be seen as a natural outgrowth of rationalism in morality. Humans are seen as properly responding only to reason and in particular to justified universal principles of right and wrong. Accordingly, if they are exposed to appropriate principles and related information and then given a peaceful, ordered context in which to make political and moral decisions, they will do so wisely. The political leaders who, more than anyone else, have been favored with a principled upbringing, a broad education, and a peaceful, ordered life will tend to make wise decisions of universal acceptability in those areas that affect the general good; but as a check on their judgment the general populace should be given an opportunity to understand the issues and make suggestions about what is to be done.

With a maximum of light and a minimum of heat, things will work out.

From this vantage point, the school is not a political institution but rather a neutral resource available to all to facilitate enlightened thinking on every side. The school should not be used to press any particular political or moral position; at most it should stimulate the natural development of students in moral reasoning. Further, within the school one should not use non-rational procedures to persuade students to adopt particular moral views; rather one should expose them to information and ideas and thought-provoking moral dilemmas so that they will be able freely to gravitate toward sound moral principles.

In fact, of course, the world is not like this. Political leaders and followers are influenced by a wide range of considerations and forces. Leaders do not naturally act in the interests of the whole. The general populace is notoriously vulnerable to manipulation. Nor is there some homeostatic state of rationality and universal concern to which society may be gently encouraged to return. Society is a complex of competing interest groups in constant tension, and in order to keep it from flying apart different groups and agencies often engage in remedial measures that are far from gentle. Within this context, the school is never neutral; it is always being used by various individuals and groups to further their own interests, often to the detriment of others. It is often an instrument of oppression rather than liberation, of manipulation rather than enlightenment.

Within the school, again, one is not dealing with a neutral, peaceful, well-ordered state of affairs. Students are already being heavily indoctrinated in both public and personal matters. The teachers have their own interests; and at the same time they are under pressure to serve the interests of other individuals and groups through what they do to students. A neutral approach to moral issues cannot possibly succeed in such an environment. Further, because morality has many non-principled, non-cognitive roots, a rationalistic moral education program operating only at the cognitive level and directed toward the acceptance of a handful of universal principles cannot have a significant impact, except to reinforce a liberal ideology that it is in certain people's interests to maintain.

To conclude: a rationalist, universalist, purely principled approach to morality and moral education is untenable; and its natural accompaniment, a liberal approach to politics and education, is naive and ineffective. A more adequate approach is one that acknowledges the complexity of the basis of morality, the interactive relationship between particular cases and general moral principles and ideas, and the constant state of tension and conflict in society and the school that makes a neutral approach to moral education impossible. This alternative scenario should not lead to alarm or despair: it provides a basis for interest, challenge and even exhilaration. However, it does indicate the kinds of approaches and instruments we need if we are to work effectively in moral education in society and in the schools.

ARE CONCEPTS ACQUIRED BY IDENTIFYING THE COMMON PROPERTIES OF OBJECTS?

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Anyone who hopes to study concept acquisition is confronted by two formidable problems. The first problem is posed by the extraordinary complexity of the phenomenon and the enormous number of unknowns that must be faced in formulating any questions about it. As a result of this problem, exceptions can be found to practically any statement about concept development. The second problem is posed by the vagueness and ambiguity of the terms commonly employed in describing concept acquisition. As a result of this latter problem, any statement about concept formation is likely to be open to multiple interpretation.

I propose to probe the question of how concepts are acquired by considering a deceptively simple statement: "Concepts are acquired by identifying the common properties of objects." I shall argue that depending on how each of the key terms in this statement is interpreted, this view could be ascribed to psychologists as diverse in their thinking as Tracy Kendler, J.J. Gibson, and Katherine Nelson. The philosophical assumptions underlying the theories of these psychologists are derived from sources as diverse as the British empiricists, Aristotle and Kant. My analysis of the hypothesis that concepts are acquired by identifying common properties of objects will have three components. First, it will outline the kinds of questions which a view of concept acquisition must attempt to answer. Next, it will relate these questions to three variant interpretations of the hypothesis. It will describe the changing theoretical commitments which lead to such interpretations, and raise problems which are unresolved by these views of concept development. Finally, it will suggest an alternative direction for the study of concept development.

The first task in attempting to make sense out of the hypothesis before us is to consider the kinds of questions that a view of concept acquisition should attempt to answer. Any adequate theory about how concepts develop must come to grips with six interrelated questions about the nature of concepts.

Defining a Concept

The most obvious of these six questions is: what is a concept? Answers to this question tend to emphasize one of three different views of concepts: referential views, mental entity views, and dispositional views. Referential views of concepts assert that the concept derives its meaning from the entities referred to by the concept—by its extension. In such views, the concept is either considered to be a category, set or class or a *label* for a category, set or class. Many empiricist and associationistic views of concept formation hold that a concept is a class label. While this view of concepts may seem appealing, it runs into difficulty with certain types of concepts: (a) concepts with no referent, such as unicorn; (b) different concepts which have a single referent, such as the morningstar and the evening star, and (c) concepts which do not have fixed referents, such as "this" or "whom."

Those who wish to stress the independence of concepts from linguistic labels often view concepts as mental entities. Thus Katherine Nelson has argued that concepts are "cognitive organizations of information about objects and events,"[1] and D. Bob Gowin has argued that a concept is a symbol pointing to regularities in events.[2] The difficulty with theories of concepts as mental entities is that they raise the question of how such entities exist in the head. A major problem with this view of concepts is that it is rooted in the tradition of Kantian Idealism. Once one places the source of categorization within the head, it becomes difficult to prove that the rest of the world is not "in the head" too. Thus the trick is to explain entities which exist only in the head (a difficulty with referential views of concepts) while maintaining philosophical realism (a difficulty with mental entity views of concepts).

Largely to avoid problems of this nature, many have urged dispositional views of concepts, views which focus on the use of concepts. But these accounts tend to run into difficulty when they attempt to describe a particular domain of activities as crucial to the usage of a concept. For example, some, pursuing a verificationist view of meaning, have identified concepts with the ability to verify an instance of a given concept. This verificationist approach is sympathetic to a view of concepts as rules for class inclusion. Two major difficulties with this verificationist account of concepts can be raised. First, many concepts such as game, furniture, and breakfast do not have clear rules for class inclusion. It appears to be genuinely impossible to verify whether a person arising at 3:00 PM and eating a hearty meal consisting of an orange blossom cocktail, eggs benedict, and strawberry shortcake is in fact eating breakfast. Second, many people have concepts of entities without possessing the ability to verify instances of them. I know a fair amount about jade, and may be said to have a concept of jade, but I am unable to verify whether the Chinese statue given me by my grandmother is in fact jade or jadite.

A popular alternative to the problems of this verificationist account of concepts is to identify concepts with the ability to use words correctly. Hilary Putnam is a well known proponent of this view of concepts. The influence of the later Wittgenstein is undoubtedly at work here, although Wittgenstein's word usage approach to meaning was an attempt to explain the meaning of words rather than the meaning of concepts. At any rate, psychologists seem now to be turning to this strategy also, as evidenced by an important new work by George Miller and Philip Johnson-Laird, *Language and Perception.*[3] In this book the authors examine referential and verificationist accounts of concept acquisition, find them wanting, and then conclude by arguing for a word usage approach to concepts similar to that of Putnam.

However, this alternative dispositional view of concepts suffers from definition of concepts entirely in terms of word use. This view appears to conflict with Miller's own work on the concept of pastness,[4] as well as with recent work by Eleanor Rosch on childhood categorization[5] and by Katherine Nelson on concrete concepts.[6] All of this recent research suggests that the formation of a concept *precedes* the use of the appropriate words for the concept. An excellent example of this line of research is the elegant analysis by George Miller of what it would take for a child to learn the concept of pastness from cues provided by the language. Miller's conclusion is that the linguistic patterns used to indicate pastness are so complex that a child who did not already have a concept of pastness would be incapable of acquiring it through linguistic cues. So it would appear that each of the three views of concepts—referential, mental entity and usage—is fraught with difficulties.

Having a Concept and Recognizing Concept Attainment

The next two questions are closely related to each other as well as to the previous question. What does it mean to have the concept of x? How does one recognize when someone has the concept of x? Depending on what one thinks a concept is, *having* the concept of x might be: (a) the ability to recognize instances, (b) the ability to appropriately label new instances, (c) knowledge of the critierial attributes of x, (d) ability to verify an instance of x, (e) ability to use the word properly in normal conversation, (f) the ability to apply new information to the concept, or (g) the ability to make inferences based on the concept. In many cases, these same criteria could be used to *recognize* when someone has the concept of x. However the criterial attribute requirement illustrates the distinction between the two questions. A person who holds that having a concept entails knowledge of its criterial attributes might be willing to accept recognition of new instances as evidence for concept attainment. On the other hand, he might require some further evidence, such as ability to itemize those criteria. The former question concerns the criteria for concept attainment; the latter question concerns the criteria for evidence of concept attainment.

To ask what criteria are adequate to indicate concept attainment is to ask what criteria are *sufficient* to indicate concept attainment. One needs further to ask if any of these criteria are *necessary* to indicate concept attainment. The previous discussion of the difficulties of defining excatly what a concept is should indicate how problematic it is to specify any necessary criteria for the indication of concept attainment. For example, consider the concept of gold. I am not sure whether I could identify a piece of gold correctly. I might easily mistake gold colored metal for gold. Similarly, I might easily mistake gold ore for pyrite. I do not know that I can cite the criterial attributes for gold other than the common stereotypes of color and malleability. I doubt that I could properly verify that a piece of gold colored metal presented to me was actually gold. I *can* use the word properly; but to claim this criterion as necessary is to rule out a child's acquisition of concepts prior to linguistic competence. I might not be able to apply certain kinds of highly technical information to my concept of gold. So it would appear that the task of specifying what it means to have a concept is as problematic as that of defining what a concept is.

The Process of Concept Acquisition

The fourth question concerns the nature of the processes entailed in concept acquisition. According to the classic stimulus-response view, concept acquisition occurs by association of a percept to a word. The attainment of a concept involves a *quantitative cataloging of instances* rather than a qualitative abstraction of characteristics. A more sophisticated variant of this view hypothesizes an association between an instance and a class term. The addition of classification and set theory permits concepts to be related to each other in class hierarchies. The Kendlers' work on concept development is characteristic of this approach. So also are most of the studies known in pyschology as "concept identification" studies. All of these studies employ a common research methodology. They present subjects with a series of stimuli containing two or more sets of criterial attributes and ask the subjects to determine which set of criterial attributes corresponds to a particular nonsense word. For example, a subject might be given 24 wooden shapes, consisting of 4 different shapes, 2 different sizes and 3 different colors. The small blue circle might be marked LEV.[8] It would be the child's task to learn through trial and error that LEV referred to all small circles. In the minds of many researchers the task presented to this subject is equivalent to the process of attaining a concept. Although this methodology has been widely employed by cognitive psychologists,[9] it reflects two key assumptions of associationistic views of concept formation. The first is that concept acquisition consists of the process of associating a percept to a word. The second assumption is that the stimuli and the responses are essentially random events which depend on reinforcement patterns for their association.

Perhaps the strongest critics of this view of stimuli are J. J. and E. J. Gibson.[10, 11] They argue that the basic mistake of a behaviorist account of learning is its tacit assumption that stimuli occur randomly in the world. Instead, they argue that the world is ordered, and that it presents ordered stimuli to individuals. Perceptual events come as ordered wholes, they claim; thus perception involves a continuous processing of ordered stimuli and a continuous response to them. This processing results in an *abstraction* of the common properties and invariant perceptual relationships of the objects and events experienced. For the Gibsons a concept is an abstraction which results from *analysis* of ordered wholes, rather than from a cataloging of associations. This view that the world has a distinctive order and that conceptualization occurs by analysis appears to depend on the assumption that wholes can be distinguished in the first place. This assumption comes close to the old Aristotelian notion that the world has joints. If the world has joints, then the individual wholes can be analyzed and the meaning extracted from them.

But if the world does not have joints, then how is the process to be explained? Katherine Nelson has suggested that concept acquisition may involve a two-step process of synthesis followed by analysis.[12] In her account of how children acquire natural language concepts such as "ball," she has argued that the first phase of concept development occurs when a child attends to the functional characteristics of an entity and thereby perceives the entity as an organized whole. In the case of "ball," for instance, the child notices that it rolls, that it bounces, and that his mother throws it back and forth with him. Once this crucial synthesis has occurred, the child can analyze the whole and abstract the perceptual attributes which produce the key functional attributes. Only later is a label attached to the concept. The difficulty with this view of concept development is that it fails to explain how such a synthesis could occur at all without some analysis of perceptual attributes. A more reasonable approach to concept development might be that synthesis and analysis occur together, and that perceptual and functional attributes are abstracted together. This view appears close to the theory of concept learning proposed by Eleanor Rosch in her essay, "Classification and Real World Objects."[13]

Still another account of concept acquisition would identify it with an integration into the developing system of language. According to this view, a word acts as far more than a label; it acts as a key to an intricate system of information. For example, if my friend tells me that he saw a lillibet yesterday in the botanical gardens, I immediately know a good deal about what a lillibet is likely to be. The recent work of Miller and Johnson-Laird mentioned earlier reflects this line of approach.

These conflicting accounts of the process of concept acquisition raise significant doubt about whether the process is really a have or have/not process at all. Not only is it extremely difficult to specify when the process begins, but it is often equally difficult to specify when the process is completed. There are many concepts such as energy and justice which are used by nearly everyone, yet fully developed by nearly no one. It is not clear when such concepts may be said to be acquired. In such cases the term "concept development" may provide a more adequate description of the process that the finite term "concept acquisition."

Characteristics of Conceptual Change and Growth

How one views the process of concept acquisition will determine in part how one views the characteristics of conceptual change and growth. One key issue which has been raised already is the problem of whether the process of concept acquisition can or should be distinguished from the process of conceptual growth. Another key issue is whether conceptual growth involves mainly a quantitative process of differentiation and articulation, or whether it involves successive qualititative reorganizations. The former view leads to continuous "bigger and better" views of conceptual growth such as those of Nelson and Rosch. The latter leads to discontinuous or even stage-related views of conceptual change such as that of Piaget. If one holds that concepts are subject to reorganization, then it becomes pertinent to ask what pressures stimulate conceptual reorganization. How is collateral information used in developing concepts? If concepts function like theories with einstullung effects, then some collateral information may be ignored as irrelevant, or resisted as anomalous. The uncertain status of anomalous information may persist until the utility of the existing conceptual structure is called into question or until a better alternative structure becomes available.

Relations Between Concepts

The consideration of how concepts change brings up the further question of how concepts are related to each other. The naive associationist would argue that concepts are tied by simple association linkages. The more sophisticated associationist would argue that these linkages form hierarchial structures. Others such as Eleanor Rosch would contend that concepts are more loosely connected in multiple levels of organization. For example, Rosch maintains that certain concepts are "primary level" concepts—concepts which provide the most information for the least cognitive effort. Consider the three concepts, plant, tree and birch. According to Rosch, "tree" constitutes a primary level concept. She argues that it is the primary level concepts which are acquired first through the acquisition of rich information afforded by prototypical instances.[14] While the description of such structures provides a fascinating subject for speculation, unfortunately, most of the hypotheses about conceptual relations or cognitive structures tend to suffer from similar difficulties: (a) They assume the existence of clearly organized conceptual networks. (b) They assume that some single system relates the concepts. (c) They assume that the concepts being related consist of unitary mental entities. (d) They avoid consideration of the logical status of the relationships. Are the relationships dependent on truth value, or meaning, or class inclusion rules? (e) They tend to confound the logical relationships with relationships of psychological function, and with the actual physical relationships that may obtain in the brain as thinking occurs.[15]

I have outlined six questions which are crucial to the investigation of conceptual development. (1) What is a concept? (2) What does it mean to have attained the concept of x? (3) How does one recognize concept acquisition? (4) What processes characterize concept acquisition? (5) What are the characteristics of conceptual change and growth? (6) What are the relations between concepts? When these questions can be adequately answered, we shall have a successful account of conceptual development. Until they are answered at all, we can not interpret even the simplest assertion about concept development.

Now let us return to our orginal hypothesis concerning concept development: that concepts are acquired by identifying the common properties of objects. Depending on what is meant by "concepts," by "acquired," by "identifying" and by "common properties," this statement might mean:

H_1: Class labels are learned by repeatedly associating labels with objects and by catologing the perceptual attributes of those objects.

This is a standard associationist view of concept development. It might have been written by Tracy Kendler. It employs a referential view of concepts, a quantiative notion of conceptual development, and a criterial attribute view of concept acquisition. It assumes a world in which no particular order can be accepted as given. Its philosophical roots lie in empiricism. It implies an epistemology based on sensory data, and a theory of meaning based on extension.

H_2: Cognitive abstractions are formed by analyzing the distinctive features and invariant sensory relationships of events.

This is a Gibsonian interpretation of the same hypothesis. It assumes that cognitive growth is a qualitative change produced by a continuous process involving greater and greater differentiation of sensory information. It assumes a world with a distinct order which produces unambiguous sensory information to permit detection of that order. It is a strongly realistic view of cognition. Its roots go back to Aristotle and the notion that the world is divided into clear and distinct units which can be apprehended as wholes. Its assumption that even infants can directly apprehend these wholes rests on a nativist rather than environmentalist view of learning.

H_3: Cognitive organizations are developed by analyzing and synthesizing the functional and perceptual characteristics of objects.

This is a hypothesis that might be accepted by Katherine Nelson or Eleanor Rosch. Like the Gibsonian hypothesis, it assumes that cognitive growth involves a continuous process of greater and greater differentiation. But it assumes that conceptual growth is an integrative process as well, involving synthesis as well as analysis. It assumes a world in which certain features are more salient than others and one in which certain perceptual and functional features tend to co-occur with regularity. However, it does not rule out the possibility of ambiguous information which must be inferentially interpreted to be meaningful.

The theoretical assumptions of this position appear to derive from a refutation of two major premises of behaviorism: first, that concepts are formed by associations of random responses to random stimuli; and second, that thought is dependent on linguistic labeling—i.e., that thinking is merely internalized speech. However the philosophical roots of this position appear to be much older, dating back to Kant.

I maintain that the first two hypotheses are fundamentally in error about concept development. The third hypothesis appears to be valid only as a description of one aspect of the development of some concepts.

An associationist view of concept development fails to account for the enormous inferential power of concepts given three peculiarities of concepts: (a) given that necessary and sufficient criterial attributes do not exist for many concepts, (b) given that most concepts do not permit classification into neat hierarchial structures of knowledge, and (c) given that many people form concepts on the basis of an extremely limited number of instances. Furthermore, it is a highly uneconomical view of learning. Given the enormous amount of order that exists in the world, it seems unlikely that the human brain would not have evolved to make more sophisticated use of this information.

On the other hand, a view of concept acquisition which is based on the assumption that entities are apprehended directly as individual wholes from birth also suffers from epistemological and empirical weaknesses. It too runs into difficulty accounting for the enormous number of concepts that have fuzzy boundaries or perhaps no boundaries at all. It must contend with cases of perceptual ambiguity. It must further contend with T.G.R. Bower's perceptual research on infants which indicates that at least one Gestalt principle (proximity) is learned, not inherent.[16] Its extreme emphasis on stimuli information probably fails to account for the role of inference in expectation and perception.

The third hypothesis manages to avoid some of the difficulties of the more extreme second position by giving up the contention that the structure of the world is completely explicit. Instead, it is based on the assumption that some features of the world are more salient and less ambiguous than others. The infant can sieze on these outstanding examples, and through the joint processes of analysis and synthesis, can come to learn how perceptual cues and functional cues co-occur. This seems to be a reasonable explanation of how some concept learning occurs—particularly childhood acquisition of natural language concepts involving concrete objects. It also seems to be supported by the studies of Rosch and Mervis on infant classification strategies.[18]

However a major difficulty with this hypothesis is that it is not appropriate for many kinds of conceptual learning. It completely avoids the enormous role of language in creating and transmitting concepts. All kinds of concepts can be acquired without ever encountering instances—unicorn, Russian history, and quark for example. But this account of concept acquisition also fails to explain certain concepts which are obtained prelinguistically. Consider the concepts of pastness, negation, remembrance, inclusion and exclusion. It is not clear that this account explains how such concepts are acquired. Finally, the mental entity view of concepts expressed in this hypothesis leaves it open to the charge of idealism.

In summary, an adequate account of concept acquisition would seem to have to meet a stiff set of requirements. (1) It must assume that concepts are more than categories or class rules. Rich concepts enable inferences in ways that simple classification rules do not. For example, a person driving along a fault line and coming to a profusion of electrical towers can infer the presence of a dam or waterfall, and therefore the presence of water. Yet there is nothing in the classification rules for water that would entail such a conclusion. (2) It must assume that there is more to concepts than the ability to use words. There is a large and growing body of evidence which demonstrates the existence of preverbal concepts. (3) It must assume that there is more to concepts than the ability to verify instances. How many people do you know who could actually verify an instance of jade? (4) It must be based on a realistic assessment of the information provided by the world. The world provides an enormous amount of complex and well ordered information, but it also provides information which can be ambiguous or vague. (5) It must deal with concepts that have fuzzy boundaries and concepts that have no necessary or sufficient criteria. (6) It must deal with concepts that have one instance, such as Minoan civilization, and concepts that have no instances at all, such as unicorn and the present king of France. (7) It must account for conceptual relations without forcing such relations into rigid hierarchies or logically consistent sets of propositions. (8) It must account for the remarkably generative and inferential power of concepts. It must account for inductive as well as deductive inference, and even for non-logical types of inference such as metaphor. (9) It must account for the social assumptions underlying concepts and conceptual development—what Hilary Putnam has called social division of labor. Children and adults alike rely on the conceptual knowledge of those whom they consider to be experts. (10) It must account for the enormous effect of language on concept development.

This set of requirements is not met by the three variant hypotheses about concept acquisition analyzed here. Furthermore, it would seem that none of the accounts of concept development reviewed earlier meets all these requirements. The solution to the search for an acceptible account of concept development still eludes us.

As I see it, we have several options of responding to this dilemma. One option is to accept the fact that "concept" is an extremely broad term covering a multitude of ambiguous meanings, and then to attempt to construct a definition broad enough to subsume all its various meanings. The problem with this approach is that the resulting definition would be so broad as to be vacuous. Not only would it fail to convey the richness of meaning conveyed by the term "concept," but it would also fail to offer any assistance to those attempting to explore processes of concept development.

A second option is to plod doggedly onward, and to review various combinations of responses to the questions of concept development in the hope that somehow a satisfactory synthesis of views could be achieved—a synthesis which would yield a single description specific enough to be meaningful, yet flexible enough to account for all cases of concept acquisition. I believe that the preceding discussion of the difficulties of framing adequate responses to these questions suggests that such an attempt would prove futile.

It would seem that a more plausible approach to the dilemma is to abandon the attempt to describe as a unitary process what in fact is a multifaceted phenomenon. I suggest that the difficulty encountered in attempting to define a concept is due to the fact that "concept" is itself an example of what Putnam and others have called a cluster concept.

A cluster concept is a concept which is multifaceted, which has fuzzy boundaries, and for which no single set of necessary or sufficient criteria can be specified. My critique of current views of concepts has demonstrated how each of these characteristics applies to the concept of a concept. I have described how each of these accounts is too narrow to explain certain facets of conceptual activity. I have discussed the difficulties with attempting to determine necessary and sufficient criteria for the acquisition of a concept. And I have illustrated how concepts have fuzzy boundaries by pointing out how hard it is to specify exactly when one has acquired a concept. Thus it does seem that "concept" exhibits the characteristics of a cluster concept.

Once the problem is viewed in this light, something like a Gestalt shift occurs when one considers anew the question of how to investigate concept acquisition. The glass that was half empty now appears half full. It now appears that instead of searching for one account of concepts and for one description of concept development, researchers should be examining how different concepts develop in different ways, in different individuals, in different learning environments. This may sound like an innocuous conclusion, but it is not. It threatens nearly every major psychological account of concept acquisition—not only those of Kendler, Rosch and Nelson, but also those of Vygotsky[18] and Piaget.[19] These accounts are threatened because they all seek to identify the one, the true process of concept acquisition. And it is accounts such as these which inform much of the recent work in curriculum development.

Nevertheless, I believe that it is clear that the time has come to recognize that "concept" is itself an example of a cluster concept, for which no set of necessary or sufficient criteria can be itemized. If indeed that time has come, then the time has also come to abandon the search for the-one-the-true-the-only account of concept acquisition.

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1. Katherine Nelson, "Concept, Word and Sentence," *Psychological Review* 81 (1974): 268.

2. D. Bob Gowin, *The Structure of Knowledge*, unpublished manuscript.

3. George Miller and Philip N. Johnson-Laird, *Language and Perception* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 691-707.

4. Ibid.

5. Eleanor Rosch and Carolyn B. Mervis, "Family Resemblances; Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories," *Cognitive Psychology* 7 (1975):

573-605.

6. Nelson, "Concept, Word and Sentence," pp. 267-285.

7. Tracy Kendler, "Concept Formation," *Annual Review of Psychology* 13 (1961): 447-72.

8. In this case, the label LEV is not completely nonsensical. It is the first name of Vygotsky, who pioneered this experimental procedure in the thirties. See Lev S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language* (Cambridge, Mass: M.I. Press, 1962) Chapter 5.

9. The technique was popularized by Bruner in the fifties, and is still the dominant methodology for the study of concepts. See J.S. Bruner, J.J. Goodenow and G.A. Austin, *A Study of Thinking* (New York: Wiley, 1956) pp. 81-125. For a review of recent studies employing this methodology see Edith D. Neimark and John L. Santa, "Thinking and Concept Attainment," *Annual Review of Psychology* 26 (1975): pp. 173-205.

10. James J. Gibson, *The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966) pp. 7-31.

11. Eleanor J. Gibson, *Principles of Perceptual Learning and Development* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969) pp. 153-54.

12. Nelson, "Concept, Word and Sentence," pp. 275-80.

13. Eleanor Rosch, "Classifications of Real-World Objects: Origins and Representations in Cognition," in *Bulletin de Psychologie* (special issue on semantic memory), ed. S. Ehrlich and E. Tulving (in press)

14. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

15. To be sure, this latter objection need not be problematic, since the functionalist account of psychological explanation put forth by Jerry Fodor permits some confounding of these issues. Fodor has demonstrated that differences in the physical instantiation of two systems can be considered to be irrelevant as long as the two systems are functionally equivalent. However, an uncritical blurring of the distinctions between logical relationships, cognitive relationships, and physical relationships tends to lead the psychologist toward one of two hazards of the functionalist approach. On the one hand, he may err by giving in to the temptation to make unwarrented assertions about the nature of physical relationships which produce the functioning of cognitive structures. On the other hand, completely ignoring the question of the physical relationships which are likely to produce the cognitive functions may lead to an uncritical devotion to inappropriate metaphors for conceptual structures, and hence lead the investigator to propose increasingly unrealistic explanations of cognitive functioning. As a matter of fact, Neisser has leveled this charge against recent information processing approaches to cognitive structure. See Jerry A. Fodor, *Psychological Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology* (New York: Random House, 1968 pp. 121-52: and Ulrich Neisser, *Cognition and Reality* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1976) pp. 6-7.

16. T.G.R. Bower, "Determinants of Perceptual Unity in Infancy," *Psychonomic Science* 3 (1965): 323-24, and T.G.R. Bower, "Phenomenal Identity and Form Perception in an Infant," *Perception and Psychophysics* 2 (1967): 74-76.

17. Eleanor Rosch and Carolyn B. Mervis, unpublished research on infant classification, as reported by Roger Brown, "Toward a New Paradigm of the Development of Concepts," address to the Symposium in Memory of

Eric H. Lenneberg, Cornell University, May 21, 1976.

18. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language*, Chapters IV, V, and VI.

19. Jean Piaget and Barbel Inhelder, *The Psychology of the Child* (New York: Basic Books, 1969) pp. 43-50.

CONCEPTS AND SCOUNDRELS: A COMMENTARY ON DE JONGHE

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There has been a great deal of discussion at this present conference concerning the future of our profession and the role that should be played by philosophers of education. I thought I would give you my own views on this weighty topic, by way of introducing my comments on the paper by Lynn Sargent De Jonghe.

While I was still residing in Australia, I had on my university office wall a symbolic painting—the portrait of a toreador. It was symbolic not because it depicted a romantic, handsome, somewhat enigmatic figure (not unlike the picture's owner), but because it represented the task of the philosopher of education—we are all bullfighters. However, upon moving to the United States, and particularly upon joining this Philosophy of Education Society, I realized that a new image was required for the new milieu in which I found myself. I came to see the philosopher of education as being a Clark Kent, a mild-mannered worker in Metropolis who on occasion dashed into a phonebooth, stripped down to the red and blue costume, and sallied forth with a great deal of hustle and pep[1] to fight for truth, justice, and the American way.

Unfortunately, you will see me in neither guise today. For, trying as diligently as I could, I was not able to find any significant bull to fight in Ms. De Jonghe's paper, and I could detect no affronts to truth, justice, or the American way. The paper was clear and competent both in overall design and in execution.

Ms. De Jonghe is concerned to point out that when a person acquires a concept, and when we want to investigate what has taken place during this process, there are a number of crucial questions to be answered—namely, what *is* a concept, what does it mean to have attained a concept, how can concept acquisition be recognized, and so forth. And Ms. De Jonghe points out that researchers who at first sight seem to hold the same view (e.g., that concepts are acquired by identifying the common properties of objects), often upon examination turn out to hold quite divergent views because they count different things as concepts, and so on.

From a philosophical point-of-view I find nothing abhorrent about her discussion of these questions.[2] Her case could perhaps be strengthened just a little by referring to recent work in philosophy of science. Imre Lakatos and others have shown that, in order to get a research program under way, scientists have to make a number of methodological decisions and agree upon the rules of the particular game they are playing.[3] I take it that this is essentially the point Ms. De Jonghe wants to make in the first part of her paper—researchers cannot investigate the process of concept acquisition unless they make certain decisions falling in the six areas she has listed.

However, on the other hand, I do find that Ms. De Jonghe gets too deeply philosophical too quickly! There are some important confusions to be found in the research literature that *ought* to be clarified, and which *can* be tackled without diving into the quagmire of whether a concept is a mental entity or a disposition and so on. In other words, I am suggesting that raising deeper philosophical issues is not always the best way to throw light on a question. I am reminded of a paper one of my students reported coming across in a recent guidance and counseling journal. The authors of the paper concluded, after detailed research, that close-minded people change their views less frequently than open-minded people! Now, it would not be philosophically wrong to criticize, say, the concept of mind held by these researchers, but it would be relatively pointless in view of the fact that there is an easier critical route to take. I think that the same holds true of Ms. De Jonghe's paper.

Let me be more specific. When I read Jean Piaget, for example, and I am troubled by his many references to cognition, to conceptual development, and the like, I am not usually bothered by whether or not he is a referentialist or a mental-entity man. Indeed, these issues are a diversion. What troubles me is a little more down-to-earth: in an interview he once gave for the popular periodical *Psychology Today*, for example, in a very short space Piaget identified set theory in mathematics, the physical principle of conservation of matter, the "principle" of object permanence,[4] and the notions of "long" and "short," as all being concepts.[5] Ms. De Jonghe herself—accurately reflecting the literature, of course—does much the same, and her examples of concepts run from "gold" and "jade," through "breakfast," to "quarks" and "unicorns."

Taking the liberty of putting a little order into the literature, I arrive at the following tentative list of things that are sometimes identified as concepts, irrespective of whether they are interpreted as mental entities or dispositions or are taken in a referential mode:

- words
- ideas about common objects (sometimes called "concrete concepts")
- the "pictures" that one has "in mind"
- Relatively well-defined classes or categories (for example, the class of "jade" or of "gold")
- relatively fuzzy categories or classes (such as "breakfast" or "democracy")
- laws and principles of science ("conservation")
- theories or theoretical entities ("quark," "dielectric constant," "entropy")
- empty sets ("unicorn").

Modestly, I claim that this approach—and in particular this list—is somewhat more revealing than the route Ms. De Jonghe takes (although, as it will eventuate, we end up at nearly the same destination). For I believe my list of types of concepts raises doubts about whether the word "concept" performs any useful work at all. And, also, a number of other crucial issues are brought into sharp focus.

First, it becomes apparent that in many of the categories that I have listed it is completely arbitrary what is to count as having "mastered" or "acquired" a concept in that category. There is, I suppose, only relatively little room to maneuver with words—either the person knows a word and can use it in appropriate contexts, or she or he cannot. And the person can either identify particular common objects (a particular ketchup bottle, or a favorite pencil) or she or he cannot. But, as Ms. De Jonghe shows, it is relatively arbitrary whether we say she has a concept of the class of jade objects or not. And with the principle of conservation of matter—has a person acquired this concept if she does not understand the complex role it plays in science, the reasons why scientists adhere to the principle and so on? Have you acquired the concept of an electron, or of a quark, or of entropy, if you do not comprehend the theories and the evidence that is relevant? Percisely *how much* of the relevant theory do you need to comprehend, however, before you can claim to have acquired one of these concepts? *There seems no non-arbitrary way of answering this question.*

The issues here can probably be put even more strongly. The list of types of concepts that I have devised makes clear that these different types have quite different uses: a concrete concept must be linked to objects in the real world (for normal usages, the concept of a particular ketchup bottle is useful because of a real ketchup bottle that exists); a concept referring to a class ("gold," or "jade objects," or "ketchup bottles in general") is a useful concept in so far as rules for class membership exist (this is ignoring, for sake of brevity, the complications due to the recent work of Kripke, Putnam and others[6]); while theoretical concepts ("quark," "entropy," "dielectric constant") become viable by way of the theories or paradigms in which they are embedded. Thus, acquisition of these different types of concept will involve different things, although again it is not clear how *much* theory has to be known before a theoretical concept can be said to have been acquired, or how *many* of the class-inclusion rules must be known before the class concept of "gold" or "jade" or "unicorn" can be said to have been grasped. I think my rough typology of concepts is a more fruitful framework than Ms. De Jonghe's, which involves asking whether concepts are mental entities or whether they must be given a dispositional analysis.

Furthermore it is apparent from all this that it would be very bold to claim that there can be *one* account given to cover all types of concept acquisition. (It may or may not be true, but it is certainly bold at this stage of our knowledge). It is certainly possible that the way in which children acquire "concrete" or (as Stephan Körner calls them[7]) "ostensive" concepts is quite different from the way in which they acquire general concepts, let alone theoretical or scientific ones. In one case it perhaps can be done by pointing, but an electron or entropy is not like a ketchup bottle.

The general unhelpfulness of the research literature on concept acquisition also becomes clear. In a fine survey of the research, which was made some years ago but which is still very pertinent, John B. Carroll showed that the way concept acquisition is studied in the laboratory (and Ms. De Jonghe, too, refers to these studies) is not a particularly relevant guide to teachers to help them in their work of presenting new concepts to children:

> There is a gap between the findings of psychologists on the conditions under which very simple "concepts" are learned in the psychological laboratory and the experiences of teachers in teaching the "for real" concepts that are contained in the curricula of the schools. It is not self-evident that there is any continuity at all between learning "DAX" as the name of a certain geometrical shape of a certain colour and learning the meaning of the word longitude.[8]

What is the upshot of all this? Ms. De Jonghe moves in the right direction, but she does not move far enough. She concludes from her formulations that the concept of a concept is itself a "cluster" concept—there is no one feature that all concepts have in common, but rather there is a set of "family characteristics" (to put it in the Wittgensteinian jargon) and some individual concepts have some of the family features while other concepts bear other characteristics from the family cluster. In matters such as this it is otiose to talk of proving one's viewpoint; all that can be done is put the view forward and rely on its suggestiveness or fruitfulness to carry the day. My own viewpoint which I offer in this spirit is that there *is no* useful family cluster of characteristics that mark off the class of "concepts." Rather, I endorse the words of P.L. Heath: "The term concept is thus essentially a dummy expression or variable, whose meaning is assignable only in the context of a theory, and cannot be independently ascertained."[9]

To put it slightly less charitably, whenever an author uses the term "concept," by itself this may not be sufficient to indicate precisely what was intended. The term is (in Ryle's expression) systematically misleading, and it is tempting to paraphrase Dr. Johnson's famous dictum that "Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel" to indicate a similar judgment about philosophers who lightly toss this term about.

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1. Compare with the characterization of American psychologists given

by Bertrand Russell in his *An Outline of Philosophy* (London, 1948 reprint), pp. 32-3.

2. I was a little puzzled as to why she identified certain people or viewpoints as falling into certain camps; the view that a concept is a class *label* is identified as a referential view, while Gowin's view that a concept is a *symbol* is classified as a mental-entity theory. Whether or not this suggests that labels are not symbolic is not clear.

3. Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs," in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge University Press, 1976), esp. pp. 103-116.

4. I use quote marks here because of course not all objects are permanent, so it is hardly a *solid* principle. (Consider clouds, puffs of smoke, drops of water, lumps of ice, and so on).

5. Elizabeth Hall, "A conversation with Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder," in Robert E. Schell (ed.), *Readings in Developmental Psychology Today*, Second Edition, (N.Y., Random House, 1977).

6. See Stephen P. Schwartz (ed.), *Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1977).

7. See Stephan Körner, *Conceptual Thinking: A Logical Enquiry* (N.Y., Dover, 1959).

8. John B. Carroll, "Words, Meanings and Concepts," reprinted in R. Anderson et al, *Current Research on Instruction* (N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 222.

9. P.L. Heath, "Concept," in Paul Edwards (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (N.Y., Macmillan, 1967), vol. 2, p. 178.

(Invited Address)

THE SYSTEMIC DYNAMICS OF TWO PRINCIPLES: "BEST" AND "EQUAL"

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It can be claimed, I believe, that since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a highly significant development has occurred in virtually all regions of the world. I refer to the emergence of educational systems. Their development, and, in some parts of the world, their maturing, as a relatively separate sector of societies, is a recent phenomenon, extending over little more than the past one hundred years. To say this is not to suggest that educational systems are without roots in an earlier age. Surely, we can argue that the market system of economy emerged as recently as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries out of an earlier merchantile system. Still, its emergence constituted an event of great importance. In a precisely analogous way, I wish to suggest that the emergence of educational systems is a phenomenon of the modern world, and furthermore, that just as we can develop a "theory of the market" that helps to make its behavior rationally intelligible, so also it is possible to develop a "theory of the educational system" in ways that will render its behavior rationally intelligible.

We do not currently possess such a theory. It needs to be constructed. We may approach its construction by pursuing what might be called the "method of practical rationality." We first observe the actual behavior of the system wherever it appears and then take such observed behavior to be the conclusion of a practical argument. What remains then, is the task of identifying the premises of the practical argument. Nearly all the arguments that we ordinarily employ in reasoning about how the system behaves are incomplete. They are enthymatic arguments. When we uncover the missing premises, however, we can create practical arguments that produce the conclusions that we observe in the behavior of the system. Those arguments then render that behavior intelligible. They provide its reasons.

We are often inclined to suppose, for example, that if the size of the school-age population in some society were to increase drastically and rapidly, then the educational system would have to expand. But this inference is clearly invalid. We readily make such an inference only because we readily assume that though other things *could* happen, nonetheless, they won't. That is to say, we assume that the system will expand because the alternative, namely, educating fewer of the next generation, is something that no society would *choose* to do. The premise needed to make our accustomed inference intelligible, is provided by the claim that it is better for all to have some education in the system than for some to have none. This claim is equivalent to the claim that the system, at some level, at least, must be universal. Given this premise, appropriately framed, we are able to reason from a sudden and substantial increase in the school-age population to the conclusion: "Expand the system."

Given such a premise, in short, the behavior of the system becomes rationally intelligible. That suppressed premise, when made explicit, can therefore be identified as a principle contained in the theory of the educational system. It is required for the practical arguments of the system. In saying this, however, I am not claiming that such a proposition has some status in the theory of education. The theory of the system is not the theory of education. And that is as it should be; for one question that we shall want to leave open in any theory of the system is the question as to whether the system is a good way to advance the cause of education. Therefore, we want a way of arriving at an account of the behavior of the system that will leave open all questions of the theory of education. The theory of the system is not the theory of education.

The claim that it is better that all have some education in the system than that some have none, is a claim that might be described as normative. I do not advance it, however, because I believe it is a good principle. That is to say, I do not advance it as a normative claim that we ought to adopt, but simply as a principle that operates in the practical arguments of the system wherever the system appears. In this way, I leave it also an open question whether the system is good and useful, or bad and ought to be dispensed with. My concern is to make that system rationally intelligible. It is not my concern to endorse it or to recommend it.

Now in what follows I wish to illustrate these observations and to display their utility for understanding the behavior of the system and therefore, the demands of educational policy. I shall attempt to do so by examining the interaction between two principles that enter into the practical arguments of the system, and therefore into the theory of the system. They are what I shall refer to as "the best principle" and "the equal principle." By "the best principle" I mean the principle that each person is entitled to that education that is best for him; and by "the equal principle" I mean the claim that each is entitled to receive an education at least as good as that provided for all others.

These two principles enter into many practical arguments of the system. They are, for example, the principles in the theory of the system that, together with others, will yield an account of how the system becomes compulsory. Recent scholarship has shed some doubt on the claim, but it remains nonetheless a common view, that the system becomes universal because it is made compulsory. I wish to advance the contrary proposition that it becomes compulsory, because it becomes universal. Becoming universal is a process by which the system develops from involving some to a point in which it involves all. Thus, the expansion of the system will be described by the operation of arguments that reason from "some" to "all." These are also the practical arguments within which the "best" and "equal" principles most clearly operate. Thus, it is by examining such arguments that we shall best understand the dynamics of these two principles.

There remains one final preliminary. No matter how we finally come to understand the system, we will have to understand the principles that guide its distributive behavior. There are many distributive principles, but there is only one that we need to grasp to understand the interaction of the "best" and "equal" principles. That distributive principle I shall call "The Principle of Fair Benefit Distribution." It states simply that *any inequality in the distribution of educational benefits resulting from activities of the system, must accord approximately with the distribution of educationally relevant attributes in the population.*

That this principle is analytic can be discerned from the following considerations. No matter how the educational system operates, it will produce an unequal distribution of knowledge, skills, and taste or human sensibilities. We cannot argue, however, that this inequality is unjust if it results from the exercise of choice. We cannot claim that the system is being unjust if some benefit less because of choice. Neither can we say the system is unjust if there are some who benefit more because they are more able. Finally, if some benefit less because they are less courageous, or less tenacious than others, we cannot claim that the system is being unjust. Thus, choice, tenacity, and ability, are educationally relevant attributes unequally distributed in the population so that the system cannot be said to be unjust if it distributes its benefits unequally to accord with the distribution of such attributes.

To capture the power of this principle, it is useful to note that all arguments concerning the injustice of the educational system depend upon the claim that it distributes its benefits unequally to accord with class, race, age, ethnic origin or sex, or with some attributes other than choice, tenacity or ability. These arguments are powerful because they appeal to the principle of fair benefit distribution. That principle enters into the theory of the system because it is required by the practical arguments of the system.

Restricted and Unrestricted Arguments Stated—We are now in a position to examine the interaction of the "best" and "equal" principles as displayed in the employment of "some-to-all" arguments. There are two forms of the relevant some-to-all argument. I shall refer to them as "the restriced version" and the "unrestricted version." Consider the following argument that, it seems to me, we are disposed to use in almost endless variety:

> If there is a particular student, A, who has a specific liability, L, by virtue of which he is less likely than others to succeed in the educational system,
>
> And if there is some educational program, E, that promises to overcome that liability, then that program (or pedagogy), E, is the best one for A, and for everyone else with the property L.
>
> And since each is entitled to receive the program that is best for him, (The Best Principle)
>
> ---
>
> Therefore, everyone with the characteristic, L, is entitled to receive, E.

I shall refer to this argument as the restricted version of the some-to-all argument, because the class generated by the property L is restricted.

But we may now modify this argument so that, instead of concluding with the claim that certain persons are entitled to a certain program by virture of their special characteristics, we conclude that all persons are entitled to the *same* program. This inference may be arrived at by the addition of a single premise concerning the distribution of the property, L. We may add to the restricted argument, the claim that

The property, L, is possessed by everyone.

Therefore everyone is entitled to receive the program E.

This formulation I shall refer to as the unrestricted version of the some-to-all argument. It states that if A is entitled to receive a particular education by virtue of having the property L, and if everyone has that property, then everyone is entitled to receive that same program. The class generated by the property, L, is unrestricted. It is important to note, however, that in the unrestricted version of the argument, the property, L, changes from a liability to some common characteristic like having intelligence, being a citizen, or the like.

Restricted Version Examined—In setting forth such an argument as included within the theory of the system, we must be able to state when the argument applies and when it does not. Consider the restricted version. Will the restricted argument work for any property, L, for example? Will it work for any program E? In short, is the domain of the argument limited? To what kinds of fallacies is it subject?

It seems *prima facia* true that the restricted argument will work for any value of L, provided that L is a property having some causitive and deleterious effect upon educational success. It will not work, however, to support the claim that all children are entitled to the kind of educational program received by those who are successful in the system. Suppose there is a group of children who do very well in the system. They are successful; they have no apparent liabilities or difficulties. We are not permitted by the restricted argument to reason that every child is entitled to the program that *they* receive.

Why not? Because we do not ordinarily believe that the program they receive is a causative factor in their success. Their success is due to the fact that they have no liabilities. Presumably they would be successful in any program and not *because* of any particular educational program. Thus, L, and E, apparently have limited domains. They refer only to properties that are construed to constitute liabilities and programs that are deemed effective in overcoming those liabilities.

The principle that each is entitled to that education that is best for him is often construed to imply the necessity of "individualized instruction." But this is another kind of fallacy. Seeing why such a conclusion is unwarranted, however, will permit us to identify other, more serious constraints on the restricted argument.

It is true that no two human beings are exactly alike. There is always some property or set of properties unique to each. *In short, there are individual variations.* We cannot, however, reason from this truism to the claim that individual educational programs would be best for each. To derive that conclusion, we need to meet two further constraints on the argument. The first is to show that the variations in question meet certain *standards of relevance.* Not every variation matters, and among those that do matter for certain aspects of life, not all will matter to success in the system. Secondly, the variability in question must exist in a *certain magnitude.* Small variations even though relevant will not count. No one, I suppose would argue that stable differences of two points on an IQ scale would warrant distinct educational programs. Variations of ten times that size, however might. When the restricted argument is used, it must meet certain standards of relevance and magnitude in the variabilities that it refers to.

But though there are differences between persons, there are also similarities. In attempting to understand the constraints on the restricted argument, we need to know which of these realities—variability or similarity—we are to count as more important and when. How do we determine what is to count as a relevant difference and what is to count as a significant magnitude of that difference? How does the system make this determination?

Standards of Magnitude—I believe that a direct answer can be given. In the use of the restricted argument, the standards of magnitude will be determined by scale, and standards of relevance will be determined by the operation of the Principle of Fair Benefit Distribution. But this point needs explanation.

It is tautological that each individual has his own birthdate, and in a small randomly selected population, it is unlikely that any two will have the *same* birthdate. However, in a randomly selected population of 300, it is practically certain that some will have the same birthdate. We may reason by extension. It is tautological that each child learns at his own rate. But the claim that each learns at a rate different from all others is not a tautology. It is, in fact, a claim likely to be true only as long as we have in mind a very small population randomly selected. The probability that each child learns at a rate different from all others will be reduced with every increment in the size of the population we have in mind. It is possibly true in the family; it is unlikely to be true in the school.[1] Children learn at different rates. And those differences are relevant for certain purposes. Granted. But we want to know how large those differences must be in order for us to say that they *must* be considered. In a small group, say two or three children, quite minute differences in the rates of learning might be counted as significant. But in a very large group, say one hundred children, we are unlikely to permit such differences to count heavily unless they are also quite substantial. And if they are very substantial, *and* if such variabilities occur with a high degree of frequency, then we are likely to turn to some kind of grouping that will have the affect of reducing the magnitude of the variability in each group. Here clearly, "the best principle" is operating in a formulation of the "restricted version" of the some-to-all argument.

Standards of magnitude are established by the scale of the setting within which the restricted version of the some-to-all argument is applied.

Standards of Relevance—But what of the standards of relevance? We see how the system determines which *magnitude* of a variability is to be counted as important. But how does the system determine which variability is to be counted as *relevant* to the restricted argument?

The answer again, is readily at hand. You will recall the claim that there are only three sets of educationally relevant attributes entering into the distributive behavior of the system. They are choice, tenacity, and ability. Whatever variability is selected in using the some-to-all argument, that characteristic must be subsumable under one of the "educationally relevant attributes" entering into the operation of the Principle of Fair Benefit Distribution. That is to say, in order for the some-to-all argument to work, it must be shown that the individual property referred to in the argument is a property affecting the exercise of choice, tenacity, or ability.

Suppose, for example, that we wish to enlist the some-to-all argument in establishing the claim that those with defective sight are entitled to a special educational program. Then we must establish the claim that defective sight is a causative factor limiting the exercise of ability, or choice. We do not ordinarily take the pains to do so because the connection is so obvious. The need to establish it escapes our notice.

The need for that connection is more apparent where it is less easily provided. Suppose that we wish to use ascribed characteristics, like social class, or personal characteristics, like ethnicity, in establishing the claim of certain groups to special treatment in the system. It is not immediately obvious that differences of social class and ethnicity would constitute "relevant" variabilities in meeting the standards required for the some-to-all argument. However, if we can establish a strong claim that the possession of these attributes impairs the exercise of choice, ability, or the power to persevere in the system, then we shall have demonstrated that they are suitable attributes to employ in using the some-to-all argument. In short, the standards of magnitude implicit in the some-to-all argument are established by the *scale* of the setting, but the standards of relevance are established for the system by appealing to those attributes that are relevant to a just distribution of its benefits.

Unrestricted Version Examined—So much for the logic of the restricted version of the some-to-all argument. How does the unrestricted argument operate in the practical arguments of the system? Instead of being employed to establish the claim of certain groups for a distinctive education, the unrestricted argument establishes the claim of everyone to the *same* education. We arrive at this conclusion by a premise stating that the property L, no longer interpreted as a liability, is a property that is universally distributed. The class generated by that property, whatever it is, is unrestricted.

But what specific property is referred to and what kind of program is referred to in the unrestricted argument? The argument comes in two forms—a systemic formulation and an educational formulation.

The systemic formulation proceeds by first identifying the kind of *program* to which each is entitled and ends by defining the relevant property in the some-to-all argument. The second proceeds by first identifying the relevant *property*, and ends by defining what kind of program must be provided for all. The educational formulation belongs to the theory of education and the systemic formulation to the theory of the system. In other words, to understand the logic of the unrestricted version of the some-to-all argument, we must attempt to specify what property and what program is being referred to in the argument. In thinking about the use of the restricted argument, we can ask "How does the system determine standards of magnitude and relevance?" Likewise, in the case of the unrestricted argument, we must ask "How does the system determine what relevant properties are universally distributed, and what program of education we are referring to?"

Within the limits of this paper, the best I can do is to sketch what a fuller treatment would have to establish. Let us begin with an *operational* specification of the program or pedagogy referred to in the unrestricted argument. The system will *operationally* define the program to which all are entitled as that program that the rich provide for their sons, *whatever that program may be.* I do not refer to the kind of education that the rich *can* provide, but to the kind that they *do* provide, and not for their daughters, but for their sons.

Now it may seem outrageous to suggest that the education the rich provide for their sons is a suitable definition of the education that everyone is entitled to. But recall that I am offering an *operational* definition of one of the terms required in the unrestricted version of the some-to-all argument as it appears in the practical rationality of the system. A full defense of this claim is difficult, but some observations can be provided that will tend to make it sufficiently plausible.

First of all, we should note that if it be asked how we can operationally identify the best education that can be secured, we could look at that kind of education that is purchased by those in a position to purchase any kind there is. That would then identify the education that all are entitled to as the education that the rich buy for their sons. Secondly, we should note that the education that the rich—rich school districts and rich parents—provide for their sons is already a kind of education that the system *does* provide. Thirdly, it is the kind of education that ordinarily provides the standard of the best. For example, when we reason about a desirable equalization of resources in the system, we virtually never reason through an argument that would urge a leveling down of resources. We always seek to level up. That is to say, equality is virtually never our interest in arguments concerned with equalizing resources in the system. Our interest, rather is always to provide to everyone the education that the rich provide for their sons. Finally, we should note that the principle obliging the system to provide for everyone the education that the rich provide for their sons, has been such a fundamental part of basic educational policy wherever the system has emerged that it can be regarded merely as the operational version of a basic principle guiding the behavior of the system. This principle, that the education everyone is entitled to, the kind referred to in the unrestricted version of the some-to-all argument, is that education that the rich buy for their sons, *no matter what that education is*—this principle governs the systemic formulation of the unrestricted version of the some-to-all argument. The system provides what everybody is entitled to, because what everybody is entitled to is precisely what the system is obliged to provide. This is the systemic approach to the unrestricted argument.

But suppose we approach the unrestricted version in another way. Let us begin by asking not what program everyone is entitled to, but what property it is by virtue of which everyone is entitled to it. Everyone shares in the capacity for a developed sense of craft, the exercise of intelligence, and a sense of style. Everyone has a desire for self-autonomy and a sense of individual integrity. These are distinctive human capacities that no doubt, are universally distributed. If these capacities define the relevant property in the some-to-all argument then the kind of education that everyone is entitled to is that education—whatever it is—that cultivates these capacities.

We would not be tempted to identify this kind of education operationally as the kind that the rich buy for their sons. As a contingent fact it may turn out that it *is* the kind that the rich buy for their sons, but that would not be its *defining* feature. This kind of education—whatever it is--would have to be defined on *educational* grounds rather than systemic grounds. This is the *educational* version of the unrestricted formulation of the some-to-all argument. It belongs to the theory of education. It does not pretend to elucidate the premises of the practical arguments of the system.

Further inquiry would establish that there is a tension, perhaps even a dialectic between the systemic and the educational versions of the unrestricted argument. It is the tension or conflict between competing conceptions of what constitutes a "good education." I wish to focus, however, on a different dialectic, namely that between the restricted and unrestricted formulations of the some-to-all argument.

The Dialectic of Restricted and Unrestricted Arguments—The restricted version is an application of the claim of each to that education that is best for him. The unrestricted argument expresses the claim of each to an education that is at least as good as that provided for all others.

These principles express independent claims in the sense that either can be satisfied under conditions leaving the other unattained. Maximizing the "best principle" is different from maximizing the "equal principle." It is quite conceivable that a society providing each person an education equal to that received by all others, may not, at the same time, provide anyone the education that is best for him. And conversely, it is quite conceivable that a society providing the best education for each individual will not provide to anyone an education equal to all others in the sense of "equal" implicit in the "equal principle." These are independent principles in the sense that either *may* be satisfied without the other. They are logically independent.

But is it contingently possible to satisfy them *jointly?* Or are they competing principles, inversely related, so that in maximizing the one we necessarily pay a price in the effort to maximize the other? Both principles belong to the system and can be appealed to at any time. But we should not expect them to have equal weight at all times. There will probably be some kind of dialectic established by the presence of these two claims. But what is that systemic dialectic?

Let us begin with a hypothesis, namely that the expanded version of the some-to-all argument will predominate in the system until it *approaches* universal participation. Then the restricted version of the some-to-all argument will assume a more weighty role. The unrestricted version provides the practical arguments for the initial expansion of the system, the argument that all are entitled to the *same* education, a common education. But, at some point, the continued expansion of the system will demand substantial attention to the special needs of special populations so that they can succeed in the system. And that means that the restricted version of the some-to-all argument will take on greater weight. Attention will shift to maximizing the "best" principle. In short, up to a certain point in its expansion, the system can treat the population as homogeneous, but at another point it shall have to either approach the population as heterogeneous or probably cease its expansion. And ceasing its expansion would mean ceasing the attempt to maximize the equal principle. The system cannot give up either principle at any time. But neither will it give them equal weight at every time.

This then is the systemic or policy shift of attention from similarities to variabilities in the population,[2] from the unrestricted to the restricted formulation of the some-to-all argument. When this shift occurs, then formulating standards of relevance and standards of magnitude will become a more pressing problem. Clarity on such matters is no problem as long as we are applying the unrestricted version of the some-to-all argument because that argument places no emphasis upon variabilities in the population. Hence, the first step in the policy dialectic of the system is to move from the maximization of the "equal" principle to the maximization of the "best" principle. Whether there is a pendulum effect to this transition and whether these two principles can be jointly satisfied are matters that must be deferred for the moment.

Consider the following, however. We are maximizing the "equal" principle under conditions where the relevant variabilities between individuals are few and when the magnitude required of them is very large. These are standards of homogenity. This is the combination that will produce the smallest number of distinct groups and the smallest number of distinct programs in the system. On the other hand, we are maximizing the "best" principle under those conditions where the relevant variabilities between individuals in the system are numerous and when the required magnitude of them is small. These are standards of heterogeniety. This is the combination that will produce the largest number of distinct groups and will require the largest number of distinct programs in the system. According to this reasoning, the cells occupied in Figure 1 represent the difference between the maximization of these two principles. We can detect in that representation the basis for the claim that these two principles on contingent grounds are inversely related even though they are logically independent. It seems that as one is maximized, the other is not. Indeed, it suggests that either principle is maximized at the sacrifice of the other.

		Number of Relevant Differences	
		Large	Small
Magnitude of Relevant Differences	Large		"equal" principle
	Small	"best" principle	

Figure 1. Interaction of Standards of Relevance and Standards of Magnitude

I stress this point because it makes explicit the claim that the interaction between these two principles is a proto-typical policy problem. The two principles represent rather complex sets of goods in conflict. The problem of policy for the system is to adjust that conflict, to balance it, to find the course of action that will optimize the two sets of goods taken together instead of maximizing each taken separately.

But Figure 1 suggests something else. Recall our hypothesis about the systemic dialectic between these two principles. It states that whether the relevant variabilities in the system are many or few, and whether their required magnitude is large or small—these are matters that will be significantly influenced by the scale of the system. We see how the interaction between the "best" and "equal" principles is an interaction between standards of magnitude. But we do not know how either set of standards is altered by scale. In order to get at this point we need a further distinction, namely between "human scale" and "system scale."

We may formulate the difference directly. It is possible for us to have very small human settings for education in a system that is very large. By a large scale system we refer to a system with high attainment rates. In a society where attainment rates are high, i.e., where lots of people go to school a lot of the time, it may still be the case that nobody goes to school in a group involving more than, say, five people. So it is conceptually possible for the human scale to be small in a large-scale system.

I wish to concentrate, however, on the dynamics of system scale rather than human scaie. And those dynamics appear to be as follows. Let us suppose that at some particular time or place, property referred to in the restricted version of the some-to-all argument, defines a class that has only one member. In that case, the system will have to find enough others with such a property to constitute a group. In short, when the system is small it will probably either refuse to count that particular property as relevant or else it will broaden the definition of the relevant difference so as to generate a class of more than one member. If, for example, there is only one genius in the population or only one person with a particular handicap, then the system is unlikely to provide a special program for that particular gifted or that particular handicapped person. On the other hand, if there are *lots* of geniuses or *many* persons with a particular handicap, then those differences are more likely to be counted as relevant in the *behavior* of the system. Thus, the relevant difference will be counted as relevant only if it occurs fairly frequently. If it does not occur with enough frequency, then the relevant property will be redefined to generate a class of sufficient size to warrant a special program. Thus, *any property used in the restricted version of the some-to-all argument is more likely to generate a class of sufficient size in a system of large scale than in a system of small scale.*

The same point can be put in another way. The restricted version of the some-to-all argument recognizes differences *between* groups, but not between individuals *within* groups. Yet, as the system scale increases, the relevant groups already included in the system will grow in size, and thus differences between individuals *within* groups may begin to occur with enough frequency to permit the creation of still more sub-groups defined either by new variabilities or by the application of more refined criteria to old variabilities.

Now, these considerations argue strongly for the view that when the *system* scale is small, relevant variabilities will be few and the magnitude required for them will be large. And when the *system* scale is large, then the relevant variabilities can be more numerous and they can be defined with more discrimination. These conclusions are represented schematically in Figure 2.

The relationships represented in this Figure are precisely those that were advanced as conjecture in our hypothesis about the dailectic of the restricted and unrestricted versions of the some-to-all argument. As long as the scale of the system is small, it will follow the practical argument in its unrestricted version. The system will behave as though to maximize the "equal" prin-

		System Scale	
		Large	Small
Magnitude	Large		X
	Small	X	

		System Scale	
		Large	Small
Relevance	Large	X	
	Small		X

Figure 2. Interaction of System Scale and Standards of Relevance and Magnitude

ciple. But as the scale of the system becomes greater, it will give more weight to the restricted version. It will behave as though to maximize the "best" principle. Indeed, we can see now that as the system increases in scale, its capacity to maximize the "best" principle should also increase.

We are, at long last, in a position to confront the question that I have steadfastly deferred thoughout this extended analysis. There appears to be one possibility of jointly satisfying the "best" and "equal" principles. It bears repeating that the systemic function of the "equal" principle is to impose upon the system the need to acknowledge the claim of each to receive an education at least as good as that received by everyone else. But if the "best" principle is maximized, that is, if each receives that education that is best for him, then it can be claimed also that each is receiving an education at least as good as that received by all others. Hence, the two principles seem jointly satisfied under precisely those conditions that constitute the realization of the "best" principle.

This suggestion, however, is spurious. Why? Consider the limiting case. If the education that A receives is the best *for A*, and if we do not claim that it is also best *for B*; and if, further, the education that B receives is the best *for B*, but not the best *for A*, then we might indeed claim that the education each receives is equally as good as that received by the other. But the meaning of this claim has now changed.

"Equally good" is no longer the "equal" in "What A gets is equally as good as what B gets." It is now the "equal" in "What A gets is equally as good *for A* as what B gets is good *for B*." In the first sense of "equally good" we are assuming that the value of the education that A and B get is assessed by some standards *independent of either A or B*. In the second sense of "equally good" we are assuming that the value of the education received by A and B is its position in a rank order *relative to A and B*, and *not* independently of either. These are quite different meanings of "equal." The former is the sense of "equal" that is implicit in the "equal" principle and in the unrestricted version of the some-to-all argument. But the latter sense of "equal" is the sense that we adopt when we assume that maximization of the "best" principle is simultaneously the realization of the "equal" principle. Changing the meaning of "the equal principle" in this way is the same as abandoning it.

The unrestricted formulation of the some-to-all argument results from the claim that the defining property in the argument is universally distributed. But the line of reasoning leading to the joint maximization of the two principles through the full realization of the "best" principle is clearly the declaration that there is *no* property universally distributed such that everyone is entitled to receive the *same* education. It represents the abandonment of the claim that any two individuals are entitled to the *same* education. It is this claim that we give up when we assume that the maximization of the "best principle" can be, at the same time the maximization of the "equal principle." We end by satisfying the demands of the "best principle" at the cost of sacrificing the "equal principle" altogether.

Thus, the system clearly progresses from an initial stage in which the prevailing practical argument is the unrestricted version of the some-to-all argument. But, as the system expands, the dominance of this argument will yield before the need to apply the restricted version of the some-to-all argument. And indeed, the increased scale of the system, is exactly what both produces this shift, and increases the capacity of the system to pursue the new argument in practice. So we learn to discriminate, for example, between different racial groups distinguished from the majority. Then later we learn that there are relevant differences between language groups within those minorities, and so we further extend the application of the restricted argument. At each step in this process we identify a new variability connected with the "educationally relevant attributes" that enter into the just distribution of benefits of the system. But if this process is extended to anything approaching its natural limit, it will clearly produce the complaint "The system is not providing for us what it is providing for others." The insistence, in short, for the *same* education will reemerge. The "equal" principle will again prevail in the policy agenda.

We may offer a conjecture. As the system reaches maturity, it will pass from the unrestricted version to the restricted version and back to the unrestricted version *in its educational formulation* rather than in its systemic formulation. The issue that will become vital, in short, is the question as to whether the education that the rich buy for their sons is, indeed, the *operational* standard of the education to which everyone is entitled. And this explicit reference to the *operational* standard is meant to convey the claim that what will emerge as the most intractable and vital question *for the system* is the question as to what constitutes a good education. The juncture between the theory of the system and the theory of education will, thus, become one of the most important and vital questions to be discussed, and to be discussed not merely as an element in the academic training of educators, but as a vital matter effecting public policy.

Summary—The system is not universal because it is made compulsory. Rather, it is compulsory because it becomes universal. But now we see, in the dialectic of the "best" and "equal" principles, the logic that underwrites that expansion. The system must be made available to all because what it provides is what everyone is entitled to. The unrestricted version of the some-to-all argument underwrites that part of the system that must be common. The restricted version of that argument, on the other hand, provides the grounds for its becoming specialized and differentiated. It provides the grounds for such practices as tracking, special education in all its forms, and for the distinctions between such groups within the system that produces such things as bilingual programs of education and full service legislation for the handicapped. But the dynamic between the "best" principle and the "equal" principle, arising as it does from the restricted and the unrestricted versions of the some-to-all argument, also offers us some hunches as to the outlines of the future. And that future begins to emerge when we grasp the ways that the policy agenda for the system is shaped by the interaction between its size, its distributive principles, and the competitive nature of the "best" and "equal" principles.

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1. In these observations I do not wish to suggest that the only difference between school and family is a difference in scale. I wish only to emphasize the ways that differences in scale effect standards of relevance and magnitude in the variabilities that count in the some-to-all argument.

Nonetheless, these observations may help us to understand what sociologists have meant in claiming that one difference between the family and the school is that the social norms applied in the family are more often particularistic and those in the school are more often universalistic. See Robert Dreeben, *On What is Learned in School*, Adison-Wesley, Reading, 1968.

2. Correspondingly, in that transformation of attention we should anticipate a shift of emphasis in policy analysis away from the modal tendencies of the system to the variability of effects. Policy, after all, is policy for the system.

(Response to Invited Address)

CHOICES AND CAUSES IN SCHOOLING, SOCIETY AND THEORY

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I applaud the significant step taken by Thomas F. Green in his paper, "The Systemic Dynamics of Two Principles: 'Best' and 'Equal,'" to construct a theory of educational systems. (Incidentally, I would prefer to use the phrase "school systems," but I'll use his phrase.) Most of us concerned with theory construction in this field talk about how to do it or whether it can be done. He is trying to do what, in my view, most needs doing in our field. I support many of his apparent and basic assumptions: that the phenomena of education might well lend themselves to scientific, rational explanation; that explanatory principles do not command regularities, constancies in historical behaviors; that individuality does not signify absolute uniqueness; and so on.

For me, this occasion is an opportunity to try to contribute a bit to this essential and difficult work of theory construction. I appreciate the invitation to join him in straightforward and, hopefully, non-nitpicking discussion. After an interpretive summary of some main features of Green's theory, I offer some criticism and suggestions on a few basic matters, touching on specific items largely for purposes of illustration.

Green's aim is to develop a theory of educational systems in economically developed or developing countries. He seeks a set of general premises that, together with ancillary and more particular premises and data statements, will render the behavior of the system rationally intelligible. The theory will explicate past behavior and, hopefully, enable us to make some predictions about future behavior. His approach is to observe the behavior of the system, take that behavior to reflect the conclusions of arguments, lines of reasoning, about what we should do in the system, note the explicit, given premises and find the usually missing general premises required to complete the arguments and make them valid. Validity, then, is a key requirement for accepting theoretical premises.

In this part of his work, Green provides no evidence that the arguments he displays are representative of the relevent argument population. Green clearly believes that the meaning of terms and propositions in the arguments are effectively the same for an effective number of people who, he assumes, believe in the premises and conclusions. The theoretical premises he finds are moral principles. They seem to explicate or render intelligible the behavior of the system by providing justificatory grounds, the rules to be followed in thinking about what should be done. The arguments account for the behavior of the system.

Two major moral principles are proposed. One is the "best" principle which entitles each person to the education that is best for him. This principle grounds all forms of specialized education. A distinctive educational program is justified for any person who has a property, a liability, that is considered a causative factor contributing to failure in that part of the educational system that is common for all.

The "equal" principle is the second one. This entitles each person to at least as good an education as is provided for all others. This means, operationally, that each person is entitled to the education the rich buy for their sons since, Green holds, this education is a part of the system and has provided the model and goal we have actually used in our historical efforts not merely to equalize resource inputs but to level upward in providing common educational programs for more and more people. Clearly, for Green, the concept of the "education that is provided by the system" includes programs provided by public schools and purchased by some people.

What sanctions the "equal" principle is the claim that properties justifying the best available common education for all are distinctive human characteristics—like rationality or a sense of self-autonomy—that *all* people possess. Thus, this principle grounds, rationally explains, the *facts* that the part of education which is common or the same for all becomes universal, and therefore compulsory, and historically moves upward toward the level of the education that the rich buy for their sons.

The scale or size of the system is said to be the major factor controlling the interactions of the two principles and the relative weight attached to them at different times. Initially, when a system is small, it tends to treat its population as being relatively homogeneous, to stress maximizing the "equal" principle and, thus, to focus on the task of providing a relatively common education for increasing numbers of people. Then, as the size increases, more attention will have to be paid to the special needs of special subgroups so that they can succed in the system. This means that the "best" principle is maximized. If this process of diversificiation goes too far, then, Green predicts, calls will arise for more stress on the "equal" principle.

An ancillary moral principle is also required in order to understand the interactions of the "best" and "equal" principles. The Principle of Fair Benefit Distribution is operative. It states that inequalities in the distribution of benefits derived from the activities of the educational system must accord roughly with the distribution of educationally relevant attributes in the population. These attributes are ability, tenacity, and choice. If the system distributes its benefits unequally and in accord with characteristics—like race or sex or social class—that ought to be irrelevant to benefits received, then we have powerful arguments supporting claims of injustice in the system.

We should note that Green's purpose is to find the facts of the case. His aim is not to defend and recommend principles that *should* provide touchstones for adopting better policies and practices. His aim is to find the principles that *do* operate in the system, that do represent the basic *reasons* for the operations, the behaviors of the system. Thus, I take it that it is not proper to argue that *he* should approve of some principles other than those he claims to find.

My major criticisms center around two related points: this study seems to proceed by isolating reasons from causes and, more embracively, by isolating schools from most of their social contexts. I believe that a number of methodological, logical, and empirical problems are functionally related to these approaches.

Green seeks and finds a largely teleological theory. The premises provide mainly guidelines for actions; they present reasons or motives. Behavior is visualized as rule-governed. The behavior he observes is not merely deducible from the premises he finds. Somehow, the *existence* of that behavior is explicated, made "rationally intelligible," by the rational grounds, the moral premises said to be used in arguments which conclude that the behavior *ought* to exist. For example, Green claims that we find sufficient logical grounds for the *fact* that education becomes universal (and the attached *fact* that it becomes compulsory because it becomes universal) in the "equal" principle which states that it *ought* to become universal.

I have no desire to insulate facts from values, but this kind of move from an "ought" to an "is" is logically and empirically questionable. It would be like moving from the assumption that most people believe one ought to follow God's Commandments to the conclusions that they do in fact follow His Commandments, and that they do so just because of this one, itself unexplicated, reason. Conversely, it would be like moving from the claim that most people do not behave sinfully to the conclusion that the only grounds for this behavior must be that they believe one ought not to behave sinfully.

In Green's proposal certain moral principles seem to operate independently of other kinds of reasons and of other factors that ordinarily are called *causes*, as when we try to explain some human actions and decisions at least in part by reference to social or biological factors—like poverty, or being raised in a home that provided security and love, or the relative military superiority of one nation over another. Even the size of the educational system, described in some passages of Green's paper as having a fair degree of causal efficacy, is used in an opening illustration to show the apparently overriding power of choice.

But no choice, no reason or rule or moral principle, provides anything like a sufficient cause of either success or failure in any deliberately undertaken activity. One's intention to go to the airport does not provide the sufficient cause of whatever behavior might follow. Moreover, that intention presumably can be explained by yet other reasons and causes, and these may have little or nothing to do with that airport affair or with the agent, the person who gives *his* reasons for *his* actions. Actions often can be interpreted (and it is an *interpretation*) as conforming to a certain reason or principle. But this does not mean that there are no other reasons which help support the directing conception; it does not mean that no causes can be given which might help explain the conditions in which some reasons develop, the existential problem situation, the viable alternative choices, the means or resources available, the presence or absence of supporting or cooperating groups, and so on.

In explaining the behavior of a military system, we presumably would not rest content with exploring matters mainly or merely internal to the system—its size, growth, and so on. Nor would we rest content with finding arguments that have moral, "ought," premises relating only to *military* behavior and disregard empirical conditions and moral principles relating to other spheres of life. Usually, and with good reason, we would examine a wide variety of principles and conditions relating to historical, cultural, international, political, ideological, economic, technological and other areas of life.

If we confined our attention mainly to the moral premises seen as guiding the internal behavior of the military system, and regarded these premises as basic or inexplicable, we might be providing ceremonial rationalizations or cultural myths as explanatory principles. In any event, we would have no way of comparing the adequacy of those explanatory principles with other possible explanations. It should be noted that people may indeed believe and in part act on rationalizations and cultural myths. Nevertheless, to put forward these beliefs as sufficient to make the behavior rationally intelligible would be to present an incomplete and, in some important senses, a misleading theory.

These same claims about theoretical explanations of behavior in a military system can be made about theories applicable to any social subsystem—political, economic, religious and other subsystems. I think it is a mistake to assume that either the premises used in educational arguments or the behavior found in educational systems can be explicated without serious attention to the diverse, interacting, often conflicting, ideologies and forces within the larger social order.

In general, scientific or deep and comprehensive explanations are not developed by confining thought largely to the place or time that events and things—including cognitive events and things like arguments and premises—have their existence and characteristics. To think otherwise would be to suppose that any particular type of chemical reaction can be best understood, from a theoretical viewpoint, by ignoring thousands of other kinds of chemical reactions in domains ranging from astronomical and geological to military and biological. To think otherwise would be to suppose that a theory about the political system is best established by disregarding historical, cultural, economic, religious, technological and other social, physical and ideological matters.

Strong knowledge is relational knowledge. It derives from studies of things and people in interaction with potentially infinite sets of other things and people in sometimes similar, sometimes quite varied contexts. The notion of science as an experimental method (even though experimental techniques are by no means always necessary) and the notion of science as based on open-ended, ever-continuing inquiry are embodied in that characterization. It is a general method that has developed a growing battery of interrelated and powerful criteria for accepting or rejecting theories. I refer to such criteria as the ability to gather cumulative and converging evidence from a variety of domains; comprehensiveness, or the ability to explain a wide variety of phenomena; depth, or the ability to explain formerly basic terms of explanation; external consistency and interconnectivity, or the ability to share terms and propositions with other theories; fertility, simplicity and so on. Other criteria, such as consistency, verifiability, validity and predictive ability, are of course used in conjunction with those just mentioned.

On the other hand, the basic terms of explanation in Green's theory all refer primarily to just the educational system itself. This system is located in very barely sketched, and then largely neglected, economically advanced countries in the past century. Green seeks and finds just certain types of reasons or causes relating to some moral rules guiding educational decisions and, also, relating to the size of the system. The types of behavior he sets out to explain are those involving provisions of common and specialized programs of education.

Now, I want to provide just a few illustrations of how looking at schools *in* societies, at educational ideology and behavior as related to other ideologies and other social forces, might improve the comprehensiveness, external consistency, depth, accuracy and, in general, the methodological, logical and empirical adequacy of Green's proposed theory.

Take, for example, the fact that in Green's view the only explanation for the existence of differentiated, specialized programs is the moral-logical force of the "best" principle which entitles a person to the education that is best for him and which comes into play only when a person possesses a liability that threatens success in the common part of the system but may be overcome by a special treatment. This view may stem from a concern for the moral principles used in distinguishing common and special entitlements, but it is hardly adequate, hardly comprehensive enough to explain all kinds of program diversification.

The creation of many new economic and social roles by a technological, diversifying social order, wide variations in the abilities of parents or districts to buy or provide educational programs, variations in interests and some ability to satisfy elective choices—these and other factors are at work in the diversification of programs, even when the student has no liability (in Green's sense of the term). Elementary students in some magnet schools, high school students in "scientific," "general" or "literary" tracks of college preparatory work, or college students in engineering or social work programs need not have liabilities that account for their more or less differentiated programs. Moreover, the variety of variables at work now makes it difficult at times to know what is common and what is distinctive in programs. Is that part of a program in which any one of about thirty-five courses (ranging from speech, composition, media analysis, psychology of interpersonal relations to practical logic and race relations) may meet a common requirement in communication skills—is that part of a program a common or a special part?

Or take the fact that although Green repeatedly states that the theory aims to explain "the behavior" (unqualified) of the system, the theory does not even touch on numerous significant aspects: distribution of power; decisionmaking and communications processes; rôles of various groups, the pervasive yet not analytic or otherwise necessary conception of education as a process of transmitting knowledge and skills from older to younger heads and hands; large and significant shifts in the content and aims of both common and special parts of education—these and many other aspects and behaviors of educational systems are not covered by the theory.

Nor is it clear at all that the interrelations of size and common and special parts of the system are the significant variables which control most of the other variables. Why study these relations rather than other relations? Numerous reasons might be given but none are given. Questions about the relative scientific or theoretical significance of these variables cannot be answered until comprehensive and comparative studies are made. But asking the "Why do this rather than that?" question about scientific work can be very useful. It may help us bring to light the initial theoretical materials—the hypotheses, values, causal assumptions, favored categories—that we have in mind. Green states that he begins by looking at the behavior of the system. But it is impossible to examine all the behavior in all reasonable ways, and no explanation is given for focusing on arguments requiring the "best" and "equal" premises.

Among the many behaviors that are not rationally explained by the theory are the numerous and varied unjust activities of the system. In fact, the theory fastens upon some motives or reasons directed at moving away from educational injustices. But it provides no reasons for the existence of the many injustices.

What I want to suggest is that looking at some of the characteristic features of industrializing and post-industrial societies can provide materials for possible explanations of much that is not explicated by Green's theory. Examining school-society relations in the work of theory construction can help make a theory comprehensive and interconnected with other social theories. The process can add depth by providing some reasons and causes that help explain why many people talk in ways that might, in part, be captured by the "best" and "equal" principles, or by explaining why tenacity rather than, say, altruism or authenticity, is an educationally relevant attribute. The process can bring cumulative and converging evidence from a variety of domains to bear in verifying, modifying or rejecting propositions. For example, the rapid and simultaneous development of *both* common and specialized parts of the Soviet educational system shortly after the 1917 revolution does not seem to be in accord with the kind of dialectical relation between common and special programs that is set forth in Green's theory. A number of specific claims in the theory that seem highly doubtful could be checked, to some degree, by comprehensive studies of various types. Among those claims is the assertion that we have always desired "to provide for all that education that the rich provide for their sons." With almost any reasonable reading of these vague terms (including "we"), this is highly doubtful.

The methodological expansion that I have sketched can remove the undue reliance by Green on validity as a major requirement for accepting theoretical premises. It should be noted that the validity requirement is Green's; it is not necessarily a criterion used or used well by argument makers. People do reason invalidly. Recently, as a member of a large audience, I heard a speaker urge that black people, women, and elderly people be given the fullest possible consideration as candidates for certain positions. I know that many of the people sitting near me deduced, invalidly, that he was saying that nonblack people, males, and nonelderly people should not be given the fullest possible consideration. Filling in enthymematic arguments is a technique for finding *logically permissible* candidates for the roles that should be played. The process is not a truth-revealing technique. There is always a potentially endless number of candidates (a point I'll return to in a moment); the techniques do not themselves reveal the one that was actually "in the mind," and invalid reasoning may also lead the reconstructor of arguments to substitute a valid argument in place of the actual argument. Moreover, conclusions of both practical and theoretical arguments are rarely resultants of single chains of reasoning. They are likely to be outcomes of converging and often mutually qualifying lines of reasoning wherein various considerations, goals, facts of the case, possible outcomes, and so forth are taken into account. The structure of Green's argument is not that kind of structure.

I want to combine some of those logical and social considerations to make a final point or two.

In this country, especially since about the middle of the nineteenth century, ideals of universal education, improved specialized education, and equality of educational opportunity were increasingly supported by many different demographic or socioeconomic groups. These ideals, like equality of educational opportunity, are signaled by vague terms. This happens not because these words (or any words) are inherently vague. Inherently, signs have no meaning and, thus, cannot be vague. This happened here because these general or abstract words meant many different things to many different people.

For some people, more common education and better special education meant getting more children of immigrants, of poor people or of working-class and middle-class families through elementary school, or high school, or public higher education institutions so that the felt needs for patriotism, law and order, and trained, reliable workers might be met. Now these kinds of motives and meanings do not have very much in common with Green's concepts of "best" and "equal". What was often intended was not an education that was the same in quality or quantity of inputs, let alone of results, that the sons of the rich received. What was intended often was not an education that would best suit an individual's needs but, rather, an education that would best suit some economic, social or political needs.

Moreover, in an expanding and highly competitive society with diverse and often conflicting group and class interests, many demands for more and better education and for equality of educational opportunity were not directed at furthering the interests of all. They were and are directed at furthering the interests of some particular group. Today and yesterday, by arguments, votes, demonstrations and law suits, by moving to "better" communities to buy better education for just their own children, by supporting educational measures favoring, say, urban over rural areas, or white people over black people (or vice versa), by favoring state expenditures for basic over higher education (or vice versa), by doing many other kinds of things, people demonstrate that educational policies derive from the interactions of complex economic, political, sociological and ideological forces and diverse educational premises.

A person who believes that his child ought to have a better education need not believe in one of the possible premises that could help complete the argument and make it valid: all children should have a better education. The key premise that he believes may state that if X is my child, then he should have a better education; or, if X is an obedient, respectful child, then he should have a better education; or, any black person should have a better education. An infinite number of premises, many of them plausible, could meet the validity requirement.

In general, theoretical systems of any degree of power (of comprehension, generalizability, etc.) do not have unique premises that are logically determined by other propositions and the logical rules. Particularly in empirical matters, and most especially when waters are relatively uncharted and plausibility tests are difficult to apply, theoretical or explanatory premises should be taken to be underdetermined by the evidence available. In education, we are, I believe, in the relatively-uncharted-waters stage, far removed from a strong theory. We need comprehensive and multi-disciplinary studies of many kinds that will enable us to apply stronger criteria of acceptance to our efforts in research and theory construction.

It is much easier to evaluate than to construct a theory. Unlike Professor Green, I have no substantive theory to present for our collective consideration. This is why I applaud and respect the initiative he has taken.

(Invited Symposium: On Recognizing the Philosophical Significance of Educational Problems. Part One)

ACCUSTOMING: THE HIDDEN CONCEPT IN TRAINING

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Over the past one hundred seventy years, six different approaches to teacher training have had wide use across North America. Although recent programs of teacher preparation have always incorporated elements of several approaches, each original method has a clear central character patterned around a distinctive view of teaching. A distinct and different concept of how to teach seems to carry with it a special notion of how to train people to teach in that way. Historically, teacher training has developed in a sequence of six stages with later methods adhering to earlier ones like barnacles attached to crustaceons fastened to the side of a sunken vessel. Each stage of encrustation arrived in the company of a major innovation in practice-centered theory[1] and stayed after the theory died. The exception is the most recent approach, which is the perennial response to how to train in the absence of a credible theory. The six stages of training that make up the present approach to the practical side of teacher preparation arrived in the following order: 1. mechanical, 2. demonstrative, 3. programmed, 4. diagnostic, 5. supervisory, and 6. immersive. The theories that gave birth to the methods of training and then vanished like short-lived parents who spawn immortal children were those that gave shape to classroom practice for a century and a half: monitorial method, object teaching, Herbartianism, the Montessory method, and experimentalism, with the sixth stage being a-theoretic. It is from these notions of how to teach that training takes its shape.

1. *Monitorial Method and Mechanical Training*—Since the Lancasterian method viewed teaching as the direct transference

of what was to be learned from one person to another the activity had all the characteristics of passing a physical object from hand to hand. Training tutors to teach was a mechanical business of giving them what they were to carry and pass along and drilling them until they could make the exchange in a reliable manner. Training was mechanical and repetitive just as it is in rehearsing a relay racer in passing the baton.

2. *Object Teaching and Demonstrative Training*—Relying on the fascination all kinds of things hold for children, Pestolozzi saw teaching as the art of harnessing that inherent interest and having it draw students through lessons packed with valuable related understandings. Unlike the baton passer, the object method teacher had to be well versed in the whole range of things to be learned and then alert to take his leads from the interests that objects and events sparked. As with any art, once the necessary background materials are mastered, the training is a matter of demonstrating its features and having the apprentice attempt his own version of them until his talent becomes evident.

3. *Herbartianism and Programmed Training*—The Herbartians viewed teaching as the business of arranging and presenting a lesson in the precise order that thinking followed so that learning was as necessary as seeing an object in the right light. The lesson was to be the objective manifestation of reason generated by the teacher and absorbed by the student and the lesson plan showed its logic. Training then was learning how to construct and follow a program that reflected the necessary steps of reason.

4. *The Montessori Method and Diagnostic Training*—The Montessori approach to helping children through essential stages of skill formation and concept attainment made teaching a matter of guiding youngsters in the use of didactic tools from number rods to weaving frames so as to capitalize on their sensitivities to different kinds of learning at different ages. The heart of Montessori training lay in the expertness with which teachers could diagnose each child and identify his sensitivity to learning the skills and concepts appropriate to his stage of development. The teacher was trained as a kind of pedagogic diagnostician and practitioner adapted from the medical model of Maria Montessori's original profession.

5. *Experimentalism and Supervisory Training*—As practiced, experimentalism usually revolved around the project method and teaching became the management of many varied and dif-

ferent kinds of activities with an eye to quality of personal and educational outcome. In short, the teacher was the foreman of the project workplace and his training hinged upon mastering a wide range of supervisory techniques and usable resources.

6. *The A-Theoretic Approach: Training by Immersion*—the absence of a comprehensive theory of education leaves the concept of teaching empty and void of immediate practical significance. Hence in an A-Theoretic period "teaching" is whatever practicing teachers happen to be doing in the classroom. Lacking any concept of teaching to give structure to training educators are reduced to sending trainees out into the field to emulate whatever they see. This is training by immersion and leads to the replication of current practice.

These six approaches cover the range of activities traditionally employed in training people in how to teach and they offer fruitful grounds for examining what the concept of training means in connection with teacher preparation. Indeed, since faculties and schools of education are historic institutions their programs are compounded of past approaches and elements of the mechanical, demonstrative, programmed, diagnostic, supervisory, and immersive approaches form the very fabric of training even though the theories that spawned them may have been forgotten and the contradictions implicit in their approaches to teaching remain ignored. It is not uncommon for a student to be *told* about the mechanical approach for drilling on spelling errors, a demonstrative approach to using animals to teach nutrition, a programmed approach to giving a lecture on the solar system, a diagnostic approach to reading readiness, and a supervisory approach to having youngsters select and carry out their own projects without having been trained in any of them. In an A-theoretic period the sink-or-swim approach to training through total immersion in practice teaching becomes a strong temptation. Only a careful consideration of what training has been, combined with an examination of the implications of the concept of training itself, can show whether or not that temptation holds out promise or danger for teacher preparation.

The Approaches to Training—Related, differing, and in some aspects contradictory, the mechanical, demonstrative, programmed, diagnostic, and supervisory approaches to training marked the five peaks of teacher preparation and each contributed a specific set of notions to the concept of training in education.

The Mechanical emphasized the repetitive nature of practice prior to undertaking the task whole and in earnest so that training is seen as something carried out in advance of attempting to teach. It also put strong stress on the fact that training must be an introduction into a technique for doing something that will be used in the classroom. The notion of teaching as the physical transference of something focused attention on the need for training to be concrete and specific where that is possible.

The Demonstrative introduced the notion of training by example. Where teaching is not viewed as the direct transference of something along the lines pursued by behavioral objectives, then exhibiting the kind of teaching favored and inviting the trainee to attempt a comparable performance may be an effective technique. The notions of giving a performance and eventually getting performances from the candidate before he tries them out "live" before a student audience in the classroom are fundamental to this mode of training.

The Programmed approach added the structure of an idealized order of lesson formation and a fixed sequence of performance to the training process. The view that the teacher must know and be able to apply inherent laws of reason introduced the sense of one right way to teach into training. Standards of intelligibility, relevance, coherence, consistency, objectivity, completeness and meaning became abstract measures of competence to be striven for and met during training. Proof of the ability to use reason as the primary instrument of instruction became the basis for earning the right to appear before children as an apprentice teacher.

The Diagnostic method made training a place to learn to recognize a child's educational symptoms. In particular, the diagnostic tools were the predictive instruments of the pedagogic craft to be mastered during training as a medical student learns to use a stethoscope. In addition, the training program stressed familiarity with a wide range of teaching strategies to insure that the prospective teacher was versed in standard treatments. Between using diagnostic tools and practicing standard treatments, training was the place for demonstrating basic competence.

The Supervisory method turned training outward to insure that the prospective teacher was familiar with a wide range of community resources and their uses in guiding youngsters toward the completion of projects. It was also a place for studying and trying out a wide range of supervisory styles in the search for a comfortable fit. Training became orientation in the uses of supervisory styles to be witnessed and practiced under the controlled conditions of a laboratory school.

Taken together, then, the Mechanical, Demonstrative, Programmed, Diagnostic, and Supervisory approaches to training teachers cover the standard methods inspired by the theories that shaped classroom practice. Among them, they contain enough material so that a careful inspection should reveal the anatomy to teacher training.

The Concept of Training—As applied to people rather than to animals or plants, the concept of training seems to entail exposing or subjecting individuals to some program or set of experiences designed or calculated to achieve proficiency in some skill or activity of limited scope. Ordinarily this is done for their own or the social good, and that justifies subjecting the individuals to the training without necessarily consulting their wishes so long as the treatment they receive does not contravene their basic rights as human beings. Hence the draft subjected individuals to mandatory military training whether they wanted it or not, but there is nothing in the concept of training itself that entails its fulfillment of a positive goal. The positive aspect of training as such stops at the level of proficiency in the thing to be mastered. In training young criminals a Fagin undertakes only to make proficient pickpockets and purse snatchers. The moral outrage suggested by the training of young criminals is compounded of our abhorrence for corrupting the young and the special repugnance of a trained criminal being systematically prepared to be quite accomplished at doing what is wrong. All that is essential to training is for people to be intentionally prepared to do something well. Further, the thing that they are to be prepared to be good at must be of a limited scope. We train truck drivers and pilots to insure that they can drive and fly in a reliable and trustworthy manner. We train barbers and dentists because cutting hair and fixing teeth are activities of limited scope. But talk of training lawyers, architects, and medical doctors seems a hangover from a simpler age. Certainly we *train* technicians. The limited scope of activities falling within a narrow band of proficiencies deliberately nurtured to insure reliability so basic to training fits our notion of a technician as cause to effect. And training is a no-nonsense concept. The reliable proficiency is to be achieved as directly as possible with no reference to broader considerations unless they can be shown to materially improve performance. Training implies efficiency in achieving results.

The Anatomy of Teacher Training--An occupation becomes a profession to the extent that the requirements for doing it well extend beyond those proficiencies that can be achieved by training. But reaching beyond training does not mean avoiding it. The educated but untrained airline pilot would be a menace and the teacher who was not trained to do those things that training can provide would be ill-prepared for the classroom.

In an A-theoretic period in which teaching is viewed as a profession there are two dangers that a clear view of the anatomy of training can thwart. An A-theoretic period, such as the present, is one in which there is no clear general view of teaching to give shape to teacher training. The effort to make teaching a profession involves proving that teachers are more than technicians and, as a consequence, must be educated beyond levels that training would provide. Compounded, the two views encourage an outlook that leaves training neglected from both sides. The A-theoretic outlook that lacks a general view of teaching is tempted to conclude that teaching is whatever goes on in the public school classroom. And therefore training should be an on-the-job apprenticeship of the *immersive* kind that practice teaching provides. The advocates of a professional preparation for teachers sometimes stress the importance of an education that is rich in understanding at the expense of training. Or they are likely to accept the notion that since practice teaching is to do the training no training need be attempted in advance of the candidate going into a public school classroom under supervision. A close look at the chief characteristics of the five earlier approaches to teacher training will reveal a structure that could be used to avoid both dangers.

Stripped and condensed, the views of training designed to serve the principle theories of teaching had the following features.

1. *Mechanical*: The tutor was drilled in the lesson to be taught and tested for mastery before he entered the classroom.
2. *Demonstrative*: The master teacher explained and demonstrated segments of object method lessons until the trainee understood and then he was invited to perform his

own versions of them until he could do it satisfactorily. All this was practiced again and again before the trainee ever attempted any of it in a live classroom. Training was practice in technique only later performed before an audience.

3. *Programmed*: The student was told and shown how to build a lesson that made sense in itself and gave defensible order to the material to be taught. Then he was given practice in teaching from such a plan by doing "dry runs" before his fellow trainees. These rehearsals were then critiqued and rebuilt.
4. *Diagnostic*: Explanation and demonstration of the diagnostic tools was followed by learning how to use them in carefully controlled clinical situations. Then teaching strategies were explained, demonstrated, and tried out by the trainees in similarly controlled situations.
5. *Supervisory*: Trainees were shown and taken to observe a wide range of supervisory techniques which they then analyzed and tried to put to use. It was a matter of building a repetoire of supervisory techniques for future use.

From these, the essential anatomy of teacher training can be given shape by rearranging the order and eliminating duplication to build a sensible sequence. By generalizing from the several theory-based schemes of teacher training the following ingredients suggest a general approach to the training side of teacher education.

1. The qualifying stage
    a. Test of minimum competencies
    b. Drill in fundamentals
2. The illustrative stage
    a. The explanation of relevant practices
    b. The demonstration of model practices
    c. Exposure to clinical conditions to practice identifying significant features
3. The diagnostic stage
    a. Trials in carrying out appropriate activities
    b. Analysis of strengths and weaknesses
    c. Attempt at improved trials under clinical conditions
    d. Review of quality of performance
4. The performative stage
    a. Attempt at a full scale teaching performance on a "dry run."

b. Critique of full scale performance to eliminate faults
c. Enhanced full scale performance under clinical conditions
d. Critique of full scale performance to stress strengths
e. Dress rehearsal

In the Mechanical, Demonstrative, Programmed, Diagnostic and Supervisory approaches the essential features of training, reorganized above, all took place *before* the trainee went out into the public school classroom to face children under the guidance of the public school teacher in charge. Indeed, the laboratory school so prominent between the two world wars, existed as a large scale clinical institute for trainees in need of live students to observe.

Each approach to training derived from a positive view of teaching saw to it that the practitioner did not try his hand on the public until steps had been taken to achieve the needed competence. This accords with the self-protection involved in giving a soldier a full course in basic training before sending him into combat as surely as it meets the conditions of responsibility that require a co-pilot to be thoroughly trained before he practices landings with passengers aboard. Training before public practice is a condition of responsibility and it seems directly related to having a positive general notion of teaching. Where the positive concept of teaching is absent the assumption that good teaching must be witnessed and imitated invites training by immersion.

The Immersive Approach—Very few programs of teacher preparation are so staunchly committed to the immersive approach that they eliminate all pre-practicum training and rely entirely on the sink-or-swim experience that practice teaching provides. Yet the temptation to move in that direction grows stronger as long as an A-theoretic period lacking in a general concept of teaching endures. Indeed, many outside of the field of education have never seriously entertained any alternative approach since the college teacher in liberal arts is often self-taught on the job. The temptations to embrace the immersive approach are powerful precisely because the absence of a credible theory and an agreed upon concept of teaching make pre-practicum training seem an exercise in blind groping for something that isn't there. Under such circumstances those who teach the so-called methods courses are forced to abandon the qualifying stage because there is no longer any clear view of the threshold of minimum competences and that makes any standard seem arbitrary. The diagnostic and performative stages dry up because there are no believable models that can be practiced with conviction until perfected. Indeed, a general concept of teaching may be a fiction necessary to a full-fledged notion of training because it invites what Coleridge declared to be the minimum condition of literature: a willing suspension of disbelief.

What is left to the methods courses in an A-Theoretic period is the illustrative stage and since the explanation and demonstration of promising practices is thin gruel to pass off as training they tend to branch out in the following directions:

a. They examine the research that supports selected techniques that are explained but not demonstrated.
b. They attempt to re-teach the geography or economics or other designated content that they insist should have been learned elsewhere but was not.
c They attempt to generate a philosophy of the teaching of social studies or mathematics to substitute for training.

As a consequence, the trainee arrives in the public school to undertake his practice teaching experience virtually untrained. Twenty years of living with that harsh reality has tempted many to make a virtue of a seemingly unavoidable handicap and insist that immersion in the actual operating public school classroom is the best, and should be the primary, approach to training. That practice teaching was not meant to be a substitute for training is simply a fact of its historical development. That it ought not to be a substitute for training or the place where training is initiated is a matter of being responsible to a public that deserves protection from the initial fumblings of incompetents. That trainees deserve better if better can be provided is obvious. What is less obvious is the hidden concept embedded in the notion of practice teaching that makes initial training by immersion an idea set against itself.

The Hidden Concept—In the manner of the year of internship for the medical doctor, the practice teaching experience carried out under the eye of the master teacher charged with the full fledged operation of a public school classroom is a post-training exposure to full fledged practice under casual supervision. That this is so can be seen by the fact that the master teacher has a full time job and responsibility in conducting the class before, during, and after the student teacher appearance. Typically the master teacher expects:

a. That the training should be completed before the student teacher arrives for an extended period.
b. That the visiting methods teachers who come out from the university will not interfere with the ordinary conduct of the class and will offer quite limited advice to the candidate.

Although there is no reason why these expectations cannot be changed, their widespread continuance suggests that even when the master teacher believes in training by immersion she has little background and less opportunity to actually carry it out.

Practice teaching has been and remains a post-training or at least advanced training experience and, as such, it ranks on a par with being an intern or a co-pilot. It is designed to enable the already trained individual to get the full sense and feel of teaching by doing all the things that a teacher does. It is, in short, *accustoming*.

Accustoming--The concept of accustoming refers to the action by which habituation is achieved. The individual is exposed to actual conditions and encouraged to carry on in the manner of a full-fledged practitioner. When he has been trained in advance so that he knows the reasons for doing what is done, this practice in doing the task in the appropriate way gives him experience in putting his understanding to work under actual conditions by modeling his behaviour after a successful practitioner. The why, the how, and the precise manner of making them work under field conditions are the intended result. It is this combination of doing the right thing for the right reasons that Aristotle had in mind when he said that the just man is one who does the just thing as just men do them. He wrote:

> Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these who is just and temperate, but the man who also does them *as* the just and temperate men do them. It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good.

Accustoming, then, the business of doing the appropriate things *as* the practitioners of that enterprise do them, is the hidden concept in training and serves as a capstone that brings it to completion. And teaching *as* a good teacher teaches entails doing what the accomplished professional does for the reasons he does them that way. While *Accustoming* is the hidden concept in training that gives it an achievement thrust there is nothing about accustoming itself that enables it to substitute for training in activities that call for understanding to be conducted at the appropriate level.

The child who has been raised to model his behaviour after the adults who surround him could become thoroughly habituated in a set of greeting rituals and table manners without ever learning any reasons for them. His accustoming would have been quite thorough at one level of doing as others do. And it is this level of doing as others do without knowing the reasons why they do it that way that is central to the notion of training by immersion. But training viewed as imitating the actions of accomplished persons is but a shadow of what is intended by teacher training. It is a view that goes against itself because the very sense of efficiency suggested by direct habituation without bothering to provide prior training eliminates the very background in reasons for doing something one way rather than another that is fundamental to making the trained person trustworthy and reliable in new situations.

Viewed in sound perspective a program of teacher training has five stages which are essential to preparing an effective practitioner even in the absence of a positive concept of teaching. Those stages are as follows:

1. The qualifying stage
2. The illustrative stage
3. The diagnostic stage
4. The performative stage
5. The accustoming stage

Until the early stages are given full and extensive development, accustoming, the hidden concept in training, will be called upon to do more than it can possibly accomplish. Naturally, the magic ingredient in any working program of teacher training is a credible general concept of teaching to give it shape.

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[1] For a detailed and documented account of the nature of the chief practice-centered theories see Brauner, Charles J., *American Educational Theory*, Prentice-Hall, N.J., 1964.

(Invited Symposium, Part Two)

ON RECOGNIZING THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS (OR) IN MAKING WINE YOU NEED GRAPES AND A WINEPRESS

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On Philosophic Significance

The philosopher George Santayana wrote that it is not easy for a philosopher to shout. Or to address a crowd. Or even to pilot a boat of voluntary companions. I agree. I must admit I've had fine pilots in my teachers and excellent companions in my students. But the metaphor I choose for this occasion is oenological: in making philosophical wine you must put the grapes through a winepress.

The philosophic significance of educational problems is, first of all, simply that there *is* philosophy of education. Philosophy of education exists. This means, in part, that the problems of education are sufficiently generative of philosophical work that philosophy of education has come into existence. The problems of education are sufficiently yeasty, profound, difficult, and important to generate philosophical treatment. Not everything that one might choose to philosophize about, not all the problems people face, have the right qualities to stimulate philosophical works.

This view comes perilously close to noting that the philosophical significance is *in* the educational problems. They reside there, ingredient in the problems of education. The answer to the question "What's philosophical about education?" seems to be: "Well, of course, *only* those philosophical elements of education." Is there an intrinsic philosophical value in educational problems? Perhaps. One way to read *Democracy and Education*[1] is to see that the good of education, the good of the social, and the good of philosophy are all the same good of connection-making.

I begin with what seems a prior question: By what criteria can we judge an instance of something as philosophy, as education? I give a cluster of criteria for philosophy, another cluster for education, and make some connections between them. For philosophy such a cluster of criteria would include:

a. specifying a context in which statements have meaning;
b. use of clear philosophic concepts;
c. asking a philosophically telling question—and this is about something!
d. use of techniques, procedures and methods of philosophy to answer the telling question;
e. answering the question by asserting a philosophic claim (including especially a proof the question can *not* be answered; clarifying the question is a valued product of philosophic work);
f. using philosophic principles of value to judge claims (e.g., for philosophic systems the values of coherence and comprehensiveness; for analysis, the values of well-constructed arguments, elegant proofs, powerful metaphors, skillful use of techniques of analysis).

These criteria are a cluster; they are neither exclusively necessary nor exhaustively sufficient. Instead they are present or absent in degree. The joint presence in high degree identifies conditions recognized as significant philosophy.

The telling question is always *about* something. All philosophy is *about* something. When the object or event the question is about is an educational problem, then we see one basic connection between education and philosophy.

For education, a cluster of relevant criteria would include:

a. specifying a context in which educational statements have meaning, including the language of both technical and ordinary discourse (on the ground that meaning derives from contexts in which terms are used);
b. using a concept or theory of education to mark off events as educative events (including general concepts such as "shaping behavior and belief systems" and specific concepts of teaching and teachers, curriculum and program, learning and learners, governance and administration);
c. specifying methods of two sorts: methods for conducting

the practice of education, and methods for conducting inquiry about the practice which includes research, evaluation and philosophic criticism;

d. specifying a set of substantive claims about education: e.g., the social setting (a school), the person (it takes a person who understands something to tell if another person understands something), the educative process (a process "from . . . to", from immaturity to maturity, from ignorance to knowledge), and the value of education (changing the meaning of experience, enrichment).

These criteria may, of course, be modified and extended. The cluster is open-ended since it does not represent necessary and sufficient conditions but rather elements present or absent in degree. Again, the joint presence in high degree gives us confidence we have identified "education."

Combining sets of criteria turns up several points. First, the criteria marking off education mark off objects, events, facts, problems, examples that become the content for philosophizing. The possibility emerges here that facts about the problem can be used to improve the concepts used in thinking about the problems. Thus, educational facts change and improve philosophic concepts. Second, the philosophic criteria became second-order criteria for processing educational matters. Examples: clarifying meanings, stipulating contexts, analyzing concepts, constructing arguments, making value judgments. Third, philosophic content and methods are found within the domain of education directly. Example: philosophy for children in school.[2] Fourth, if the substantive philosophic claims are about educational matters, then Dewey's extraordinary assertion that philosophy is the general theory of education becomes more plausible.

Fifth, educational problems are a *source* of philosophical problems. When Dunkel writes: "Wanted: New Paradigms and a Normative Base for Research,"[3] he is analyzing problems of research in education in such a way as to pose a new problem for philosophy. The standard philosophy of science arguments are inadequate to educational research because of the way they treat (or fail to treat) values and normative concepts. (Education is a normative concept.) Thus, some new philosophizing needs to be done.

Sixth, educational problems are a testing site for philosophical methods, distinctions and solutions. The very nice alternation between educational problems and philosophical methods found in Thomas Green's book on *The Activities of Teaching*[4] illustrates this point.

Seventh, if philosophy is to have a vibrant social meaning, it seems to be well-placed in the social context of arguments about education. Arguments about the good and the right, the true and the false, become important to us socially when we are trying to decide practical educational issues.

I mention these seven points primarily as illustrations of the notion that one set of claims and criteria about education can be significantly related to other claims and criteria about philosophy. Perhaps that is one meaning of significance, i.e., the import of one set of claims for another set. To make the connection between sets establishes significance.[5]

One of the troubling characteristics of philosophy, as I understand it, is that almost any part of philosophy can, by some logical bridge or other, be related to other parts of philosophy. If one begins with the problem of explanation and causes and reasons, one can move to reasons, to reasoning, from there to rationality, on to rational animals, and so forth. The possibility of an endless array of connections can permit even the wildest connections to have potential philosophic sense and significance.

On Recognizing Sense and Significance

It seems to me that recognizing this sense and significance is a profoundly personal matter. By this I don't mean it is purely private or subjective, but that genuine philosophical understanding (whether of educational or other matters) requires that we make philosophical problems our own, living with them, caring about them, working away at them until the result is a critical form of self-expression. Perhaps I can illustrate what I mean by saying something about the difficult topic which the organizers of this symposium originally asked me to talk about: how I do philosophy of education, and particularly whether beginning with educational problems shapes my work. I believe that it does.

Piaget makes the observation about children that verbal forms evolve more slowly than actual understanding. I'm not too certain how Piaget knows that, but it seems to be true to me, and true of how I do my work: Philosophic forms evolve more slowly than educational understanding. Sometimes my students think I'm pigheaded, or stubborn.[6] In the course of developing a philosophic argument, I find myself at odds with others; they suggest a change of formulation, and I will resist it because it doesn't feel right to me. I often take words with a fairly clear central use (like "teaching") and develop a new meaning related to the central ones. Only through a slow process of sustained conversation, using the words over and over again in various sentences, using different examples, clarifying meanings, and so on, do I finally manage to express what has been clear to me, but somehow inexpressible. I have learned from my experience to stick to the understanding I have until I can find some way to make others understand. If I can't make sense of it for others, I try to see what it was I said that would make others respond to me with their (misleading) comments. I take the responses to mean that I haven't worked something out yet, that I haven't learned to say all that I meant to say. One of my students wrote: "You are ready to tackle problems from the point of view of 'What does Bob Gowin make of this?' and not 'Well, here's a problem, here's what others have said, here are the gaps that need filling.'" I have to think through the problems on my own, reach my own understanding, and then try to express that to others. The grapes have to go through the winepress.

Did Aristotle ask himself, or did others ever ask him, to recognize the philosophic significance of Greek life? Or did Aristotle just "do" philosophy? Did Bertrand Russell, so careful to study himself from his adolescent years on, ever wonder if he were doing philosophy? Was John Dewey's program for philosophizing something he never doubted, was it never problematic for him?

For many artists it is important to keep production in the saddle, and reflective scrutiny on the side. But reflective scrutiny is the productive work of the philosopher. It seems inevitable, at some point at least, that any philosopher will philosophize about doing philosophy. For some, the answer is simply training. For others it is a game, a spectacular intellectual game for intellectuals. Others are too intelligent to become intellectuals. To matter, matters: Greek life, mathematics, arts, education. The funny, puzzling, wonderful problems these first-order events have are the proper significance we need to recognize. And it is nice to have a puzzle or a problem, for then you have work.

For me, now that I've thought about it a bit, and asked for help from some of my former students, the answer seems straightforward. If we begin with genuine educational problems and do our damnedest as philosophers to understand them, then the philosophic significance simply emerges in the course of our work. The wine comes out here in the transformation of problems, education, and philosophy.

How has it been, to me, to work on educational problems? What significance for my philosophizing do educational problems have? Is there anything in the way I do philosophy that causes my work to have a characteristic form as a consequence of tackling educational problems? Artists are responsive to the medium they work in. Am I? This question is difficult to answer well.

As I review my past work I sense an evolution of shifting concerns. An examination of my past writings will show first a concern with academic knowledge, with knowing what the best minds thought and published. Second, and closely related, is a concern that theory ought to go into practice, and that these beautiful ideas of the best minds in their brightest hours ought not remain on the shelf, but ought to make a difference in action. Third, when I looked at the practice I thought that we could change the practice by research, and I did some standard empirical research. Slowly it dawned on me that we needed not only to change practice by research: we need to change research by philosophizing. That is the fourth point. I have written on the philosophical redirection of educational research.[7] Now, with the request of this symposium, this thinking together, I can think about changing philosophy by a concern with educating. This is the fifth point.

On Changing Concepts with Facts

"Intelligence, knowing, is the most important and the most significant *fact* in the universe," John Herman Randall writes in *Aristotle*. Humans "are animals that can know the world and the world is a world that can be known." Knowing, intellectual grasp (*nous*), is also a life.[8] And talking (teaching and tutoring), using *language*, is the instrument of knowing-living.

What an exciting thing to say: that you have found the most important *fact* in the universe. Further excitement develops for education because the most important fact is intelligence, knowing, *nous*. We educators know about knowing, about the care and development of intelligence. Even the thrilling prospect of modern technology to explore the vast universe pales in comparison to the report that we already know the most important fact in the universe.

Nevertheless, I'm puzzled. I'm not quite sure what it means to call intelligence a fact. I think a fact is a record of an event. What event is intelligence a record of? An event of thinking? An event of record-making? Are persons recorders of events? Are persons facts?

Facts are significant when we connect them up with concepts, events and other facts. They are philosophically significant when we use facts to test or to change philosophic concepts.

From Randall's book, I have this pleasant image of a middle-aged Aristotle, his concepts clear from years of study, poking around in all sorts of unusual places in Greece. I see him in my mind's idea getting a kick out of keeping the list of victors in the Olympic games, and also noting their records. He drew up a list of competing dramatists, and noted the winners. He collected digests of the constitution of 158 of the Greek city-states, and he wrote one for Athens. Aristotle did a history of animals, collected psychological problems, and put together large histories of philosophy and the sciences. Facts were important. Why? Facts can change theories.

My fondest hope, at this point in time, is for changes in standard philosophical views guiding educational research. Epistemology should help us in making knowledge about education. I think it is way past time to replace the narrow paradigm of science with one more adequate for research on educational problems. We need new meanings for the standard concepts of facts and observations, and I think that new meaning involves conceiving of facts not as propositions[9] but as records-of-events. I believe we need to define concept differently, not as a class or as a category, but as a sign/symbol signifying regularities in events. I think we need to think of knowledge claims as assertions of regularities found in records of events, and to expect these knowledge claims not to be uniform laws that build up cumulatively but rather as claims that are consumed in the progress of our understanding. I believe that we need a new view of theory which can combine normative concepts with other concepts in a rational manner. By trying to get smart about education, by trying to solve its problems, we might create a new, more appropriate epistemology. The new epistemology would reconstruct subject-object epistemologies with a triadic relation between concepts-events-and-records.

My thinking about the structure of knowledge, coupled with my continual analysis of primary sources (research papers, monographs, etc.), has convinced me of the utility of thinking of knowledge as a construction of the relations between concepts, events, and records of those events. I set aside the standard subject-object epistemology, or at least the standard formulations of it. In my epistemic triad between concept, event and record, both subject and object are to be found there, but in a somewhat altered relation. The subject is a conceiver, naming regularities in events, and externalizing the conception through signs and symbols. These signs and symbols can be communicated to other persons. Additionally, the person is a maker of records of events. These "objective observations" can be used by other persons. Anyone can look at the records, and some can "read" them by bringing to these records appropriate concepts. Finally, some events are directly participated in by persons. The person is in the world, and the world is a place with persons in it; they are jointly co-implicated. Whether these epistemological views will serve I do not yet know. I do recognize spreading dissatisfaction with the narrow positivistic paradigm throughout the educational research community. We have the chance, now, of seeing the old paradigm lost, a new paradigm regained.

Search Out the Metaphor

When Ray Bradbury was trying to answer the question for NASA: "Why explore?" he climbed atop the 500 foot strutworks, looked down at the great rocket engines waiting to be filled with energy to go off to the Moon on another journey. He is in tears the whole afternoon, trying to find a metaphor to explain this titanic thing, the exploration of space. He says the only thing he can think of is that he is walking around in Shakespeare's mind. And he writes a poem.

I think I must have been walking around in John Dewey's mind for several years. Looking down on his nature and experience, feeling the ultimate explanation that makes the whole thing go, enjoying in *Experience and Nature* the real relaxed tension John has, rattling the cages of philosophical thought, emptying some, locking others, constructing others. If you just see things-in-connection, John tells me, then you'll overcome the lacerations language enforces; you'll make your language your ally. It is a cobbler's job, this philosophy work, making, doing, acting, wearing thin and weary yet promoting growth. Look at the energy in art when it is seen as experience. Look in present time how the social is moral. Look at the creative intelligence coming from science properly understood. And of course everyman his own philosopher, every woman her own philosopher. Walk around in Dewey's head for years and you'll see these wonderful things, and many more.

If Dewey was a cobbler, Santayana was a winemaker. Not your chemical red ink, but great wine. I leave you with Santayana's view of the philosopher (from *Character and Opinion in the United States*):

> At best, the true philosopher can fulfill his [or her] mission very imperfectly, which is to pilot himself, or at most a few voluntary companions who may find themselves in the same boat. It is not easy for him to shout, or address a crowd; he must be silent for long seasons; for he is watching stars that move slowly and in courses that it is possible though difficult to foresee; and he is crushing all things in his heart as in a winepress, until his life and their secret flow out together.

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1. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1916).

2. Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp (Eds.), *Growing Up With Philosophy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978).

3. L. G. Thomas, et al., *Philosophical Redirection of Educational Re-Search* (N.S.S.E., 1972), pp. 77-93.

4. New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1971.

5. It is helpful to distinguish "significant for education" from "educationally significant." James Coleman's work is not educationally significant because he does not consider the problems of teaching, of learning, of administration, of curriculum. His work focuses on housing problems which have significant consequences for schools, but these are not problems of education.

6. In the course of responding to this invitation, I wrote former students for their views on how I do my work.

7. In Thomas, *op. cit.*, "Is Educational Research Distinctive?"

8. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960, pp. 5-6.

9. If you call facts propositions, then what sorts of things are propositions?

(Invited Symposium, Part Three)

HOW I GET TO WHERE I GO AND WHY I WANT TO GO THERE

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I want first off to note one or two things about differences in the ways that Gary Fenstermacher has titled this session and I have subtitled my part in it. One notes a contrast in tone and grace and gravity. My title has a certain awkwardness which I rather enjoy, and if you think about it, it is reminiscent of some Theatre of the Absurd titles, and I find a certain appropriateness in that too. Beyond such subtleties, though, I wanted to make it clear from the start that I would not myself characterize all that is to follow as philosophy—or as philosophizing about philosophy, non-philosophizing about philosophy, or as philosophizing about non-philosophy. It will be however, a description of how I get to where I go, why I find the trips worth making, and the contrasts I see in my own diverse routes and destinations.

One of the reasons for beginning with this sort of disclaimer is Wittgenstein's famous stipulation that philosophy is what philosophers do. I'm not convinced that philosophers of education really accept this, however, because at the same time that we were learning Wittgenstein, one of the collateral learnings was that *philosopher* is an achievement not a task term. Thus, save for the most self-assured, "philosopher of education" was an accolade bestowed, not a claim staked. A somewhat different order of reason for what I have said so far is the sorts of feelings which an invitation such as Gary's generates. On first examination, it is of course terribly flattering; and it promises all the absorption and fascination of mirror-gazing. Second thoughts are a bit more sobering, however, as one realizes that the task calls for a real stocktaking of the pilgrim's progress—and perhaps a premature or halfway obituary of sorts.

I don't want this extended introduction to risk the error of Doris Lessing—who in her desire to tell all (in *The Golden Notebook*) reported a good deal more than I found worth sharing. But as you will see, the increasing intrusion of the personal is one of the stylistic changes I find noticeable in my own work.

A bit about the *genre* first, however. Without trying to define philosophy of education one more time, it might be noted that there does seem to be a characteristic way in which philosophers choose to be in the world—a way which differs from the postures of other specialists. An anthropologist, for example, is likely to see cultural causation in all he observes. A cleric is thankful and/or prayerful. A Freudian goes digging for buried lust and guilt. A New Leftist stages a takeover. And a philosopher writes a paper. It is prophetic of the results that the enterprise involves a withdrawal from activity, in the interests of reflection—and when needing help, the philosopher is likely to consult the words (i.e., the papers) of other philosophers rather than the objects or events to which other specialists might look. It also seems clear that different expectations and standards attend the work of different specialists, and what counts as strengths in one may represent flaws in another. (I am thinking here of my experience with a psychologist colleague with whom I exchange papers. We remain friends despite the fact that she typically finds my work to consist of inconsequential distinctions and ambling speculations arrayed in overly complex sentences. Her articles, on the other hand, invariably strike me as the data collections from which quite good stuff could be built if she only took the time to think about their meaning and inter-connections.)

Beyond the shared tendencies of the calling, however, philosophers of education display considerable difference as to the personal style which marks their work. Mike Apple, Jane Martin, and Chet Bowers have all done what I would consider philosophic jobs on the Hidden Curriculum. Yet these are very different kinds of work, stamped with the distinctive trademark of the inquirer. It is a matter of different presuppositions and bibliographies, but it is also a matter of one's personal imprint on what one does. Maxine Greene's induplicable papers, for example, are all marked by a breathless character—a tumbling forth of her marvelous range of associations. Jim McClellan's work is recognizable not only for its logical force and merit, but also for its linguistic texture, combining the Classical Greek with the ever-current Anglo-Saxon. Depending upon his theme, Harry Broudy's work also frequently displays a most distinctive flavor—with the unusual characteristic of sounding very much as he often talks in private conversation. And Tom Green's work is comparably distinctive, with enormous clarity and order and system brought to an extraordinary array of empirical and philosophic elements and qualities.

I have long been interested in such personal stylistic patterns, and have plans to do a paper on them someday—in combination, perhaps, with an explication of my own criteria for judging a philosophic paper (a job Ron Swartz keeps goading me to complete). But until quite recently, I had not turned my sights on my own work as a package. This is what Gary's invitation has pushed me to do, and here are the results of that inquiry.

First, with respect to substance, two broad themes subsume much of what I have written: the relationship between society and education; and the methodology or procedures for arriving at beliefs, commitments, and decisions. Links between schools and the political have been a recurring topic for me—with *The Ax-Grinders*, and in a series of articles: an exchange with Bob Ennis on the "possibility of neutrality" matter, an investigation of the Council for Basic Education, a couple of things on Extremism and the schools. As a good majoritarian, I argued against the Rightwing's attempt to function as the majority it wasn't, while claiming in the exchange with Bob that Dewey was right and schooling cannot be politically neutral. It seemed to me though, that the politicalization that reached a crescendo at the end of the Sixties was just too much—and I did several things arguing against the reduction of education to its political import, somewhat analogously to the way that I.A. Richards had earlier claimed the reduction of a novel's worth to its ideology to be fallacious—the "fallacy of doctrinal adhesion," as he called it.[1] New work in the sociology of knowledge and elsewhere has jarred my perspective of such matters, however, and generated questions to which I want to return. (I want to see what it all adds up to, for my questions, when you juxtapose Nell Keddie, Basil Bernstein, some selected Critical Theorists, Fred Hirsch, and Ronald Dworkin.)

My education-society interest has also taken another form—a series of papers on what specific developments will and should mean for schooling (i.e., what schools should do in light of identifiable trends). One such paper, on "Illich As Stalking Horse," put me in the position of correctly anticipating the now familiar anti-school sentiment. However, by the time it got published, the predictions were already being realized—and there's nothing that tarnishes a prophet's image quite like coming in *post hoc*.

With respect to stance, the things I worry about have changed —so that the interests which seem to need protecting are no longer the majority against the tyranny of militant minorities—but that sort of oppression visited on all of us impartially. I don't see myself as having become radicalized, by a long shot. I do, however, seem to find increasing communion with Michael Novak, and to have shifted my concerns in the general direction he identifies with the New Left. "According to the Old Left," he states, "the number one danger is the Radical Right." But for the New Left, the Radical Right can't represent anything like the threat that comes from more heavily concentrated and pervasive power.[2]

> According to the New Left, the number one power in the United States is "corporate liberalism"—an alliance of technical experts, well-paid professors and communications specialists, managers, staff politicians, professional social workers, and tycoons of the new technologically based industries.

Although I do not share a number of the prescriptions of the New Left, I find much to recommend this kind of diagnosis of our time—and hence, it is increasingly the kind of perception of the public space from which my thinking emerges. The gravest threats to human wellbeing seem to me to be coming not so much from the malevolent, or the doctrinally misguided, as from the fallout from our triumphs: the toll on individual human beings of the social forms our esoteric knowledge and high technology have created for us.

One of the changes this kind of perception has brought to my earlier convictions has been to challenge the centrality of method and procedure, and the primacy I had been taught to assign them—in arriving at and justifying belief, in making practical decisions, and in working out problems in human affairs. A two-year term on the county board of the Civil Liberties Union proved a critical experience in this regard. It convinced me that the procedural commitments and guarantees which I had prized so highly were worth far less than I had presupposed. For not only did they depend upon moves and safeguards that are evadeable; even when successfully invoked, these procedures often end in "hollow victories"—the kind where nobody wins, or where the battle is won at the cost of the war. By the end of my two-year term, I had become convinced that the Civil Liberties Union approach to human affairs is so essentially bureaucratic as to tie the Union as closely to the problem as to its solution. It served just as wholly to functionalize and de-personalize human existence as the telephone company or the Civil Service Commission! It took me a while to figure it out. But what was wrong with the whole thing, I finally concluded, is that the CLU is committed to trying to offset the absence of community—to making things work without it. And I have come to believe that that just can't be done: not even the most well-designed procedures imaginable can make up for the absence of good will; and given the good will, of course, they can recede into the background.

I am not sure just how far I want to generalize this disenchantment with procedures in human affairs to more formal concerns—to epistemological and axiological questions, for instance. One of my current interests, however, is in epistemological alternatives to the familiar scientific paradigm. I have become increasingly fascinated with the central role we have assigned the problem of error in epistemology, and with the issue of what happens if we remove it from the pedestal Pierce assigned it in that classic on the fixation of belief—which, you will recall, failed all other ways of knowing on the grounds that they offered no test for ferreting out error.[3] I'm not at all sure that I would be willing to accept the alternatives—but I am interested in looking them over, and have begun to talk a bit about it with Bob Osborn, who is exploring "Radical Inquiry" and with Mike Simmons who is also fascinated with the error problem.

Some of the changes in substance—and possibly of stance as well—have been associated with a gradual evolution in what I seek to accomplish by writing. Obviously we often have prudential purposes in mind when we write (such mundane matters, for example, as promotion or tenure), and psychological dynamics are undoubtedly present as well. But whether or not we fully state them to ourselves, we also have notions of a different order about what we want our work to accomplish. I think that what instigated much of my earlier writing was an effort to call attention to ills: to things I thought were being overlooked, or which needed a different kind of attention or treatment. Some such function has not been uncommon for a philosopher of education to assume—and, in several variants has perhaps been a major part of the role definition assumed by those entering the field since the mid-Fifties. I would like to think that such efforts on my part have brought some clarity and needed redirection to the work of my colleagues. But I'm not at all confident about that. The gadfly function may advance the search for truth, even while impoverishing the quest for its application to human affairs. So I don't do nearly as much gadflying as I once did—only when I am overcome with fits of moral indignation, and these are rarer than they used to be.

But the role question has been a continuing problem. The period in which I entered the field was one which made advocacy highly suspect. Or, more precisely, it made *positive* advocacy suspect; it was all right to oppose error and recommend its curtailment, but it was not all right to venture much further in the direction of promulgating programs. So some of my more analytically-oriented colleagues focused on unearthing logical error, while I busied myself with the ideological errors of Rightwingers. The reasons for such a professional trend were part historical, part logical. As of the Fifties, many of us were rather sensitive to the extravagances of some of our predecessors. The paradigm case for me was Harold Rugg, whom I greatly admired, but who in his book *Foundations for American Education* (which I also greatly admired) kept repeating—in caps and itals, no less—"*LET THE FACTS CONCLUDE!*" Such shameless abandonment of one's cool was disturbing in the Fifties—let alone such blatant submersion in the Naturalistic Fallacy. Advocacy was unfashionable because we had learned from the Emotivists that ultimately proposals were logically arbitrary. Indeed, the only suggestions that weren't logically arbitrary were logical corrections (within a logical system, of course—the desirability of which was widely taken for granted).

And this is how philosophers of education removed themselves from the relevant action. For as a story of Jerry Reagan's shows in most explicit terms, there is just not an awful lot of help to be had from the admonition "Don't mess up." So by confining themselves to such advice, philosophers of education abandoned the leadership roles which their logical commitments turned into hubris if not chutzpah. And in so doing, they left a vacuum which came eventually to be filled in two sorts of ways: by an assortment of such luminaries as John Holt, Neil Postman, and Leo Buscaglia, on the one hand—and on the other by the empiricists who rushed in to fill the void as best they could. Most typically this has taken the form of meeting school-related "ought" questions with needs assessments— where votes establishing gaps perceived are syntactically converted into goals statements. There is also another strategy for arriving at educational goals which I find absolutely mind-blowing: There is at least one major research-evaluation center in this country from which you can *buy* educational goals: hundreds or even thousands of them, if you are so disposed and have the money!

As perhaps you have inferred, I think the matter of educational direction can use a lot of help from philosophers of education. Formal education seems to be in a lot of trouble, both logically and empirically, and I think there is much that we can do. My own sense of the nature and scope of the difficulty has led me into efforts that stray well beyond the philosophic function as I learned that. I am involved in trying to stimulate the spread of alternative education systems in this country. I remain strongly convinced of the need for schools—for all youngsters, and most particularly for the less fortunate. But I think that they need to be schools matched on the one hand to the values of diverse adult communities of belief, and on the other to differences in learner traits and characteristics. What I see as the best means of bringing about such a system is a contemporary Eight-Year Study—an updated version that would do for alternative education what the earlier inquiry hoped to do for Progressive Education. I have been working on this for about two years now, and a great many of the related efforts have little to do with philosophy. They do, however, relate closely to what I take to be leadership in much needed directions.

My work choices, then, suggest tendencies in the direction of an increasingly more positive and broader sort of attempt to grapple with educational problems—reflecting an expanded set of goals for myself: namely, not only to understand and conceptualize practice, but to improve it; and that, not only through formulation of what would constitute improvement, but by planning and participating in the strategies of improvement.

What I have reported represents some rather far-reaching changes in focus and perspective. There are, however, some major continuities and constants. I remain committed to a contextualism that is evidently deeply embedded. I remain committed also to the general sorts of democratic goals Dewey sought in human affairs—but supplemented with other kinds of goals aimed at inner as well as external wellbeing for humankind. I find that these two sorts of concerns recommend extensive change in our institutional structures and arrangements. For to the extent one takes contextualism seriously, one presupposes that the optimal arrangements for today—and perhaps even the mediate criteria for assessing them—must differ considerably from what seemed best for the first half of the century.

There are also some stylistic constants in my work. Whether the activity be the writing of papers or something else, I think my philosophic background has yielded a built-in nonsense detector that is almost always on duty. (This is not to be confused with Postman and Weingartner's Crap Detector which fails to note the important distinction between macro and micro. Analytic tools help identify micro nonsense but they cannot help with unveiling the macro, which calls for the equipment of a Joseph Heller or a Kurt Vonnegut.) I use the detector a bit differently today than earlier—partly in the wake of Lawrence Stenhouse's comment that Americans, unlike the British, seem to seek improvement via "the enumeration of human failure."[4] But it functions rather consistently, and I think it is responsible for whatever clarity and precision my work can claim.

But if there are stylistic constants, changes of this sort are also discernible in my work. They parallel the changes in substantive focus I have described, but they show developmental changes as well. It seems to me that one can discern distinct stylistic phases in the work of a number of us, varying with career stages and associated with "coming of age" in the profession. These phases undoubtedly vary with vicissitudes in philosophic fashion, but I suspect they may be identifiable quite apart from these. The paper written soon after graduate school days is a "Bases Touching" presentation. For reasons eminently understandable, whatever else it may do the paper seeks to demonstrate the author's familiarity with the most important entries in a typically modest-sized problem area. It is rarely a paper whose burden is largely the workings of the author's own mind.

In a subsequent phase to which many of us come a few years later, the ambitions have expanded and the attempt is to speak from a command of the *full* related literature. One not only claims but displays his or her credentials. At this point, the footnote compendium may become particularly notable, sometimes vying with the text in word count. I spent a while here and found it a burdensome obligation. (Jan Weaver referred to the papers emerging from it as representing "overkill.") This stage abates with the onset of a third in which a scholar comes into his or her own. Here one can detect a greater degree of venturesomeness and a greater willingness to advance ideas and claim them as one's own. The product is marked by a reversal of the first stage proportion of input and output. The third stage paper, that is, is less data-oriented, and likely to be far more idiosyncratic in form, and original in substance: the ritualistic display of one's completed homework is not obligatory, and the ideas and conclusions offered may seem much more the writer's product than the yield of his or her reading. Instead of feeling obligated to show that someone else thought of it first, it becomes permissible to have thought it up for oneself. There is, then, a stronger subjective component in third stage papers. They are more self-disclosing and personal, and traffic more in what the writer holds important. As I guess this statement testifies, I think that's where I'm at (to use the graceful locution of the day).

There is another change which, for me, has paralleled the movement through these stages. Perhaps the best way to describe it is through the contrast Whitehead is supposed to have drawn for Russell some years after their famous collaboration. "Bertie," he is supposed to have said, "there are two kinds of people in the world: the simple-minded and the muddle-headed. You're simple-minded, and I'm muddle-headed." I think my work has tended to move from the first of these to the second—a move that accords with one's most fundamental sense of things: If one sees the world as fundamentally a place that can be penetrated and brought to order only as one divides it up and walls off small chunks for examination, then one becomes a simplifier in the attempt to cope with complexity. One deals in the atomic instead of the molecular. If, however, one's primitive sense of the world suggests that meaning and connections have to be supplied to things, then one becomes a complexifier. I suspect I'm somewhere on the trek between the two. I guess I find it less meaningful and satisfying now to draw lines sufficiently sharply to arrive at the exclusions necessary to intellectual clarity and precision.

The move toward the muddle-headed means that my work is sloppier now (but by the same token, more reality-oriented, I think). It is harder to outline, not only before it is written but afterward as well. It also develops quite differently from the way in which papers used to, for me, and over a longer period, with less intentionality. What will eventually become a paper may well begin as I am doing something else (very typically, reading exams), and the new problem suddenly pops up.—Not, as in Dewey's neat mind, at the terminus of one inquiry and smoothly segueing into the next; but typically in mid-problem or activity. I stop and jot a note or question on a slip of paper, and move it off my book or yellow pad. Such jottings get dropped into an unwieldy file called "Stuff" (in tribute to Archie Anderson, who labelled all of his files "Stuff . . ."). When enough notes have been jotted on a topic, that gets dignified with a folder all its own. As the folder gets fatter, the article's time seems to come. It is a pattern which makes any single venture take longer, but one which means that over a period of time, most articles will write themselves. This statement has largely done itself this way. It offers the advantage of a richer perspective, I think, although the process has probably delayed and diverted 20 or 30 other projects along the way.

Method and style, then, seem to have changed for me, along with substance. Auden is supposed to have said that one of the grounds for distinguishing minor from more substantial poets is that it is impossible to tell with the former, which of two poems came first. I hope that is not the case with my work. I hope that what I do reflects cumulative gain along the way, and an increasing awareness of that and willingness to share it. I can remember a popular social science professor at my institution who, at about the turn of the present decade, when the cosmos seemed least stable, made some kind of presentation on world affairs. Afterward, he responded to student questions indicating he found them annoyingly inappropriate: "You're asking me how to live," he said, "and I can't tell you that. Nobody can." The years since have made me increasingly sure that it was not their questions, but his answer which was inappropriate. And it seems at least as reasonable to expect some help with such matters from philosophers of education.

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1. Cited by Louis Ehrenkrantz in "Reviewing the Reviewers," *Intellect*, December, 1977, p. 246.

2. Michael Novak, "The Secular Saint," *Center Magazine* (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions), I:4 (May, 1968) p. 53.

3. Charles S.S. Pierce, "The Fixation of Belief," *Popular Science Monthly*, 1877, pp. 1-15.

4. In a presentation to an AERA meeting, New York, April 7, 1977.

(First Concurrent Session)

THE SHIBBOLETH OF EQUAL PER-PUPIL EXPENDITURES*

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationships among two policy formulation categories and a non-policy category of social inquiry and social action, all relevant to the goal of equalizing educational and economic opportunity in American society. The two categories for policy formulation are "educational policy" and "social policy," while the non-policy category is designated as "fundamental social change." Each of these categories has been cited as the appropriate orientation for interventions aimed at equalizing educational and economic opportunities in our society. This paper will argue that achieving both these goals requires strategies and tactics of change that call for adherence not to educational or even social policy but to the category of fundamental social change.

Several social issues in education are of current interest and import. They include the controversy between cognitive and affective views of education, the IQ debate, alternatives to conventional schooling, the education of cultural minorities, and the question of accountability. All of these issues are interrelated with one another. In some, if not most, respects they are all aspects of the great social issue of our times, viz., the establishment of social justice, or as this paper will treat the issue—the achievement of equality of educational and economic opportunity.

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The legal-financial issues associated with the controversy over equality of educational and economic opportunity will be focused upon in establishing the claim that fundamental social change is required to realize the goals of educational and economic opportunity. To support this assertion regarding equalizing educational and economic opportunities, *Financing the Public Schools in Kentucky*, a Kentucky Department of Education document, will be used for illustrative purposes.[1] A critique of its policy proposals will highlight the inadequacy of educational and social policy orientations for achieving equality of educational and economic opportunity as well as to emphasize the need for fundamental social change.

Financing the Public Schools of Kentucky makes the following explicit and implicit assumptions: First, formal schooling is a necessary and sufficient condition for "all individuals to secure livelihood and establish personal economic independence."[2] Second, lower achievement and lower aspiration levels from one school district to another are due to differences in per-pupil expenditures among school districts.[3] Third, it is the responsibility of the state to attempt *through education* "to provide for equality of opportunity to develop children's talents to the greatest extent possible."[4] Lastly, the achievement of equality of opportunity is to be sought by both an increase in state revenues for education and equal access to these revenues by all children, regardless of the school district in which they reside.

From these assumptions stem recommendations concerning the proper financing of elementary and secondary levels of education for realizing the goal of equality of opportunity. The central recommendations are increasing both state income and local property taxes, enlarging the total amount of the Commonwealth's existing foundational program for equalizing per-pupil expenditures among rich and poor school districts in Kentucky, and utilizing a new approach for allocating foundational program monies among the school districts. Entailed in both the study's assumptions and recommendations is the belief that equality of educational and economic opportunity may be reached through reform in the financing of education via an educational policy prescription of equalizing per-pupil expenditures.

This approach, one that reflects a commitment to corrective actions associated with the categories of educational and social policies, is an inadequate means for attaining the goals of equality of educational and economic opportunity. Equalizing per-pupil expenditures is a shibboleth that functions to distract us from the necessity of pursuing modes of intervention that are tied to the category of fundamental social change. Let us examine why this is so.

In recent years the courts have participated in the battle over equalizing educational opportunities not only through decisions regarding racial discrimination but also by judgments involving the financing of education to achieve equality of educational opportunity. Notable cases are McInnes v. Shapiro, Burruss v. Wilkerson, Serrano v. Priest, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, Robinson v. Cahill, and Serrano II. One assumption underlying these court litigations over school funding is that in-school changes such as more textbooks, overhead projectors, laboratory beakers, and well-paid teachers add up to better education. Unlike the Brown decision regarding the indefensibility of separate but equal schools, the court decisions on equalizing per-pupil expenditures have not been based upon social science research. Thus, although simple social justice would dictate that children in poor school districts should have equal access to revenues for schooling, the empirical question of whether more money for schools in poor communities will raise the educational level of their pupils has apparently been ignored by the courts. That question, though, has remained a subject of sharp debate among educational professionals and the lay public. Extensive empirical data, analyzed by sophisticated statistical procedures, strongly support the powerful and provocative position that if there is a relationship between expenditures and achievement it is probably very slight.

For many decades it was generally assumed that much of the scholastic success of pupils in the Great Necks and Grosse Pointes of America was due to the relatively large amounts of money those communities spent on education. In 1966 this belief began to crumble with the publication of *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, popularly known as The Coleman Report. This study sought to determine if links existed between pupil performance and in-school factors such as teacher salaries and school facilities. From Coleman's regression model and his use of analysis of variance an unexpected message emerged: the social backgrounds of pupils appear to exert a far greater influence on their achievement than anything the schools did or did not do. The statistics showed, for example, that most of the variation in student achievement was within a school, not between schools in different socio-economic areas.[5] This suggested that attributes of schools could not account for much of the variation in pupil achievement. Later, The Coleman Report conclusions were largely supported by a Harvard sponsored research group of political and social scientists, educators, and mathematicians.[6]

Although there is a weak relationship between expenditures and achievement, many reform-minded persons retain an intuitive faith that spending inequities are at the heart of differential achievement levels. For example, while observing "the fact that substantial increases in costs per-pupil in recent years have not been accompanied by comparable improvements in school performance," the 1972 Fleischman Report on Education in New York state argued contradictorily that inequities in raising and spending education dollars "is the key logjam which must be removed before movement toward high levels of educational achievement can be resumed."[7]

All this has presented partisans on different sides of the issue with a confusing array of studies from which to prove one claim or another. For example, some opponents of tax reform have argued that The Coleman Report means that schools don't really matter, so why bother spending even more on them. The point has also been made that the issue of the relationship of expenditures to achievement in policy formulation will not be settled by social science. In the introduction to their study, *Private Wealth and Public Education*, the Coons et al. group contends that reforms in the financing of education should not hinge upon the current status of social science research and that expenditures should be equalized between rich and poor school districts. They argue that "If money is inadequate to improve education, the residents of poor districts should at least have an equal opportunity to be disappointed by its failure."[8] Again, simple justice.

Financing the Public Schools in Kentucky, however, does assume that equalizing per-pupil expenditures will help to achieve equality of educational and economic opportunity for Kentucky youth.[9] A conception of equality of educational opportunity is not explicitly stated in *FPSK*, which undermines much of the value of the study. But a conception of equality of educational opportunity may be discerned indirectly by *FPSH's* assumption that improving Kentucky education will contribute to "the economic development of the state and nation." The entailment is the implicit idea that enhanced skills on the part of youth will be supportive of economic growth. Thus *FPSK* espouses a conception of equality of educational opportunity as equality of results. But its policy formulation of equality of educational opportunity in terms of means to the end of equality of results is equality of inputs with that referring to various school-related phenomena such as requiring all school districts to operate a K-12 educational program and the equalization of per-pupil expenditures among all school districts.

Although *FPSK* is a product of the 1970's, nowhere is there mention of The Coleman Report or other studies such as the Averch group's *How Effective Is Schooling: A Critical Review and Synthesis of Research Findings.*[10] These studies do not support the assumption that school expenditures are significantly related to educational achievement. For example, analyses employed in The Coleman Study indicate that the overwhelming amount of variance in student achievement is attributable to sources other than per-pupil expenditures.[11]

Despite these research findings, efforts continue for equalizing per-pupil expenditures in order to equalize educational and economic opportunities. Underlying these efforts is the assumption that reducing or eliminating poverty or at least randomizing poverty (one version of the meritocratic ideal) among all ethnic groups may be achieved through educational policies, with educational policies referring to interventions that take schools as the context for inquiry and social action. This is how the category of educational policy is generally used. Yet, our experience with this policy orientation during the 1960's and 1970's suggests that we need to go beyond it. Numerous evaluations have demonstrated the general inefficacy of Head Start programs, the Job Corps, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, manpower training programs, the National Teacher Corps, compensatory education programs emerging out of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and other programs such as multicultural education. Henry Levin has argued cogently that, because of existing power relations in the community, expenditure increases will not likely help disadvantaged children because expenditures "are being used to maximize the status and employment of educational personnel while being packaged in the rhetoric of helping children."[12] Martin Carnoy argues in an empirically-grounded paper that Coleman's claim won't stand up "that once the socio-economic background of children in school is accounted for school inputs have negligible effect on students' achievement." But research, says Carnoy, does demonstrate that equalizing per-pupil expenditures will not equalize academic achievement among different economic, ethnic, or racial groups of children.[13] Even given these conclusions, Levin supports the principle of financing schools found in the Serrano decisions. His grounds for doing so are moral (viz., that it should be done "for its own sake") rather than consequential.

What this essentially all adds up to is the outlook that in order to achieve equality of educational and economic opportunity educational policies must be replaced by social policies. The category of social policies refers to social interventions aimed at changing those non-school aspects of society that function as a barrier to achieving both educational and economic opportunity. The context for inquiry and social action would extend beyond the school to not just the surrounding community but the nation-state as well.

Considerable evidence supports this orientation for policy formulation. First, Bowles and Nelson have shown that even if cognitive achievement were equalized among different groups of children the goal of equality of economic opportunity would not be realized. In a study of IQ and economic inequality they demonstrate that persons in the lowest decile of years of schooling possessing the same average adult cognitive test scores, as a group, as those persons in the highest decile of years of schooling have only about one-tenth the probability of being in the top fifth of the income distribution in the United States.[14] Secondly, Bowles and Nelson also demonstrate that the relationship between level of income and inherited social status is not a function of IQ. In the same study of IQ and economic inequality they show that individuals in the lowest decile of family socio-economic background possessing the same average childhood IQ, as a group, as those individuals in the highest decile for family socio-economic background have only about one-eighth the probability of being in the top fifth of the income distribution in the United States.[15] Thirdly, Herbert Gintis has shown through a linear regression analysis that "the contribution of schooling to worker earnings or occupational status cannot be explained by the relationship between schooling and the level of cognitive achievement."[16] The contribution that schooling makes to worker earnings or occupational status apparently is to be found in patterns of reinforcement for personality characteristics such as a disposition to not rock the boat.

Inequality, the Jencks et al. study, further discredits the merit of an educational policy of equal per-pupil expenditures for achieving equality of educational and economic opportunity. The Jencks group discovered a negligible relationship between cognitive achievement and income and, more interestingly, that considerable inequality exists among individuals who are identical in their genes (identical twins), quality of schooling, family background, and educational credentials.[17] One of their conclusions relevant to considering an educational policy orientation for equalizing educational and economic opportunities is that:

> . . .even if America could reduce inequalities in opportunity to the point where they were no greater than those that now arise between one brother and another, the best-paid fifth of all male workers would still be making 500 percent more than the worst-paid fifth. *We cannot, then, hope to eliminate, or even substantially reduce, income inequality in America simply by providing children from all walks of life with equal opportunity*. When people have had relatively equal opportunity, as brothers usually have, they still end up with very unequal incomes. If we want to prevent this, we will have to establish floors below which nobody's income is allowed to fall and ceilings above which it is not allowed to rise.[18]

In summary, what these as well as other studies indicate is that equalizing per-pupil expenditures will not result in equalizing scores on cognitive achievement tests and that even if that conception of equality of educational opportunity were fulfilled the goal of equality of economic opportunity would not follow. Additionally, and, more significantly, even if we achieved the goal of equality of economic opportunity, gross structural inequalities of income would persist, such that poverty would remain largely unabated. The upshot, then, is that documents such as *FPSK* and court decisions such as *Serrano* represent adherence to the category of educational policy formulation, which has been shown to be an inadequate approach to the goal of educational and economic opportunity.

The logic of an educational policy prescription, such as equalizing per-pupil expenditures, is that schools are the context for intervention and change. The limitations of an educational policy orientation have led many of those committed to equality of educational and economic opportunity to advocate adherence to a social policy orientation. The logic of social policy, relative to equal educational and economic opportunities, is that nonschool societal factors need to be eliminated or modified. Such would be suggested by all the studies so far cited to show the limitations of educational policy. Other studies such as that of Kohn,[19] Bernstein,[20] Davé,[21] and White[22] emphasize the overwhelming impact that the home has on influencing what pupils are able to achieve in schools. Kifer's analysis of many of these studies argues for the appropriateness of a social policy orientation that would alter the dynamics of poor families from which come many of the culturally disadvantaged, low-achieving students for whom an educational policy of equal per-pupil expenditures has proven to be of little or no avail. The home merely mediates other societal forces affecting human development.

Drawing on studies of family socialization patterns, Kifer identifies "status" and "process" variables that affect the capabilities a child brings to school. Status variables refer to facets of the family situation, such as the educational level of the parents. The related but more important dynamics Kifer designates as process variables. These include the nature and complexity of the verbal interactions between parents and children, wherein "bathing an infant in language" and encouraging precise use of language is a way of life.[23] Process variables also shown to be related to school achievement include the congruence between parent expectations and those of the school and an "environmental press" stemming out of the general cultural climate of the home.[24] Perhaps the most significant process variable is what Kifer refers to as "duration of the treatment." (He is a psychologist!) What exemplifies this notion is not a ghetto child being exposed periodically through field-trips to museums and related cultural enterprises, but such experiences being a part of the woof and warp of a child's everyday life-world. Kifer concludes his argument regarding family dynamics by saying:

> If we posit that parents vary greatly in their ability to provide an educational environment for children, then it is clear that those children who have been exposed continuously, intensely, and for a long time to either effective or ineffective environments are going to vary greatly in skills, knowledge, and attitudes brought into and maintained in the school. So such major variations in the home are going to have a substantial impact on what children can and will do in the school.[25]

Although this is not a surprising conclusion, the point of Kifer's analysis of relevant interest to social policies is that he neither makes reference as to how social stratification produces "ineffective" environments nor does he propose social policies that might transform "ineffective" home environments into "effective" ones. If Kifer had included in his anaylsis research of the type found in Melvin Kohn's *Class and Conformity* he may well have included some mention of implications for social policy. Kohn demonstrates that the occupational setting in which parents plug into the world of work profoundly affects the values, dispositions, skills, understandings, knowledges, and cultural life-styles they acquire. These, in turn, affect what their children bring to school with regard to, for example, attitudes toward authority, achievement motivation, and level of aspiration.[26] Regarding the relative merits of educational policies, social policies, or fundamental social change to the goals of educational and economic opportunity perhaps Kohn's most significant finding is that the patterns of social relationships and styles of life that are associated with hierarchical levels in the world of work become reflected in the patterns of social relationships and styles of life found in families of different socioeconomic status. These differences in occupational levels result in familial child-rearing practices among low-status families that "pattern [socially disabling] self-concepts, personal aspirations, styles of self-presentation, class loyalties, and modes of speech, dress, and interpersonal behavior."[27] All these behavioral characteristics, argues Kohn, are significant for the inter-generational reproduction of status differentials.[28] The stratification system in the world of work casts its shadow on family life; the family functions to perpetuate inequality.[29] In the language of neo-Marxist educational theorists there exists a *correspondence* between the role demands of the occupation one engages in and the mind set and attitudes, e.g., a Bernsteinian restricted or elaborated language style and obedience to authority, that are acquired by an individual and passed on to his children.

What this suggests is that equalizing educational opportunity when that goal is defined as equal group results on cognitive tests requires social policies that call for a re-design of work so that all workers have access to educative social roles, that is, work that elicits from them those mental and personality characteristics that will result in their providing more "effective" home environments as defined by Kifer and suggested by Kohn. Also implied is not only educative work, but the availability of non-poverty-level remunerated work, even if that work cannot always be made educative. That is, an implemented social policy for a full employment economy.

But the catch is this. The logic of social policy entails the assumption that the values, norms, structures, processes, and dynamics of American capitalism are not a strategic barrier to the goals of equality of educational and economic opportunity.[30] All that would be required for the realization of these goals is incremental reforms aimed at altering or fine-tuning some aspect of society at large. Also assumed in the logic of social policy is that what is required for the realization of a goal is a process of rationally-based policy analysis, formulation, and implementation. But if the family dynamics that Kifer describes as "ineffective" and "effective" are integral to the capitalist mode of production, as social analysts such as Carnoy and Levin and Bowles and Gintis contend, and if that mode needs basic alteration in its social relations of production does it make sense to adhere to a social policy orientation for effecting the goals of educational and economic opportunity? Such a category of inquiry and social action presumes that a *conflict* resulting from the great social cleavage in society can be converted into a *problem* amenable to social policy. If our economic system is "at the root of the problem" of equalizing educational and economic opportunities as well as reducing income inequalities to the degree necessary to eliminate poverty, then we must go beyond social policy and adhere to a third category of inquiry and social action, viz., fundamental social change.[31] This latter orientation for human action acknowledges that the logic of social policy excludes the type of changes involved in dismantling an existing mode of production. That is, revolution is not a matter of policy analysis.

Transformation of the capitalist political economy is a revolution that seems like a pipedream. But, the implications of the limits of educational and social policy for achieving educational and economic opportunity do point to a revolution in thinking and action that may have far greater possibilities. That is, to move schools away from many of those policies and programs, such as accountability procedures for reaching hothouse forms of narrowly conceived cognitive outcomes, that have resulted from a misperception of the causal role that schools can play in equalizing opportunities and eliminating poverty. Schools might then be characterized more by values such as intrinsically motivated learning, the simplicity and beauty of wonder, and the tone and style of a rational, caring, and ingenuous community.[32] But, given the positive feedback educational professionals receive for continuing to act as though schools could solve problems generated by the political economy, perhaps this is too far-fetched a revolution as well.

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1. This 1973 publication is available from the Kentucky Department of Education, Frankfort, Kentucky, 40601.
2. Ibid., p. vi.
3. Ibid., p. vii.
4. Ibid.
5. James S. Coleman, et al., *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 21-22.
6. Frederick Mosteller and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.), *On Equality of Educational Opportunity* (New York: Random House, 1973).
7. Manly Fleischman, *et al.*, *New York State Commission on Quality, Cost, and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education*, (1972).
8. John E. Coons, *et al.*, *Private Wealth and Public Education* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 30.
9. *Financing the Public Schools of Kentucky*, p. vi.
10. Harvey Averch, et al., *How Effective. . .Findings* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1972).
11. Coleman, et al., *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, p. 312.
12. Henry M. Levin, "Effects of Expenditure Increases," in Martin Carnoy and Henry M. Levin, *The Limits of Educational Reform* (New York: McKay, 1976), p. 192.
13. Martin Carnoy, "Is Compensatory Education Possible," in Martin Carnoy and Henry M. Levin, *The Limits of Educational Reform* (New York: Mckay, 1976), pp. 214-15.
14. Samuel Bowles and Valerie Nelson, "The 'Inheritance of IQ' and the Intergenerational Transmission of Economic Inequality," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (February 1974). Cited in Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 111.
15. Samuel Bowles and Valerie Nelson, "The 'Inheritance of IQ' and the Intergenerational Transmission of Economic Inequality," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (February 1974). Cited in Bowles and Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America*, p. 121.
16. Herbert Gintis, "Education, Technology and the Characteristics of Worker Productivity," *American Economic Review* 61, No. 2 (May 1971), p. 266.
17. Christopher Jencks, et al., *Inequality* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), p. 209.
18. Ibid., p. 220. Emphasis added.
19. Melvin L. Kohn, *Class and Conformity* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1969).
20. Basil Bernstein, *Class, Codes and Control, 1: Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971).
21. R.H. Dave *The Identification and Measurement of Environmental Process Variables That are Related to Educational Achievement*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1963.
22. Burton L. White, *The First Three Years of Life* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975).
23. Edward Kifer, "The Relationships between the Home and School in Influencing the Learning of Children," *Research in the Teaching of English*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 1977), p. 8.

24. Ibid., p. 9.

25. Ibid., p. 10.

26. Kohn, *Class and Conformity*.

27. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 147.

28. Kohn, *Class and Conformity*, p. 200.

29. Ibid., p. 200–201.

30. Note the elimination from the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill of requiring the Federal Government to reach a goal of 4% unemployment. The bill only requests that the Government try to reach that objective. The passed version of the bill was also watered down with the removal of the clause requiring the Government to become an employer of last resort if necessary to reach the 4% goal. In additional ways the bill was further weakened, making it not much more than a symbolic gesture to the memory of Hubert Humphrey.

31. This thesis is supported by many studies. See, for example, Ashley Montagu, "Just What Is 'Equal Opportunity,'" in Ashley Montagu (ed.), *Culture and Human Development* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974).

32. Cf. James McClellan's eloquent and elegant statement on "What is Philosophy of Education" in his *Philosophy of Education* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 1–22.

Response to LaBrecque

ASPECTS OF EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

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Before entering into a critical assessment of Professor LaBrecque's talk, it is important to note how, by addressing a specific state level policy document, LaBrecque is charting a relatively new and quite significant area for philosophy of education. Moreover, while this response will attempt to sharpen the focus of LaBrecque's criticism of that document, it seems that his two major points regarding the Kentucky report are quite accurate. These are: first, the equal per pupil expenditure is not sufficient to secure personal economic independance, and second, equalizing expenditures alone will not close the gap between low and high-achieving students. More questionable, however, is whether or not equality of educational opportunity is to be gained by equal access to educational resources. LaBrecque thinks that social science shows that it will not. However, I think it depends partly upon how EEO is to be understood.

a. If it means equal results in terms of educational achievement and economic rewards, then he is correct.
b. If, EEO simply means a procedure whereby educational resources are not to be allocated according to family resources and thereby used to reinforce existing differences, albeit with no guarantee that differences will not be maintained, then there is something to the claim about equal resources providing equal opportunity.

One of the problems with LaBrecque's analysis is that it does not discriminate between various ways in which EEO is used. I will return to this point.

Before developing these points, I want to suggest another simpler reason why equalization formulas, at least in some states may be a shibboleth. Many states, including Illinois (I don't know about Kentucky) in figuring equalization aid, include in the formula an index of effort, which is essentially a measure of the level at which a district is willing to tax itself for school support. Assuming some form of local finance of education, such a measure makes initial sense since without it, given two districts of equal wealth, under some idea of total equalization, each could receive the same level of per pupil expenditure even though one taxes itself high and the other low. In other words, I see this as some form of incentive control to avoid the free rider. Yet, as economists have pointed out at least in Illinois, the formula does not equalize at all. This is because the measure of a districts wealth is based primarily on property and ignores income. Hence, given two districts with equal property, (perhaps because one is a rich suburb and another an industrial town with an expensive plant) but vastly unequal income, the tendency will be for the suburb to tax itself higher than the industrial town, and hence to have a higher measured rate of effort, and hence to receive a higher level of state aid. Thus, under this formula the rich get richer and the poor gain very little.[1] Now, if this is the way equalization is measured, then it seems to me that we have neither the likelihood of equal results, or equal procedures, and that the first line of attack is to correct this situation.

I think that it is important to keep these more mundane issues in mind when discussing issues like equalization if for no other reason than to be aware of the way in which words can be used to conceal and legitimize practices. I assume however that LaBrecque's analysis begins at the point at which it can be said that some form of procedural EEO has been effected, and his question is then what can we expect from such procedural EEO, to which he answers, not much. Now if I were to take his line of argument through to its conclusion that effective educational change must be accompanied by changes in the work place, I would find very little to quarrel with. However, there are some questions that I have about other aspects of LaBrecque's analysis. Perhaps most important is the difficulty in understanding what kind of change would be acceptable to LaBrecque. For example, he seems to accept some notion of equality of educational opportunity but it is not very clear about just what that notion is. I have already mentioned the distinction which remains implicit between procedural equality and equality of results, but there are other formulations as well. For example, at one point, he seems to connect up EEO with enhancement of the economic growth of the nation, a statement which he derives from the Kentucky report, and then links this idea up to a conception of equality of educational opportunity as equality of results, a link which I frankly do not follow. Later he suggests that it involves each pupil achieving according to his or her potential. At another point he seems to imply that EEO will not be effected unless poverty is either eliminated or randomized among different groups, thus the elimination of poverty seems to become the test of EEO. Later he speaks of EEO as meaning equal group results on cognitive tests. At another point, EEO seems to mean the randomization of school achievement. Thus, he writes in reporting on Carnoy's work that research. . .demonstrates that equalizing per-pupil expenditures will not equalize academic achievement," and then in commenting LaBrecque notes, "What this essentially all adds up to is the outlook that in order to achieve equality of educational and economic opportunity educational policy must be replaced by social policy," thereby seeming again to equate equal achievement with equal opportunity. And at still another point, in his discussion of Bowles and Nelson, and then Jencks, he seems to suggest that equality of opportunity, both educational and occupational, requires a close correspondence between intelligence and economic rewards.

Now given these varied meanings of EEO it is difficult to understand what LaBrecque means when he says equalizing school expenditure will not achieve it. For there does not seem to be any necessary connection between some of these meanings. Hence, economic growth could be achieved without eliminating poverty, or poverty could be eliminated without eliminating differential group performances in academic achievement, or academic potential could be differentially affected by schools such that each pupil would achieve according to his or her potential, but economic rewards would be distributed on other bases. Or, school achievement could come to better correspond to intelligence but achievement would not be randomized among different groups (assuming say that intelligence was not randomly distributed among different groups) and so on. Thus it seems to me that we need a clearer statement about what it is that will not be achieved when we equalize per pupil expenditure, and a clearer link between this goal, whatever it is, and the capitalist form of political economy.

Along these lines, we need to better understand the relationship not only between education and capitalist economic forms, but also between these and certain implications of large-scale technology, whether pursued under capitalist or socialist forms of political economy. While I suspect that the structures generated by welfare capitalism do accelerate many of the problems that LaBrecque is concerned about, I am less clear about the casual factors involved. For example, does the link that Kohn establishes between class and a disposition to conform also exist in noncapitalist countries? And if so, then to what extent. Unfortunately, LaBrecque misses the opportunity to explore this issue by prematurely assuming that Kohn has established a causal link when the strength of his analysis still remains on the level of correlation. Indeed, there is a tension, if not a contradiction between the citation of Gintis which suggests that occupational status is a function of the willingness to conform and the citation of Kahn which suggests that the willingness to conform is greatest among lower status workers. I suspect that this tension could be resolved, and it might be fruitful for LaBrecque's analysis if he attempted to do so. My own view is that a deeper analysis of these issues will do little to soften the critique of capitalist political economy, but that it would provide a more exact understanding of the kind of fundamental social change that would be most productive in achieving the type of society LaBrecque seems to want.

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1. See Walter W. McMahon, "A Broader Measure of Wealth and Effort for Educational Equality and Tax Equity," mimeo copy.

MARX, PHILOSOPHY, AND EDUCATION

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> *"Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, to change it."*
>
> *Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, 1845*

Introduction

In many ways, this paper is a philosophical reflection on Karl Marx's famous and controversial reflection on philosophy, his 11th Thesis on Feuerbach. The paper is written in a time when there is an increasing interest in the philosophical work of Marx among philosophers and scholars in other disciplines. Among educational scholars, we find an increasing number of scholarly critiques of education and schooling which draw directly on a "Marxist" analysis.[1] Curiously, a reconsideration of Marx's philosophical work has yet to take place among philosophers of education. Neither the major journal of the Philosophy of Education Society, *Educational Theory*, nor the *Proceedings* of the annual meetings of the Society have published in the last five years a paper whose central focus is Marx's work. A major objective of this paper is to make a case for the reconsideration of the importance of the work of Karl Marx to current literature and discussion in philosophy of education.

I make three distinct points in support of a (philosophical) reconsideration of Marx: (1) Marx's work merits *philosophical* (as well as *political*) treatment; (2) the great number of critiques of American schooling that are "Marxist" in their approach make it mandatory that we fully understand with some clarity what exactly Marx had to say of relevance to education (as well as what he did not say); and (3) the great number of "Marxist" educational experiments around the world are fascinating in their own right and merit our interest and concern as philosophers of education; it is important for us to understand in which way they are "Marxist."

I approach my task in the following way. After pointing out some necessary cautions to discussing Marx's contribution to education, I go on to my central purpose of focussing attention on two traditional philosophical categories, one metaphysical and one epistemological: Marx's view of human nature and Marx's view of knowledge. In doing so, I quote Marx extensively, both to sensitize us to Marx's language and to what he really said, and also to make my point that these are indeed *philosophical* concerns in Marx. I then go on to conclude the paper with two sorts of summary comments: (1) how these philosophical notions in Marx function as a critique; and (2) why these notions might be of interest to educators, and to philosophers of education in particular. This is a more speculative and difficult section that demands much more exposition than I give it in this paper. It does, however, serve my more limited purpose of reintroducing Marx into the current discussion among philosophers of education.

I begin with some general *caveats* about the topic itself, Marxism and education, or Marx and education, or Marx's contribution to education. There are some problems here. First, Marx had almost nothing to say in any direct way about education or schooling.[2] Nevertheless, much of what Marx had to say is of direct relevance to education, and I hope to show this. Second, my comments will focus on Marx, and not on the much more diverse Marxist tradition of the last one hundred years. Third, we must understand that we can approach Marx from several different perspectives and levels of analysis. This is characteristic of Marx's work itself, and he worked from different perspectives and levels of analysis, depending on the task before him. We must keep in mind that one of the greatest problems of Marxist scholarship, interpretation, and critique has been the fact that scholars have dealt with different facets of Marx: Marx the historian, Marx the philosopher, Marx the sociologist, Marx the propagandist. There are genuine problems of interpretation when we focus on only one aspect of Marx and forget all the other aspects and levels of analysis that characterize his work. For example, if we were to look at the *Communist Manifesto*, which is more than anything a work of propaganda, a political position paper and platform of the Communist League of 1848, we might conclude that Marx was a shoddy historian or philosopher who didn't bother to back up his assertions with solid argument. This is clearly not the case. One would have to look at other works to examine Marx the careful historian or precise philosopher.

In addition to these general hesitations, there are also some specific cautions to keep in mind in approaching Marx from the more specific perspective of philosophy. First, there is a sense in which "Marxist philosophy" might seem to be a contradiction in terms. We must remember that the thrust of Marx's early work was very much a critique of philosophy, specifically, the Hegelian idealist tendency in the philosophy of his own time. Related to this point is the notion that Marx perceived the philosophy of his time as functioning as part of the idealogical superstructure of society, and hence, he emphasized the need to supercede, or go beyond, philosophy. Second, we must be cautious in dealing with the Marxist philosophic legacy because of the divergence of two central traditions in the Marxist literature. On the one hand, there is what is called "orthodox Marxism," which begins with Engels, and continues with Lenin and Stalin and is developed through the various Communist parties of Europe. This tradition interprets Marx's 11th Thesis quite literally and tends to be anti-philosophical or at best, aphilosophical. While this tradition has no doubt been of immense *political* importance, it is one of little concern in this paper. Here, I am much more concerned with Marx himself and the philosophical questions that are raised by his own work. The second tradition of Marxist scholarship is unfortunately not quite as popular as the first. It is tradition that focuses on the Hegelian roots of Marx, giving importance to the early works of Marx as central to his entire corpus. This tradition is developed in some key works in the 1930's by Karl Korsch and George Lukacs,[3] and continues to be developed most systematically by the philosophers of the Frankfurt School since the 1930's. This school is marked by some important early works of philosophers Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, and the more contemporary works of Jurgen Habermas and Albrecht Wellmer in philosophy, as well as Theodore Adorno and Erich Fromm, who defy any disciplinary classification.[4] From the beginning, the Frankfurt School took up the task of Marx and the Left Hegelians of the 1840's, attempting to carve out a way for the integration of philosophy and social analysis, with the intention of transforming the social order. This school of thought has had much more influence on my own approach to Marx, and it has enjoyed a mild renaissance of interest since the 1960's.

One last caution has to do with Marx's use of language and his philosophical method which plays havoc with ordinary conceptual analysis. We are reminded of Pareto's statement about Marx's use of language: Marx's words are like bats: one can see in them both birds and mice.[5] The point is that Marx's language is often (not always) Hegelian in style and form, and as he seems to be taking unusual liberties, it is sometimes difficult to pin down his meaning in what seems like the ambiguous use of terms. This is unfortunate because all too often difficulty with the Marxist language has led non-Marxist scholars to reject Marx's ideas before giving them appropriate treatment.[6]

I have taken some time to spell out some of the difficulties in approaching Marx's philosophy and Marx's possible contribution to education because these difficulties are in part responsible, I suspect, for the hesitance of philosophers of education to concern themselves with Marx's work and to see any relevance of his ideas to their work. I now focus on two central philosophical notions in Marx's work, his view of human nature and his view of knowledge.

Marx's View of Human Nature

Marx's notion of human nature—what it means to be human—is difficult to understand. There's a problem from the very beginning because Marx does not want to characterize human nature in any absolutist or idealist terms of human *essence*. In fact, his discussion of human nature begins with a critique of these tendencies in Hegel. Because for Marx what it means to be human is *historically determined*, he adamently rejects any notion of absolute essence that does not allow for change. Nonetheless, we can isolate three key elements of human nature for Marx, without doing violence to the centrality of change to his characterization. These key elements are the notions of production, objectification, and history.

Perhaps the most central element of Marx's discussion of human nature is a human being's *capacity to produce.* In his other work this is the central *economic* category for Marx, here I an concerned with it as a *philosophic* category. Wherever Marx talks about what it means to be human, we will find some reference to production as life-activity. Now, what does that mean? In one of the early manuscripts of 1844, Marx introduces the notion in a provocative way by comparing the productive activity of human beings with that of other animals, pointing to some crucial differences:

> To be sure, animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwelling places, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But the animal produces only what is immediately necessary for itself or its young. It produces in a one-sided way while man produces universally. The animal produces under the domination of immediate physical need while man produces free of physical need and only genuinely so in freedom from such need. The animal only produces itself while man reproduces the whole of nature. ("Alienated Labor," pp. 294-95.)[7]

To be human, for Marx, is to be able to produce beyond immediate need in a predetermined way like the animal that can produce "only according to the standard and need of the species to which it belongs." Human production is both *conscious* and *free*—humans are free to produce according to the standards of any species, universally instead of in a one-sided way. Even free, as Marx points out in the same passage, to create according to the laws of beauty.

Free, conscious, productive activity is what characterizes the human species. It is what Marx calls *species-being.* Through it, humans produce not only their immediate means of subsistence, but their entire life-activity in the world, indeed, the very world itself. One creates one's essence and one's concrete world in the process of production. We can better understand the importance and non-triviality of this claim if we relate it to Marx's notion of *objectification.* Through the act of production, human beings objectify the world, that is, they appropriate nature to produce a world that is, *in its entirety,* their product:

> In the treatment of the objective world, therefore, man proves himself to be genuinely a *species-being.* This production is his active species-life. Through it nature appears as *his* work and his actuality. The object of labor is thus the *objectification of man's species-life,* he produces himself not only intellectually, as in consciousness, but

> also actively in a real sense and sees himself in a world he made. ("Alienated Labor," p. 295.)

This notion of objectification is a key ontological category in Hegel, and Marx keeps it as central to his view of human nature. Humans actualize themselves through productive activity. However, Marx develops the notion in two new directions in distinction to Hegel. On the one hand, Marx materializes Hegel's notion to claim that production and objectification are concrete and sensual human activities that are primary and prior to consciousness. And, on the other hand, Marx characterizes human production as *historical* activity:

> The first premise of all human history, of course, is the existence of living human individuals. ((The first historical act of these individuals, the act by which they distinguish themselves from animals is not the fact that they *think* but the fact that they begin to produce their means of subsistence.)) (*The German Ideology*, p. 409.)

To be human is to exist and to produce, and out of this comes the formation of consciousness. Because production is also a historical act, that is, because it occurs under certain historical conditions, Marx wants to point out that the process of objectification can be thwarted. In certain historical periods, under particular modes of production, certain forms of consciousness will be produced. For Marx, the conditions of capitalist political economy and private property are such that the free spontaneous life-activity which identifies human beings as human is no longer free activity. It is no longer an end, but a means. One's life activity is no longer one's own, but belongs to another. For Marx, these are the conditions of human alienation, a distorted objectification where one is alienated from the products of production, from the productive activity itself, from oneself as a species-being, and from other human beings. Nowhere is this more apparent than the workplace. In Marx's words:

> First is the fact that labor is external to the laborer—that is, it is not part of his nature—and that the worker does not affirm himself in his work but denies himself, feels miserable and unhappy, develops no free physical and mental energy but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind. The worker, therefore, feels at ease only outside work, and during work he is outside himself. He is at home when he is not working and when he is working he is not at home. His work, there-

> fore, is not voluntary, but coerced, *forced labor.* It is not the satisfaction of a need but only a *means* to satisfy other needs. Its alien character is obvious from the fact that as soon as no physical or other pressures exists, labor is avoided like the plague. . .Finally, the external nature of work for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own but another person's, that in work he does not belong to himself but to someone else. . .the activity of the worker is not his own spontaneous activity. It belongs to another. It is the loss of his own self. ("Alienated Labor," p. 292.)

In this concern for the loss of the self, Marx provides us with his answer to a traditional philosophical question: what does it mean to be human? His response in terms of the centrality of production, objectification, and a concept of history as a process of self-realization of human essence, provide the outline for a form of philosophical humanism. It is a humanism firmly rooted in the ideals of concrete action and practice, in the malleability of the human character, and in the notion of social beings who are both free and conscious to create themselves and their world unless otherwise thwarted.

To go further here is to merge the search for philosophical clarity with social analysis which, although consistent with Marx's own sense of philosophy, is not my intention in this paper. I am here trying to show that what Marx was up to merits *philosophical* attention and that we, as philosophers of education, can gain from his insights.

Marx's View of Knowledge

Marx's view of knowledge is closely related to Marx's view of human nature, especially the notion that to be human is to produce not only the material world but also consciousness and the world of ideas. In this regard, I will focus on four overlapping aspects of his view: (1) knowledge as a social construct, (2) the uses of knowledge, (3) the non-neutrality of knowledge, and (4) the relationship of knowledge and the task of philosophy.

The sociology of knowledge and the idea that knowledge is a social construct have their most thorough beginnings with the work of Marx. He holds that what one knows and the ideas that one holds are a product of the form of social production in a certain historical epoch. Turning Hegel rightside up and planting humankind firmly on their material feet, Marx posits consciousness as a product of life-activity:

> In direct contrast to German philosophy, which descends from heaven to earth, here one ascends from earth to heaven. In other words, to arrive at man in the flesh, one does not set out from what men say, imagine, or conceive, nor from man as he is described, thought about, imagined, or conceived. Rather one sets out from the real, active men and their actual life-process (production) and demonstrates the development of ideological reflexes and echoes of that process. . .Morality, religion, metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness no longer seem to be independent. They have no history or development. Rather, men who develop their production and their material realtionships *alter* their thinking and the products of their thinking along with their real existence. *Consciousness does not determine life, but life determines consciousness.* (*German Ideology*, pp. 414-15.)

There are some obvious difficulties here, as Marx does not clearly distinguish between ideas, conceptions, and knowledge. The notion is nonetheless provocative in positing the sources of knowledge as dependent on concrete human activity.

This notion becomes even more intellecturally radical with Marx's related claim about the uses of knowledge. Not only is the human production of knowledge, like *all* production, conditioned by the particular forces of production in existence at a particular time, but the mode of production under conditions of capitalist political economy leads to certain uses of knowledge:

> In every epoch the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas, that is, the class that is the ruling *material* power of society is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* power. The class having the means of material production has also control over the means of intellectual production, so that it also controls, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of intellectual production. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas, hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one and therefore the ideas of its domination. . .(*German Ideology*, p. 438.)

The linking of certain forms of knowledge (including philosophy) with ideology make this connection in another way. Because all knowledge is tied to social practice, and hence to *power*, it is clear that no knowledge is *neutral.* This is the thrust of Marx's 2nd Thesis on Feuerbach:

> The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-

> **reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely *scholastic* question.**

The notion is not a new one, and it is not unlike the Baconian principle that "human knowledge and human power meet in one." However, with Marx, it occupies a central place in connecting theory with practice. This, then, is the perspective that informs us of the role and task of philosophy and the meaning of Marx's 11th Thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is, to *change* it." Marx's point here is not the complete rejection of philosophy as some vulgar Marxists might have us believe, but rather the rejection of all theory, philosophical or scientific, that is not necessarily tied to human sensuous practice.

This is as much as I want to say about these two related philosophical categories in Marx's work: his view of human nature and his view of knowledge. Hopefully, in a brief and limited way, I've been convincing that they do raise important *philosophical* concerns and questions. I will now make some summary comments as to why they merit our particular concern as philophers of education.

Clearly, Marx puts before us a new and challenging notion of the philosopher's task. Not only are clarification and the ferreting out hidden assumptions important, but critique is also to play a central part in the philosopher's work. This is not a completely new idea, but rather places Marx in the mainstream philosophical tradition of the Enlightenment, where the notion of *critique* was both a central idea and product. If anything, Marxist philosophical critique is an even more intense work of beneath-the-surface clarification and ferreting out of assumptions. I offer three illustrations based on the earlier analysis in this paper: (1) the critique of ideology, (2) the critique of neutrality, and (3) the critique of the separation of theory and practice.

Critique of Ideology

It seems clear that we do not have to agree with Marx's political position to be challenged by his critique of ideology, by the possibility that what passes for knowledge, e.g., philosophy, *can* present a class-biased and false interpretation of the world. Marx claims that not only the *content* but also the forms of conceptualization of the world are conditioned by mode and social relations of production. This is an extremely important point. It carries the Kantian notion of critique beyond what Kant envisioned. It goes against Kantian a priori categories and the entire tradition of epistemology that has developed since then. Marx challenges us to look more deeply and see beyond the image and the idea to the concrete life-activity itself. This challenge is lucidly put forth in a passage from *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte:*

> Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, rises an entire superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed sentiments, illusions, modes of thought and views of life. The entire class creates and forms them out of its material foundations and out of the corresponding social relations. The single individual, who derives them through tradition and upbringing, may imagine that they form the real motives and the starting point of his activity. . .And as in private life one differentiates between what a man thinks and says of himself and what he really is and does, so in historical struggles one must distinguish still more the phrases and fancies of parties from their real organism and their real interests, their conception of themselves, from their reality. (*The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, p. 47.)

The challenge here is a Hegelian one. We need to distinguish between appearances or phenomenal forms of social reality and reality itself. The phenomenal forms both mask and disguise "real" relations and also lead to forms of consciousness that necessarily misconstrue real relations. This is the problem of ideology.

Critique of Neutrality

Marx's view of knowledge disputes all claims that the creation and transmission of knowledge is merely the disinterested pursuit of truth. Rather, Marx challenges us to consider the view that all knowledge is both interest-bound and value-laden. This is not an attack on knowledge per se, but on our failure to recognize its non-neutral aspects. Marx would want us to recognize that there are additional factors which need to be considered in any pursuit of truth, and in knowledge production or dissemination. Nowhere is this more important than in conceptions of science, and especially social science. There are now many works that challenge science's supposed "neutrality" or objectivity. Neither the interests and values which guide the production and dissemination of knowledge nor the question of its applicability are separable from the knowledge itself.

Critique of the Separation of Theory and Practice

One of the most provocative ideas in Marx's work is his challenge of the notion of an absolute separation between theory and practice, or thought and action. For Marx, questions of knowledge or theory are not answerable in the abstract alone, and because they have their origin in social practice so must they be answered in the context of social practice. This is surely the direction of his critique of the idealist and speculative philosophy of his own time and is part of the meaning of his 11th Thesis on Feuerbach. Marx would claim, as Marcuse has pointed out, that this separation between theory and practice is itself a reflection of the "division of labor" that results from the modern separation of the mental from the material means of production.[8] Marx would challenge us to look at this appearance of separation as an ideological reflection, as a historical phenomenon which occurs only under certain objective conditions. Nowhere is this assumption more commonplace than the university, where it is commonly believed that what we ought to be concerned about is theory (or thought in the abstract) and that the arena for action (or practice) is somewhere else.

Some Closing Reflections on Educational Practice

Given these views and assumptions about human nature and about knowledge and the role of ideas, and given the materialist conception of knowledge and history of which they are key elements, what can we say about a "Marxist" view of education? Clearly, for Marx, education forms part of the ideological superstructure, and we can thus expect the ideas which dominate in education to correspond to those that dominate in society. We can also expect the social relations prevalent in schooling, for example, to reflect the social relations of production in society. This is the meaning of the claim by Marxists that *any* reform movement in education is severely limited in terms of its affecting any major change in the structure of society as a whole.

On a more concrete level, we might ask how would someone with a Marxist perspective approach education, as a teacher, for instance? I offer the following three points. First, a Marxist would hold that education is not neutral, nor are the activities of teachers. Despite continued claims to the contrary, teachers must be aware that education is a non-neutral activity, and they must examine with their students the illusion that it is. Second, if it is the case that the capitalist mode of production *is* exploitative and oppressive, and if the social relations of production are mirrored in the educational institutions of society, then an important aspect of learning would lie in the examination of these oppressive social relations and their capacity to thwart human beings from fulfilling themselves as human beings who create themselves and their world through their acts of production. Third, the notion of *critique* ought to play a crucial role in all aspects of teaching and learning. Insofar as one sees a principle task of education as transmission and production of knowledge, it is important that one take a critical view toward existing (and dominant) conceptual structures; there is a real need to focus one's attention on exposing, in a much deeper way than we have, possibly hidden assumptions and values. We need also to increase our awareness (and that of our students) of the importance of a *historical* understanding of the role of knowledge in society. Lastly, we can begin to examine education as more than knowledge transmission and production per se, but also as a basic productive life-activity that is not complete unless all participants in the educational activity, teachers and students, are creating themselves and their world through mutually productive activity.

In closing, let me remind you of my objective in *this* paper. What I have been advocating is that there is something *philosophically* interesting in Marx's work. I hope that I have begun to convince you. There is also much that is problematic and in need of critical scrutiny, both in Marx and in contemporary "Marxist critiques" of education. That is the task of perhaps other papers and perhaps other philosophers. Neither goal will be accomplished, however, without our first taking another look.

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1. See, for example, Martin Carnoy's *Schooling in a Corporate Society* (1972), and *Education as Cultural Imperialism* (1974), Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America* (1976), Maurice Levitas,

Marxist Perspectives in the Sociology of Education (1974), and Henry Levin, *The Limits of Educational Reform* (1976).

2. There are only a few scattered references in *Capital, The Communist Manifesto*, and *The Critique of the Gotha Program*.

3. See, for example, the essays included in George Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1971), and Karl Korsch, *Marxism and Philosophy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970).

4. Key philosophical works readily available in English are Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1972); Herbert Marcuse's early (1941) *Reason and Revolution—Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), as well as his several more recent works; the many recent works of Jurgen Habermas, especially his *Theory and Practice* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974); and Albrecht Wellmer's *Critical Theory of Society* (New York: Seabury Press, 1974). For an excellent history of the Frankfurt School as well as a detailed bibliography of its key actors, see Martin Jay's *The Dialectical Imagination-A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research*, 1923-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1973).

5. Quoted in Bertell Ollman's *Alienation—Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971). Although primarily devoted to analysis of Marx's concept of alienation, Ollman's work is one of the best philosophic treatments of Marx's work.

6. For an excellent discussion of these problems see Charles Taylor's "Marxism and Empiricism," in Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore (eds.), *British Analytic Philosophy* (1966).

7. Quotations from Marx are from the following two sources: Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (eds.), *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (New York: Anchor Books, 1967); and Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparté* (New York: International Publishers, 1963).

8. Herbert Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," in *Negations—Essays in Critical Theory* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 147.

(First Concurrent Session)

RESPONSE TO PACHECO

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I welcome the opportunity to respond to Professor Pacheco's well-wrought and significant paper. He engages in what he calls "philosophical reflection" with clarity, modesty, and good sense; and I think he has introduced into our discussions themes altogether worth attending to, and a mode of analysis we all need to understand.

He makes, I believe, a convincing case for "the reconsideration of the importance of the work of Karl Marx"; and he is certainly correct in drawing attention to the fact that there have been no papers focusing on Marx's philosophic views published in our journals, at least in the recent past. Like Dr. Pacheco, I am struck by the number of references to certain modes of Marxist and neo-Marxist analysis in our literature; and it does seem remarkable that no one yet has chosen seriously to examine the metaphysical and epistemological views from which so much of that analysis derives. I am struck by the burgeoning interest in the work of Paulo Freire, Jurgen Habermas, Paul Ricoeur, Herbert Marcuse (on occasion), and by the connections found between their writings and themes of concern to sociologists of knowledge, radical curriculum theorists, and those whose primary interest seems to be in one or another mode of "emancipatory thinking." There is (as most of us are aware) a fascination with what is called "critical theory," which may or may not be linked to study of the Frankfurt School. Sometimes it is evidenced among those preoccupied with the critique of positivism; sometimes it appears among those in search of a new notion of *praxis*; on occasion it is manifested among those involved with exposing the "domination" that occurs within our public schools. In my experience, few of the so-called "radicals" or (as some call themselves) "reconceptualists" have much acquaintance with the work of Karl Marx *or* (and this may be equally important) with Hegelian philosophy. They may nod in the direction of the *1844 Manuscripts* or, now and then, of the *Grundrisse*; but they are prone to do what they think of as neo-Marxist analysis without familiarity with the source. It is for these reasons that I applaud Professor Pacheco's effort. Not only do I want to see the dialogue in educational philosophy enriched; I hope to see a more thoughtful and more scholarly critique develop where American education is concerned, and I believe this does in many ways depend upon serious study of what Pacheco calls Marx's "philosophical concerns."

The Frankfurt School, writes Pacheco, has had much influence upon his approach to Marx. I must say that, like him, I have been influenced by certain current tendencies of thought—including social phenomenology, sociology of knowledge, and the thinking of such scholars as Habermas, Marcuse, Ricoeur, and Fromm, in addition to Paulo Freire, Hannah Arendt, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. With great respect for Dr. Pacheco's interpretation, I can only respond in the light of my own perspective on contemporary concerns. In many senses, I also conceive Karl Marx to be a kind of "precursor"; but, as Arturo Pacheco implies, we are likely to constitute somewhat different precursors, depending on where we begin. Nothing in this response is intended to "correct" the paper under discussion. I have no desire to suggest that one interpretation of Karl Marx is more "true" or more "valid" than another. I simply want to look for a moment from a somewhat different vantage point—and, if I can, enlarge or complement Dr. Pacheco's notion of the significance of a Marxist perspective for teaching today.

It is difficult for me to encounter Marx's early work without some awareness of our historical condition today. No specific mention is made in Pacheco's paper of the great gaps between early industrial capitalism and the economic structures of what may be a "post-industrial" society—of what is, in any case, a technological society subjected to a range of technical controls. Marx's emphasis on starting out "from real active men and on the basis of their real life process" is still impressive, as is his critique of Hegelian idealism. But I am convinced that the assumptions underlying Marx's critique of political economy no longer hold today. It is true enough that the Marxist emphasis on material necessities provides a ground for a dialectical theory; but it seems to me that the concern for the material must be broadened somehow to include a consideration of historical domination and the ideological reifications that block human liberation. Pacheco does talk of the importance of a critique of ideology; but he does not deal directly with the need for the kinds of emancipatory thinking needed to reconstruct the forms of consciousness.

"To be human," Pacheco writes, "is to exist and produce, and out of this comes the formation of consciousness." This appears to me to be continuous with the phenomenological approach, which emphasizes the fact that the so-called objectivity of society is actually an intersubjectivity, and that the *praxis* of individuals can only be realized within a context of interrelationship. At the same time, the phenomenologist is likely to make the point that the sources of sociality are to be found in the structures of experience and the intentionality of consciousness. He or she will point to the possibility of bracketing out the taken-for-grantedness of the "objective" world in an effort to discover its existential meaning, or what it signifies in its various aspects for lived experience. This mode of reduction is likely to make the process of objectification visible, as it makes evident the fact that reality is indeed a social construction. I believe that, at a moment of intense mystification and scientistic control, this kind of bracketing out may sustain and clarify the process of critique.

Also, I believe that Pacheco's proposals with respect to teaching, appropriate though they are, may have a greater effect if the understanding he hopes to bring about is not conceived to be a purely intellectual project. Even as a worker's objective position in the production process is no longer sufficient in these days to awaken class consciousness in that worker, so a student's objective position with respect to an oppressive school situation is not sufficient to insure that he or she will see himself or herself as manipulated and oppressed. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, speaking of the factors that move a worker to see himself as a proletarian, has written that it is not the economic system of society considered as a system of impersonal forces, "but these institutions as I carry them within me and experience them . . ."[1] A revolutionary project, for him, is not "the result of a deliberate judgment" or the necessary consequence of some abstract decision. He said that a person recognizes himself or herself as a worker or a bourgeois only on the day he or she takes a stand in relation to a possible revolution. The taking of a stand is not the outcome "through some mechanical causality" of the individual's position as a worker or a bourgeois. It is, rather, "prepared by some molecular process; it matures in co-existence before bursting forth into words and being related to objective ends."[2] Class, he thought, has to be lived through as a presence, as possibility; and I believe the same thing is true about the condition of being a student in an educational institution mirroring (as Pacheco puts it) "the social relations of production." And I believe that, for that student, intellectual projects ought to signify the coming to completion of existential projects. By that I mean those projects through which persons identify themselves in their co-existence as workers, as oppressed peasants, or as dulled, domesticated students at a particular moment of history.

In classrooms that are opened up for Marxist teaching, deliberate efforts ought to be made to make this co-existence possible. It not only requires the stimulation of dialogue and the encouragement of the kind of conversation that permits persons to articulate their own perspectives on the common world. It requires a deliberate effort to objectify and understand the social situation the students experience together, as persons sharing a common plight. To understand it, according to the perspective Dr. Pacheco is proposing, is to perceive it as part of a totality—in its relation to the superstructures and to the explanatory systems that legitimate those superstructures. To understand it, also, is to reflect upon it in such a fashion that its lacks and insufficiencies are made visible, to reflect upon it in such a fashion that some mode of social action is undertaken to repair those lacks and insufficiencies, to transform. Again, I think Merleau-Ponty is correct: an individual student will not recognize himself or herself as an oppressed person (or someone being thrust into a mold) unless and until he or she takes a stand in relation to possible change.

Jean-Paul Sartre has made a point regarding possibility that is relevant here: "It is on the day that we can conceive of a different state of affairs that a new light falls on our troubles and our suffering and that we *decide* that these are unbearable."[3] He was describing 19th century workers who saw their oppressed condition as "natural" and could not act to alter it. After they formed a project of changing their situation (because an organizer or a political leader came to speak with them), the situation began to appear intolerable. They were able to objectify it and, at once, to posit an ideal state of affairs. Once they did that, once they posited their sufferings as unbearable, they could make them a motive for taking action. I think this applies to students within our schools, who certainly take for granted the structures of those schools, who see them as God-given, wholly "natural." One aspect of the critique of ideology might well be a disclosure of a more critical and liberating atmosphere for learning. With such a "different state of affairs" in mind, students might well choose their present situation as unbearable.

Clearly, like Dr. Pacheco, I have gone beyond a philosophical reflection to a mode of prescriptive talk. Indeed, it is interesting to see how Pacheco avoids the problem of implication when he moves to the question of education. He talks of "someone with a Marxist perspective" taking a critical view and encouraging critique. And yet, at the start of his paper, he says he intends to reflect philosophically on Marx's "reflection on philosophy," the "11th Thesis on Feuerbach." He believes Marx's work deserves philosophical treatment; he thinks it important for us to understand what Marx had to say of relevance to education; and he wants to examine "Marxist" educational experiments around the world to see in what way they are "Marxist." I think he has done less than that—and more. I recall Isaiah Berlin writing, with respect to Marx: "And while history is determined—and the victory will, therefore, be won by the rising class whether any given individual wills it or not—how rapidly this will occur, how efficiently, how far in accordance with the conscious popular will, depends on human initiative, on the degree of understanding of their task by the masses and the courage and efficiency of their leaders. To make this clear and to educate the masses for their destiny is, therefore, according to Marx, the whole duty of a contemporary philosopher."[4] I believe that this is what Arturo Pacheco has basically in mind. If we are to "gain," as he puts it, from Marx's insights, we cannot pose as neutral, nor can we separate what we learn as theory from *praxis* in the space we posit for ourselves. I like Paul Nizan's questions in *The Watchdogs*: "Contemporary philosophy is alive. But what kind of life is it leading? What functions is it performing?" And, a moment later: "My question is this: is the philosopher of today living like a human being or like a worm? There is no reason to brush questions like this aside."[5]

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[1] Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (New York: Humanities Press, 1967), p. 443.

[2] Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 446.

3. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 445.

4. Isaiah Berlin, "Historical Materialism," in *Karl Marx*, ed. Tom Bottomore (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 65.

5. Paul Nizan, *The Watchdogs: Philosophers and the Established Order* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), p. 48.

(Second Concurrent Session)

MYTH, EDUCATIONAL THEORY, AND THE FIGURATIVE IMAGINATION

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> "All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much a point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life."
>
> Ludwig Wittgenstein

> "Criticism . . . is to art what history is to action and philosophy to wisdom: a verbal imitation of a human productive power which in itself does not speak."
>
> Northrop Frye

I. Introduction

The first question that a philosopher or an historian will typically pose in examining a text with a class is "What is the argument?". If this is not literally the first question, it can nevertheless be said to be the controlling one. The priority of this question and the pedagogical/critical tactic implicit in it is at least in part guaranteed by a view of what "the text" itself is, and at the risk of caricature, we might formulate this view in the following way. The text is really a vehicle for a construct we call an argument, or a series of arguments. We understand an author's explanation, his view of the matter at hand, when we understand his argument; and at the very least, understanding that argument requires that we are able to set it out in simple and direct fashion and comment usefully upon its assumptions, consistency, and explanatory power. In the end, we judge an author's explanation to be a good one if his argument can withstand critical scrutiny of this sort, and if it is a good one, then it is worthy of our belief. Whatever remains of the text that does not contribute to the argument is at best interesting obiter dicta, at worst so much filler that should have been blue-pencilled by a friendly editor.[1]

My aim in calling your attention to this approach and the view of the text which authorizes it is to focus in a preliminary way upon its limitations, particularly in connection with work like Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis' *Schooling in Capitalist America*, James Herndon's *How to Survive in Your Native Land*, or B. Paul Komisar's *Natural Teaching Encounters*. We could add more titles to the list, but as we shall see more specifically in a moment, together these are representative enough.[2] Now I certainly do not want to claim that these texts contain no formal arguments, or to suggest that these arguments are unimportant. Indeed with the possible exception of Herndon, I suspect that the caliber of the formal arguments is a major source of whatever pride these authors take in their work. The thesis that I *would* like to invite you to consider, however, is as follows. First, as useful as it has proved to be, this conventional view represents an unduly restricted conception of what the text itself is, identifying as it does the whole of an author's achievement with one of its component parts—the formal argument. Second, this preoccupation with the formal argument has had unhappy consequences which are at once both pedagogic and philosophical. What follows is a necessarily brief sketch of an alternative conception of the text, and then an initiative in the direction of applying this conception to the work of Bowles and Gintis, Herndon, and Komisar. The paper closes with some indication of the pedagogic and philosophical ramifications of accepting the alternative.

II. An Alternative Conception of the Text

It is not as if an author can just proceed to argue about a particular matter straightaway. He also has to represent the matter.

It is in that representation—in the very language that the author deploys to grasp the outlines of his object of understanding—that we find the moral and aesthetic dimension of the text. But it is not as if this moral and aesthetic dimension embodied in the figurative language lies inertly, as it were, alongside the explicitly cognitive operations revealed in the formal argument. Rather, the formal argument is harnessed to, and laboring on behalf of, the figurative elements. Put another way, the figurative elements have priority over the cognitive component because it is through these means that the subject is constituted. It is for this reason, as Hayden White has explained, that the reader experiences the well-wrought text as coherent—experiences "*both* the description of the facts and their explanation as plausible on the one side, and as adequate to one another on the other."

> It is not the case that the fact is one thing and the interpretation another. The fact is presented where and how it is in the discourse in order to sanction the interpretation to which it is meant to contribute. And the interpretation derives its force of plausibility from the arrangement of the facts in the order and the manner in which they are presented in the discourse. The discourse itself is the actual combination of the facts and meaning which gives to it the aspect of a specific structure of meaning that permits us to identify it as a product of one kind of . . . consciousness rather than another.[3]

But of what specific elements does this figurative dimension consist, and how are we to disclose these? If it is true that an author must represent the matter as well as argue about its significance, it is also true that these representations are wrought in conformity with the literary conventions of narrative discourse and the figurative possibilities of the language itself. Thus the "order" and at least one part of the "manner" that White speaks of here—the "where" and at least one part of the "how" in the presentation of the facts—is revealed in the plot structure of the story the author tells. Following White, we can think of each of these texts as pointing in two directions simultaneously: "first, toward the set of events [each] purports to describe and, second, toward the generic story form to which [each] tacitly likens the set in order to disclose its formal coherence considered as either a structure or a process."[4] The generic story form can be classified as a Romance, a Comedy, a Tragedy, or a Satire, and together these exhaust the available narrative possibilities. Each offers a distinctive thematic range of attitudes toward the adequacy of human consciousness and action to the powers of the universe, and each displays as well certain conventions of plot and character.[5]

The remaining part of the figurative dimension (the other part of the "manner") is revealed in the figures of speech that are favored in the account. These can usefully be classified according to the tropes of modern language theory and traditional poetics—viz., Metaphor, Metonomy, Synecdoche, and Irony. The tropes are distinguished from one another by the kind of integrations and dispersions each achieves on the literal level, and correlatively, the kinds of illuminations they aim for at the figurative level. The rub is that to unpack this matter here in any detail, particularly the tropes, would press us well beyond the limits of my own understanding and your tolerance. In what follows we shall rest content with revealing the story forms that seem to animate each of these texts. If we can, we shall try to note in each case the controlling figure of speech and some of its elements, but no attempt will be made to classify those. In closing, then, we are suggesting as Northrop Frye has put it, that "the resources of verbal expression are limited, if that is the word, by the literary equivalents of rhythm and key." But this does not mean, " any more than it does in music, that its resources are artistically exhaustible."[6]

III. Educational Theory in the Comic Mode:
Is Schooling in Capitalist America *Funny?*

Given the conventional view of the text with which we began, the one, that is, which thinks of it exclusively as a vehicle for a formal argument, the opening chapter of *Schooling in Capitalist America* is without much interest. But in "Beyond the Educational Frontier: The Great American Dream Freeze," Bowles and Gintis establish both the controlling figure of speech and the generic story form which together constitute the subject of the book, the title notwithstanding. It is on behalf of these elements that the formal arguments labor, and together with the formal argument produce what the reader experiences as its distinctive "explanatory effect." Recall, if you will, the dramatic way in which the chapter begins.

> "*Go* West, young man!" advised Horace Greely in 1851. A century later, he might have said: "*Go* to College!" The Western frontier was

> **the nineteenth-century land of opportunity. In open competition with nature venturesome white settlers found their own levels, *unfettered* by birth or creed. The frontier was *a way out*—out of poverty, out of dismal factories, out of the crowded Eastern cities. The frontier was the Great Escape. Few *escaped*. Railroad companies, mine owners, and, before long, an elite of successful farmers and ranchers soon captured both land and opportunity. The rest were left with the adventure of making ends meet. . .(emphasis added)**

And so forth. What follows soon after is a representation of the Sixties—a decade which "*burst* upon a complacent public in successive *waves* of political and cultural *conflict*," a decade of "sporadic, but intense, political assaults" with a good deal of "forcing," "throwing," "seizing," "sweeping," "demanding," and "rocking." The chapter ends with an insistence upon a need for individuality and community which is "irrepressible" and the conviction that "a proper organization of educational and economic life. . .can *unleash* a people's creative *powers*." The chapter ends with a reference to a "prolonged struggle" to be "waged", and the hope that the book itself will serve as "a step in that long march" to "revolutionary transformation of social life."[7]

Perhaps the first thing we notice about this chapter is the extraordinary energy it manages to convey. It begins with an imperative: "Go!", and ends with an inspired call to join "the long march." A detailed analysis would be necessary to disclose the workings of the figurative language in all of its richness, but for our purpose it is sufficient to recognize that the central figure here is one of pressure which cannot be contained interminably. Initiated with the comparison between "education" and the Western frontier, each operating in a different period of history as "an admirable safety valve for the economic pressure cooker," its possibilities are then played upon through the "bursting" description of the Sixties, and the recognition that "the liberal school reform balloon has burst." This last image is a particularly successful one coming where it does after the characterization of the Sixties, for it carries the pressure figure forward by transposing it from society at large to a particular group within it. Moreover, it expresses something about that group itself, rich as it is in associations of the experience of children who come to a fearfully sudden and inescapable recognition that their game is over. Is it any wonder that the times are characterized just over a page later as projecting "inertial pessimism"—"not a healthy conservatism. . .but a rheumy loss of nerve, a product of dashed hopes of the past decades"?

But there is one more element to notice here—the plot structure. As the title of this section indicates, although the story Bowles and Gintis weave so successfully is not funny, the plot structure of that story is a classically "comic" one. In comedy, as Northrop Frye has pointed out, "time plays a redeeming role, it uncovers and brings to light what is essential to the happy ending," and it is here that we begin to glimpse the rhetorically functional connection between the figures of speech which play on pressures which cannot be contained interminably and the comic emplotment. Frye has dubbed comedy "the mythos of Spring", and he does so because archetypically the dramatic movement in comedy is from one kind of society to another—from one dominated by the habits, obsessions, and arbitrary law of the old to one which is controlled by youth, and which is at once more free, more socially inclusive, and more life-giving. Central to comic action then is the dispelling of illusion. These illusions are classically embodied in the actions of the old who are in charge of the society when the dramatic action begins. The dramatic function of the blocking characters who stand as obstacles to the hero's desire is to repeat their obsession, a role played by none other than liberal policymakers, past and present, within the context of *Schooling*. Moreover, and once again consistent with comic convention, Bowles and Gintis' judgment against the liberals is not so much a moral judgment against the wicked (the tragic norm) as a social judgment against the absurd. In the end, the liberals too are invited to participate in the building of the new order. They are not repudiated, but reconciled. This suggests yet another reason for the image of the bursting balloon, as well as the later references to illness. Simple hypocrisy is not the source of the liberals' behavior, so much as a lack of knowledge (like children), or at least something beyond their control (like an illness). And of course this judgment is one source of the considerable interpretive distance these authors have put between themselves and some revisionist historians.[8]

IV. Educational Theory in the Tragic Mode:
How to Survive in Your Native Land

The shift to Herndon's world from the one portrayed in *Schooling in Capitalist America* is an abrupt and jarring one for as a pair, comedy and tragedy, like romance and irony, contrast rather than blend. To be sure, unlike comedy which conventionally deals with characters in a social group, tragedy is focused archetypically upon a single individual. But more importantly, this difference in scale is underscored because time is assigned a very different role in *How to Survive* on behalf of a theme directly contrary to the one represented in *Schooling*.

As we observed in Bowles and Gintis' text, time redeems by disclosing the folly of liberal presumptions for all to see, and by holding out at the same time the possibility for triumphant collective action in the future. But it is precisely this possibility that is written off as illusion in *How to Survive*. Only if we remain outside of time—"unstuck in time"—could we nourish the hope that one day we might "turn them instruments of death, repression, and ignorance into instruments of work, knowledge and love." Because of its very nature as an institution, Herndon insists unequivocally in his Explanatory Notes, "the school is not going to change." "Change it? Better change the music of the spheres instead." Thus time here plays a restrictive role, enclosing the dramatic action, and sustaining the inevitability of what is and what must be. Worked out within the conventions of tragedy then, *How to Survive* is a story about the inescapable requirements of the order of things, and the awful consequences of violating that order. It is told by a man who was once "a great teacher", a "creative teacher", who in arrogant pride set himself against the school in the futile hope of redeeming it—of giving "the school a lesson a change." He comes to recognize that order of nature, but like the classical tragic hero, like Creon, Oedipus, or Lear, he learns only through bitter suffering. The consequence of this brand of hubris, Herndon tells us, is that you will "drive yourself crazy with boredom, rage, or a sense of your own hypocrisy," and in the end perhaps, lose your work. In a comedy, repetitions and obsessions are funny or absurd. But in tragedy, obsession leads to catastrophe. In Herndon's moral universe, the very convictions that set one against the school in this fashion imply a lack of both knowledge and love. The consequence of this posture then is nothing less than being cut off from the "wellsprings of human life." What could be worse than that?[9]

One final contrast is in order before we bring this section to a close. In *Schooling*, you will recall, we noted that the controlling figure of explosion was the linguistic means by which the dramatic movement of the plot toward liberation was carried forward. In *How to Survive*, figures of speech like the "stream of life," the soft ball game, and "solidarity," play on integration. These represent the social correlates of the personally integrative figure of "seriousness," a notion as central to Herndon's moral vocabulary, it appears, as it was to Paul Goodman's.[10]

V. Educational Theory in the Satiric Mode: Natural Teaching Encounters

On the face of it, the thesis of this text is innocent enough. School teaching, "official teaching," has the shape it does for two reasons. First, we have, as it were, pedagogic resources in the culture which are fairly limited. These are the "natural teaching encounters" of the title, and what makes them "natural" is that they are "commonplace, a casual part of everyday life." More precisely, we can distinguish among six of these commonplace episodes when we begin to reflect upon "the relationships between and respective motivations of teacher and learner." Under what circumstances, Komisar asks, are each of these episodes typically initiated, sustained, and finally terminated? What kinds of values are embodied in each? Secondly, the school is, like the militia, a "borrowing institution." Incapable of generating its own resources, it turns to civic life and draws from among this range of available possibilities in accordance with its own institutional imperatives. These imperatives are not only bureaucratic ones, the rationalized requirements for scheduling, planning and the like, but also historical. Among the historically conditioned imperatives some are indeed properly educational ones, although by now they have been rendered outmoded by changing socio-economic circumstances. Others, like social control presumably, are not educational at all. After this introduction, each of the remaining chapters is devoted to a discussion of one of the encounters—Exuding, Manipulating, Passion, Service, Group Task, and finally, Credomania.[11]

Frye suggests that satire is best approached as "a parody of romance, an application of romantic mythical forms to a more realistic context which fits them in surprising ways."[12] Tactically, the introduction establishes that more realistic context by moving the paradigmatic cases of teaching outside the school. But it also positions teaching for the satiric assault in another way, one which will not be cashed in until later, and then only by implication. What is claimed in the introduction is that natural teaching encounters together with "informal learning modes" are more important to carrying the burden of socialization than official teaching (or official learning?), since these antedate widespread schooling. But by the time the book is completed, it is apparent that teaching, be it natural or official, is a fairly odd and impotent practice. The implication is clear then: natural learning modes have priority over teaching in any form.

But where is the romance that fuels the parody and makes the sting of satire possible? Why, in the formally uninvoked conception of teaching which the reader presumably brings to the text, of course; the one which views it as the glorious means of overcoming the obstacles of ignorance, immorality, and poverty. Watch.

Remember that charismatic classroom performer from high school or college who aroused your interest in mathematics, or English poetry, perhaps? In Komisar's world he becomes "the exuder," one who is congenitally unable to shutup. He goes about the world imposing his "garrulous, and hectoring nature" on whomever he can snare without regard for the needs or interest of the listener. Or perhaps he was a "manipulator," morally indistinguishable from a traveling swindler who promotes a worthless unguent to serve his own ends. Or perhaps he was a "credomaniac," the figure with which the book concludes. Strictly speaking, these characters do not *teach about* a creed: they obsessively embody it, devoting all of their energy to its pursuit. These three types, under different names and different representations, are recognizable as three conventionally heroic embodiments of the romantic conception of teaching, and each in turn falls under the inexorable logic of Komisar's representation. Thus one of the central themes of this, the "mythos of winter," is the "disappearance of the heroic." Like Swift, "through a slight shift in perspective, a different tinge in emotional coloring," Komisar gains leverage on the obstacle to the free movement of society: "the proposition that men must be instructed."[13]

VI. Some Concluding Remarks

It bears repeating that this paper represents only a beginning. A good deal more could be said about the figurative dimension, and needs to be said about the relationship between these moral and aesthetic features of the text and the explicit argument. But let me leave you with two general points about the ramifications of this approach. It appears that *what* each of these authors has to say is, in a non-trivial sense, indistinguishable from *how* he says it. If this is true, it has consequences for how we construe the items on the philosophical agenda—how we conceptualize what the disputes are about, and what kinds of moves would be useful in adjudicating them. White believes, and I with him, that there are no properly epistemological grounds upon which to favor any one of these representations over any other as "more realistic." This includes the mode we have not discussed here but which, suggestively enough, set the conventions for much of the writing when the public school movement flourished—the romance. If such an epistemological justification is possible, it remains to be set out.[14]

The line we have taken here also has consequences for how we construe the social significance of the philosophical agenda. Pedagogically, students want to know "Is this what school does? Is this what I should believe?" and the approach which fastens on the argument exclusively leaves them with few satisfying answers, if only because every argument can be refuted. What works effectively as a social-psychological imperative within the guild appears implausible or foolish within ordinary life. What functionally guarantees that you and I write more papers only confirms in them the naive view that "it's all just opinion." The alternative suggested here gives us a way to explicate an author's achievement more comprehensively, and I think more accurately. But it has a price. To say that as professors we explicate texts first and foremost, not the world, would mean giving up some pretensions that we find comforting. I, for one, would applaud that.[15]

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* Peter Goldstone, Leonard Waks, and John O'Breza have patiently discussed and criticized the ideas that eventuated in this paper, and so I owe them special thanks. I would also like to thank Robert Holtzman. He was kind enough to invite me to participate in a summer lecture series, and that provided the first opportunity to go public with this strategy—"Is *Schooling in Capitalist America* Funny?"

1. Cf. Walter Feinberg, *Reason & Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations of Twentieth Century Liberal Educational Policy* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975), p. 1. Like Professor Feinberg, I too am skeptical of the idea that a philosopher ought to be conerned exclusively with "pure thought"—i.e., "with the structure of thinking, with the logic of the

arguments, and the consistency and rigor with which a string of propositions are held together"—but for different reasons. For the moment at least, therefore, we will not follow Professor Feinberg's lead beyond the text into the streets to consider anything called "consequences" or "motives." The reason for noting that a view of the text is only a part of what guarantees the plausibility of the question "What is the argument?" should be obvious enough. "Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings," as Wittgenstein put it, and thus while the question makes sense enough in a college classroom, few parents would greet in that way their youngsters' dinner table report that they just finished *Moby Dick* or an interesting article in *Time*. The epigraphs are from Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, ed., G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 16 e; Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 12.

2. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life* (New York: Basic Books, 1976); James Herndon, *How to Survive in Your Native Land* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1971); B. Paul Komisar *et al.*, *Natural Teaching Encounters: Toward a General Theory of Educational Encounters* (Philadelphia: KDC Enterprises, 1976). In addition to the reasons developed in the text, together these books represent a wide cross-section of the writing on schooling—from avowedly social science, through memoir, to the philosophical. Any of the work of historians of education, revisionist or otherwise, lend themselves to the approach outlined in the paper, just as the work of Ivan Illich would, or someone like Jonathan Kozol. That much is intuitively clear, I think. Beyond this, there are difficulties, but we shall not address those here.

3. Hayden V. White, "History, Historicism, and the Figurative Imagination," *History and Theory*, Beiheft 14 (1975), p. 55, 58. This paper represents an effort to apply White's theoretical work, elaborated specifically in connection with history and the philosophy of history. Thus the title of this paper, a deliberate echo of his piece in *History & Theory*, is intended to serve as a reminder of that fact. The license for this effort has been issued by Professor White himself, I take it, since he believes that in "any field of study not yet reduced (or elevated) to the status of a genuine science, thought remains the captive of the linguistic mode in which it seeks to grasp the outline of the objects inhabiting its field of perception." White's article provides a short account. Readers interested in the fully elaborated treatment are encouraged to consult his *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). It goes without saying, I suppose, that the foolishness in this paper is my own. For different approaches to the question of expressive values in works of scholarship see Robert Nisbet, *Sociology as an Art Form* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), and Peter Gay's *Style in History* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974).

4. White, "History, Historicism and the Figurative Imagination," p. 54. White's conception of "generic story form" or "generic plot structure" is borrowed from Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism*, pp. 131-239.

5. Frye recognizes six phases within each of these major categories. As he puts it: "The distinction between an ironic comedy and a comic satire, or between a romantic comedy and a comic romance is tenuous, but not

quite a distinction without a difference." (p. 177) I have avoided such subtlety here.

6. Frye, p. 133. See White's discussion of the tropes in *Metahistory*, pp. 31-38. I also found John Nelson's review of *Metahistory* for *History and Theory*, 14, 1 (1975) pp. 75-91 helpful.

7. Bowles and Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America*, pp. 3-17. The term "explanatory effect" is Hayden White's.

8. Frye's discussion of comedy is found on pp. 163-186. The quote is from page 213. From the perspective of the argument developed in this paper, it is interesting to examine David K. Cohen and Bella Rosenberg's "Functions and Fantasies: Understanding Schools in Capitalist America," *History of Education Quarterly*, 17, 2 (1977), pp. 113-133. Their argument appears to be confused since they urge us to "take *the past* as a series of texts, to be read much as we read prose and poetry," (p. 121, emphasis added) while at the same time holding *the text* they are addressing (*Schooling in Capitalist America*) to the requirements of the conventional view of the text ("What is the argument?") with which we began. For whatever it is worth, Joseph Featherstone and others who find *Schooling* "remote from the lives and consciousness of the ordinary people for whom it claims to speak" might find consolation in the fact that it is one of the conventions of comedy to leave the hero, like the new society that promises to displace the comic one, relatively undeveloped. See Featherstone's review of *Schooling* in *The New Republic*, May 29, 1976.

9. Herndon, *How to Survive*, pp. 9, 13, 100 and *passim*. The reference to "the wellsprings of human life" is in the epigraph to Part One. Frye's view of "the mythos of autumn" is set out on pp. 206-233. See also Joseph Tussman's remarks on "docility", what he terms "a non-denominational or secular term for 'piety' " in his *Experiment at Berkeley* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 32-33.

10. On Goodman, see James E. McClellan's chapter in *Toward An Effective Critique of American Education* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1968), p. 276 and *passim*.

11. B. Paul Komisar, *et. al.*, *Natural Teaching Encounters*, introduction.

12. Frye, p. 223.

13. Komisar, p. 4 *passim*; Frye, pp. 228, 234, 235. Although space does not permit a discussion of the relationship between the character of the figures of speech favored in *Natural Teaching Encounters* and its "explanatory effect", we can note here that in contrast to the "explosive" figures in *Schooling*, or the "integrating" ones in *How to Survive*, Komisar's account plays on figures of "opposition". This rhetorical capital is banked in the concept of an "encounter". See the entry in the *Oxford English Dictionary*.

14. See White's preface to *Metahistory*, p. xi-xii. See also Frye's remarks about the four modes as being four aspects of "a central unifying myth," *Anatomy of Criticism*, p. 192.

15. The radical reaction to the social implications of the New Criticism seems applicable to the line I have taken here. See Richard Ohmann, *English in America: A Radical View of the Profession* (New York: Oxford, 1976), pp. 66-91. The counterpoint to this view is eloquently defended by Philip Rieff, *Fellow Teachers* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1972).

Response to Angelo

THE IMPORTANCE OF STORIES

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Three things will be attempted in this response: Provision of a very brief summary of Richard Angelo's paper, mention of several related parts of Hayden White's *Methahistory*, and a suggestion that the Wittgensteinian epigraph was particularly well chosen.

Angelo believes that historians and philosophers are interested too exclusively in the "formal arguments" of the texts about which they teach. "Formal argument" is a term which Angelo has apparently borrowed from White, and I will mention in a moment how broadly White uses it. For now, however, I want to point out only that Angelo probably does not intend to imply that all historians and philosophers agree exactly about what is most important in a given text—they may all concentrate on "formal argument," but that may include a variety of strategies.

What does this overemphasis on the formal argument obscure? On Angelo's view, even though certain texts are vehicles for their formal arguments, it is also the case that the arguments' meaning and significance depend upon a range of figuratively represented experience. The "formal argument is harnessed to, and laboring on behalf of, the figurative elements" of the text.

What are "figurative elements"? Angelo mentions two kinds, and then concentrates on one of them. The first kind can be understood in terms of the four tropes of traditional poetics. These are, loosely, metaphorical devices which can be used to call attention to various part-part, part-whole, or analogical relationships in a field of study. According to Angelo and to White, these tropes are extremely important because they are a necessary part of the earliest stages of inquiry wherein understanding is so undeveloped that only the barest "outline of objects" in the emerging field can be coaxed into consciousness. This initial apprehension of basic "data" within an emerging system of thought is achieved through devices which are more "poetic" than "literal."[1] The second kind of figurative element, which is the one Angelo emphasizes for the purposes of his present paper, is the mode of emplotment. Plot structure is possible once the basic events or metaphorically grasped "data" are arranged into a narrative. The appropriateness of a particular narrative structure will depend to some extent upon these events and hence upon this initial step of "poetic" figuration. Plot structure can be described in terms of four basic types: Romance, Comedy, Tragedy, and Satire.

Angelo's analyses of three contemporary books about schooling and teaching are intended to make two basic points. One point is pedagogical and the other point is epistemological. The pedagogical point is roughly that there are figurative elements in these books (and presumably others) which may explain part of a student's resistance to or acceptance of each of the authors' views. The epistemological point is roughly that there are no considerations expressible entirely in terms of historical accuracy which we can use to justify a particular story form, or a particular combination of trope and plot.

So much for my sketch of Angelo's thesis. Now, with a sense of prudence inferior to Angelo's, I'll make a complex picture even more complex by mentioning several more elements of the backdrop provided for Angelo's paper by White. My excuse for doing this is that Angelo endorses White's claim that there are no purely epistemological reasons for accepting one system of figurative expression over another, and White's position on this depends rather heavily on elements as yet unmentioned. First to review, Angelo and White claim that the initial apprehension of subject matter is metaphorical, or more correctly, is tropological as set out in classical poetics. White claims that in history and the social sciences, "thought remains the captive of the linguistic mode" in which this "prefiguration" is done.[2] White's reasons for believing this are partially based upon his belief that socio-historical accounts are all comprised of a system of interdependent elements. We've mentioned two of these elements: the initial tropological prefiguration, and the mode of emplotment of the narrative. There are two other elements in these systems: the formal argument, and ideological implication.

White says that formal arguments are centrally nomological-deductive or covering-law explanations which are explicitly stated. However, White also says that formal arguments may be categorized using Stephen Pepper's four "world hypotheses." These are called Formist, Organicist, Mechanistic and Contextualist, and they involve, respectively, what might be called explanation by appeal to classification, to structure, to causal law, and to pattern. With respect to the epistemological point of Angelo's paper, these "world hypotheses" have two important properties. First, certain of them are more appropriate than others to the basic subject matter initially conceptualized by one of the four tropes, and second, each contains what White and Pepper call its own "theory of truth."[3] Besides the four kinds of formal argument, these systems of interdependent elements also contain an ideological implication or position. These ideological positions also have two distinctly important properties with respect to Angelo's epistemological thesis. First, certain of the ideological positions are more appropriate than others when particular kinds of narrative emplotments and formal arguments are used, and second, each ideological position carries its own standards regarding what is significant.

In brief then, White believes that socio-historical investigation must commence with an initial prefiguration, which in turn suggests certain forms of emplotment, explanation and ideological position, and these in turn contain their own standards of truth and significance. White believes that these interdependencies are such that purely epistemological argument for the superiority of one type of text has not yet been developed and probably never will be; each system contains its own standards for what is sufficiently significant to demand description and explanation as well as standards for what an accurate description and adequate explanation are. (White does believe, incidentally, that a moral or aesthetic justification may be made for certain types of texts.)[4]

This will sound very familiar to those who have been following current disputes in philosophy of science regarding the alleged interdependencies among theories and their associated facts, methodologies, values and models. At least one difference, however, is that White and Angelo are speaking only of a text which is not "genuinely scientific" (to use White's term). These are texts which tell stories—purportedly true stories, but stories nonetheless. But if stories, even true stories, must be so enveloped in figurative elements, then perhaps we should not use stories to shed light on the nature of schools and teaching. And if we must use stories, then perhaps we should do just as Angelo says historians and philosophers tend to do—we should extract the "scientific" part or the formal argument and attend only to that.

Consideration of this potential objection to Angelo's thesis brings us to Wittgenstein, whose own work is often criticized for an excessive reliance on stories and for a paucity of argument. Wittgenstein, similarly to Angelo and White, seems to have believed that argument alone cannot completely supplant figurative language, and one reason for that belief may be found in the epigram so well chosen for this paper.

Angelo's paper seems to run against the grain of much "analytic" philosophy of education even though the literature in that tradition also acknowledges a debt to Wittgenstein. Perhaps part of the explanation of these conflicting appeals to Wittgenstein is that we have tended to loose many of his most important insights; we have tended to treat Wittgenstein's stories and his richly imaginative excursions into "anthropology" as queer manifestations of a highly original character. We collapse his comments about the *use* of symbols (their functions, or the purposes they serve) to comments about their *usage* (their exculsively syntactical or grammatical employment), and we collapse his examples of linguistic *activities* into strings of propositions with no appreciable social or physical dimensions. We use, and then when convenient, forget his analyses of logical necessity; we forget that in important ways Wittgenstein did not want to dichotomize questions of persuasiveness and questions of validity. The "flow of life", as found in an individual's experience and also in the succession of individuals' experiences through history, which was so important for Wittgenstein thus begins to seem irrelevant. It was not important because we *argue from* this "flow of life"; stories are not needed as a *basis* for epistemology. However, stories may have a unique capacity for capturing "the element in which arguments have their life", and this is part of the very "essence of what we call an argument."

I believe there are serious points of divergence between the work of Wittgenstein and White, as well as the similarities Angelo has spotted. Ironically (and thus in perfect keeping with the figurative mode of Angelo's paper!), pursuit of these similarities and differences might revitalize "analytic" philosophers' investigation of the nature of argument and of teaching.

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1. Hayden V. White, *Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Unversity Press, 1973), pp. xi, 34-38.
2. Ibid., pp. x-xi, 427, 430.
3. Ibid., pp. 11-21.
4. Ibid., p. 433.

(Second Concurrent Session)

WHAT PASSES FOR MORAL?

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It has taken almost two hundred years for Herbart's description of how all sentient beings make a severe selection from among the many data that present themselves to consciousness, to become a commonplace. Each of us manages to attend to only a few things and sometimes the choice is made for us by others. Buber has said that conscious and willed education means "*a selection by man of the effective world.*"[1]

Philosophers have perhaps been somewhat resistant to the notion that they too make conscious and unconscious selections among possible questions, possible data, possible answers. Yet we have no trouble in admitting that Plato was influenced not only by Socrates but by the Peloponnesian Wars, that Hegel's political philosophy is not wholly independent of his Prussian citizenship, or that J.S. Mill's attention and values were somewhat shaped by his father and his Utilitarian friends. Today few of us are likely to dismiss out of hand a claim that class and ethnic bias somewhat limit the ideal of seeing the world *sub specie aeternitatis*, and even males are almost ready to confess that philosophy is very possibly changing by virtue of a growing influx of females into the serried ranks. Occasionally in outbreaks of frankness, we admit that our particular philosophic questions are professional heritages more than spontaneous eruptions of innocent wonder. Certainly we induct graduate students into the guild by seeing to it that they learn which are the right questions to ask by reading the journals and getting drawn into the polemic.

It is perhaps harder, though, to admit that our very personalities influence our philosophic selections, though no less a philosopher than William James declared:

> The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments. Undignified as such a treatment may seem to some of my colleagues, I shall have to take account of this clash and explain a good many of the divergencies of philosophers by it. Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing to sink the fact of his temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he argues impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He trusts his temperament.
>
> Of course I am talking here of very positively marked men, men of radical idiosyncracy, who have set their stamp and likeness on philosophy and figure in its history. Plato, Locke, Hegel, Spencer, are such temperamental thinkers. Most of us have, of course, no very definite intellectual temperament, we are a mixture of opposite ingredients, each one present very moderately . . . But the one thing that has *counted* so far in philosophy is that a man should *see* things, see them straight in his own peculiar way, and be dissatisfied with any opposite way of seeing them.

He went on to say:

> Now the particular difference of temperament that I have in mind in making these remarks is one that has counted in literature, art, government, and manners as well as in philosophy. In manners we find formalists and free-and-easy persons. In government, authoritarians and anarchists. In literature, purists or academicals, and realists. In art, classics and romantics . . . In philosophy we have a very similar contrast expressed in the pair of terms "rationalist" and "empiricist," "empiricist" meaning your lover of facts in all their crude variety, "rationalist" meaning your devotee to abstract and eternal principles.[2]

Here he was leading up to his famous distinction between the tough- and tender-minded, which though it has passed into our language has got oddly distorted from its original meaning. In "The Sentiment of Rationality", where he put forward the amazing claim that we recognize a rational conclusion through a certain *feeling*, he went on to argue that:

> Idealism will be chosen by a man of one emotional constitution, materialism by another . . . To say then that the universe essentially is thought, is to say that I myself, potentially at least, am all. There is no radically alien corner, but an all-prevading *intimacy*. . .(Materialists) sicken at a life wholly constituted of intimacy. There is an overpowering desire at moments to escape personality, to revel in the action of forces that have no respect for our ego, to let the tides flow, even though they flow over us. The strife of these two kinds of

> mental temperament will, I think, always be seen in philosophy. Some men will keep insisting on the reason, the atonement, that lies in the heart of things, and that we can act *with*; others, on the opacity of brute fact that we must react against.[3]

Yet have we ever taken William James' point at all seriously? Has it not been commoner to say, "How charming!" and then to go on supposing that temperament is not to be mentioned in proper philosophic company, or if it is, to regret its intrusion into serious matters? (Even over the many years, I have a clear recollection of being taught in Philosophy 1-A about the Genetic Fallacy and being sternly cautioned that real philosophers ignore the origin of ideas and attend only to universal logical principles by which they are argued for or against.)

Still I've not ever quite got it out of my head that there is an allowable variation in both the questions and the answers that we concentrate upon in philosophy and that the Guild or prevailing fashions make philosophy a narrower endeavor than it should be by making it hard for some temperaments to find even an attic room in the Celebrated Mansions.

Perhaps James would have agreed that in Ethics no less than in Metaphysics and Religion temperament is a determinant and a variable, and that here too philosophy reduces its range of relavance and appeal as well as reducing its own potential for genuine novelty, by an unnecessary narrowness.

One could do worse than to employ the Tender-Minded/Tough-Minded dichotomy in examining tendencies in ethical theory, but let us try out a somewhat roomier typology—that of C.G. Jung, who indeed found James's distinction to be one of several anticipations of his own Introverted-Extraverted distinction. I have in mind Jung's so-called *functional* typology, four ways of selecting and construing aspects of the world: namely, Thinking and Feeling, Sensing and Intuiting. Since these have been widely discussed I will content myself here with a reminder that the value questions which we tend to hold in abeyance while trying to get clear about our concepts—which is of course Thinking—are precisely at the heart of the *opposite* way of functioning which he calls Feeling; and that sensory perception, with its attention to ready-to-hand (and eye, etc.) features is inimical to intuitive functioning, by which is meant attending to contrary-to-fact possibilities. Everybody uses all of these functions, just as everybody sometimes introverts, sometimes turns outward in his orientation; but a particular propensity for using one of the functions types us thereby, just as we recognize that there are Introverts and Extraverts temperamentally.

I should not pretend that these are the only significant human types by any means, though a very sharp psychologist of my acquaintance, a woman, reminded me of this when I had been provisionally arguing in her presence that that overwhelmingly popular moral idea of *Justice* betrays a *Thinking* bias by saying, "Well, I think of 'justice' as a very masculine idea, one most women have trouble working up any enthusiasm for." I shall say something more about *justice* presently, but first, I should like to raise the question about why quite a number of people profess a singular lack of interest in morality at all. I suspect that this has always been the case, but (as with quite a number of other views, including disliking both marriage and child-rearing) it now seems increasingly permitted to say so.

Of course everyone knows that a good bit of that negative reaction to moral issues is really to heavy-handed moral*ism*, to traditional piety, conventional prohibitions, and the like; but I newly suspect that that is not the whole story. I am ready to hypothesize not only that a strong preference for rule-governed morality and for moral theory that centers upon universal requirements for fairness, justice, or other *summum bonum*; or for love, kindness, sympathy and other benevolent feelings and attitudes (again, both in practice and theory) is rooted in personality type, but also that a prevailing dislike for making moral judgments at all, for pronouncing obligations and duties, and for the effort to decide which of the moral concepts is central, and how best to define it, is so rooted.

Those who are predominantly introverted tend to differ nontrivially from extraverts in their moral stance, I believe; and those whose thinking function is most prominent (in their cognitive battery) differ from those who run more to feeling. It is essential, however hard for those rooted to the main stream of the history of philosophy, to understand that that distinction is non-invidious.

Yet both of the latter "function-types" are very often interested in moral questions, practically or theoretically. It is not uninteresting that they are put together on the Jungian typology as characteristically taken up with *judgment*. But two other types are said to be mainly non-judging, attaching their interest to one or another kind of *perception*.

On this reading, then, one would hypothesize that something like half the population is less than keen about the whole enterprise of morality. But now I want to examine the possibility that this is so because of the *way* the first two types have preempted the field. I strongly suspect that the following represents a rather common attitude that is today increasingly legitimized as a public stance: if morality has to do with the Good and the Right, Justice and Fairness (and their antonyms) or with Love and Hate, Kindness and Cruelty, Warmth and Coldness, etc., then the whole subject is (to me) uninteresting and irrelevant.

Yet, if one adopts the assumption that everybody has some very general values that he particularly prizes and advocates, then it may be that we will be better off not to delimit morality quite so severely, not to insist that it is defined by its centering upon only those concepts.

Let us then ask what else might be included by asking what the other two types, on the typology we are employing, do seem most often to value and disvalue.

Those who most commonly construe the world through sensory perception, the so-called Sensation Types, are said to be characterized by their particular regard for the here and now, for the presented physical world, with its colors and shapes, smoothnesses and roughnesses, solidities and fluidities. They tend to be indifferent (or even hostile) to fanciful schemes and ideals, Golden Ages and Utopias, sentiment and universal brotherly love, but to be attentive to detail, to accomplishment (not just potentiality), to palpable reality. It is probably fair to say that they are "law and order" types, as the phrase is commonly used—that is, to designate a fundamental conformity to prevailing regulation and practice. They are often impressed with success, with "track record," with solid evidence of achievement in the ways of the world.

At another extreme, the "intuitives" tend to scant the present and hurry to future considerations, to like possibility more than actuality, planning more than tradition or status quo. They are long on imagination, short on adjustment and coping; given to far-out schemes and notions, but quickly bored with routine and repetition.

Faced with the ways philosophers have characteristically put moral questions and developed schools of ethics, Sensation Types are likely to respond that they are pedantic, Visionary, unrealistic, and excessively intellectual. Yet, personalities of this sort are by no means amoral *if* the central moral question is something like this: What is of most worth, most important, counts for most, really *matters*? Or, as William James was wont to say, What is the *cash* value of your ideal? But just as he had to answer critics that he meant this expression in a metaphorical way, not to signify a crass, materialistic fixation, so Sensation Types too are often unjustly accused of being mundane. But at their best they have a nice sense for what really works, and for the importance of piecemeal reform of social ills as against pie in the sky. They are not wholly unrepresented in the philosophic tradition: Jeremy Bentham is no bad example. Here was a theorist who yet fought for parliamentary and prison reform. Moreover he was one who unabashedly identified the good with pleasure, and believed pleasure to be no mysterious matter, but something measurable, and that alone which all men seek. Protagoras and Hobbes were other philosophers with a strong bent toward this way of construing value questions, but the plain fact is that those who are *very* strongly inclined toward "sensation" do not characteristically run toward the philosophic enterprise (even broadly defined), but get on with the world's work, with practical politics and business, home and bank account, farm and factory. They have a strong sense of palpable, present reality, and that is where they find their principal values and virtues. If they are writers about values, they are somewhat likely to be rather home-spun, down-to-earth, like Ben Franklin. However, *sensation* as auxiliary to *thinking*, is very commonly found in empirical science. Educators will easily recognize this combination in the company of educational psychologists, for instance. And sensation associated with feeling may well make for real achievement of ethical ends as distinct from elegant but futile schemes.

One is tempted to say that the Intuitive Type is like the Sensation Type in only one respect, and that is in finding traditional ethical questions and answers somehow beside the point. For the intuitive, it is far more important that something be interesting than that it be consistent and law-like. "Very well, I am inconsistent," answered Emerson to a severe charge: spoken like an intuitive. Of course the intuitive is much given to "dreaming up" alternatives to present and prevailing ways. The conjuring up of a utopia is the best of exercises, though he would hate to have to live in one, or do the grubby work of building it. The Republic is an intuitive's state, and Plato was frank to admit that its achievement was in the highest degree unlikely. Sometimes the intuitive and the sensation types will point directly to the "primacy of perception": as in the following words of David Prall:

> If we are to be happy in a world as it really lies before us and about us in its actual appearance, that appearance can not remain unsatisfactory to contemplate, that is, aesthetically unsatisfactory,—condemned in the bare honesty of recording aesthetic judgments. If poverty and disease bore a pleasant aspect to discriminating perception, if injustice were aesthetically and directly satisfying to experience, and to dwell upon, what would there be to condemn it in any rational creature's eyes? For it is only in the embodiment in concrete aesthetic data of such abstractions as injustice and suffering and poverty, only their appearing in the world as unmistakably marked for aversion in a direct aesthetic view, that makes them unsatisfactory and ugly and bad.[4]

This is characteristically intuitive: if you have to use words like *good* and *evil*, make them intelligible by equating them with *beautiful* and *ugly*, for the latter are given directly in perception, as well as serving as ideals for future striving.

What appears to be true, then, is that ethical questions can be put and the field of ethics circumscribed in such a way as to make a very large number of people not very concerned with ethical matters. If (as is not uncommon) one argues that there are no genuine ethical interests for the solitary individual, but only with respect to inter-personal relations, then one is inviting introverts to say, "Well, then, count me out." If one takes a Kantian line, the invitation to those who count feeling very much more important than consistency and the employment of a principle of universality, is to wonder what kind of theory (other than ethical, which has been pre-empted) there is. But, admitting that it is more likely that thinking and feeling types will simply debate with each other about which is the *better* way of characterizing obligation and goodness, when we get to all of those who incline more toward relating to reality perceptually than judgmentally, they will be found oddly indifferent to most of the traditional ethical theories, and may even seem almost amoral in their attitudes. Yet, if one thinks that whatever be the best way of characterizing the fundamental ethical questions, surely they must be rooted in human nature, so that virtually everybody (the exception being pathological cases) deep down really cares about ethical values, then the concern will be to find ways of characterizing ethics and moral development more broadly than has been common.

Still, most of us probably do not want to fall into some sort of psychological relativism. No more than we want to believe that there is one morality for the Zuni and another for the Kwakiutls and no possibility for any cross-cultural comparison that is anything but biased, so we do not want to proclaim four or eight or some other number of non-comparable moralities, depending upon personality type. But in fact no such relativism is implied by the theory so far sketched. In order to see that this is true, it is now necessary to come back to the difference between *function* and *type*. There can be no doubt that all of us use all the functions designated by the words, "thinking," "feeling," "sensing," and "intuiting." It is next to unimaginable that anybody should somehow get along with one, two, or even three of these functions. All of them are used by each of us, and pretty commonly too. What it means, then, to be a type, is to find one sort of function especially easy, ready to hand, natural, quick. This predominant function tends to color our way of construing the world around us: we see the world (posited as a uni-verse) through the corner of a temperament. No doubt, although ultimately temperaments can be construed as individual, they tend to group into classifications, as suggested.

A person who is so heavily inclined to use one function that he neglects the others repeatedly is a natural subject for caricature: the intellectual so preoccupied by ideas as to be insensitive, unrealistic, impractical, unimaginative. Or so taken up with love and compassion as to reduce thoughtfulness, the everyday concerns of life, or fantasying, to minimal levels. And so on, with each of the types. But, it is meaningful to think of development toward full humanness in terms of the cultivation of a readier use of functions we tend to neglect. Thus, just as it is obligatory for a person of one sex, one nationality, one social class (though some types shy away from this word), to be able to see various aspects of life from other perspectives than those which announce his primary categorizations, so it is obligatory not to be unduly hemmed in by one's personality type. Though there is probably nobody who is perfectly in command of all the functions, we in fact differ greatly from each other in the versatility of our functioning. This gives us a developmental goal, or if one prefers, a series of goals. What I am saying is that is is not only just possible, but also desirable, to admit to a diversity of ethical paths of life, but also in a measure to transcend any one type sufficiently to understand the desirability—even the meta-ethical obligation—to develop ever greater capacity in the other respects as well.

I had got this far in my considerations when by chance I ran across Suzuki's account of the fourfold nature of the virtues in Zen Buddhism. The virtues are said to be Love, Justice, Propriety, and Wisdom. I was immediately struck with the applicability of his scheme to the morality of the functions. There is, I think, little difficulty in seeing that Love is the obvious virtue for Feeling Types to exalt, and Justice, with its characteristic emphasis upon law and its thoughtful application even to the most complex cases, is just the thing for the primary Thinkers. Wisdom has often been taken as importantly different from Knowledge or Intellectual acumen, in embracing insight and the imaginative extension of principles to action—even, as in the case of Socrates' *daimonion*, recognizing a mysterious inner check as an authority not to be denied. The point is not, of course, that Intuitives *are* wise—any more than Feeling types are invariably full of loving kindness or Thinking types remarkably brilliant—but that Wisdom is what Intuitives most admire, the virtue they prize most in themselves and others.

The one virtue of this lot that surprised me was Propriety, but only because I had not seen theretofore that it names perfectly what Sensation Types do very frequently seem to esteem most highly: fitness, rightness, correctness—the appropriate act for the occasion, a good sense of timing, a nice adjustment of means to ends, of key to lock, of word to thought, of gesture to impulse. Something of the Greek *Sophrosyne* is here, the nothing too much, a kind of moral sanity, a mean between extremes, a harmony between ideal and real.

Few of us have any trouble recognizing that all of these four *are* virtues, though we are likely to have our favorites amongst them, and—which is not the same thing—to admit that we ourselves exemplify each of them in different measure. It seems plausible that an ethical theory or a proposal for moral education will vary interestingly, as it is based on now one, now another preference, or—if you prefer—on temperamental propensity. A case can be made for the moral dangers implicit in a serious neglect of any of these virtues or, more generally, of the ways of construing our world; yet this is entirely consonant with asserting that we do and must differ temperamentally in ways that affect our moral practice, and very likely our moral theory.

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1. Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 89.

2. William James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1948), pp. 6-9.

3. William James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1917), pp. 147-48.

4. David Prall, *Aesthetic Judgment* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1929), p. 349.

RESPONSE TO JARRETT

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From the papers I have delivered in the past at various meetings I would like to extend my sympathy to Professor Jarrett. I think it's time that someone wrote a paper on the art and science of responding to other people's papers. It's a special world unto itself.

Carl Rogers has a technique that he uses in encounter groups where, before a person can respond to another person's statement, he must restate what he thinks that the person said in order to reduce the perceptual distortion which is ordinarily involved in any sort of interpersonal communication. Since Professor Jarrett's paper is largely concerned with precisely this problem of "cognitive processing," I would like to use a variation of Roger's approach in my response, by beginning with a brief summary of what strikes me as being the basic points that Professor Jarrett has made in his presentation.

Let me say at the very beginning that the paper as a whole is thoughtful and provocative. It addresses itself boldly to significant questions, and, in general, it strikes me as a successful appeal for a reexamination of some of the "conventional wisdom" which currently exists in the area of moral education.

On the other hand, I have certain reservations about Professor Jarrett's paper, and, since I am limited to about twelve minutes, let me proceed rather directly to the crux of what bothers me rather than simply congratulating Jarrett on the vast bulk of his paper, which I find highly commendable. If I may be allowed to begin with the axiological argumentative assumption that one can make a defensible distinction between *isness* and *oughtness*, description and prescription, let me state in rough paraphrase what I consider to be the central five points contained in Jarrett's paper—and I have reorganized these in a somewhat different sequence than they were originally advanced.

1. We are all predisposed by nature (both because of our general nature as human beings and because of our individual temperaments) to respond to the world in certain characteristic ways. Philosophers, like everyone else, process the world through certain propensities for certain types of actions and experiences rather than others. We see what we look for, we look for what interests us, and what interests us is largely a function of our individual psycho-biological natures. In short, we experience the world characterologically.

2. Generally speaking, the theory advanced by C.G. Jung is probably the best description yet advanced concerning how human nature is structured, how it functions, and how individuals tend to differ with respect to their innate structural propensities.

3. In line with Jung's point of view, most people (or at least half of the population, consisting of the sensory and intuitive types) are essentially what might be termed "non-intellectual" (a term I prefer to Professor Jarrett's "non-judgmental") in their approach to life, but, since philosophy has been virtually preempted by the intellectual types (the thinking and feeling categories—and generally the extraverted members of these classes), the false notion prevails that *ethics* is properly restricted to the characteristically outer-directed and interpersonal concerns of these individuals rather than to the much more privatistic and subjective concerns of the sensory and intuitive types.

4. This is a mistake, however, for "the fundamental ethical questions. . .must be rooted in human nature, so that virtually everybody (the exceptions being pathological cases) deep down really cares about ethical values."[1] In short, contrary to what many people believe, sensory and intuitive types also have values, even if they act out their moral commitments without becoming involved in conventional ethical decision-making, which has usually tended to be looked upon as the sole legitimate avenue for ethical expression by those who operate in the usual intellectual mode. Properly conceived, then, ethics is broader than matters of social obligation (interpersonal responsibility). It ultimately addresses itself to much more encompassing and complex questions of "what is of most worth," [of what] "really matters."[2]

5. Finally, both cultural relativism and psychological reductionism are inadequate answers to the moral question of what

has ultimate value. The highest value, as Jung correctly conceived, is self-actualization viewed as the attainment of true selfhood through "the fullest, most complete differentiation and harmonious blending of all aspects of man's total personality."[3] What is needed, then, is not only a greater intellectual tolerance for the legitimate philosophical pluralism which is implicit in the diversity of temperament types but also a recognition that the highest personal value ultimately resides in the "meta-ethical obligation" "to transcend any [temperament] type sufficiently to understand the desirability. . .to develop even greater capacity in other respects as well."[4] In short, what Jung terms the "transcendent function" of a human being is to arrive at a harmonious and unified development of all of his inherent structural predispositions—the creation of a new centered "self" (beyond the conventional "ego") which incorporates the highest development of all four of the basic temperament functions. In this sense character may still, as the old saying has it, be destiny, but the highest good of all is the realization of one's fundamental *human nature*, which is more basic than any specifically characterological differences and which acts teleologically as the implicit imperative behind all personal behavior.

Having explicated my understanding of what Professor Jarrett has said, let me quickly list my major reservations. These, listed in rough order of priority, but without much elaboration in view of the obvious time restrictions, are as follows:

1. Professor Jarrett—probably in an attempt to avoid formalism and pedantry—does not define his terms or, at least, does so only casually and by indirection. A paper which proposes that philosophy is characteristically determined by inherent temperamental propensities and/or personality traits, should probably define such key terms as *temperament* and *personality*. In a similar sense, a paper which quarrels (quite legitimately, it seems to me) with conventional notions of ethics, should probably contain an explicit statement regarding what "ethics" properly is (or should be). There is a great deal of semantic ambiguity in the paper.

2. It would have been helpful to know if Professor Jarrett accepts Jung's overall orientation or merely those particular ideas about the attitudes of extraversion and introversion and the four temperament types to which he explicitly addresses himself. The attitudes and the temperament types, important as they are, have a distinctive meaning in Jung's fully-developed

theory, because they relate to a far more encompassing concept of the psyche—the strata of consciousness (consciousness, the personal unconscious, and the collective unconscious) and the other inherent dimensions of human nature (the persona, the shadow, the anima, the animus, and such). If Professor Jarrett is using these terms casually and eclectrically, they mean something quite different than they would for an orthodox Jungian.

Related to this, some of Jarrett's statements about Jung's ideas strike me as somewhat contentious. My reading of Jung does not confirm Jarrett's contention that the sensation type is more present-oriented, more geared to the "here and now" than, say, the feeling or intuitive types. In a similar sense, I fail to see precisely why the sensation type is more committed to "law and order" or more concerned with "success" than the other types might be. Is the intuitive person really more future-oriented? Or—and I may be caviling about terminology here—does "intuitive functioning" really mean "attending to contrary-to-fact possibilities,"[5] or does it pertain primarily to operating in a nonrational mode (which would not necessarily be contrary-to-fact). That is, if I dream the sun comes up every morning, my belief is not *contrary* to fact although the process whereby it was derived is neither rational nor empirical in the usual senses of these terms. Intuitive people may be *non-rational*—the opposite of rational—but this is not the same as being *irrational*—the contrary of rational. Many of these difficulties probably derive from the fact that Professor Jarrett tends to be somewhat elliptical, flattering his readers by assuming that most of us are probably much more conversant with Jung's ideas and terminology than we actually are.

3. It seems to me that Professor Jarrett tends to confuse *ethical* behavior (that is, behavior motivated by some concept of what constitutes good and appropriate action) with behavior that can be *ethically-interpreted* (That is, with behavior that, however directed or motivated, can be construed after-the-fact on the basis of ethical belief). Philosophy professors have always loved to pronounce the ultimate particality of studying philosophy on the basis that behavior is theoretically motivated: "after all, you can't practice practice, you can only practice theory." Unfortunately, this is not true. Most people do live unreflective lives, practicing practice, and, while all behavior can be theorized about, most behavior does not appear to be *derived* theoretically. The fact that the thinking types can theorize

about the hypothetical motives (that is, the implicit and nonconscious "reasons") which they frequently assume to underlie the actions of the intuitive or feeling types does not necessarily mean that the intuitive or feeling types are actually operating on the basis of unobserved theory.

4. Finally, I find Professor Jarrett's attempt to reconcile Zen (as construed by D.T. Suzuki) with Jung a trifle disconcerting. Even if Suzuki is correct in his identification of the four basic virtues of Zen Buddhism (which could generate a ten hour debate all by itself, since Zen's concerns with conventional interpersonal ethics are secondary, to say the least), I fail to see exactly how Jarrett is defining "propriety" which he ultimately describes as both "fitness" and "temperance"—significantly different notions—or how he arrives at the dubious (if guarded) equation between Zen "wisdom" and the Platonic concept of the "diamonic." To view Zen, which rejects the conventional notion of autonomous selfhood (and conventional "self"-actualization) altogether, in favor of participation in an overarching cosmic "Self" which incorporates no less than everything—the absorption of the illusory self into the true Self of the absolute non-self of pure ongoing process—strikes me as a somewhat questionable enterprise.

In conclusion, Professor Jarrett's paper was interesting, challenging, and for the most part, well-done. He has presented a difficult and complicated position with a refreshingly straightforward approach. He makes many points that deserve further development—his comments about the significant differences in the moral stance taken by the introverts and the extraverts as well as by the thinking and felling types come immediately to mind as does his observation about the "esthetic" approach to ethics associated with the intuitive temperament. I look forward to his further work on these areas.

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1. Jarrett, James L., "What Passes for Morals?" Paper delivered at the Annual Philosophy of Education Society Meeting, Indianapolis, April, 1978, p. 9.

2. Ibid, p. 7.

3. Hall, Calvin S. and Gardner Lindsey. *Theories of Personality*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957, p. 96.

(Second Concurrent Session)

CHANGING THE CONCEPT OF CONCEPTUAL CHANGE

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I.

At the 1976 Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, Hugh Petrie called the attention of philosophers of education to "the largely ignored role of conceptual change in education."[1] He pointed out the strange fact that educators have dealt with learning, teaching and curriculum planning mostly without an adequate appreciation of conceptual change. More specifically, he argued for the understanding of that process in terms of Piagetian adaptation, and ultimately within the framework of an evolutionary epistemology. I shall not discuss here his second point, and I certainly agree with his first one. It is high time that more attention be paid to the phenomenon of conceptual change in its relation to teaching and education, especially from its more philosophical aspects.

The idea of conceptual change, indeed the very term, originated in its present version in the domain of the history and philosophy of science, and is readily associated with such names as Kuhn, Popper, and Toulmin, to cite only a few. It is from there that Petrie suggests that educationalists take their cues, even if belatedly.

In this paper I want to argue that there are some very significant differences between conceptual change as it has been understood in the last twenty years by historians and philosophers of science and conceptual change as it should be understood in educational contexts. To my mind, these differences put a serious question mark on the adequacy, for education, of the model of conceptual change in science. A few of these differences have been pointed out by Petrie himself. But, to my mind, he has not followed them far enough. I shall first analyse some of these differences; then, I shall enumerate some of the requisites that a model of conceptual change would have to meet for it to be a useful tool in educational thinking and research; and lastly, I shall briefly try to sketch the main lines of a possible model, alternative to the prevalent one based on the philosophy of science.

II.

We should note in the beginning that teachers, educators and educationalists are typically interested in conceptual change *in the individual.* That is to say, the educationalist is primarily concerned with understanding how the concept of, say, causation changes in the mind of Dick or Jane over a period of time, possibly with some external intentional help. He may find, for example, that the notion of causation slowly crystalizes round a voluntaristic and highly personalistic idea, and eventually changes, over a long period, if ever, to something more akin to the concept of a function. By contrast, the philosopher or historian of science looks at conceptual change *in the scientific community.* His typical question is, What makes this particular conceptual shift acceptable to this scientific community? Or, Why was the need for conceptual change felt at that particular time and not at another? Why, for example, was the heliocentric theory acceptable some time after Copernicus proposed it, but not when Aristarchus brought it up? The philosopher of science will be interested in the question why is it rational, if he thinks it is indeed rational, for the scientific community to exchange its current ideas for some set of new ones. This is not what the educationalist is interested in. He wants to determine the conditions of change in the individual mind, and in these, the psychological conditions figure prominently, even if not exclusively.

Further, the historian of science deals with changes that have occurred in the past, recent or remote, and specifically insofar as they are documented in scientific texts. Therefore, change as inquired into by historians and sociologists of science is typically *discrete*, i.e., it takes place by steps and jumps. Even if one does not subscribe to Kuhn's conception of the progress of science through a series of revolutions, and one rather postulates an evolutionary, continuous development, still the conceptual changes one typically deals with will have to be documented in scientific texts, and such texts are available only at specific junctures in the history of science.

Moreover, the model of conceptual change in science takes into account concepts which are, at least ideally, coherent, well-defined and distinct from one another. The concept of impetus and the concept of inertia are distinct from one another, and each of them is reasonably coherent. So are, for example, the concepts of combustion by loss of phlogiston and of combustion by oxidation. It is true that intermediate steps are often found. But it should also be noted that such intermediate steps are always attempts at partial systematization.

The kind of conceptual change which interests us in the educational context is not crystalized in texts. Educationalists have to assume the *possibility* of a *continuous* change in the way the individual mind grasps its concepts. Room must be left for a continuous slide from one concept into another, with a somewhat large, incoherent "gray zone" in between. And it is in that gray zone that much of the educator's interest lies. It may be proven true, empirically, that concepts do change in the individual mind by jumps from one "level" to another. Even so, at this stage, the weaker assumption of continuous change should be taken; for it is quite easy to describe discrete change by means of a continuous model, but the reverse may be very awkward and heuristically unrewarding.

Also, the change in the individual learner's mind does not occur from one well-defined concept, belonging to one conceptual scheme to another well-defined concept, belonging to another conceptual scheme. Rather, it is a slide from a confused and ill-defined concept into another, perhaps somewhat more coherent concept. The child does not parallel the progress of science, but goes on a course of his or her own. We may have had an intuitive notion of impetus not unlike the medieval one, but if we ever exchanged it totally or partially for a notion of inertia, it was not in the same ways and for the same reasons that the change came about in modern science. And whatever our naive notions about combustion were, they most probably were not much like the theory of phlogiston.

Lastly, there remains the question of the *rationality* of change. In philosophy of science this question looms large, as in the controversy between Kuhn and Popper. Is change in science merely a fortuitous affair, a purely sociological phenomenon, or is science intrinsically rational or evolutionary, and it is the "best" changes—in some sense of "best" yet to be specified—that are eventually accepted? In educational contexts the question takes a different turn. Philosophers of science may rightly be concerned with the problem of demarcation, tracing the line between what is and what is not science. But educationalists should, at first, take change as it comes. For them, *in the first stage*, the distinction between rational and irrational change is irrelevant. For a model of conceptual change to be useful for educational purposes, it should be able to handle any type of change in the conceptual set-up of the individual. That is to say, the model should afford a *description* of conceptual change that would be *neutral* in respect of rationality or irrationality.

But there is also a normative, more narrowly educational aspect of the problem, which should be kept apart, for our purposes, from the purely descriptive, psychological aspect. Educators typically want certain changes to occur, which they believe to be better, or more rational, than others. Here the question of the rationality of change reappears, at a higher level, but only after the phenomenon of change itself has been adequately described. In the beginning of the educational process, the role of the teacher as promoter of rational change is simplified by the fact that the goal of the change is given to him by the results of his discipline. Therefore, he directs his student's change of concepts to what is, at least for him, a foregone conclusion. Not so at the higher levels of education; but then the problem of the student merges with that of the teacher and of the scientist.

Let us summarize the requirements of a model of conceptual change for the use of the educationalist:

a. It should provide a description of conceptual change which would be neutral as between rational or irrational change. At the same time, the model should allow for an adequate demarcation of rational from irrational change, when this is needed.

b. It should allow description of change between ill-defined concepts, and not only between well-defined ones.

c. It should allow, at least in principle, the description of change as continuous, i.e., as a gradual "slide" between concepts.

d. It should be empirically applicable and heuristically fruitful.

I would like to draw attention to this last point, as often there seems to be an almost total lack of mutual communication between the philosopher and the cognitive psychologist, supposedly working in areas adjacent to each other. More usually it is the philosopher that will try to account *ex post factum* for the psychologist's practices. Only rarely will the cognitive psychologist be directly influenced by current work in the relevant branches of philosophy.

III.

At this point, an example of possible conceptual change in the individual student could help. At the same time, by means of the examples, I shall propose an approach for adequately dealing with this type of change.

Suppose a child who gradually learns about the square. In the process of learning, the child's concept of a square changes. That is, the relations between the concept "square" and other concepts such as "diagonal" or "rhomboid" change in his or her mind. Now, as I have remarked earlier, for the child, at that stage, the concept of a square is not clear and distinct, that is to say, well-defined. In other words, psychologically, the strength of the relations between "being a square" and, say, "having two equal diagonals" or "having four right angles" may vary. Similarly, two disjoint concepts, like "square" and "rhomboid," or "square" and "rectangle," may be run togehter in the child's mind, or kept apart only with difficulty. Moreover, in time, the relations between the concepts change, not only in that new relations are added which were not envisaged before, and others which were affirmed are recognized as erroneous, but especially in that *the relative strength* of already recognized relations changes. So, for example, the association will be strengthened between "being a square" and "having two equal diagonals," and that between "square" and "rhomboid" will, so we hope, be weakened (and eventually negated).

Now, this situation calls for the abandonment of standard two-valued logic in dealing with the phenomenon of conceptual change. Our common two-valued logic allows us to say that either a square is a rhomboid or a square is not a rhomboid. But educational honesty requires us to acknowledge that teachers deal, most of their professional lives, with confused and ill-defined ideas. Under some circumstances, the student may recognize that a square is not a rhomboid, and under different circumstances, say if the square stands on one of its angles, he or she may fail to differentiate it from a rhomboid. In this case, however, we could still make do with traditional logic plus some ad hoc arrangements. But, further, the student may be inconsistent, i.e., he or she may react differently to the same stimulus at different times. This too can be taken care of by standard tools with yet some more ad hoc apparatus. More important to my argument is the case of the student who, not uncharacteristically, shows different degrees of assurance about the various relations between the concepts considered. Thus, he probably will be quite positive that a square has two diagonals, but he may be a bit wobbly on the equality of those diagonals or on the relation of the diagonal to the side. Similarly, he will be pretty sure that a whale is a mammal, but he may take some time making up his mind whether or not it has warm blood.

What I've been driving up to is essentially that, in order to give an adequate account of conceptual change in the individual, his concepts should be represented in such a way that their relative indeterminacy, fluidity and even inconsistency with each other are duly recognized. A logic which is too strict will not handle, say, the above example of the whale. In that example, the child may, indeed, hold contradictory beliefs, albeit without being aware of the contradiction. Moreover, for him, insofar as he does not see the contradiction, it is not true that everything follows from it, as our standard logic would have it. Rather, he would draw his own conclusions, at least for some time, as if the contradiction were not there. This is a situation with which every teacher is familiar.

An adequate logic and a good representational technique are important for the empirical value of any model of conceptual change. There are several approaches which may enable us to do justice to those aspects of the student's thinking which we have been discussing, and at the same time are logically and heuristically adequate. I shall propose two variations of what is in fact the same approach.

IV.

One variation makes use of L.A. Zadeh's "fuzzy sets."[2] As Zadeh defines it, "a fuzzy set is a class of objects with a continuum of grades of membership," ranging from 0 (complete exclusion and 1 (complete inclusion). On this model, standard sets are a limiting case of fuzzy sets, when the intermediate grades of membership are disregarded. The notion of a fuzzy set is clear enough intuitively, and there is no need to elaborate its technicalities. It can be easily seen that if concepts are understood on the analogy of fuzzy sets, the requirements set above for an adequate tool for the description of conceptual change in the individual are met. It is only an analogy because the main relation is not that of inclusion in a set but that between a "core-concept," say, 'square' and the concepts related to it, say, 'having four sides,' etc. The relations between the concepts can be represented as stronger or weaker along a continuum, and a definite numerical value can be ascribed to the strength of the relation, if needed. The question of measurement of the strength of these relations is one for which cognitive psychologists have the necessary tools. A discussion of such methods of measurement would be out of place here.[3]

The other variation is based on the representation of the relative strength of the relations between concepts as distances in a (geometrical) space. Let the concept of square be a point in a space; and let the related concepts, or those which are apprehended by the individual as related, such as having four (equal) sides, having two (equal) diagonals, etc., be so many different points in that same space; and, finally, let the distance between any two points be inversely proportional to the strength of the relation between the concepts they represent.

We could, for example, have the following "conceptual map" of a hypothetical five-year-old's idea of a square: (for simplicity's sake, I shall consider only the distances between 'square' and its related concepts and ignore the distances of the related concepts between themselves.)



Now it is possible to express the change that takes place in the individual's conceptual set-up as a shift between two "conceptual maps," taken at any two points in the individual's biography. Here is the hypothetical map of an eight-year-old's idea of a square:



Note that the concepts in question can be represented as coherently or incoherently as it happens to be the case, and that change can be presumed continuous or discontinuous. Both are empirical questions which should not be prejudged by the model itself.

V.

Two short final notes on questions of basic philosophical position:

Some may prefer to give up speaking about conceptual change, and would rather speak of change in the meaning of the *terms*. So, for the five-year-old the term "square" means something, for the eight-year-old it has come to mean something else. I do not think this is an adequate analysis of what happens. But I do not think either that this matters very much for the present argument. The argument can be easily recast in another terminology.

The second remark has to do with the distinction between changing concepts and changing beliefs. The examples I have given are all examples of changing concepts by some sort of restructuring of the individual's conceptual set-up, not of changing beliefs by simple accretion of new information. Obviously, to maintain this distinction, one would have to have some such differentiation as between essential and nonessential properties. This seems to me to be inevitable. If one does not agree with me on this point, then perhaps part of what I said will be unacceptable too. On the other hand, one should not suppose that the child has to be aware of this distinction for conceptual change to occur. On the contrary, it is against the background of the phenomenon of conceptual change that we gradually become aware of this distinction.[4]

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1. Hugh G. Petrie, "Evolutionary Rationality: Or Can Learning Theory Survive in the Jungle of Conceptual Change?" *Philosophy of Education 1976: Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*, pp. 117-132. See also D.C. Phillips, "Response to Petrie," ibid., pp. 133-140.

2. L.A. Zadeh, "Fuzzy Sets," *Information and Control*, 8 (1965): 338-53. Quine's concept of a "quality space" is also useful in this context. See his *Word and Object* (Cambridge, Ma., 1960) Sec. 17.

3. See, e.g., Robert E. Warren, "Association, Directionality, and Stimulus Encoding," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 102 (1974): 151-58.

4. I have greatly profited from discussions with Yaacov Kareev, Israel Scheffler, and Robert Nozick.

Response to Scolnicov

ON THE NATURE OF CONCEPTUAL CHANGE

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By its very nature, philosophy of education is a risky business. On the one hand we may undertake the examination of important educational issues without adequate philosophical equipment and thus end up confirming personal or partisan views. On the other hand we may be so taken by impressive but still unclear and controversial ideas in a nearby area of philosophy that we may employ them inappropriately in our study of educational phenomena. The latter is what Scolnicov is guilty of in his reply to Petrie.

Professor Scolnicov[1] has argued correctly that Petrie's[2] claim that there is a close parallel between the general growth of human knowledge and the educational development of the individual is unwarranted. Nevertheless he, like Petrie, continues to talk about "conceptual change" and offers his own model which is supposed to be a more adequate account of what the rest of us call "learning a concept" and some psychologists still refer to as "concept formation." I want to argue that all this talk about "conceptual change" in education is an unwarranted transposition of current talk in the history and philosophy of science and that it is vague, obfuscating and misleading in important ways.

The biggest problem with this new talk about "conceptual change" is that it is not clear what is being talked about—once again language seems to have gone on holiday. The whole talk is couched entirely in metaphorical language. Petrie's metaphors were all biological in their origin ("adaptiveness", "assimilation", "accommodation"), while Scolnicov's metaphors are primarily visual ("fuzzy sets", "continuous" or "gradual slide from one concept into another" with "gray zone in between"). But uninterpreted metaphorical talk is of very little use. Even worse, if a metaphor is explained in terms of further metaphors then the whole talk becomes deceptive and dangerous; we may be under the impression that we are saying something important when in fact our talk rotates idly. Consider Scolnicov's "example of possible conceptual change in the individual student." "Take a child," Scolnicov says, "who gradually learns about the square. In the process of learning, the child's concept of square changes: that is, the relations between the concept 'square' and other concepts such as 'diagonal' or 'rhomboid' change in his or her mind."

However, Scolnicov's explanation of this process of change is not very informative because it is again stated in metaphorical language. The clarity and distinctness of the concept of square, for example, depends on the psychological "strength" between being a square and having two equal diagonals or four right angles. If that relationship "weakens" then the result is a confused and ill-defined concept of square. I would like to ask Professor Scolnicov why is this "explanation" more informative than the explanation of the phenomenon of sleepiness as being due to the abundance of somniferous substance in the body? Is not this talk about conceptual change another one of those "lumps that our understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language"?[3]

Let us then try to tell the real story from the beginning in order to bring this vacuous metaphorical talk about conceptual change back to its actual home. By the time young children come to school they have learned several uses of the word "square," all proper. If they live on a ranch they know what square bales of hay look like and how they differ from round bales. If their father says "fetch me that square, please", they know which tool to get. Later they learn what a square piece of land or cloth is, and they resent it when they are called "square". Now, during their time in school or as a result of watching Seasame Street, children come to learn about the square as a plane figure having four equal sides and four right angles. What would it mean to say that when a child comes to refer to all plane figures with four sides as squares, his concept of square is "confused" or "ill-defined"? Is it not more proper to say that given that child's purposes and the contexts in which he uses the word, his notion of square is as clear and proper as it should be? Unless one is wearing some kind of metaphysical blinders I cannot see how one can argue that somehow this or any other use of the word square is epistemologically or ontologically inferior to the notion of square in geometry books.

When the circumstances require that the child learn the notion of square in geometry then he will have to make further distinctions. In the process of doing so he will have to become clearer and more explicit about the criteria for a figure being a square or about the necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the term (although he does not have to learn the terms "criterion", "necessary", and "sufficient"). Without learning these notions, *in some sense*, he will not be able to learn the concept of square or any other concept for that matter.

If my story about the legitimacy of the various uses of the word "square" and the necessity for recognizing criteria or necessary and sufficient conditions for its various uses is correct—as I believe that it is—then we can dispense with all this colorful talk about "gray zones," "continuous slides from one concept to another," and "shifts between two conceptual maps" as unnecessary primitive psychologizing. Whatever family resemblances there are among the various uses of the word "square" they are not due to "gray zones," "slides," or "shifts" (whatever these terms mean!), but to their logical public character.

I have not been able to find a clear and explicit account of the causes of "conceptual change" in the individual child in Scolnicov's model. However, his repeated references to children's concepts as being "confused and illdefined," "not clear and distinct," indeterminate, fluid, and inconsistent suggest some kind of Platonic epistemology as well as a corresponding innate hierarchical conceptual development in each child—the child's concepts are initially ill-defined and confused but as he matures intellectually his concepts become well-defined and clearer. This view appears attractive but it is certainly false. The young child does not confront the world like a preprogrammed lonely Cartesian homunculus. It is in fact a truism that some form of social life is a necessary condition for the human development of any individual. It is that social life, with its institutions, rules, customs, goals, feelings, emotions, values, language, etc., that puts children in the way of learning a multitude of things. Any theory of human development (including conceptual development) that does not take into consideration the character of the world that the young are about to inherit is seriously lacking, to say the least.

The role of the human environment for the development of the child varies with the age of the child, with the object of learning and the circumstances. During early life, for example, parents and other persons provide the foundations for the child's growth with

> . . .a constant respect for feelings, care, love, and so on, which elicit responses from the child which are, if not the same, at any rate appropriate to the situation. . . .Early learning is very much a function of personal relationships that exist between the child and other human beings: without this or something like it, it is difficult to see how learning could go on at all, let alone make much progress. . .
>
> One would expect early learning to consist of a slow sorting out of categories and distinctions and the gradual acquisition of general principles. The application of these distinctions and principles to cases, even to new and previously unforeseen cases, might well be sudden and quick. . .In the case of late learning factors concerned with personal relationships may enter the scene as providing motivation or the reverse, insight or the reverse, but they are not a condition of learning taking place at all."[4]

Conceptual development, which begins with these first broad categories and distinctions, is possible to the extent that the young person gets initiated into his complex intellectual heritage. Without it he would have no chance of acquiring new concepts, and enriching his mind. The character of that heritage therefore influences the child's conceptual development to a large extent. And yet, Scolnicov wants to take that development "as it comes" and promises that his model would "afford a *description* of conceptual change that would be *neutral* in respect to rationality or irrationality." He talks as if rationality were a mere option for human beings that could be given up at will. One wonders what kind of conceptual changes could occur in a social vacuum and how one would identify and describe them neutrally. As we saw earlier, all the talk about stronger or weaker relationships between concepts can either be understood as metaphorical talk about necessary and sufficient conditions or criteria for the application of a term, or it does not make sense—let alone have heuristic value.

Perhaps I can illustrate all this by referring briefly to Piaget's famous "conservation studies" which were concerned with the child's understanding of such general principles as the conservation of matter, size and weight. What reason could we possibly have for believing that children should have an *a priori* appreciation of these concepts or that the order of their learning such concepts could disregard their complexity and abstractness?

"The principle of invariance," says Barbel Inhelder, "is no *a priori* datum of the mind . . . Grasping the idea of invariance is beset with difficulties for the child, often unsuspected by teachers."[5]

An example that shows the child's lack of appreciation of the principle of invariance is when we transfer liquid of a specific color from a wide transparent container into another one which is tall and narrow. Young children, at a certain age, believe that there is more liquid in the tall receptacle than the flat one. When one thinks that the notion of volume is a more complex one than the notion of height then the mystery disappears and the child's thinking once again appears perfectly rational. It would indeed be logically puzzling if young children seemed to have an appreciation of the notion of volume before understanding the concept of depth or length. This simple example shows also the way we must go about teaching young children such concepts.

As Hamlyn put it: "There is no short cut, but that certain things must come before others in any process of this sort is a matter of logical necessity of a kind."[6]

I find it very difficult to see how this metaphorical talk about "conceptual change" can help us to understand conceptual development in children better. What I fear is that if it continues to be taken seriously it may draw our attention away from the continuous examination of the character and worthwhileness of the world into which the young people are initiated.

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1. Samuel Scolnicov, "Changing the Concept of Conceptual Change".

2. Hugh G. Petrie, "Evolutionary Rationality: Or Can Learning Theory Survive in the Jungle of Conceptual Change?" *Philosophy of Education, 1976: Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*, pp. 117-32. See also D.C. Phillips, "Response to Petrie", *Ibid.*, pp. 133-40.

3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), No. 119.

4. D.W. Hamlyn, "Human Learning" in R.S. Peters (ed.) *The Philosophy of Education*, (Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 190-91.

5. Barbel Inhelder quoted by Jerome S. Bruner, *The Process of Education*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 41. See also discussion by D.W. Hamlyn "The Logical and Psychological Aspects of Learning" in R.S. Peters (ed.), *The Concept of Education*. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967).

6. Hamlyn "The Logical and Psychological . . .", p. 35.

(Third Concurrent Session)

EDUCATIONAL INQUIRY SUPPORTS ITS OWN "FOUNDATIONS"*

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I.

The following solution to "the trouble with U.S. high schools" was advocated in a recent letter to *Time* magazine: "abolish all 'education' departments, shoot all 'doctors of education', and fire any high school teacher with an education major instead of a major in an academic subject."[1] Looking past the hyperbole and past the apparent assumption that departments of education should study only schooling, this letter displays an unfortunately frequent approach to educational issues. This approach is explicitly endorsed by many theorists and also more subtly reflected in many educational programs, and it involves the assumption that there are *foundations* of education.

These "foundational" approaches to education all seize on some body of thought which is believed to be less problematical or more basic than educational thought itself, and then attempts are made to draw educational implications from this more "solid ground." All the implications are assumed to run from the "foundational" thought to the educational thought; educational thought is not believed to carry significant implications for its "foundations." Architectural analogies are almost irresistable: a building *rests* on its *foundation* and the support runs in only one direction—from the bottom up. A finely engineered junction with its foundation may maximize a building's stability, but the ultimate limits of support are set up by the nature of its foundation

The pervasiveness of this "foundational" approach to education will not be examined here. However, I believe that Dewey was correct when he claimed that educators have usually seized on something in collective adult knowledge (e.g., the disciplines, the "great books", or the "forms of knowledge") or something believed to be part of each individual (e.g., a person's desires or a naturally unfolding psyche) as the basis of educational thought. Once one of these "bases" of educational thought, most commonly the academic disciplines in our present schools,[2] has been used to derive the basic aims and content of the curriculum, then certain disciplines such as sociology or psychology are used to "simplify" or select from these aims and content in order to achieve optimal instruction of students with particular abilities or backgrounds.

Since these are sociological and psychological factors which are studied to help pitch the curriculum appropriately to individual children, this step in curriculum design does not require any more uniquely *educational* expertise than did the first step of deriving the basic standards. Indeed, many psychologists and sociologists of education who implicitly endorse a "foundational" view say that the best work in their fields of study is done by "pure" psychologists and sociologists. As the above letter to *Time* indicates, and as James B. Conant and others have said in more measured tones, this leaves little room for *educational* studies. Apart from methodological technicians whose job it is to implement various educational programs in schools and other institutions, we require only experts in the "subject matter areas" to devise curricular ideals, and then social scientists to "adapt" these ideals to individuals of various abilities and circumstances.

We are all quite familiar with one consequence of this "foundational" view of education, and that consequence is a professional identity crisis within the field of educational studies. As part of this field, philosophers of education frequently experience this consequence of "foundational" thinking. Epistemological or ethical inquiry which falls squarely within the domain of general philosophy is said to provide the accounts of knowledge and morality from which educational implications must be drawn, and hence the study of the philosophical "foundations" of education falls squarely within the domain of general philosophy. No consolation is provided when other areas of general philosophy are argued to be essential as well as epistemology and ethics. Except for the analysis of a few specifically educational concepts and the relatively routine task of drawing out the implications of these philosophical "foundations," there is little which is unique to philosophy *of education*. I suspect that this is behind the frequent complaints by general philosophy departments that some people within colleges of education are trespassing, and also behind the lack of much serious attention paid to specifically *educational* issues by these same general philosophy departments.

These undesirable consequences of "foundational" approaches to education will not be discussed in this paper, and have been mentioned only to suggest part of the significance of that which will be discussed. The more important part of this paper's significance resides in whatever claim it has to correctly depicting the nature of educational inquiry. The steps this paper takes toward this correct depiction will undermine the idea that educational studies *rest* on a set of philosophical, disciplinary, or other *bases*. Philosophy and the academic disciplines sometimes aid educational thought, but it will be argued here that educational thought can warrant changes in philosophy and the disciplines. The implications run *both* ways, and none of these areas of inquiry is in a *foundational* position. This indicates these professional identity crises in educational studies are unwarranted, to say the least. In some respects, this paper heads in directions taken by other papers which comprise part of the extensive treatment of the autonomy of educational inquiry and the nature of philosophy of education. However, I hope that the argument here goes to the heart of matters in a way which does not simply duplicate previous work.[3]

This paper will start with two ideas which are usually granted important roles in educational inquiry: objectivity and neutrality. It is argued that not only are sound judgments about objectivity and neutrality necessary for educational inquiry, but also that educational inquiry is necessary for making sound judgments regarding objectivity and neutrality. This *inter*dependence between objectivity and neutrality judgments on the one hand, and educational inquiry on the other hand, indicates that any so-called "foundation" of education which utilizes objectivity or neutrality judgments could not actually serve in a foundational role. Given the ubiquitous nature of these objectivity and neutrality judgments, this effectively rules out all plausible candidates for the foundational position. General philosophy, then, supports *and* is supported by educational inquiry. As part of educational inquiry, philosophy of education cannot involve simply the drawing of educational implications from a more basic foundation of general philosophical work.

II.

After mentioning a few ways in which judgments about objectivity and neutrality are important in the sphere of academia, it will be asserted in this section of the paper that epistemological research indicates that judgment about objectivity must utilize a prior commitment to the significance of certain activities. This epistemological position seems to raise a threat of objectionable "subjectivism" or "relativism," but this threat will not be addressed until the next section of the paper.

The full thrust of the following comments about objectivity can be fully appreciated only in light of some rather specialized work in philosophy of science and epistemology, but the issues are significantly familiar to anyone who has spent time worrying about academic policy. For example, W.L. Weinstein has discussed some of the ways in which a neutral admissions policy in a university requires an objective assessment of academic ability and mastery of subject matter. This ability and mastery must be understood in terms of qualities such as relevance, coherence, critical awareness, and accuracy, however, and Weinstein has noticed significant differences among Liberals, Marxists, and others when it comes to judging these basic qualities. How then is a university policy to be developed which is neutral with respect to these different modes of inquiry? Andrew Graham has discussed a similar problem involving the need for impartial university research. Such research is essentially undistorted and objective, but Graham believes a problem immediately arises because what counts as distortion varies with theoretical viewpoint. As an economist, Graham cites some of the problems which he might face after being admonished to reveal only "the facts."

Graham considers the task of giving the present level of unemployment in the country. This is indeed about as basic a fact as can be found in economics, and yet different theoretical perspecitives yield different meanings for "unemployment," and different purposes for asking can result in different determinations of the fact from within the same theoretical perspective. If the purpose behind seeking this fact involves ascertaining *waste* of human talent, and if laws regarding school-leaving age, mandatory retirement, or minimum wage are seen as *legitimate*, then people not working because of these laws will be excluded from the ranks of the unemployed. Their talent would not be seen as *wasted*, and they are not therefore to be counted among the unemployed. If the purpose behind the inquiry is to determine how many of those who *want* to work are working, then our determination will turn on our view of human wanting and actions based upon it. Liberals and Marxists are likely to disagree about whether persons who act out of desires which have been shaped by, say, wage-labor or capitalistic social arrangements should be viewed as acting on their *own* wants. Here we have a question whose answer partially defines a Liberal or Marxist perspective: Is there alienated labor, and can it be pursued because of the worker's *own* desires? Various purposes and theories significantly affect very basic economic facts (to say nothing of the interpretation of those facts).[4]

Issues such as these raised by Weinstein and Graham cause considerable anguish among academicians, and they are highly illustrative for the purposes of this paper. However, it is research in epistemology and philosophy of science which reveals that they are not infrequent oddities, and that such problems cannot be avoided. This does *not* mean that this research undermines the intimate relationship between objectivity and truth, nor that it undermines the idea that truth must depend in some way upon actual states of affairs in the world. However, judgments about the truth of a statement must involve what we can *know* about the relationship of the statement to those states of affairs, and not simply what is *true* of the relationship.

Popper has neatly expressed the problem I wish to raise, although to use his particular formulation we must assume that conceptualization of the relationship between a statement and some actual state of affairs is best given in terms of a semantic "correspondence." Popper writes, "Although it needed the genius of Tarski to make it clear, it has by now indeed become perfectly clear that, if we want to speak about the correspondence of a statement to a fact, we need a meta-language in which we can *state* the fact (or the alleged fact) about which the statement speaks, and in addition can also speak about this statement in question (by using some conventional or descriptive *name* of that statement)."[5] In other words, it is possible to give an unambiguous definition of what it means for a statement to be true, and yet this brings us no closer to knowing when we possess the truth than when we had the original object-language statement. The metalanguage, and our knowledge of the isomorphism between it and the statement of fact it represents, will be subject to the same limitations as those of the original object-language and our knowledge of its relationship to reality.

Semantic "correspondence" is not the only way in which to depict the relationship between statements of fact and reality, and statements are not the only possible representational devices. But regardless of how the relationship between reality and our representations of it is depicted, there is a large body of research which indicates important limits about what we can know about the relationship. Perhaps the most well-known and widely accepted portion of this work indicates that our observation and other sensory apprehension of reality always involves the distinctions and other artifacts of some representational system. This alone would make the problem indicated by the previous quotation from Popper a significant one, but the case is tightened by work on the nature of reference which indicates that reference must be a part of a more comprehensive and socially constructed system of representation. If we can know only what we observe and refer to through our system of representation, Popper has indeed raised a serious problem.

There are certainly many disagreements within philosophy of science and epistemology, but it is probably accurate to say that the currently dominant problem is to arrive at a method for choosing among representations of reality. This is the issue, whether couched specifically in terms of intertheoretic reduction, commensurability of paradigms, or progress in scientific inquiry. It is an issue of considerable complexity in the literature only because there is wide acceptance of the basic assumption of this paper. Observation and reference are always parts of a system of representation, and inseparable from the rest of that system, and therefore when we are involved in a conflict among representational systems, neither observation nor reference can provide the grounds for settlement of the dispute. The dominant assumption of this paper may be stated as follows: *There may be only one reality, but we construct many different representations of it, and our choice among these representations must be made without comparing them to unrepresented reality, or reality "itself."*

It's not unusual to find people who seem to accept this dominant assumption and yet do not see that it raises *fundamental* problems for judgments about objectivity. Perhaps Alan Montefiore is a case in point. He grants that the most basic categories which we bring to any situation "rest on" and "derive from" our previous experience, and that the idea of neutral and nonevaluative facts is "another illusion." Montefiore is generally sympathetic with the above assumption, then, and yet he indicates that we can still *strive* for objectivity by being "open-minded," which means being aware that there may be new facts to be discovered or old facts which are more relevant than heretofore thought. He also recommends that we should proceed by "checking" that our theory or report "is as faithful as possible to the reality that the theory or report is about," thus guarding against "distortion."[6]

These are common recommendations, but they are not helpful given our assumption that we cannot know what parts of our representation systems involve reality itself. Statements of facts often vary from theory to theory, and we cannot know when statements of facts and facts are related except by appeal to theory. Since the statements of fact within any theory are as much a part of the representation system as any other part, the very idea that objectivity is centrally related to these statements is questionable. Admonitions to check whether a report is "faithful" to reality and lacking in "distortion" also provide no actual guidance to people such as Weinstein and Graham in the examples which opened this section. If we cannot gain access to uninterpreted subject matter, then no useful meaning can be given to "faithful" or "distortion" which will solve their problems.

These comments may seem silly in light of the undeniable fact that there are cases which nobody can sincerely deny involve distortion or, conversely, faithfulness to reality. We can and do all agree on the distortion and the accuracy of certain representations of reality. However, neither truth nor objectivity is always served by our mutual feelings of certainty, and we cannot know when truth or objectivity is being served by checking these shared perceptions or beliefs against reality itself. When trying to evaluate two conflicting views, we cannot assume that we have an objective evaluation simply because the evaluation is based upon elements shared by each view.[7]

III.

In the previous section it was stated that neither objectivity nor striving toward objectivity can be described usefully in terms of comparisons between our representations of reality and reality itself. Statements of facts and names are parts of representational systems, and appeal to them can no more be known to be an appeal to reality itself than appeal to any other element within a representational system. An objection to this position might be made to the effect that it reduces objectivity to an essentially "subjective" or "relativistic" affair. If we never appeal to reality itself in these judgments about objectivity, so the objection might go, that leaves us with only an appeal to our previous judgments. The examples which began Section II of this paper indicated significant relationships between neutrality and objectivity in academia, and it is to the work on neutrality which we now turn for an answer to this objection regarding subjectivity.

Charles Taylor has argued that "'neutral' has *no unambiguous sense*" without a background of value-commitment. In the same book, Alan Montefiore has specified what this value-commitment must involve, arguing essentially the same line taken by Robert Ennis over a decade ago. These men hold that neutrality is basically non-intervention in other people's conflicts, and that what is to count as non-intervention depends upon judgments about how the conflict *ought* to run. We must believe, for example, that certain people and not others ought to affect the outcome in order to say that a particular person has *intervened* in the conflict rather than simply acted as *part* of the conflict.[8]

The clearest specifications of how a conflict should run are probably found in sports or other games, but even in these cases neutrality cannot be specified simply in terms of the rules which constitute the game. It is often judgments about how the rules should be *applied* which are accused of being non-neutral, and furthermore, rules must sometimes be modified in order to preserve the game in light of newly developed techniques or equipment and these rule-changes are sometimes accused of being non-neutral. For example, permitting special footwear for football field-goal kickers may be said to favor those teams with soccer-style kickers. To say this is a non-neutral rule-change one must be committed to the view that a team's possession of a soccer-style kicker should not be a factor in winning or losing a game.

Situations in "real life" are seldom games which are neatly circumscribed by a set of *stated* rules, but this does not rob these sports examples of their basic thrust: neutrality judgments require a prior value commitment which extends beyond a commitment to a set of stated rules describing how the conflict in question should be conducted. Taylor has said that whether in a game or in a moral dilemma, any question of neutrality makes sense only when there is a larger "background of overriding common commitment." A few pages later in the same book, Weinstein expresses a similar view, saying that it makes no sense to speak of a university being "neutral in the defence of its essential interests." Unless we had some idea regarding how a university ought to conduct itself, we could not speak of neutrality within a university, and hence to give up that vision of a university's essential interests is to give up the possibility of talking about neutrality within the university.[9]

In neutrality discussions we can sometimes appeal to the rules which state how the conflict is supposed to be conducted, but since the neutrality of those rules can always be challenged, the ultimate court of appeal is the purpose behind the rules or the *point* of the whole activity. If the game's basic purpose, for example, is to promote a certain kind of enjoyment or entertainment, then decisions about changing the proper conduct of the game can be made on the basis of how well these purposes will continue to be fostered under the new rules.

A charge of ethical "relativism" might be leveled against this position in exactly the same manner as a charge of epistemological "relativism" might be leveled against the previous position regarding objectivity. Judgments about neutrality (as well as related judgments about impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness) are a significant portion of ethical judgment, and it has been claimed here that neutrality judgments depend upon logically prior value commitments. It was claimed earlier that objectivity judgments are always based upon a commitment to some representational system, but it is precisely the objectivity of various representational systems which is so often a serious concern.

This work on neutrality suggests a first step to take when an objective judgment is desired and several different systems of representation—perhaps several different theories—are involved. As in the case of neutrality, we may appeal to a basic point or purpose behind a tradition of representation which spans the variations under consideration. Toulmin has discussed this approach in some detail, but it is enough here to notice that even though these "intellectual ideals" and "explanatory ambitions" of science are not expressible apart from actual theories and investigation, they nonetheless have a wider background and greater history than any given system of statements which momentarily represents some theory or part of a theory.[10] When we appeal to the "certain kind of enjoyment or entertainment" which is the point or purpose of some athletic game, we can use other related sports as well as that particular sport's whole history to express just what we mean.

Why is this kind of approach not objectionably subjectivistic or relativistic? First, neither individuals nor groups can just "make up" an activity's history. When appeal is made to the point or purpose behind some activity, the appeal is to a part of that activity's history as it has actually unfolded. We are able as individuals and as groups to develop a number of games or coherent systems of representation, and our selections from among these options are the result of "a sequence of interlocking choices none of which, in the actual context of decision, could have been taken differently except at a certain price." These are seldom conscious decisions, but more usually decisions implicit in the process of changes in our activities and our concepts. The process can be evaluated as a series of decisions, enabling us to see what purposes our representations serve. We can see the kinds of changes which preserve the significance of certain activities, and we can see what activities would likely be sacrificed by a change in representational method.[11] The point of any particular activity, whether it is simply a game or a portion of scientific research, is not simply a "matter of opinion" nor is it something which can be legislated at a particular moment by any individual or group.

If an individual or group cannot simply "make up" the history behind some activity, can they nonetheless decide at any given instant whether or not to continue an allegiance to the point or purpose behind an activity which the activity's history reveals? No, because individuals and groups are never in a position to determine completely what methods of representation they find significant. To borrow a term from Dewey which he used to make a very similar point, no individual or group can escape the "continuum of inquiry."[12] Representations must be created from intellectual materials and physical instruments made available by previous inquiry, and the problems which such representations can help to solve are only felt problems because our intellectual histories enable us to feel them.

The foregoing considerations show that neutrality and objectivity judgments need not be "relative" to a moment's decision (much less a moment's whim) made by any group or individual person; the history of an activity and allegiance to the purposes behind an activity take longer than that to develop. Does this mean, however, that neutrality judgments are relative to any values which just happen to be held by individuals or groups through longer periods in history? No, because values don't "just happen" to develop. There are physical, psychological, and social factors which explain the development of attitudes, aims, and other value allegiances, and these factors are in various ways beyond the power of individuals and groups to change. For example, we cannot develop commitments to games or representational activities which human beings cannot play because of physical or mental inability. There may be sequential processes in cognitive change which we cannot now alter. Various types of group dynamics and power relations may in part determine how ideas change within a disciplinary "guild." Historians and sociologists of knowledge have revealed certain economic and political barriers to the production and dissemination of certain kinds of "games" or ideas. All these factors to some extent take the background for neutrality and objectivity judgments out of the hands of groups even when those groups have an extended existence through history.

There is yet another major factor which takes part of the bases for neutrality and objectivity judgments out of the hands of individuals and groups, both at any given time and also through history. Although this paper assumes that we know the nature of reality only through our representations of it, we nonetheless must develop our representations *in* reality. Donald Campbell and Karl Popper have suggested that this type of limitation can be conceptualized as an "editing" effect upon our representations of reality. Although we cannot appeal directly to reality in evaluating our representations of it, reality nonetheless may affect our representations because they are developed as we act under the constraints imposed by it.[13]

By now it should be apparent that in discussing these aspects of neutrality and objectivity judgments, we have come full circle back to educational judgments. Neutrality and objectivity judgments can be saved from objectionable subjectivity only when careful attention is paid to the processes through which individuals and groups form allegiances to certain pursuits and representational systems. In short, we have been talking about paradigmatically educational concerns: the *development* of values and concepts in the minds of individuals and in groups. Furthermore, certain features of these processes indicate that a fairly sophisticated educational theory will be required in order that they be sufficiently understood for the purposes of making sound neutrality and objectivity judgments. As Dewey wrote when arguing for a comprehensive view of philosophy and philosophy of education which encompasses the position taken in this paper, "The educational point of view enables one to envisage the philosophical problems where they arise and thrive."[14]

Why is *educational* theory necessary for understanding these issues? First, even though the various factors that prevent neutrality and objectivity judgments from being entirely relative to individual desires are related to those factors which prevent these judgments from being entirely relative to group desires, there is still some *possible* deviation here between individuals and larger social groups. This indicates that we need guidance in deciding when this possible deviation is *desirable* or *permissible.* The extent to which activities and commitments to the point behind activities (and hence judgments about neutrality or objectivity) may vary from group to group and individual to individual is a complex issue in educational theory. As Robert Halstead and I recently argued, this issue cannot legitimately be bypassed by using the same schema to represent thought in individuals and in groups, nor by appeal to standards for publicly justified belief.[15]

Despite this divergence between individual and society which may sometimes be permissible, our previous discussion of objectivity and neutrality indicates that some of the limitations involved are social in nature, and hence we must also have some guidance in deciding what social activities and allegiances are desirable. At least one thing we will want to know here is to what extent these various social activities and commitments foster the intellectual and personal development of individual members of the society. We will want to know how compatible various aspects of the society are with education. We will want to know what kinds of values and understanding are being furthered by the various public activities in question.

Educational theory has the unique problem of conceptualizing the development of allegiances to activities, and hence the development of basic concepts such as those of neutrality and objectivity, and it must do this in a way which makes *evaluation* of various individual and social options possible. This is not the purely epistemic problem of defending an account of "optimal public inquiry," because as we have seen purposes of groups and individuals may legitimately differ and hence educational defenses of inquiry methods will have to be somewhat pluralistic.

On the other hand, this is not the traditional ethical problem of adjudicating among competing interests of different people, because education is concerned with the development of people who do not yet have any interests or allegiances.

For the sake of brevity, this paper has simplified or skipped a number of complex points. For example, the philosophical work which is so important to this paper, according to the paper's own conclusions, should itself be partially evaluated in terms of its socio-historical context, understood in part through an adequate educational theory. Since this has not been done here, our conclusions must be tentative. If the line taken here is even approximately correct, however, we can say that neutrality and objectivity are as dependent upon educational theory as the reverse. Our judgments about objectivity and neutrality are ultimately based upon our commitments to certain activities, not as they are constituted at any given time, but as they have maintained some significance or point through periods of social and personal change. We have choices, both as individuals and as groups, regarding these commitments, and hence our judgments about objectivity and neutrality are no sounder than are our choices regarding these commitments. Educational theory is required if these choices are to be sound ones. All the proposed "foundations" of education embody implicit or explicit judgments about objectivity and usually neutrality, too, and to this extent they depend upon an adequate educational theory for their full explication and defense.

It could be argued that we have come to at least part of Dewey's view of the nature of philosophy of education, and done so for many of Dewey's own reasons. There is an "intimate connection between philosophy and education", and philosophy of education is not "an external application of ready-made ideas to a system of practice having a radically different origin and purpose."[16] Good philosophy of education must be good *educational* thought, and whether or not this is compatible with good philosophical thought as defined by that professional "guild" is an open question. The answer to that question will depend a great deal upon just how seriously philosophy is willing to take educational issues.

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*Assistance well beyond what is normally sufficient for a co-author's byline has been provided by Robert Halstead, Hugh Petrie, and Suzanne Smither, and important advice from Graham Oliver and Richard Angelo has also been heeded. Each of these generous friends may be in disagreement with many parts of this paper, however.

1. *Time*, December 5, 1977, p. 7.

2. For a penetrating analysis of this kind of approach to the development of educational ideals, see Robert E. Roemer, "Forms of Inquiry at the University," *Philosophy of Education 1977: Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society* (Worcester, Massachusetts: Philosophy of Education Society, 1977), pp. 163-72. Roemer's emphasis on the importance of understanding the "human ecology" which shapes intellectual development in dividuals and in groups parallels the direction taken in this paper.

3. Much of this work is listed in Section F, Part I, of *Philosophy of Education: An Organization of Topics and Selected Sources*, ed. H.S. Broudy, M.J. Parsons, I.A. Snook, and R.D. Szoke (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967), pp. 249-61.

4. Andrew Graham, "Impartiality and Bias in Economics," and W.L. Weinstein, "The Academic and the Political," in *Neutrality and Impartiality: The University and Political Commitment*, ed. Alan Montefiore (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 50-54, 175-82.

5. Karl Popper, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 46.

6. Alan Montefiore, "Objectivity, Impartiality and Open-mindedness" and "Kolakowski," in *Neutrality and Impartiality*, ed. Montefiore, pp. 18-21, 211-15.

7. Kai Nielsen makes this point using an example involving a debate between Schlessinger and Chomsky. An objective evaluation of this liberal-radical dispute is not made possible by the existence of a set of facts upon which both sides agree. The shared facts are themselves representations of reality and so we are still left without a comparison between the positions and anything which can be used to ascertain their accuracy. Kai Nielsen, "Social Science and American Foreign Policy," in *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs: Essays edited for the Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs*, ed. Held, Morgenbesser and Nagel (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 286-319.

8. Robert H. Ennis, "Is It Impossible for the Schools To Be Neutral?" in *Language and Concepts in Education*, ed. B. Othanel Smith and Robert H. Ennis (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1961), pp. 102-111; Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in the University," and Alan Montefiore, "Kolakowski," in *Neutrality and Impartiality*, ed. Montefiore, pp. 128, 221-22.

9. Taylor, Neutrality," and Weinstein, "The Academic," in *Neutrality and Impartiality*, ed. Montefiore, pp. 130-32, 165-66.

10. Stephen Toulmin, *Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts* (Princeton: Princeton Unviersity Press, 1972), pp. 149-55, 173-75, 378-80.

11. Stephen E. Toulmin, "From Logical Analysis to Conceptual History," in *The Legacy of Logical Positivism*, ed. Peter Achinstein and Stephen F. Barker (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 48.

12. John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1938), especially pp. 140, 245-263, 311, 489-490.

13. Donald T. Campbell, "Evolutionary Epistemology," and Karl Popper, "Replies to My Critics—Campbell on the Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge," in *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, ed. P.A. Schlipp, Vol. 14, I and II, *The Library of Living Philosophers* (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974).

14. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1916), p. 328.

15. Robert Halstead, "Cognitive Structures and Forms of Knowledge," and Ralph C. Page, "Reasonable Beliefs and Personal Points of View," in *Philosophy of Education 1977: Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society* (Worcester, Massachusetts: Philosophy of Education Society, 1977), pp. 203-214, 257-67.

16. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 328, 331.

(Third Concurrent Session)

CREATIVITY REVISITED

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The writer who presumes to add yet another monograph to any well-trodden subject must, at the very least, feel formally obliged, or so it would appear, to absolve himself of his presumption by doing at least two things. First he must apologize for making the addition—no repentance necessarily implied—and second, something akin to a puzzle, he must justify the addition. I will promptly accomplish the former, since—and I'm here indebted to the performativists—the act of apologizing is merely a matter of employing language performatively.[1] As for the latter, it is hoped that its requirements are convincingly met by the claim developed and argued for in this essay. So, I apologize for the addition, and I now attempt its justification.

This essay is on creativity. Its writing has been occasioned partly by the stubborn conceptual haze which, in spite of perennial claims to its being rather central to educational discourse, as yet troubles the concept, and partly by a concern provoked by the lively interest manifested in it nowadays by practically all who have to do with schools. In this latter respect, it takes particular note of those who feel the need to address themselves whether explicitly or implicitly to matters involving normative criteria in regard to curricular matters and matters of instruction.

The notion creativity is, admittedly, a very puzzling one—much easier to employ than it is to justify its employment. What, for example, are we really saying when we say that a certain so and so is creative, is being taught to be creative or can be creative if he chose to be? Or, more adequately, what *ought* we severally to mean in order to claim properly that a certain so and so *is* creative, is being *taught* to be creative, or *can be* creative if he chose to be? Is the notion creativity subject to any clear-cut criterial test?

In this essay, I will argue, among other things, (1) that the view that the notion creativity entails uniqueness is mistaken,[2] and (2) that the view that "creative" describes only certain kinds of public products which are necessarily predicated on an understanding of certain relevant rules is also mistaken.[3]

I will propose, on the contrary, that the claim that "P is creative," understood in part to mean, P originated something, presupposes some specific universe of reference as the crucial warrant for the justification of the use of the term creative, and especially so for making sense of the notion of newness and originality which the term entails.

It is assumed in this essay that when we inquire into the meaning of a concept we are inquiring into specific sorts of things. That is to say, when we inquire into the meaning of any given concept, say "X", we are not seeking an opinion poll, at least not in any ordinary sense, regarding how any assortment of individuals choose, for whatever reason, to use the concept X. On the contrary, as Thomas Green urges, we are inquiring after the rule for the use of the concept in question, the notion concept being taken to mean the range or locus of inferences permitted by the various uses of that term.[4] It should accordingly be possible, that is, on the premise just stated, to distinguish on logical and other grounds between one concept and another, or to speak sensibly of a contrasting opposite,[5] that is to say, of that which instantiates as opposed to that which clearly does not instantiate a given concept, all of which is irreparably stultified if a concept were taken to mean precisely what anybody chose it to mean, no more and no less.[6] In fact, an oddity develops if such were not the case. For if everything, say, were creative, there would be little point in noting that a particular thing was.

If therefore we allow, as it appears we must, that the notion of a concept entails certain limiting constraints, we cannot but take issue with Sprecher's proposal—in his "A Proposal for Identifying the Meaning of Creativity"—for identifying the meaning of the concept creativity when he urges:

> We need not assume a universal meaning for the term 'creativity.' Since human beings assign meaning to the term, they may well choose not to agree; it is not necessary that they should always agree, but

> only that they should know how and to what extent they disagree. What I propose is that we study the variety of meanings which in practice are assigned to the term rather than attempt to discover some ultimate meaning. If we can get people to be precise about what they mean by creativity, we can learn to live with any discovered disagreement.[7]

There is a great deal of truth in the contention that meanings are assigned by users of language. Few would want to urge that meanings are *a priori* given, or that in speaking of the meaning of a term we are searching for hidden essences or some noumenal something. But it is a bit much to reason that the denial of *a priori* or essential meaning entails the conclusion that locutions of the sort, "What is *the meaning* of such and such," can have no well-defined conceptual or logical limits, hence that to ask, "What is the meaning of any such and such" is tantamount to asking, "What are the meanings clearly assigned by any and everybody to such and such," the former intending precisely the latter. Sprecher's accommodation may have the dubious merit of promoting good human relations among users of identical sounding words, but even to such users, the deficits which accrue to communication in general and to action and expectations in schooling in particular become inadmissibly high. In investigating the meaning of the term creativity we must be after something like logical unpacking rather than apologetics.

In developing and defending the contentions made earlier in this essay, and in responding more fully to Sprecher's point of view, the following sections will, for the sake of convenience, look critically at Paul White's "Creativity and Education: A Philosophical Analysis."[8]

In launching his analysis, White presents four cases, each, according to him, presumed popularly to instantiate the concept creativity. In case 1, a girl at an infant school is given a pad of newsprint and a box of crayons and is left alone to draw whatever she pleases. In case 2, a twelve-year old boy is asked to write down as many uses of a brick as he can imagine. He accordingly produces a great number of unusual uses. In case 3, a primary school child, learning mathematics, is given certain data and is left to discover on its own the rule that explains them. Case 4 exhibits Dostoevski as novelist and Einstein as scientist.[9] White then argues that contrary to the contentions frequently found in educational writings that "the 'creative process' is at work," all that the four cases have in common is the application to each of the term creativity but with confusing consequences. He then, in Rylean fashion, proposes as his thesis that the term creative "picks out not something about a person's inner process, but about what he publicly produces," and this as he is guided by rules. White is careful to add the proviso that what the person produces conforms to criteria of value in one domain or another.

While White quite properly regards a concept to be limited in certain important ways, and that not any and every employment of it correctly instantiates it, I shall argue that his analysis is mistaken in at least two directions. First, I think he is mistaken in his, to all intents and purposes, exclusive emphasis on the "public products," and second in the kind of criterial and hence exaggerated emphasis he places on the contribution of rules, that is, the following of rules in his explication of the concept.

White seems to have been seduced by Ryle's ghost story into drawing an excessively sharp distinction between inner process and outer product, a distinction which he doubtlessly found logically difficult to maintain. When, for example, he assesses case 1 above not to be a genuine instance of creativity, it was not solely on the ground of the public product but, it would appear, on certain inner processes. An example would indicate what I mean. A is an artist of especial renown, B is a schoolboy of eight. A and B have never met and B knows nothing of A's works. A and B both paint pictures which are exhibited at the same art show, but the pictures carry numbers rather than the names of the painters. It happens that both A's and B's pieces (they exhibited one painting each) are unusual and though not looking exactly alike have a very great deal in common as if produced by the same person.

Now applying White's public-products test, if the piece submitted by A were judged creative, there is scarcely any reason ex hypothesi, why B's piece should not be similarly judged. But should a panel of judges assess both as being creative, White's objection immediately is that while A knew what he was doing by virtue of his knowledge of the rules of his discipline, B could scarcely be said to have known what he was doing, certainly not in A's sense and cannot properly be regarded as having been creative. In arguing this way, either White has discarded his public products test or is inconsistent. For White to concur with any creative assessment he must know who did the paintings, not merely that they were done independently and that they are unusual and original; and that does not seem to be a purely public test any more than "knowing that Q" is purely a public matter.

That is not to say, on the other hand, that creativity is essentially or primarily a matter of inner processes. This would be to commit no less a mistake. But it is to say that any procedure that seeks to account for creativity on the inner-outer dichotomy in the way in which White proposes in his thesis is only partly correct.

But perhaps by stressing the matter of "public products" White is making an essentially normative point. Perhaps he intends to emphasize the crucial function in creative assessment of some sort of objective, that is to say, intersubjective, test which products must unmitigatingly satisfy. For, he says, to judge someone creative is not to report on a peculiar type of cerebral process nor to make a global statement about him, but to declare that in some specific regard that someone has produced something adjudged to be creative by those competent to do so.

If this is what White, more or less, intends, as I am led to suspect, the position he holds is yet in need of significant repair. When we look at a work and competently judge that some person, say P, was creative, we do not take what we say to be materially equivalent to, "that work was or is creative." If that were the case, it should not particularly matter who originated it, or how it came about. But, as indicated above, White would take issue with this and insist on a roll call, perhaps rightly, to ascertain the origin. Hence what, it would appear, we in fact are saying when we judged P to be creative is that *by virtue of that work* we judge P to have been creative in some specific regard. And in doing so we are not merely locating an appropriate human body for distinction but pronouncing in some way on the quality of his thought in the specific regard in question. We are not merely attending to a public product, or for that matter, to a public process. We would just as well say of a bystander who truthfully said, "I had exactly that in mind but did not actually follow through with it," and whom we were disposed to believe, that he was in the relevant regard creative. It would hardly suffice for one to object that in this case our judgment is concerned solely with an utterance which was public. In making this point, it is not essential that we be able to monitor thought processes or set them in identifiable bundles.

I shall not attempt to write another chapter here on the mind-body problem. I merely say at this point that the philosophical behaviorism which White seems to have employed as his theoretical framework is at least amply challenged elsewhere.[10]

I turn now to the second direction in which I think Mr. White mistaken, that of the matter of rules. It is my contention that White's emphasis on the creator's attention to rules as critical in any instance of creativity is unwarrantably restrictive.

Regarding case 2 above, White tells us that the boy who proposed unusual uses of a brick not only had to know, for achievement pruposes, what a brick is and what its usual uses are, but also had to be guided in his imaginings by certain rules. "It is, presumably not open to him," he notes, "to put down *anything* as a use of a brick." Hence, he concludes, he has more in common with the creative artist and scientist in case 4 than with girl with the crayons in case 1. For, he tells us, "artistic or scientific creativeness involves an imaginative leap to a new perspective. This imaginative enterprise is guided by certain rules which differ from discipline to discipline."[11]

If I read White correctly, the notion rule is employed in his essay in a rather broad sense to include the relatively trivial matter of the boy's recognizing some connection between the use he proposes and the properties of the brick, and in a narrower, rather specialized sense to refer to the rules characteristic of a discipline. The second, narrower sense appears to be crucial to White's conception of genuine creativity since for him an understanding of such rules is presupposed by any one who has "produced something aesthetically and intellectually valuable."[12] And for White being regarded as "aesthetically and intellectually valuable" is the sine qua non of a genuine instance of creativity. It is not surprising, therefore, that White experiences no little difficulty in seeing the term creativity as any but an "adult" or quasi-aristocratic notion, so to speak, which could hardly, without serious attenuation, be applied to the products of children. Children simply are unlikely prospects for his creativity tests. In a typical passage White observes in regard to the case 1. girl's crayons vis-à-vis the adult artist:

> To say that both are producing something which is 'different from conventional expectations' obscures the fact that the adult artist is reacting against conventional standards, while the child clearly is

> not. Originality in the case of the adult has written into it this intention—to produce something different—which in its turn implies knowledge of what the conventional standards are. Unconventional children's drawings. . .are not original in this sense, since the children who draw them have neither this intention nor this knowledge.[13]

One gets the impression that White is a bit arbitrary. No cogent case is made for this essentially esoteric stance. Nor has he shown why the notion creativity should be limited to that which is "aesthetically and intellectually valuable," a phrase which though crucial to his analysis he did not attempt to explain. Why, one may well ask, must a work in whatever discipline be both aesthetically and intellectually valuable in order to be judged creative? This double-barreled test is hardly convincing even on strictly empirical grounds. Given that certain inventions have been deemed creative in the highest degree it is difficult to see how in each case the test of being aesthetically valuable was met. White seems to be requiring too much.

Perhaps a relationship important to ascertain at this point is that between being inventive and being creative. It would appear that every instance of inventiveness is also an instance of creativity. That is to say, inventiveness, though not materially equivalent to it, materially implies creativity.[14] But if sheer trial and error may eventuate in inventiveness, then the emphasis which White places upon knowing the rules and standards is either trivial, if by rule or standard is meant simply the do's and don'ts one comes upon in the process of trying, or else unsupported in actual experience.

The scope and purpose of this essay do not permit fuller treatment of the puzzlements involved in attempting to ascertain the boundaries of the notion. The questions raised earlier on in this essay have been addressed only obliquely, and by inference. It should now be possible to approach them more directly.

What ought we minimally to intend when we assign the term creative to any person, say P? What, in other words, does the concept creative minimally entail? We would have no warrant for employing the term "creative" to P if P were not in some sense the originator of something, some kind of object, say O. A necessary though trivial condition, therefore, is that P must have produced some O. A further and rather complex condition, is that O must have been of a certain sort. But problems immediately arise for these conditions are not self-explanatory. What, for example, does it mean to say that "O must have been of a certain sort"?

It does not appear that the claim expressed above in the first condition that P originated O requires that P be the first or only person to have brought this O of a particular character into being or, equivalently, that O was unique in the sense of its being the first and only of its kind to have existed. On the contrary it does appear that the claim addresses itself primarily to the circumstances and conditions under which P produced some certain O rather than, if at all, to the temporal character of O. If on the basis of some production of the sort O, P_1 is appraised creative, there seems to be no logical reason why P_2 or P_n in essentially similar circumstances should not be similarly appraised for similar or identical productions. To say then that any P originated some certain O is not so much to place a temporal label upon O as much as to say something about the effectiveness of P's thinking. It would be absurd to suppose that we were mistaken all along that persons in a certain say, terrestrial, civilization were creative solely on the ground that we had newly discovered an incomparably superior civilization that had long discarded its terrestrial type "creations." It seems inescapable, therefore, that the claim that P is creative, understood in part to mean that P originated something presupposes some specific universe of reference which may be large or small but not one that is necessarily global and exclusive. Hence while that which P originates is considered new, it is new only in the minimally required sense that in the setting of a specific and crucial universe of reference that which P originates satisfies the conditions of being extraordinary. By universe of reference is meant that cluster of background circumstances and considerations, that matrix, so to speak, out of which a particular production emerges.

In so far as this consideration goes, it should be entirely possible for a teacher to judge a student creative without thereby implying, for example, that the student had come up with some brand new literary device that promises to change people's outlook on literature or had initiated some radically new genre in art. Accordingly, it should not particularly matter whether that which a particular student produced had been produced a thousand times before by as many others.

By extension, we have been addressing outselves in part to the further condition indicated earlier on, that to be judged creative that which is produced, O, must be of a certain sort. That O must be new is hardly debatable, but new only in a restricted sense. Certainly more reproduction or imitation will not do. On strictly logical grounds, therefore, it is mistaken to argue, as Ghiselen does, that "the saw as an artifact of the mind was produced once, and thereafter reproduced."[15] (For the same mind in the same temporal order it would be). And equally mistaken in contending, again as he does, that a creative product is "new in the sense of being unique, without a specific precedent,"[16] especially when he explains his notion of originality to be "not original in the sense of statistical rarity, which indicates only a degree of unusualness, but original in the absolute sense of priority in the time of their introduction into the sphere of human thought."[17] In view of what has already been said, this stipulation which Ghiselin proposes as "the primary criterion of creativity" has the doubtful merit of being a test fairly simple to apply but rather difficult to justify.

The newness entailed by the concept seems to consist only in the fact that the originator of that which is deemed creative, given his peculiar universe of reference, must have been in some regard imaginative and perceptive to an unusual degree to have come up with whatever he came up with. Again, the expression "peculiar universe of reference" is crucial for it permits us to speak sensibly of a child's being creative in some particular without thereby implying the global claim that his was in any way a dramatic or unique contribution to the store of human achievement or wisdom. We would judge of unusualness by the quality or character of the imaginative or perceptual leap, as it were, which coming up with a certain production must have entailed. Hence the boy in White's example who came up with unusual uses for a brick, could well have been creative in an unattenuated sense depending on how imaginative and perceptive he was. There is nothing in the nature of the "leaps" of creativity which reserves them for a chosen few, for the Einsteins and the Picassos. This must suffice for this point.

There seems to be one further necessary condition. That which is judged creative must have been the outworking of some intention in the sense that it was not a mere occurence, or the upshot of purely accidental circumstances. This in no way rules out, a priori, trial and error, once such trial and error comes under the general direction of some idea. There seems to be no further requirement that a production, our O, must, except perhaps in necessarily aesthetic fields, or under the most generous employment of the term, satisfy a purely aesthetic condition. The intellectual or perceptual condition crucial to the notion of creativity has already been gone into.

Our discussion so far would render significantly odd the claim that someone was being taught to be creative or was being taught how to be creative, creativity being much more than the mastery of some set of rules or technique. But it is not equally odd to say that someone was being taught in a way or in ways that allowed or made for creativity. For this is nothing more than the empirical, though arguable claim, that certain conditions rather than others seem to make for creativity and that the teacher was attempting to maximize the former.

Space constraints permit of only the merest summary. In this essay I have argued against the view that the notion of creativity entails uniqueness and against the view that the term creative describes only certain kinds of public products, those predicated upon an understanding of relevant rules. I have proposed, instead, that the concept creativity is applicable and hence explicable only and necessarily in terms of some specific universe of reference. It is my hope that the justification requirement noted at the outset has been amply met.

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1. See Austin's *Philosophical Papers*, ed. J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 44-84.

2. Brewster Ghiselin, "Ultimate Criteria for Two Levels of Creativity," in *Scientific Creativity: Its Recognition and Development* edited by Calvin W. Taylor and Frank Barron. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963, p. 36.

3. J.P. White, "Creativity and Education: A Philosophical Analysis," in *Education and the Development of Reason* edited by R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst and R.S. Peters, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972, pp. 132-147.

4. Thomas F. Green, *The Activities of Teaching* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 11.

5. See John B. Magee, *Philosophical Analysis in Education* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971), pp. 32-34.

6. Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland & Through the Looking Glass* (New York: The New American Library, 1960), pp. 186-87.

7. Thomas B. Sprecher, "A Proposal for Identifying the Meaning of Creativity," in *Scientific Creativity: Its Recognition and Development* edited by Calvin W. Taylor and Frank Barron. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963, p. 77.

8. J.P. White, op. cit. 132-147.

9. Ibid., p. 132.

10. See Robert D. Heslep's "Philosophical Behaviorism and the Mental,"

Philosophy of Education, 1976, edited by Kenneth A. Strike. (Worchester, Mass.: Hefferman Press, 1976).

11. J.P. White, op. cit., pp. 136-37.
12. Ibid., p. 137.
13. Ibid., p. 141.
14. Irving M. Copi, *Introduction to Logic* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), pp. 262-86.
15. Brewster Ghiselin, op. cit., p. 36.
16. Ibid., p. 36.
17. Ibid., p. 36.

Response to Phillips

CREATIVE ENCOUNTERS OF THE THIRD KIND

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White and Phillips come up with two different sets of criteria—criteria that purportedly explicate the concept "creativity." Phillips thinks that their having arrived at different sets of criteria means that he, Phillips, disagrees with White. To the contrary, White and Phillips only appear to disagree. In fact, they are concerned with two different notions and two different programs. If there is a real dispute between the two, it arises from their attempts, in effect, to legislate into sole usage the senses of creativity that they, respectively, address.

Rather than to join that argument, I propose to review the White and Phillips analyses as a way to point to a third sense of creativity—one that requires that we look beyond objects and character traits to actions. To convey what it is that I shall be about, it is important to note that my interest is not in developing a list of commonly employed senses of creativity. Instead, it is to identify a *program* that merits more attention than we philosophers of education have given it. What is the connection between senses of a term and programs? I submit, to acknowledge a particular use of a positively loaded term, such as creativity, is to point to a program. Thus, the central value of the White and Phillips discussions rests in their tagging some things as worthwhile, rather than in their "discoveries" regarding *the* concept "creativity."

First, let us turn to White's analysis. The foundation premise of his discussion is that creativeness is something that is ascribable to objects, the products of persons doings. Whenever we label a person "creative," we do so only by virtue of our judgment of the object. That is, in the primary sense of the term, it is paintings, theories and buildings, rather than painters, physicists and architects that are creative. Thus, White's analysis follows from the question, "What must be true to say that some object O is creative?" His answer: O is creative if it accords with the formal rules and techniques of a discipline[1] and if it in some notable way breaks with prevailing substantive conventions within that discipline.[2] His paradigmatic cases are the works of Dostoevsky and Einstein. Dostoevsky's works clearly qualify as novels, and yet in substance they break notably with convention. Einstein's theory of relativity meets the general requirements for being a scientific theory or hypothesis; yet what it proposes departs from convention. Even if we disagree with White's exemplars, we likely recognize this strict sense of creativity with which he is concerned: creativity in the objective, revolutionary sense. That is, something is creative only if it *both* accords with the rules and techniques of a discipline or mode of endeavor *and* breaks with prevailing standards. The works of many "greats" who, such as icon painter Rublev, perfected techniques within the prevailing conventions or who, to use Kuhn's now well-worn language, worked within the "normal science," would not count as creative in this strict sense. But never mind that; we do sometimes use "creative" in this way.

In that the endeavors or disciplines that White uses to locate creative objects define, if only a rough way, a culture, let us label his the *cultural* sense of creativity. By acknowledging this sense of creativity, we point to the belief that such creative works should be encouraged. The question of whether such creativity should be promoted within the context of formal education White leaves open. But he does make the conservative suggestion that we should not await works of Dostoevskys and Einsteins to spring from disciplineless schooling.

The Phillips analysis begins from a different question; so, not surprisingly, it leads to a different answer. While White asks what must be true to say that an object or product is creative, Phillips opens with "What must be true to say that a *person* is creative?" (Now, to paraphrase someone in his presence is a risky business, but it's good for discussion. So I proceed with abandon.) Phillip's answer: Person P is creative only (1) if P produces objects (here I say object in the plural, though Phillips doesn't, to correct for an apparent oversight: one would not in general call P creative on the basis of one instance), (2) if the objects represent the working out of some intentions of P, and (3) if the objects are new to P in the sense that the production of those objects required an unusual degree of imagination and perceptiveness on P's part. I infer from Phillips's saying that a "cluster of background circumstances and considerations" form the universe of reference in which the objects are to judged to be new, that Phillips is pointing to a subjective sense of creativity. (By way of comparison, it might be noted that White's strict objective sense of creativity also requires a universe of reference for explication, namely the disciplines.)

The sense of creativity on which Phillips focuses is readily recognizable. It is the sense in which even a young child can be creative. Because with this sense the ascription of creativeness depends upon the "background circumstances and considerations" of the person who produces the objects, let us call this the *personal* sense of creativity. In acknowledging this sense, Phillips tags "valuable" the tendency, habit or trait of seeing things in a way that is new to that person's perceptions and understandings. While Phillips stops with the suggestion that persons could possibly be taught in ways that are conducive to their becoming creative in this personal sense, I strongly suspect that he would be sympathetic to arguments that we should so teach children, if it is in fact likely to help them become creative.

So we see that if we ascribe creativity to *objects*, we focus on the cultural sense of the term. If we talk of *persons* as creative, then we feature the personal sense of creativity. Yet another sense—one that I find attractive for the program it imports—issues from ascribing creativity to doings or *actions*. If we ask under what logical conditions is P's X-ing creative or is P X-ing creatively, we focus neither on the product nor on the individual's traits or tendencies, but on the producing itself. Time here does not permit a proper analysis, but a proposal by sociologists Zdravomyslov, Rozhin, and Yadov in *Man and His Work* will suffice to suggest what I take to be a productive line of development: P's X-ing is creative only if it entails a search for or the development of previously unknown solutions to problems indigenous to X-ing or for new algorithms or at least the independent discovery of algorithms.[3] The attendant program is that we should establish the material conditions and content of work that invite and support creative doings.

In that this sense of creativity requires a newness both on subjective and on objective standards, an appropriate label might be the *social* sense of creativity—"social" for it links a concern with the individual's fulfillment with a concern that tasks the society needs to have done get done. Its subjectivity consists in the requirement that the doing entails a search for solutions or algorithms that are new to the doer. Its objectivity derives from the requirement that the problems indeed be indigenous to the doing, whether that be the construction of buildings, the supervision of play, farming, teaching, or the making of automobiles. Pre-programmed, totally routinized work would fail to be creative on the subjective standard; work or doings that are not addressed to problems inherent in the activity would fail to be creative on the objective standard.

Arguments supporting creative encounters of this third kind would likely be more in tune with the individual-societal tension of public policy than would arguments for the programs of strictly cultural or personal creativity, for a program of creativity in this social sense promotes the development or fulfillment of the individual personality in a way that contributes more directly to the functioning of the society, i.e., through the workplace. Arguments for the program of social-sense creativity might be grounded in the works of such unlikely partners as Rawls and Marx: Rawls from his notion of self-respect as a primary good[4] and Marx in his early writing on the relationship between the individual and his work.[5] Of course, such arguments would extend beyond noting criteria for the proper use of a term in a particular sense to the giving of good reasons for promoting creativity in this social sense.

In conclusion, I wish to underscore four points that I have tried to make. First, how one puts the question to which an analysis responds can make a substantial programmatic difference. (Those who think that linguistic analysis is necessarily sterile or innocent simply don't understand it.) Second, to avoid fruitless argument, it is important that those who analyze concepts take care to acknowledge that *each* sense or usage of a term itself constitutes a distinct concept—a concept that may be more or less useful to given purposes. Third, if as philosophers of education we always take as our starting point "educational discourse," whether conducted by teachers or even, more generally, by anyone who focuses on schooling, we shall fail to consider other more broadly educational or miseducational forces of the social arrangements: for example, work.[6] And finally, the notion of creativity can provide a powerful means for identifying important relationships and programs at that intersection of the individual and society called education. For his encouraging us to revisit "creativity," we owe Hollibert Phillips our thanks.

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[1] J.P. White, "Creativity and Education: A Philosophical Analysis," in *Education and the Development of Reason*, ed. R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), esp. pp. 134 and 137.

[2] Ibid., p. 141.

[3] A.G. Zdravomyslov, V.P. Rozhin, and V.A. Yadov, *Chelovek i ego rabota* (*Man and His Work*), (Moscow: Isdatel'stvo "Mysl'," 1967) p. 24.

[4] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 440-46 *et passim*.

[5] Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), esp. pp. 103-105.

[6] For a suggestive paper that considers industrial work in its educational function, see Vincent Crockenberg's "Industrial Work: How Much Organization Can Democracy Endure?," in *Culture as Education*, eds. Vincent Crockenberg and Richard LaBrecque, (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1977), pp. 43-77.

(Third Concurrent Session)

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY REVISTED

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Derek Birley and Anne Dufton, in their book *An Equal Chance: Equalities and Inequalities of Educational Opportunity* write: "in education equality of opportunity is a fundamental issue, but there is no more complex or sophisticated question than deciding what the words actually mean. Tackling this analysis in logical or philosophical terms is something like peeling an onion: the removal of layer after layer seems to take you very little nearer the heart of the matter and you may end up with nothing but tears in the eyes and a heap of disconnected fragments."[1] If this is true, then perhaps it would be better to build an ark in anticipation of the flood rather than to add more tears to those already accumulated. Philosophical truthseekers, however, are required by duty to peel onions come hell or high water.

I would like to begin peeling the onion by examining John Schaar's attack on the principle in his paper "Equality of Opportunity, and Beyond." It might be mentioned that Schaar's position has been adopted by Walter Feinberg, who, in his recent book *Reason and Rhetoric*, entitles a subsection of his last ter: "Against Equality of Educational Opportunity." John Rawls, also, acquiesces to Schaar's argument and coins another term "fair equality of opportunity" in order to describe the principle that he is interested in elucidating as part of a general conception of justice. Brian Crittenden responded to Schaar, among others, in his paper "Equal Opportunity: The Importance of Being in Context"; my criticisms of Schaar, though in some respects parallel to Crittenden's, are different from his. More importantly, I will argue that the notion of equal opportunity can be developed in ways that neither Schaar, Crittenden, nor others have seen.

The plan of this paper is to begin by examining Schaar's view of the nature of equal opportunity. Specifically, I will critically examine a number of his claims regarding equal opportunity. Then I will use the discussion of Schaar's view to work out some distinctions that allow us to see how opportunities differ in the liberal-capitalist and egalitarian societies, and to see more clearly, perhaps, what it is over which the liberal and the egalitarian differ. (I might mention that my views about what is socially desirable are not significantly different from Schaar's, however the way we conceptualize the issue of equal opportunity differs considerably.)

Schaar's general argument is that we should abandon the principle of equal opportunity and embrace the principle of democratic equality. We shall see what he means by "equal opportunity" momentarily. "Democratic equality," as Schaar develops it, is fundamentally an egalitarian notion. It is "based on a philosophy of equal human worth;"[2] it "stresses the greatest possible participation in and sharing of the common life and culture";[3] it requires a "far greater measure of economic equality;"[4] it requires a "democratic mentality;"[5] and, finally, it affirms the "equality of being and belonging."[6]

Concerning the doctrine of equal opportunity Schaar writes: The doctrine itself is attractively simple. It asserts that "each man should have equal rights and opportunities to develop his own talents and virtues and that there should be equal rewards for equal performances."[7] Equal opportunity, he adds, "emphasizes the need for an equal opportunity among men to develop and be paid for their talents, which are of course far from being equal."[8] There is, however, nothing in the notion of equal opportunity that addresses the question of rewards or pay. It would make sense to talk about equal opportunities in an egalitarian society. Liberals may believe that people with different talents should be paid differently, but the principles of equal rewards for equal performances and unequal rewards for unequal performances do not derive from the principle of equal opportunity. Giving unequal rewards to individuals would, however, be unfair to the extent that there is not equal opportunity, so it can be argued that equal opportunity is a necessary condition for the fairness of unequal rewards, but it is not a sufficient condition. In any case, equal opportunity does not require that one be paid commensurately with one's talents.

Schaar goes on to claim (correctly) that "not all talents can be developed equally in any given society."[9] From this he concludes: "the equal opportunity formula must be revised to read: equality of opportunity for all to develop those talents which are highly valued by a given people at a given time."[10] His claim refers to what we might refer to as *internal* equal opportunity. We can imagine, however, people arguing that their talents are not given an equal opportunity within the society; in such a case we could say that they are claiming that the society lacks *comparative* equal opportunity. That is, compared to another society, or an ideal society, people do not have the equal opportunity to develop their talents. The main criticism of the liberal society Schaar has in mind, then, is that too narrow a range of talents is valued or that the wrong set of talents is valued. Such a criticism, however, does not provide an argument against the equal opportunity principle.

On the basis of the preceding argument, Schaar claims that the equal opportunity policy is conservative, that "no policy or formula is better designed to fortify the dominant institutions, values, and ends of American social order."[11] This is, first of all, manifestly false insofar as the dominant institutions are racist, sexist and/or class-biased, i.e., insofar as equal opportunity does not exist. Equal opportunity is not essentially conservative; what might be conservative is to link up the equal opportunity principle with what Crittenden refers to as "liberal-capitalism." It is the latter, liberal-capitalism, that Schaar actually wants to criticize, but instead he turns his cannons on the principle of equal opportunity. It can be conceded, however, that the equal opportunity principle is conservative compared to Schaar's democratic equality principle, but it should be emphasized that the equal opportunity principle is a progressive principle in a racist, sexist or class-biased society.

Schaar maintains that the equal opportunity principle would lead to "a condition where natural and social aristocracies would be identical—a meritocracy."[12] If it does lead to a meritocracy that is a basis on which to argue that the equal opportunity principle is not a sufficient condition for achieving a just society. Similarly, Schaar claims that "the doctrine of equal opportunity, followed seriously, removes the question of how men should be treated from the realm of human responsibility and returns it to 'nature.'"[13] Again, it can be replied that it is not the principle of equal opportunity that "removes the question of how men should be treated from the realm of human responsibility," but an ideology which takes equal opportunity and a principle of freedom to be sufficient conditions for a just society.

"The very best training and equipment that society can afford," writes Schaar, "would, of course, go to those of the superior group—in order to assure equality of opportunity for the development of their talents."[14] The meaning of this claim is not clear. It could mean that the best training and equipment would go to those who go on to higher education. In some sense it is justifiable for that to happen, because they are the people who can benefit from higher education. It could also mean, however, that the best training and equipment should go to those in primary and secondary schools who are academically superior *at the expense of* those who are less so. If that were to happen, equal opportunity would not be served. Equal educational opportunity requires us to provide good education for each ability group.

Schaar writes:

> What is so generous about telling a man he can go as far as his talents will take him when his talents are meager? Imagine a footrace of one mile in which ten men compete, with the rules being the same for all. Three of the competitors are forty years old, five are overweight, one has weak ankles, and the tenth is Roger Bannister. What sense does it make to say that all ten have an equal opportunity to win the race? The outcome is predetermined by nature, and nine of the competitors will call it a mockery when they are told that all have the same opportunity to win.[15]

Now it could be pointed out that there is an equal opportunity in the sense that the rules are the same for all; there is an equal opportunity to compete under the same rules. It is true that, given the descriptions, the runners do not have an equal opportunity to win in the sense that the probabilities of their winning are unequal. Consider the top four milers in the world. Suppose they race against each other often and they always place in the same order. Can the number two, three and four men *complain* of an unequal opportunity to win? The race between the top four milers can be judged to be fair, it seems, because they do have an equal opportunity to compete and they do so under conditions that are judged to be fair.

In Schaar's example, what makes his imagined contest unfair is that the people are so different in ability. Ability grouping is part of what gives a contest its point. Then, will and desire and the most refined skills will be demonstrated, and such factors will determine, generally, who wins. Schaar's people would be protesting the holding of the race, not Bannister's winning.

One lesson we can learn from Schaar's example is that we should not think of all of life as a race. There might very well be areas of life in which contests are inappropriate, but, conversely, there are areas of life in which contests, open to all, are important. Even a just society might have competitive sports, and presumably a just society would have political contests of a democratic sort. While grouping the contestants according to ability in an athletic event makes sense, it would be nonsense to group political contestants according to their ability or to handicap some because they have more ability. The process of becoming educated is not like running the mile. While it might make some sense to handicap people in the latter, it makes no sense to follow Schaar's advice, at least in education, "to take responsibility for the matter, perhaps by devising a system of handicaps to correct for the accidents of birth, or even by abandoning the competitive ethic altogether."[16] (This claim follows, by the way, his claim that the best training and equipment, under an equal opportunity policy, go to those in the superior group.)

Crittenden agrues that the liberal-capitalist and the egalitarian interpret the principle of equal opportunity differently. The former interprets it as saying "arrange social conditions so that each individual can go as far as his native ability will take him."[17] The egalitarian, on the other hand, takes it to mean "arrange social conditions so that the level of total good enjoyed by each individual in society will be approximately the same."[18] Crittenden takes these to be two different versions of the same principle, and there is a sense in which he is correct. That is, the liberal and the egalitarian differ on how to arrange the *conditions* under which people have opportunities; they differ on how to *structure* society which in turn means that the conditions under which one has an opportunity will be very different. Liberal-capitalist society is characterized by a hierarchy of roles with great disparities in the way income is attached to those roles. As a result some people in such a society are going to have to accept the low-paying roles, and, consequently, they may not be able to meet the conditions for obtaining the basic goods in that society. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that a bachelor's degree is becoming an increasingly important condition for obtaining many preferred jobs and the commensurate income.

To the extent that liberal-capitalist society is racist, sexist or class-biased, there are not equal opportunities among races, between sexes, or among classes. Liberal-capitalist society could, theoretically, end racism and sexism and *perhaps diminish* the class-bias within the society, and by doing so it would make the opportunities between the races and sexes, anyway, equal. Even so, the egalitarian can argue that many people will not have the opportunities that they could have in an egalitarian society simply because the *conditions* for obtaining certain sorts of benefits are vastly different in the two societies. The egalitarian might admit that opportunities, at least with respect to race and sex, are equal in a particular liberal-capitalist society; he would be noting that the rules are the same for both sexes and all races. He would still want to deny, however, that the poor have an equal opportunity with the rich to obtain the goods which the society produces.

What we need, here, is a distinction between what I will call *competitive opportunities* and *non-competitive opportunities*. An example of a competitive opportunity is the opportunity to run in a race, and an example of a non-competitive opportunity is the opportunity to divide a cake among a group of people. One characteristic of a competitive opportunity is that only some are able to obtain the good; in a race, for example, only one is able to be the winner.

The sense in which a person has an opportunity to share in the dividing of a cake is obviously very different. The salient characteristic of such non-competitive opportunities is that everyone could, in principle, obtain the good. It follows that success in obtaining the good is not limited as it certainly is in the case of competitive opportunities.

Non-competitive opportunities can be distinguished by the kinds of goods to which one has an opportunity. There are non-diminishable goods such as knowledge and there are diminishable goods such as money and food. Knowledge is non-diminishable because one may give of his knowledge to another and not thereby diminish his own.

Opportunities to obtain goods of various kinds may be either competitive so that while everyone has an opportunity to compete for the goods, only some may obtain them. Or the rules may be structured so that there are non-competitive opportunities to obtain the good. A society which made the conditions for obtaining (basic) goods minimal would provide non-competitive opportunities to obtain those goods.

It is noteworthy, in this connection, that schooling may be arranged in some societies as a diminishable good for which people must compete, i.e., there would only be competitive opportunities to obtain the good. Such would be the case if only a given number were accepted at the university level though there were more who were willing and able to undertake such studies. On the other hand, schooling might be arranged as a non-diminishable good for which people do not have to compete (against one another). All who qualify could have the (non-competitive) opportunity to go to the university. If we were to change medical school policy from admitting only a given number of students—a policy which provides competitive opportunities—to another policy that admitted all students who met the relevant academic criteria, we would be changing to a policy that provided non-competitive opportunities.

Finally, it should be mentioned that a good such as education shares some characteristics with both sorts of opportunities. Consider, for example, that there are relatively stringent conditions for obtaining, say, a Ph.D. There is an equal (competitive) opportunity if *anyone* can try to meet the criteria, and insofar as the criteria are relatively stringent, the case is similar to the race example—some will meet the criteria and some will not. The good is, however, divisible, and in that way it is similar to the example of dividing a cake. It is possible *in principle* that everyone could obtain a Ph.D.

Once we have drawn the distinction between the competitive opportunities and non-competitive opportunities, we have a way of showing how an equal opportunity principle can be used to argue that there is a sense in which there is a lack of equal opportunity under the liberal-capitalist system. Now we are in a position to see that Schaar was objecting to the equal competitive opportunity principle as being a sufficient condition for a just society, and he was doing so partly on the basis of an implicit equal non-competitive opportunity principle. It could be argued that in an egalitarian society also the equal competitive opportunity principle would be appropriate under certain conditions where special ability is relevant, e.g., in athletic events. The equal non-competitive opportunity principle would apply to fundamental social goods—food, clothing, medical care, education, etc.

I have argued that Schaar is mistaken in characterizing equal opportunity in the way that he does. An objection to the foregoing argument might be that Schaar was characterizing the liberal-capitalist concept of equal opportunity, the notion of equal opportunity as it is understood within the context of liberal-capitalism. There are two responses to such an objection. First, Schaar's criticisms are directed explicitly toward the equal opportunity *principle*, and it is not explicitly clear that he is criticizing the principle *only* as it is understood in a liberal-capitalist society. If one interprets Schaar as addressing the liberal-capitalist version of equal opportunity, then it is still the case that many of his claims, as I have argued, are mistaken or misleading. One might concede that in some cases the principle of equal opportunity works as Schaar describes it in liberal-capitalist society, but argue *contra* Schaar, that the fault is not in the principle of equal opportunity but in the ideology which says that such a principle is, regarding equality, a sufficient condition of justice. We should not confuse the principle of equal opportunity with liberal-capitalist ideology.

Secondly, it seems to be a mistake to attack the principle of equal opportunity which most people think of as being necessary for a just society in order to try to get them to see the faults of liberal-capitalism. Schaar claims that "the principle is widely accepted as just and generous,"[20] so if it is a necessary condition of justice, and if one's goal is to show the weaknesses in liberal-capitalist society, why attack the equal opportunity principle?

There is, it can be argued, a place in a just society for both competitive and non-competitive opportunities. Even a just society might very well have athletic contests, political contests, etc. Status also, is best thought of as being distributed on a competitive basis. Status is a function of the values of a society. Status is ascribed to those who fulfill the conditions for various roles to a superlative degree. Thus, an athlete achieves status by running faster or passing a football betten than others. If people did not think that fast running or the accurate passing of a football were valuable, then those activities would not have status. While the kinds of status just discussed can be appropriate in *any* society, the status based on wealth would not. In an egalitarian society, wealth would be distributed rather equally, so wealth would not be a significant source of status.

In an egalitarian society, the social structure would be designed so that with respect to certain goods, there would be non-competitive opportunities to obtain the goods. So, for example, it might be very easy in such a society to obtain the basic goods of life. The *conditions* for obtaining such goods would be rather minimal compared to a society which structures opportunities on a highly competitive basis.

A hierarchically arranged society would be a paradigm case of a society which would provide competitive opportunities. Imaging a heirarchy of positions with differential incomes attached. Imagine, further, that the incomes range from extremely low to extremely high, and imagine, further, that the people in the society are reasonably able. Then it would be the case that some reasonably able people would be forced into positions with very low incomes. Those people would not be able to obtain a significant portion of the basic goods of such a society. Such a society might provide competitive opportunities to rise within the hierarchy, but it would, because of its structure, necessarily have some poverty within it, and there would not be equal non-competitive opportunities to obtain the goods of the society. Now consider a society that has its "opportunity structure" arranged quite differently. The hierarchy of positions with its hierarchy of differential incomes is reduced to a minimum. People in such a society, we can suppose, would obtain roughly the same income, and all would be able to purchase the basic goods. We can say of such a social structure that it provides non-competitive opportunities. In this case people's opportunities are similar to those who have an opportunity to divide a cake amongst themselves. There are positions with roughly equal incomes attached. What is most significant is that the conditions for obtaining the goods are very different in this egalitarian society from the hierarchical society. In this society all have the opportunity to take positions commensurate with their abilities and to be rewarded more or less equally. In the hierarchical society, on the other hand, the conditions for obtaining a significant portion of the goods are such that one must obtain a position in the middle or upper portion of the hierarchy, and in order to do that one might have to meet another condition such as holding a college degree, and in order to get a degree one must have the money, the motivation and the ability to do so. The "opportunity structure" in such a society is very different, and the conditions that are attached to obtaining many of the positions make the situation a competitive one. Thus, opportunities in such a situation may be called "competitive opportunities."

A liberal-capitalist society structures opportunities in a hierarchical fashion. It provides "competitive opportunities." Nevertheless, to the extent that liberal-capitalist societies accept the welfare state, to that extent they acknowledge, at least in a limited way, the non-competitive opportunity principle. Some argue that the applicability of the latter principle should be extended. Bernard Williams, for example, can be understood as arguing for such a position when he claims that medical care, for example, should be distributed to those who need it and if money becomes a necessary condition for obtaining such care, "an irrational state of affairs exists."[21] He adds, "What is meant [by such a state of affairs] is that it is a situation in which reasons are insufficiently operative; it is a situation insufficiently controlled by reason itself."[22]

Robert Nozick, on the other hand, parodies Williams' argument when he writes, "Presumably, then, the only proper criterion for the distribution of barbering services is barbering need. . . .If someone becomes a barber because he likes talking to a variety of different people, and so on, is it unjust of him to allocate his services to those he most likes to talk to?"[23] It probably is not. And if someone becomes a doctor and sets up practice in the suburbs because he likes whites. . .or at least does not like minority groups—is it unjust of him to allocate his services to those whites? Yes, but it is a personal injustice, not a social injustice. When, however, doctors devote their attention to the majority group and ignore the minority groups, *then* it can be argued that there is social injustice.

Nozick further comments:

> Like others, Williams looks only to questions of allocation. He ignores the question of where the things or actions to be allocated come from. Consequently, he does not consider whether they come already tied to people who have entitlements over them (surely the case for service activities, which are people's *actions*), people who therefore may decide for themselves to whom they will give the thing and on what grounds.[24]

Clearly, the major question in the case in which doctors do not want to treat minorities is the question of allocation. The question of where the actions "come from" is quite secondary when we are considering the question of social justice as we are in this example. It could also be argued, of course, that in addition the doctors in the example are guilty of personal injustice.

What separates Williams and Nozick is that they disagree upon the conditions under which someone should have an equal opportunity to obtain fundamental benefits. A defender of

Nozick might say that there is an equal opportunity to obtain x in Nozick's state if one does what is necessary in order to obtain x. One has an equal opportunity to obtain medical care if one pays for it. It is the *conditions* under which something is obtained, then, that differentiates Nozick and Williams. The rich and the poor in William's example do not have an equal non-competitive opportunity to obtain medical care because the conditions are such that the poor are prevented from obtaining it. Since medical care is so important, it can be argued that the poor should have an equal (non-competitive) opportunity with the rich to obtain it. Again, it should be pointed out that the claim that there is an equal opportunity to obtain medical care in Nozick's state must mean that one has a competitive opportunity to obtain such care because money is a prerequisite condition and some of the poor cannot meet this condition.

I have argued that Schaar is mistaken in claiming that equal opportunity requires unequal monetary rewards; mistaken in claiming that equal opportunity necessarily leads to a meritocracy; mistaken in claiming that the best training would, unambiguously, go to the superior group under the principle of equal opportunity; and mistaken to think that the equal opportunity principle should be rejected because, by an analogy with an unfair race, the principle is unfair. In examining Schaar's claims, in peeling the onion one more time, we have been able to uncover some significant distinctions that should help us to get clearer about equal opportunity.[24]

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1. Derek Birley and Anne Dufton, *An Equal Chance: Equalities and Inequalities of Educational Opportunity* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971), p. 2.
2. John Schaar, "Equality of Opportunity and Beyond," in *Equality, Nomos, IX*, eds. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, (New York: Atherton Press, 1967) p. 229.
3. Ibid., p. 248.
4. Ibid., p. 242.
5. Ibid., p. 241.
6. Ibid., p. 248.
7. Ibid., p. 229.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 230.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 232.
13. Ibid., p. 233.
14. Ibid., pp. 233-34.
15. Ibid., p. 233.
16. Ibid., p. 234.

17. Brian Crittenden, "Equal Opportunity: The Importance of Being in Context," in *Philosophy of Education 1970: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*, ed., Harold B. Dunkel (Edwardsville, Ill., Southern Illinois University, 1970), p. 51.

18. Ibid.

19. Schaar, *op cit.*, p. 229.

20. Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality," in *Moral Concepts*, ed., Joel Feinberg, (London: Oxford, 1969) p. 163.

21. Ibid., p. 164.

22. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974) p. 234.

23. Ibid., pp. 234-35.

24. For their helpful remarks, I would like especially to thank Robert Ennis and Lori Gross.

(Fourth Concurrent Session)

COMPULSORY SCHOOLING WITHOUT COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE LAWS: REFLECTIONS ON THE BEHAVIOR OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS

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The notion of compulsory schooling has come to play the part of a favorite whipping boy in the writings of many social and educational critics, revisionist scholars, and respected panels on education. Times have changed, indeed, for once compulsory schooling could be glowingly praised as the bulwark of a free society. Today, however, a more likely refrain finds compulsory schooling to be "a universal trap," "a twelve-year sentence," "a dead hand on the schools," or simply a vestige of the past that is incompatible with the ideals of freedom and democracy. Several revisionist historians view the matter in an even less favorable light. They trace the roots of compulsory schooling to the, evidently successful, attempt of one social class to do something to the children of another social class. Thus, with Bowles and Gintis,[1] we might say that compulsory schooling served to perpetuate the hierarchical social relations of capitalist production. In other words, compulsory schooling was instituted as a tool to further the interests of the rich, propertied, and powerful class of Anglo-Americans by schooling the potentially explosive underclasses of immigrants, blacks, Catholics, and the simple poor into docility, punctuality, and resignation to their sorry plight in life.

Whether one accepts the revisionist version of compulsory schooling, argues a more complex thesis as David Tyack has recently done,[2] rejects compulsory schooling on Goodman's or Illich's grounds, or even finds something favorable about compelling the young to attend school is one thing. But whether the debate on the merits and historical antecedents of compulsory schooling, *as framed*, truly corresponds to the phenomenon of compulsory schooling is quite another. If we step out of the chase and ask why schooling is compulsory, we may find that we have, all this time, been pursuing the wrong hare. At least that is what we shall argue.

The normative issue of whether schooling should be compulsory and the search for the proper historical explanation for compulsory education have been based on two assumptions. (1) Schooling is compulsory, and (2) it is the State that compels parents to send their children to school. We take the first proposition to be true—schooling, today, is compulsory. However, we have serious doubts that schooling is compulsory *because* the state compels school attendance. In what follows, then, we shall in Part I attempt to show why State action is fairly insignificant concerning compulsory schooling and argue that the compulsory aspect of schooling has greatly to do with variable rates of school attainment. The positive argument hinges on a conceptual point and offers an entirely different perspective on the phenomenon of compulsory schooling. In Part II, we show how the basis for compulsion in education is central to the discussion of inequality of economic opportunity and competency-based education.

Part I

Because critics, advocates, and scholars have assumed that State action is the source of compulsion in schooling, nearly all have focused their attention on the existence and legislative enactment of compulsory school attendance laws. In that regard the ledger is clear, for between 1852 and 1918 the battle was fought and won to enact laws establishing a minimum amount of days and years of schooling for all children in the contiguous states and territories. Thus, critics of compulsory schooling have been led to call for the repeal of the statutes (or else a lowering of the upper age limit from a usual 16 to 14 or so) on the assumption that compulsory schooling would end with repeal of the statutes.

Historians, too, have found the passage of compulsory attendance laws to be a major key in explaining compulsory schooling. As Tyack states it, "Thus. . .any historian investigating compulsory school attendance logically needs to attend to political processes"[4]—the political factors affecting legislative enactment. But the historical stakes are higher yet. The statutes, containing legal sanctions or penalties for non-observance, can be viewed as simply a means to an end: the enrollment and attendance of all children. In other words, the non-selective portion of educational system is universal because it is compulsory. Thus, if the explanation of the passage of compulsory attendance laws (whatever it might be) adequately explains the existence of compulsory schooling, and if compulsory schooling accounts for the universality of the educational system, then the explanation of statute passage is also useful in explaining the great expansion of the American educational system.

Unfortunately, it is fairly clear now that, for several reasons, the existence of compulsory attendance laws had little effect upon school enrollment or attendance. Landes and Solmon report that in 1880 and 1890 the major difference between states with laws and those without laws was a higher rate of enrollment in the states possessing laws.[5] They argue that rather than causing higher levels of schooling, the statute enactment simply confirmed the high rates. Furthermore, our own research on the rates of enrollment and attendance in each state and territory at the time of first enactment indicates that *no* state, excepting one, was able to pass a compulsory attendance law until at least 60% of the school-age children were enrolled in school.[6] As Michael S. Katz has recently argued, few children have been coerced by attendance laws into the classroom.[7] Even in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, schooling levels in the lower grades were high because of voluntary, rather than state-required, attendance.

Surprisingly, even though he agrees that compulsory attendance laws were more a result, rather than a cause, of high rates of schooling and even argues that the laws were for a long period unenforcible, Tyack, for one, still seems to maintain that the laws are the key to compulsory schooling. Apparently beguiled by the development of school management into a bureaucratic organization, he places the true era of compulsory schooling with the institution of new enforcement and administrative techniques. Or, as Tyack states in one place, "From

1900 to 1920 educators became less ambivalent about coercion than they had often been during the nineteenth century."[8]

"Influential" though the powers of the school attendance enforcement units may have been, we rather doubt that anyone could argue that they were responsible for the 25 million children out of a 5-17 year old population of 28 million attending public schools on an average daily basis in 1930 or the 29% of all 17 year olds who completed high school.[9] No doubt a certain number of "recalcitrants" were brought into the schools, yet there is no reason to suspect or evidence to suggest that the extremely high levels of schooling were anything but a continuation of the educational trends of the nineteenth century.

System Expansion and Compulsory Schooling—If compulsory school attendance laws are not the source of compulsory schooling and lack power in explaining the near universality in enrollment and attendance of the educational system, then why is schooling compulsory? Perhaps we are wrong to think that there is such an animal as compulsory schooling. Despite celebrated legal cases like Yoder, perhaps we have bullied compulsory attendance laws simply because, regardless of their insignificance, we don't like the sound of the name. If so, why not repeal them? But, if we should repeal them, we should not expect to put an end to compulsory schooling. Compulsory schooling does exist; and we are more likely to understand the phenomenon if we turn our attention away from compulsory attendance laws and the motives of those who promoted the laws and simply focus on the structure and relationships of the schools as a social institution.

Whatever else the phenomenon of schooling is, it is complex. On one level, just consider the number of parties who have interests at stake in the functioning of the institution. The State clearly has an interest, but so do parents, teachers, administrators, technicians, the economic sector, society as a whole, and, in so far as the interests of parents and the young may diverge, children may also have an interest. To suggest that the various interests are identical at all times or even part of the time is to pass well beyond the limits of credulity. Better wisdom lies in attempting to identify the nature of the various interests and in arriving at an understanding of the conditions under which they are likely to conflict and the conditions under which one or more are likely to predominate for the moment. Such a perspective is unlikely to yield a picture of the control of education in which one interest dominates all the others all of the time—a picture like that drawn by traditional as well as revisionist historians in which a small group of people have done something benevolent for or evil to other peoples' children—but it is more likely to reflect the complexity of the school as a social institution.

Furthermore, the interplay of interests does not occur within a vacuum, but rather finds expression in relationship to an institution that has a definite structure that exhibits relationships, logical and causal, between its various elements and relationships between itself and other social institutions. Though the educational system is a historical creation whose structure has developed over time and in part out of the interplay of various interests, the structure—and we do not mean its legal or organizational arrangement—is independent of this continuous interplay. There simply are schools and colleges; they are arranged into a hierarchy of sequential levels so that relationships obtain between the levels. The schools and colleges are themselves related: they are a *system* of formal education. Clearly, these are systemic facts that modify and determine the way in which the issue of school control can be raised and the interests at stake can be expressed. Concerning the historiography of compulsory schooling, attention to the structure of the educational system, and relationships between elements of that structure, is vital. To the extent that it is ignored, as it has been, no explanation of compulsory schooling can be adequate.

Why is schooling compulsory? *Schooling is compulsory because it is universal.*[10] Or, to reflect the dynamics of the educational system, schooling becomes more compulsory at a given school level as the rate of attainment at that level approaches 100 per cent of an age cohort population. Yet even this statement is inadequate, for the matter is more complex.

Imagine a situation in which all 17-year-olds complete high school. That fact alone is insufficient to render compulsory the completion of high school. But if a *link* exists between the educational system and the socioeconomic system such that educational attainers *disproportionately* monopolize socioeconomic goods like income, prestige, and status—a condition central to the common notion that education "pays"—we can understand how compulsion arises: Quite clearly high school completion, logically speaking, *cannot* pay off in a disproportionate amount of socioeconomic goods if everyone completes. In that situation, it is necessarily true that high school attainment, in and of itself, correlates (for distributional purposes) with no other variable—socioeconomic or otherwise. The point is conceptual. (Likewise, if everyone had brown eyes, the possession of brown eyes can have no correlation with anything else.) Schooling, then, can be socioeconomically efficacious only *above* the twelfth level.

Now, however, examine the other side of the coin. If nearly everyone completes high school, the socioeconomic advantages of being an attainer can only be extremely low. But though attainment confers little advantage, the failure to complete high school is disastrous for individuals. "Dropping-out" in a world of attainers is a condition to be avoided at all costs since it ensures socioeconomic disadvantage relative to one's peers. Thus, for an individual to even stay abreast of his contemporaries, much less secure a relative advantage over them, school leaving is not a rational option. This simply means that high school completion is *compulsory* (except, perhaps, for the extremely wealthy).

The claim, then, that schooling is compulsory can be rendered as follows. The basis for systemic compulsion is a function of the dialectic between attainment rates at different levels of the system and the use of educational attainment (or its equivalents such as diplomas, degrees, and grades) to effect a distribution of socioeconomic goods. In practice this means that schooling can be compulsory at some levels and not at others, compulsory at some period of time, but not during other periods. The important element to watch is the rate of attainment at a given level. For example, in 1912, when only about 10 per cent of 17-year-olds completed high school, school leaving was an attractive option since high school attainers were too small a percentage to monopolize socioeconomic opportunities and high school completion represented a relatively large investment in "foregone opportunity costs." As the rate of attainment increased for whatever reasons over the years, the power of the high school diploma increased. By 1952, about 55 per cent completed high school and the advantages of the diploma were quite evident and probably near the apex of its power. Of course, the diploma became a highly sought after good. From that point on, as we urged more and more individuals to remain in school, the benefits of the diploma began to decline and the liabilities of nonattainment began to soar. By 1965, high school attainment stood at 75 per cent, a rate well beyond the threshold of compulsion.[11] Never before had the high school diploma been of so little socioeconomic value, yet so necessary to social survival. And never before had high school drop-outs, the remaining 25 per cent, suffered so greatly from the reduction in socioeconomic opportunities.

Part II

Compared to the actual phenomenon of compulsory schooling, compulsory attendance laws as potential instruments for coercion appear to be almost benign. What we have is a situation in which individuals are condemned to pursue education to ever higher levels of schooling simply to remain abreast of their contemporaries in the race for socioeconomic advantage. In principle, it is a race that can be won by individuals only if a goodly portion of their fellows drop out through exhaustion and frsutration.

No doubt the mechanism that triggers compulsion in schooling is also responsible for much of the current crisis situation in primary and secondary education—a situation partly linked to the fact that high school completion no longer pays off as it once did. And it is easy to see how higher education may eventually follow in turn. Could the B.A. degree go the way of the high school diploma? Part of the problem is a deeply held social belief that the benefits of schooling are absolute and invariable. Though this is true of knowledge and skills, it cannot be true of socioeconomic goods. The socioeconomic benefits arising out of a link between the educational and socioeconomic systems can only be relative to and variable with educational attainment rates. But in so claiming, we have the glimmer of a solution to compulsory schooling and the failure of secondary education to be socioeconomically efficacious.

Rather than employing policies designed to increase high school completion, we could do just the opposite. By reducing high school attainment to a rate of around 45-55 per cent, compulsion to complete high school would be eliminated *and* the high school diploma could once again have socioeconomic value. Strange as it may sound in the context of current educational policy, we may have to *encourage* young people to drop out of school.

Politically, such a course of action may appear to be unfeasible. We have built such a theology around schooling that dropping out is like committing heresy. Interestingly, however, competency-based education may have the effect of reducing attainment rates even though this effect is not an aim of the policy. First of all, a good argument can be made that competency-based education as a policy views the benefits of schooling to be absolute and invariable, hence the inclination to relate the declining benefits of education to a lowering of academic standards. It is, in other words, a misconceived attempt to re-establish and shore up the link between the educational and socioeconomic systems. Though the quality of education is a perennial issue in American education, the crux of the problem is the quantity of educational attainment. However, if competency standards are rigourously enforced, a sizeable percentage who now complete high school may never do so. Therefore, as an unintended policy consequence, competency-based education may bring about a situation that politically could not be pursued in an open manner: a situation in which the attainment rate is reduced.

The aims of competency-based education are, however, on a collision course with another fundamental educational policy concern: the promotion of equal educational opportunity. The individuals most likely to fail to satisfy competency standards are those comprising the lower socioeconomic groups. Hence, a reduction in the rate of attainment, to levels at which high school completion is free of compulsion and at which the high school diploma can have value, would carry enormous social costs. For it would mean the denial of socioeconomic benefits to those groups in our society who have been, relatively, deprived of just such benefits in the past.

Nonetheless, our present course is hardly more acceptable. Our very success in reducing educational inequality simply reflects the high attainment rate in high school. Thus, we have (1) compulsory schooling to the highest level of secondary education, (2) a situation in which individuals in the lower socioeconomic groups who fail to complete high school are worse off than before, and (3) a condition under which lower socioeconomic class high school attainers are no better off than before.

Conclusion

Is there a way of breaking the horns of this social dilemma?

For if we seek to eliminate the desultory effects of compulsory schooling by introducing a policy that reduces attainment rates, we are likely to injure the prospects of those we can least afford to injure. Yet if we continue to support the conditions sufficient for compulsion to occur at the high school level (and eventually at higher levels), we are likely to increase the penalties for non-attainers and yet fail to reduce socioeconomic inequality. Hopefully, however, it is not too late to be reminded of the alternative vision that Paul Goodman set before us—an alternative in which formal schooling plays a part, but a very small part, in youth's transition to adulthood and socioeconomic self-sufficiency. At the very least, we would urge a total reconsideration of a socioeconomic distribution principle that disproportionately rewards formal educational attainment.

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1. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America* (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

2. David Tyack, "Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the History of Compulsory Schooling," *Harvard Educational Review* 46 (August 1976).

3. The argument of this paper is based upon the argument developed in "Historical Explanations of Compulsory Schooling and the Behavior of Educational Systems" by David P. Ericson with Thomas F. Green and Robert H. Seidman (unpublished manuscript, 1978). The latter paper was based on research conducted for *Studies in Educational Policy and Educational Systems* by Thomas F. Green with Robert H. Seidman and David P. Ericson (unpublished manuscript, 1978).

4. Tyack, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

5. W. Landes and L. Solmon, "Compulsory Schooling Legislation: An Economic Analysis of Law and Social Change in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Economic History* 32 (1972): 54-91.

6. Ericson with Green and Seidman, *op. cit.*

7. Michael S. Katz, "Compulsion and the Discourse of Compulsory School Attendance," *Educational Theory* 27 (Summer 1977): 179-84.

8. David Tyack, *The One Best System* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 183-84.

9. *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, U.S. Government Printing Office, H 412-32, H 520-30, and H 598-601.

10. Of the students of compulsory schooling, only Katz, *op. cit.*, appears to grasp the potential import of this claim. Whether he would agree with our treatment of it is another matter, however. See his comments on social compulsion.

11. Though precision is difficult, we judge that compulsion begins to set in when the attainment rate edges over 60 per cent.

(Fourth Concurrent Session)

RESPONSE TO ERICSON AND SEIDMAN

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I. Introduction[1]

In their provocative essay, Mr. Ericson and Mr. Seidman argue that most of those writing on compulsory schooling have misconceived this phenomenon by overemphasizing school attendance laws and the legal compulsion that accompanies them. The problem, they assert, is that "we have. . .been pursuing the wrong hare." Their essay is an attempt to correct this misleading pursuit; in the process, they provide us with a new way of understanding how schooling becomes socioeconomically compulsory.

The authors' argument draws sustenance from the insight that it is altogether too easy to exaggerate the potency of compulsory attendance laws. Moreover, they contend, quite correctly, that one can easily neglect the way in which educational policy is informed by the structural relationships that exist between schooling and the socioeconomic system. The authors suggest that "schooling is compulsory because it is universal." Let me hazard a partial translation of this elliptical remark. Even if individuals are not employed, they must participate in the socioeconomic system; in order to do so, they must first compete in the educational system.

The authors argue that socioeconomic compulsion, or "systemic compulsion," reflects the dynamic link between the educational system and the socioeconomic system that distributes goods and services unequally. Systemic compulsion is a property of the educational system, and it becomes evident, the authors suggest, when the attainment rate (of high school diplomas) edges over 60 per cent. Beyond that point the external pressures to attain a high school diploma increase while the payoff in socioeconomic advantage of having that diploma decreases. What the authors argue is that the workings of the educational system in its link with the socioeconomic system compel increased high school attainment upon the promise of socioeconomic advantages but fail to live up to that promise beyond a certain point.

The heart of the authors' argument revolves around the effort to explain socioeconomic compulsion and its role in the educational system. However, the authors also aim to provide a critique of historical accounts of compulsory schooling and to illuminate the policy dilemma of making compulsory school attendance laws competency-based. Although I find their essay most provocative, I have three central difficulties with their argument itself. First, in their historical critique, the authors, I believe, exaggerate an important historical point—that school attendance laws *by themselves* do not account for the dramatic increase in secondary school enrollments in the early 20th century; moreover, they fail to clarify or adequately support their own central historical claims. Secondly, the authors fall prey to some linguistic corruption in their use of the terms "compulsion," "compulsory," and "compulsory schooling;" their casual departures from the intuitions of ordinary language users sometimes obscure the distinction between legal and non-legal compulsion and prevent the authors from keeping their central line of argumentation clear. Third, the authors' systemic model restricts how we shall value educational attainments and does not seem to account for the way in which the worth of these attainments may be dependent upon the socioeconomic context in which they are to be employed.

II. The Historical Critique

In their historical critique, the authors argue that historical accounts have made too much of the causal significance of compulsory attendance laws; although they may be correct, the authors have constructed a straw man in their own presentation. They homogenize various revisionist accounts of the history of education under the simplistic label "revisionist"; moreover, they fail to note that very few of these accounts seek to explain the historical relationship between compulsory schooling laws and increased attendance in the schools. Historian David Tyack is singled out for special treatment; however, Tyack's own position is seriously distorted by the authors' suggestion that he has viewed the passage of compulsory attendance laws as a major key in explaining the increased participation in schooling in the late 19th and early 20th century. As a matter of fact, Tyack's most recent work strongly reinforces the authors' contention that schooling in the late 19th century was largely voluntary. His earlier work has focused on the diversity of causal components in the passage and implementation of compulsory attendance laws and on the selectively coercive focus of the laws themselves, i.e., those deviant groups least likely to send their children to school. What Ericson and Seidman posit is something I find absent in the recent historical literature—a monocausal emphasis on compulsory attendance laws effecting a vast expansion in school enrollment and attendance. Thus, they write: "If compulsory school attendance laws are not the source of compulsory schooling and lack power in explaining the near universality in enrollment and attendance of the educational system, then why is schooling compulsory?" I do not believe that recent historical accounts suggest that the laws had these effects. It seems to me that Ericson and Seidman exaggerate their central historical point—that school attendance laws *by themselves* do not account either for the high amount of voluntary attendance in the late 19th century in elementary schools or for the dramatic increase in secondary school attendance in the early 20th century.

How should we evaluate the authors' central historical claim that "State action is fairly insignificant concerning compulsory schooling"? Since this claim is not fully clarified, it remains unclear what kind of evidence would count for or against it. That the early compulsory attendance laws were passed in states after high rates of voluntary school attendance already existed seems less than fully supportive of the idea that state action was "farily insignificant"—especially in the early 20th century. The authors do not take Tyack's effort to distinguish the late 19th century from the early 20th century seriously; however, one could argue that the scope of state involvement in education becomes much more significant in the early 20th century. In this period, the states institutionalize a substantive connection between schooling and child labor policy. By 1930, compulsory schooling, as a set of obligatory practices, is rapidly becoming *a new form of life* for large numbers of adolescents; this form of life reflects a fit between the world of schooling and the world of work. Indeed, the development of this fit between schooling and work is a *systemic development* of significant proportions, albeit one that the authors neglect to consider. In this regard, Ericson and Seidman have reminded us that "concerning the historiography of compulsory schooling, attention to the structure of the educational system, and relationships between elements of that structure, is vital." One must remind them that they have ignored the historical relationship between compulsory schooling policy and child labor policy; in so doing, they have violated their own programmatic recommendation.

The authors conclude their historical critique by claiming that "there is no reason to suspect or evidence to suggest that the extremely high levels of schooling (in the early 20th century) were anything but a continuation of the educational trends of the nineteenth century." Since they do not tell us what "educational trends" they are speaking of, it is hard to get the full sense of this claim. However, it is an unsupported claim, and one that is less than fully convincing. It seems to do violence to the historical complexity of the early twentieth century developments in compulsory schooling, both as a policy connected to child labor policy and as a set of obligatory practices that mesh with the world of work. To suggest that dramatic increases in enrollments were part of the continuation of educational trends, even if correct, is to fail to touch the flesh of the interesting historical developments in compulsory schooling in the early 20th century.

III. Compulsion and Compulsory Schooling: Linguistic Corruption

The authors' claim that the coercive force of school attendance laws was minimal, depends upon a distinction between legal and non-legal sources of compulsion. Unfortunately, at several points in their argument this distinction is collapsed when the authors refer to compulsion *simpliciter*, as if there were only one *real* form of compulsion—the systemic, socioeconomic compulsion they discuss. Clearly, the authors seek to clarify what they mean by "systemic compulsion." However, the value of this sense of complusion need not be purchased by suggesting that there is only *one sense*, or even one important sense, in which schooling can legitimately be considered "compulsory."

At a couple of points in their discussion, the authors suggest that there is "an actual phenomenon" to which the term "compulsory schooling" refers and that we have been overlooking this phenomenon. The problem with this way of talking, it seems to me, is that it obscures an important ambiguity built into the use of the term "compulsory schooling" in ordinary usage. This phrase can refer to *the policy that makes schooling legally obligatory* as well as *to the substantive practices of obligatory schooling* that are partially constituted by that policy. At times, the authors want the phrase "compulsory schooling" to imply neither of these ordinary senses of the term; rather they would have it pick out that which makes school attendance socioeconomically obligatory. Unfortunately, some oddity accompanies several sentences in which the authors try to avoid the equivocal sense of "compulsory schooling."

It is important to remember that the authors are not seeking to clarify the senses of "compulsion" and "compulsory schooling" as these terms are used in ordinary language. Nevertheless, the clarity and force of the authors' argument suffers, I believe, from their casual departures from the ordinary intuitions we have in using the words "compulsion," "compulsory," and "compulsory schooling."

IV. Systemic Compulsion

The authors argue that the workings of the educational system compel increased high school attainment upon the promise of socioeconomic advantages but fail to live up to that promise beyond what they call the threshold of compulsion. For example, the authors write that "By 1952 about 55% completed high school and the advantages of the diploma were. . .probably near the apex of its power. . . .From that point. . .the benefits of the diploma began to decline and the liabilities of nonattainment began to soar." In these remarks the worth of school attainment is determined by its value as a commodity that confers some measure of socioeconomic advantage upon a person. Moreover, one gets the sense that the advantages of school attainment and the liabilities of non-attainment are not dependent upon the particular demands a socioeconomic system makes upon its graduates within the Ericson-Seidman model. Clearly, there appears to be no substantive connection at present between the awarding of diplomas for educational achievement and the content of that achievement. Moreover, the educational demands that a socioeconomic system might make upon its schooling graduates may be quite difficult to determine.[2] However, for the sake of argument, let us imagine a society in which 99% of all jobs demanded advanced reading, writing, and mathematical skills—skills to be certified by awarding high school diplomas to those who demonstrated these skills on adequate tests designed to measure them. Would the value of the high school diploma be affected by the changed condition? According to the authors' model, I think not, for they suggest that the threshold of compulsion property is context-free and that the diploma, viewed solely as a means of distributing socioeconomic advantage, begins to lose its value beyond the 60% attainment rate. However, if one takes our hypothetical condition seriously and posits a substantive connection between the diplomas and the necessary skills demanded by society, one may suggest that the diplomas would have socioeconomic value even if 70%, 80%, or 90% of the population was acquiring them. Their socioeconomic value is context-dependent, not context-free. Moreover, their value is not determined independently of their substantive connection with the educational skills valued by the society. One wants to ask Professors Ericson and Seidman if they view the property of systemic compulsion as a universal property of all educational systems. Does it have an a-historical, non-contextual dimension to it?

V. Competency-Based Education: Concluding Remarks

In their analysis, Mr. Ericson and Mr. Seidman suggest but do not explain how competency-based education views the benefits of schooling to be absolute and invariable. I am not clear what they mean by this suggestion or why we should believe it. Are all the advocates of competency-based education in possession of a common belief about the absoluteness and invariable worth of a competency-based education? I rather doubt they are. Although competency-based education remains a rather open-ended and vague idea, one could agree with others on the principle of awarding diplomas on the basis of having demonstrated educational competencies and disagree with them over the content of the competencies, who should define them, how they should be tested, how the standards of fair application would be conceived and applied, how individual failures would be treated, etc.[3] Mr. Ericson and Seidman urge us to regard competency-based education as "a misconceived attempt to reestablish and shore up the link between the educational and socioeconomic systems." Perhaps, we should regard it in this light. However, do we not also want to regard the competency-based education movement as an attempt to establish a clearer link between educational diplomas and what they are supposed to represent?

Quite correctly Ericson and Seidman point out that the implementation of competency-based laws is likely to have adverse socioeconomic effects on those who can least afford the lack of high school diplomas—the high percentages of poor and minority students who already fail to do well in school. In their view, the issue of establishing meaningful standards for educational diplomas is not a central problem. Thus, they write that "though the quality of education is a perennial issue in American education, the crux of the problem is the quantity of educational attainment." My own view has a different emphasis. Having institutionalized the practice of education through arbitrary school attendance, course-credit, and major-field requirements, we now confront legislators (at the secondary level) and curriculum bodies (at the college level) rethinking what an education as an achievement ought to embody. Whether the focus is upon a minimal high school education or upon a liberal arts education, the issue of educational quality has become a central policy concern today, and philosophers of education ought not to dismiss it glibly as a "perennial issue." Within the context of our own educational system, we may inquire whether education as an achievement in knowledge, skills, and understanding is, indeed, compatible with education as an achievement in socioeconomic opportunity. If the problem is framed in this way, the relationship between quality and quantity in American educational attainment becomes most significant.

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1. I am indebted to Professors Lyle Eddy and Harvey Siegel for discussing the Ericson-Seidman paper with me at length. They will find several of

their ideas incorporated into the paper. I am also grateful to Professors C.H. Edson and David Kapel for their critical input on the paper. Needless to say, I am responsible for any errors or weaknesses in the paper.

2. This idea was pointed out to me by Professor Eddy. Whatever insight is contained in this section of the paper is owed largely to him and Professor Siegel.

3. It should be noted that competency-based requirements raise a special problem within a legally compulsory context. Laws regulating conduct, e.g. attendance laws, presuppose the capacity of those to whom the laws are directed to perform the mandated conduct. However, it is not clear how we can legally try to mandate an educational achievement, especially when that achievement may be beyond the capacity of many. That the competency-based requirements exceed the capacities of many students is well-illustrated in the recent efforts to implement them in Florida. Without doubt, the relationship between these competency-based requirements and the capacity of students to achieve them needs further examination.

CONFUSION IN 'A WELL-ORDERED SOCIETY': TANGLED CONCEPTS IN *A THEORY OF JUSTICE*

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I. Introduction

Throughout *A Theory of Justice*, John Rawls relies upon the concepts "well-ordered society," "congruence," and "stability." For instance, throughout Part I, we are told that his two principles serve as a foundation for a stable well-ordered society. Various arguments attempt to show that the two principles underlie a social order that would not only be more stable than competing social orders, but that also would foster a society in which each individual affirms society's good (right) in his own life plan; i.e., there would be congruence between the individual's good and what is right.

Although the direction and content of such argument seem intuitively clear at first glance, upon scrutinous examination, some basic confusions seem evident. This discussion will attempt to discover what Rawls means by "well-ordered society" both independent of and related to the concepts "stability" and "congruence." We shall attempt to point out that Rawls is not clear as to whether stability and/or congruence are defining or accompanying characteristics of a well-ordered society. Furthermore, we shall point out some major questions with which he must come to grips, and shall also show that Rawls's confusion undercuts his second main ground for adopting the two principles of justice.

II. "Well-Ordered Society"

As a first step, let us look at a definition of 'well-ordered society'. One of the more general formulations is the following:

> At the beginning (section I) I characterized a well-ordered society as one designed to advance the good of its members and effectively regulated by a conception of justice. Thus it is a society in which everyone accepts and knows that others accept the same principles of justice and the basic social institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy these principles. . . .Now a well-ordered society is also regulated by its public conception of justice. This fact implies that its members have a strong and normally effective desire to act as the principles of justice require. Since a well-ordered society endures over time, its conception of justice is presumably stable: That is, when institutions are just (as defined by this conception), those taking part in these arrangements acquire the corresponding sense of justice and desire to do their part in maintaining them.[1]

Although this seems to present an adequate conception of a well-ordered society, there is a major problem with the above as well as with other accounts. Here, it is unclear whether stability and congruence (to be understood intuitively for the moment) are defining or accompanying characteristics of a well-ordered society. Rawls speaks of a well-ordered society as enduring over time, and of its conception of justice as, hence, stable, without noting whether this is an empirical generalization or an analytic claim. However, he does speak of the "problems" of congruence and stability for the well-ordered society at various places, which would seem to imply that the relationship between a well-ordered society and stability or congruence is an empirical one. Initially, these problems show that Rawls's notion of "well-ordered society" is not easily grasped. For the moment, then, let us attempt to clarify "well-ordered society" independent of stability and congruence.

To begin, we can turn to Rawls's discussion of, "The Idea of Social Union," which will give us a better idea of what "well-ordered society" means without as much emphasis on "stability" and "congruence." Quite generally, first, Rawls's two principles of justice are those principles which would underlie a well-ordered society in order to make certain inequalities work to the benefit of all and would foster a cooperative (in the general sense of the term) society. This seems to be leaning towards the idea of a society as a community, and Rawls makes this explicit, finally, towards the end of his work:

> But the question remains whether the contract doctine is a satisfactory framework for understanding the values of a community and for choosing among social arrangements to realize them. It is natural to conjecture that the congruence of the right and the good depends in large part upon whether a well-ordered society achieves the good of community.[2]

Although we have not found a defining characteristic of 'well-ordered society', the value of community (whatever that might turn out to be) does seem to be an important feature.

Furthermore, the value of community seems to rest upon a particular nature of mankind, according to Rawls:

> The social nature of mankind is best seen by contrast with the conception of a private society. Thus human beings have in fact shared final ends and they value their common institutions and activities as good in themselves. We need one another as partners in ways of life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the successes and enjoyments of others are necessary for and complementary to our own good. . .The potentialities of each individual are greater than he can hope to realize; and they fall far short of the powers among men generally. Thus everyone must select which of his abilities and possible interests he wishes to encourage; he must plan their training and exercise, and schedule their pursuit in an orderly way.[3]

Given the above foundation of the nature of humankind, we, therefore, arrive, as Rawls tells us, at the community of humankind:

> We are led to the notion of the community of humankind the members of which enjoy one another's excellences and individuality elicited by free institutions, and they recognize the good of each as an element in the complete activity the whole scheme of which is consented to and gives pleasure to all.[4]

Here, Rawls is aiming at the idea of a social union. Furthermore, we are told that a social union has two essential features: (1) there is some shared final end; and (2) there are some common activities which are valued for themselves. Rawls provides us with such examples of social unions as science, art, families, and friendship. This idea, at least, is a main feature underlying the idea of a well-ordered society:

> The main idea is simply that a well-ordered society (corresponding to justice as fairness) is itself a form of a social union. Indeed, it is a social union of social unions. Both characteristics are present: the successful carrying out of just institutions is the shared final end of

> **all members of society, and these institutional forms are prized as good in themselves.**[3]

Although Rawls goes on to discuss the idea of a social union of social unions, for our purposes we need only summarize three important points. First, the so-called value of community underlies the idea of a well-ordered society. Second, both the conception of the community of humankind and the idea of a social union of social unions are based upon a particular nature of humankind (for which Rawls is quite willing to accept responsibility). Third, and most importantly, we have been brought full circle back to the question of whether stability and/or congruence or neither is a defining or an accompanying characteristic of a well-ordered society. In the above passage, Rawls again has begun to speak of the members of a social union of social unions affirming the institutional forms (congruence), and we might wonder again if such a social union has a tendency towards justice (stability) as a necessary feature of it. Hence, we should now look at "stability" and "congruence."

III. "Congruence"

Let us investigate 'congruence' first since, as Rawls notes in the following passage, congruence may be a crucial factor in determining the stability of a society: "It remains to be shown that this disposition to take up and to be guided by the standpoint of justice accords with the individual's good. Whether these two points of view are congruent is likely to be a crucial factor in determining stability."[6]

Although Rawls is confused about whether or not congruence and stability are defining or accompnaying characteristics of a well-ordered society, at times he speaks of them as accompanying characteristics. Since he addresses the "problems" of stability and congruence, he must speak of the issue, at some point, as an empirical one: "But congruence is not a foregone conclusion even in a well-ordered society. We must verify it."[7] This is quite different than the passage in which we were told that a social union of social unions (a well-ordered society) has both the characteristics of the successful carrying out of just institutions as the shared final end of all of the members of society, and the characteristic that the institutional forms of such a society are prized as good in themselves.[8]

Given this discrepancy, let us turn to Rawls's description of the problem of congruence in the section entitled, "The Good of the Sense of Justice": "The problem is whether the regulative desire to adopt the standpoint of justice belongs to a person's own good when viewed in light of the thin theory with no restrictions on information. We should like to know this desire is indeed rational."[9] In other words, the problem of congruence begins with the fact that from the point of view of justice (society, the institutions of a well-ordered society, etc.) it is good (right) for an individual to uphold and abide by his sense of justice, with which Rawls had provided individuals in the well-ordered society via certain laws of moral psychology. Yet, the problem arises with the question: Is it a good for the individual to abide by/affirm this sense of justice, given that his goods are determined by his life plan which is based upon "goodness as rationality" (Rawls's thin theory of good)?

Now, if we understand the above problem correctly, and if we remember that in Rawls's theory of justice right is prior to good, i.e., individuals choose their goods within the bounds of the principles of justice which are chosen first,[10] then there is a problem of the analyticity of the "problem" of congruence. Since in a well-ordered society an individual chooses his life plans within the bounds of the principles of justice, and since in this social union of social unions it is a good for each individual to affirm the institutions of justice as good in themselves, it is puzzling how there could not be congruence between the individual's good and the good/right from the point of view of society. At one point, Rawls does acknowledge this with respect to the "problem" of congruence:

> If a person wants with deliberative rationality to act from the standpoint of justice above all else, it is rational for him to so act. Therefore, in this form the question is trivial: being the sorts of persons they are, the members of a well-ordered society desire more than anything else to act justly and fulfilling this desire is part of their good. Once we acquire a sense of justice that is truly final and effective, as the precedence of justice requires, we are confirmed in a life plan that, insofar as we are rational, leads us to preserve and to encourage this sentiment.[11]

Although Rawls rightly seeks to avoid this interpretation of the problem of congruence, he does not seek to avoid this interpretation in other places where he discusses the notion of a well-ordered society (see p. 4, for example), as is evidenced by the difficulty of finding an interpretation of 'well-ordered society' which does not include congruence as a seemingly defining characteristic. Second, although Rawls does want to avoid the analytic "problem" of congruence, it is puzzling how it is possible for him to do this, since the goods of each individual are to be chosen within the bounds of the principles of justice; i.e., right is prior to good. Hence, how gruent with right; i.e., the principles of justice? What, then, does Rawls take the real problem of congruence to be?

> The real problem of congruence is what happens if we imagine someone to give weight to his sense of justice only to the extent that it satisfies other descriptions which connect it with reasons specified by the thin theory of good.[12]

Again, how could such a problem ever arise within the confines of Rawls' theory? Unaware of this, Rawls goes on to address the problem by drawing on such elements as the publicity constraint on the principles of justice; the relation between the natural attitudes and acting justly; the good of participating in a well-ordered society; and our desire to express our (Kantian) nature as free and moral persons. From this, Rawls does not conclude that congruence will necessarily hold in a well-ordered contractarian society, but only that it is, "surely more probably than on the utilitarian view."[13]

Perhaps a look at the relationship between congruence and stability will help us to understand just what role the notion of congruence plays in "a well-ordered society":

> It can happen that there are many who do not find a sense of justice for their good; but if so, the forces making for stability are weaker . . . The greater the lack of congruence, the greater the likelihood other things equal, of instability with its attendance evils. Yet, none of this nullifies the collective rationality of the principles of justice; it still is to the advantage of each that everyone should honor them. At least this holds true so long as the conception of justice is not so unstable that some other conception would be preferable.[14]

Surely, the above passage describes the relationship between stability and congruence in at best a confusing way. First we are told that, other things equal, lack of congruence can contribute to instability. Although we shall discuss stability in a moment, at this point, such a claim makes sense intuitively. Then, we are told that it is collectively rational for all of us to honor the principles of justice, since this would be to the good of each of us. Yet, this begins to sound suspicious when we note that Rawls seems to be telling us that we all ought to take the principles of justice as being congruent with our good, since doing this would contribute to our good. However, what is to be shown with respect to the principles and congruence is that the principles are, in fact, congruent with the good of each individual; i.e., that given each individual's life plan, it is rational for each individual to affirm and abide by the principles. Another problem with the above passage, and more important for our concern, is that Rawls tells us that we ought to take a conception of justice as congruent with our good unless it is so unstable as to make some other conception of justice preferable. This implies that even where we took some conception to be congruent to our good, which should contribute to stability, some other factor may make this conception of justice unstable. Hence, something more than congruence contributes to stability. With this in mind, we now turn to a review of Rawls's discussion of stability.

IV. "Stability"

Of the role of the concept 'stability' Rawls tells us:

> Since a well-ordered society endures over time, its conception of justice is presumably stable: that is, when institutions are just (as defined by this conception), those taking part in these arrangements acquire the corresponding sense of justice and desire to do their part in maintaining them. One conception of justice is more stable than another if the sense of justice that it tends to generate is stronger and more likely to override disruptive inclinations and if the institutions it allows foster weaker impulses and temptations to act unjustly. The stability of a conception depends upon a balance of motives: the sense of justice that it cultivates and the aims it encourages must normally win out against propensities toward injustice. To estimate the stability of a conception of justice (and the well-ordered society that it defines), one must examine the relative strength of these opposing tendencies.[15]

Before we discuss some further peculiarities which arise in the above passage, notice that the above passage portrays stability as an empirical matter in relation to a well-ordered society. Yet, strangely enough, congruence is seen to be a defining characteristic of stability: "Those taking part in these arrangements acquire the corresponding sense of justice and desire to do their part in maintaining them." What can this mean but that they take the sense of justice as a good for their life plan? This implies that in a stable society there can be no problem of congruence. Hence, if a well-ordered society turned out to be a stable society, then, by definition, given what we have seen above, there could be no problem of congruence.

Another point of key importance in the above passage has to do with Rawls's use of "well-ordered society." We have already seen that a well-ordered society fosters the so-called value of community. Yet, in this passage, we see that such a feature is not as important to a well-ordered society as we would have thought, since there seem to be as many well-ordered societies as there are conceptions of justice: "To estimate the stability of a conception of justice (and the well-ordered society that it defines), one must examine the relative strength of opposing tendencies." However, what is a well-ordered society if any conception of justice defines one?

Rawls also tells us that although stability is not a decisive feature in favor of a conception of justice, it is, other things equal, an attractive feature which could contribute to the choice of a conception of justice in the original position. Furthermore, he notes that the concepts "stability" and "equilibrium" are to be applied to systems and that in order to define an equilibrium state, three things are essential: "[F]irst, to identify the system and to distinguish between internal and external forces; second, to define the states of the system, a state being a certain configuration of its determining characteristics; and third, to specify the laws connecting the states."[16]

Next, Rawls gives us a definition of "stable" by using the notion of equilibrium and then applies this definition to social systems:

> Now an equilibrium is stable whenever departures from it, caused say by external disturbances, call into play forces within the system that tend to bring it back to this equilibrium state, unless of course the outside shocks are too great . . . Since in practice all social systems are subject to disturbances of some kind, they are practically stable, let us say, if the departures from their preferred equilibrium positions caused by normal disturbances elicit forces sufficiently strong to restore these equilibria after a decent length of time, or else to stay sufficiently close to them.[17]

Given this notion of stability and the accompanying comment on social systems, it is puzzling how this notion of stability could ever apply to "a well-ordered society," as Rawls has used the term, since throughout most of his work, a well-ordered society is seen as an abstraction: "One may think of a public conception of justice as constituting the fundamental charter of a well-ordered human association. Existing societies are of course seldom well-ordered in this sense, for what is just and unjust is usually in dispute."[18] How are we to apply such terms as "practically stable" and "preferred equilibrium positions" to the abstraction of a well-ordered society? To speculate here, we can say that for the abstract notion of a well-ordered society, stability would seem to be a defining characteristic. Yet, we have thin evidence for such a speculation.

Next we are told how the notion of stability most appropriately applies to conceptions of justice:

> The relevant systems here, of course, are the basic structures of the well-ordered societies corresponding to the different conceptions of justice . . . The stability of a conception of justice does not imply that institutions and practices of the well-ordered society do not alter . . . In this context stability means that however institutions are changed, they still remain just or approximately so, as adjustments are made in view of new social circumstances. The inevitable deviations from justice are effectively corrected or held within tolerable bounds by forces within the system. Among these forces I assume that the sense of justice shared by members of the community has a fundamental role.[19]

Again, we are confronted with the idea of well-ordered societies, even though it seems that Rawls earlier wanted to say that a well-ordered society was something more than that which followed from any conception of justice. Second, we notice that stability, as it is to be applied to conceptions of justice, seems to be defined by what has been called elsewhere "the tendency towards justice," of a conception of justice. Third, again congruence is taken (albeit, vaguely) to be a defining characteristic of stability. With reference to stability Rawls tells us: "I assume that the sense of justice shared by the members of the community has a fundamental role." What else could this mean but that they see the affirmation of their sense of justice as a good of their life plans, which in turn leads to stability? Also, coincidentally again then, the question as to how there could be a problem of congruence in a well-ordered society rears its head.

Finally, it is still unclear, even given that congruence is a necessary condition for stability, whether or not stability is a defining characteristic of a well-ordered society. In places, Rawls wants stability to be seen as an empirical matter of some sort. Yet, when we look at Rawls's discussion and definitions, we see that stability seems to be embedded in "well-ordered society." For surely if, as Rawls tells us, a stable society is one in which "the sense of justice that it cultivates and the aims it encourages must normally win out against propensities toward injustice,"[20] and since in a well-ordered society, "the successful carrying out of just institutions is the shared final end of all the members of society, and these institutional forms are prized as good in themselves,"[21] the well-ordered society seems to be stable, by definition, since there do not seem to be any possibilities of propensities toward injustice in such a society.

Since the issues involved do not seem to be resolvable given Rawls's discussion of these matters, we shall attempt to cite some major questions with which Rawls must come to grips concerning "well-ordered society," "congruence" and "stability," and shall also cite what seems to be one major pay-off of our discussion.

V. Conclusion

Four major questions result from our discussion. First, if there is a problem of congruence in Rawls's well-ordered society, then what is a well-ordered society? Second, if congruence is a defining characteristic of stability, and a well-ordered society can have congruence and still not have stability, what other factors lead to instability in a well-ordered society? Third, if any conception of justice defines a well-ordered society, then, again, what is a well-ordered society? Finally, since congruence may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for stability, what is it further that makes Rawls's two principles of justice those that underlie a more stable well-ordered society than the well-ordered societies of competing conceptions of justice?

Now, this final question leads us to at least one major pay-off of the above discussion. If we look to Rawls's second main ground for the principles of justice, we see that it loses its tenability due to the confusions which we have pointed out and because of a faulty assumption on Rawls's part. Here Rawls notes that the second main ground for the two principles of justice is that they would lead to greater stability than other conceptions of justice would:

> Earlier I stated that a strong point in favor of a conception of justice is that it generates its own support . . . A conception of justice is stable when the public recognition of its realization by the social system tends to bring about the corresponding sense of justice . . . Since everyone's good is affirmed, all acquire inclinations to uphold the scheme.[22]

Rawls argues that the above is true of his two principles of justice, but is not true of the principle of utility. His argument is on dubious ground here. First, notice the peculiar way in which Rawls, above, has gone about defining stability in terms of congruence. That is, since everyone's good is affirmed, they acquire inclinations to uphold the scheme. Second, and more importantly, although we could find in Rawls's discussion, at most, the implication that congruence is a necessary condition for stability, according to Rawls's own account of the matter, some other feature may bring about instability. Hence, Rawls mistakenly assumes that because his conception of justice brings about more congruence, it also brings about more stability than competing conceptions do. This is plainly not so, since, as we have seen, some other factors could make his conception of justice just as unstable, if not more so, than other competing conceptions of justice.

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1. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 453-54.
2. Ibid., p. 520.
3. Ibid., pp. 522-23.
4. Ibid., p. 523.
5. Ibid., p. 527.
6. Ibid., p. 567.
7. Ibid., p. 567.
8. Ibid., p. 527.
9. Ibid., p. 567.
10. Ibid., p. 566.
11. Ibid., p. 569.
12. Ibid., p. 569.
13. Ibid., p. 573.
14. Ibid., p. 576.
15. Ibid., pp. 454-55.
16. Ibid., p. 457.
17. Ibid., p. 457.
18. Ibid., p. 5.

19. Ibid., pp. 457-58.
20. Ibid., p. 454.
21. Ibid., p. 527.
22. Ibid., p. 177.

ON YIELDING TO TEMPTATION IN THE CITY OF RAWLS

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I want to look primarily at Mr. Sokolow's contention that Rawls has made the congruence between an individual's good and his sense of justice virtually a matter of definition. To unpack the issues raised here it will be helpful to take a step back and try to gain some perspective on what Rawls is trying to accomplish in his discussion of stability.

Rawls wishes to argue that a society governed by his principles of justice would be stable. That is, it would continue to regulate its affairs by just principles given the normal disturbances to which societies are liable. The structure of his arguments is roughly this. A society is stable when its members for the most part acquire and maintain a suitable sense of justice, and the members of a society acquire and maintain such a sense of justice when there is congruence between their personal good and their sense of justice. The key to the stability argument, then, is to be sought in how individuals acquire and maintain a sense of justice.

Here Rawls presents an argument which depends in part on moral psychology and in part on the kinds of personal goods a just society is supposed to provide for individuals. The key notion is reciprocity. Our attachment to justice is a function of the recognition that just institutions work to our good. Rawls does not exclude selfless devotion to justice. But he assumes that generally devotion to justice is not to be expected when just institutions are so at odds with the interests of the individual as to make attachment to them an act of pure benevolence.

Neither, however, is the commitment to justice just a matter of egoistic calculation. Rather reciprocity recognizes the normal human propensity to develop an attachment to persons and institutions which exhibit concern for one's own well being. The notion is reminiscent of the Biblical claim that we love God because God first loved us.

In Rawls' discussion, he sometimes distinguishes between the acquisition and the maintenance of a sense of justice. In the latter case he imagines the commitment to justice as conditional. As Mr. Sokolow and Rawls both note, this is intended to avoid making the issue trivial. A person devoted to justice above all will, of course, find justice to be congruent with his own good. No conflict between justice and inclination is possible.

But Sokolow thinks that Rawls' formulation is trivial nonetheless. If the principles of justice are part of the conditions of choice for particular goods, how then could an individual choose some good which was incompatible with justice? Now Rawls' claim in considering the individual whose sense of justice is conditional is not that his individual good is selected in conjunction with the two principles, but that it is constrained by the thin theory of good. Rawls uses the thin theory of good to "secure the premises about primary goods required to arrive at the principles of justice."[1] The thin theory of good does not, then, contain the principles of justice. It is assumed in their selection. Thus, Rawls' formulation of the problem does permit (in theory) the individual to have goods which might lead him astray from his commitment to justice. The thin theory of the good does not logically preclude goods which are unjust or which though not unjust can be pursued unjustly.

But Mr. Sokolow's dilemma can be put more forcefully in psychological rather than logical terms. Justice may not be embedded in the thin theory of the good, but it is part of the moral education of people in a just society. Perhaps Rawls takes this moral education too seriously and, thus, has difficulty conceiving of individuals in a just society as being seriously tempted to chuck their sense of justice in order to pursue their private aims. He starts out to show us that people who are first and foremost attached to their own good would acquire and maintain a suitable sense of justice because they recognize that their good is affirmed by justice. But he ends up with such a sanctified sense of what individuals would take their good to be that their moral dilemma is unreal. He lacks perhaps a sense of original sin. People raised in a just society seem not to have serious temptations.

To pursue this psychologized version of Sokolow's problem, we need a larger picture of Rawls' strategy in his stability argument. Here it has to be kept clear that Rawls' foil is utilitarianism. Rawls holds utilitarianism to be less stable than justice as fairness because it allows some people to benefit at the expense of others. Thus, utilitarianism asks poor people to adhere to its view of justice when it is against their interests to do so. For them a sense of justice becomes an exercise in pure altruism. On his view, Rawls claims, acquiring and maintaining a sense of justice requires only reciprocity. Men will acquire and maintain an attachment to principles which place others in cooperative, convivial, and supportive relations with them.

It may help to think of Rawls as basically trying to show that justice as fairness, unlike utilitarianism, does not generate class conflict. Class conflict, after all, results from a situation where the legitimate good of a significant group of individuals is at odds with the prevailing social arrangements. The constant contrast with utilitarianism suggests this approach as does Rawls' treatment of the problem of envy. Under justice as fairness, Rawls holds, those who are least advantaged accept their lot recognizing that they could not be better off under other arrangements and that the affluence of those who are better off works to their good.

Consider now an argument to show that class conflict is in fact a problem under justice as fairness. It is conceivable that under justice as fairness some class of persons could have interests which would be frustrated by justice as fairness and would thus erode or prevent a commitment to it. This may be the case for the more advantaged members of a Rawlsian society. They might be held to reason that their pursuit of their legitimate objectives is frustrated by the requirement to maximize the well being of the disadvantaged. They could be better off if they were permitted to keep what they earn in a pure market economy. They are, thus, being exploited for the sake of the undeserving poor. Rawls counters this with the suggestion that the affluent would accept justice as fairness because they recognize that doing so is necessary to secure the cooperation of the less affluent and that such cooperation is a prerequisite of their affluence. They might, of course, also feel that the cooperation of the less affluent could be secured by education, propaganda, or simple force.

Now Mr. Sokolow's fundamental contention (in my psychologized version) is that Rawls tends to generate a trivial response to such issues by so circumscribing the sorts of interests people can or would have under justice as fairness so as to preclude people from entertaining interests which would generate defection. He imagines Rawls as saying, in effect, "People under justice as fairness would be raised so that such nasty thoughts would not be entertained by them." Such a claim could be true. Given an optimistic view of human nature and a social order which in fact is convivial, supportive, and works to everyone's advantage, people might function this way. For those of us who are more cynical, however, such a formulation avoids the issues.

What we cynics want to know is whether justice as fairness could produce a society which would generate sufficient incentives for all classes of persons such that a general commitment to justice as fairness might be expected to result from the pursuit of interests which real people raised in a reasonably just society might be expected to have. Even in a just society the poor may be envious, the affluent may have an incentive to defect, and people will be tempted to cheat on their income tax. A just society may or may not generate benefits sufficient to overcome these temptations to defect. It would be surprising if it generated a purity of conscience which eliminated temptation itself.

It would be my suggestion that Rawls does present a non-trivial version of the problem. Such a version is logically possible. Moreover, Rawls' discussions of utilitarianism, envy, moral psychology, and the goods provided by a just society indicate that Rawls engages the substantive questions of how real people would act in a possible society. I would prefer to see him faulted for failing on substantive issues (such as the problem of securing the cooperation of the affluent) than on his formal structuring of the issues. Generally, I think it is important not to treat issues in Rawls as though Rawls was engaged in an exercise in conceptual analysis. To be sure some of Rawls' concepts are less than sharp. In this case, the concepts at issue are sharp enough to permit us to focus on the substantive issues of moral psychology and class antagonism which are at the heart of Rawls' discussion.

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1. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 396.

(Fourth Concurrent Session)

MORALITY AND EDUCATIONAL PROCESS

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In chapter one of *Ethics and Education* Professor Peters addresses the question, "Is any technique educational which serves to further legitimate educational ends?"[1] For Peters, you will recall, to be educational an interaction or process or technique not only must involve the intentional bringing about of desirable states of mind, but also must be carried out in a morally unobjectionable manner. Consequently, his answer is a determined "No!" Conditioning, on the one hand, can be ruled out as an educational process because it involves treating the learner not as a person but as a bundle of reaction tendencies without a mind of his own, while what he calls "techniques of command and formal instruction" (in later chapters he allows that these techniques can be coercive), on the other hand, have a proper place because in an important sense they require that the learner know what he is doing and that he act as a voluntary agent. This theme is taken up and elaborated upon by Thomas Benson in a 1974 article entitled "On Making Offers That Can't Be Refused."[2] Benson supports the position that the concept of education excludes some "procedures of transmission on the grounds that they lack wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner." After examining the major terms of his formula, Benson concludes that B manifests the kind of voluntariness necessary for an activity or interaction or process to be educational only if B both has *the ability* to refuse to engage in y and a *reasonable opportunity* to refuse to engage in y. In this paper I hope to demonstrate that, while Peters and Benson on occasion come close to the heart of the matter only to shy away again, their accounts are substantially incorrect. My plan is to focus on the much discussed concept of coercion: to review what I will label the standard analysis of the concept; to determine the reasons why we generally presume it morally reprehensible that A coerce B to do y; to outline the conditions which might lead us to over-ride this presumption both generally and in educational settings; to note the respects in which the Peters-Benson account fails; and finally, to offer a competing account of the criteria of educational process.

Despite the widespread philosophical attention received by the notion, the concept of coercion remains extremely controversial. Even if I were to resolve all the points of dispute associated with the concept, I would not attempt to do so in this paper. My intent in this introduction is simply to provide enough of a working understanding of "coercion" so that we might fathom the reasons which ground the general presumption that it is morally objectionable for A to coerce B to do y. I have decided to utilize the Bernard Gert account of coercion as the "standard" analysis for two reasons: first, although I will not attempt to defend this claim, the Gert account is subject to fewer telling criticisms than any other detailed analysis of the concept; and secondly, the Gert account turns on many of the same notions that Benson uses in his explication of voluntariness, thus, allowing us to spot more readily the points at which the Peters-Benson position fails.

Gert distinguishes between a wide and a narrow sense of coercion.[3] In the wide sense A is coercing B whenever A threatens to cause B (or someone B cares about) some harm unless B does (or refrains from doing) y. In the narrow sense A is coercing B whenever A threatens to cause B (or someone B cares about) some harm unless B does (or refrains from doing) y *and* said threat provides B with an unreasonable incentive for doing (or refraining from doing) y. An incentive is unreasonable if it would be unreasonable to expect any rational man in that situation not to act on it. Coercion in the wide sense does not necessarily limit freedom. Only when the threatened harm is great enough to provide an unreasonable incentive does it necessarily limit freedom. Thus Gert is able to distinguish acts of negotiation from acts of coercion. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, so Gert argues, is in a position effectively to threaten the other side with unreasonable incentives. Both sides have the power to inflict such enormous harm upon the other side that it would be pointless for either side to threaten to do so. While they may coerce, in the wide sense of pressure with reasonable incentives, in doing so they do not restrict each other's freedom. (From this point on, whenever I refer to coercion, it should be understood as coercion in the narrow sense.)

The notion of unreasonable incentive is also crucial to Gert's distinction between liberty and power. A man is free to do y if and only if he has a reasonable opportunity to do y and there are no unreasonable incentives influencing his will either to do or not to do y (he is not being coerced). But a man may be free to do y and not have the voluntary ability to do y. A voluntary ability is composed of both a physical ability and an ability to will. B may be free to dance at his junior prom, but lack the technical (he doesn't know how) or the physical (his legs are in casts) or volitional (he is pathologically afraid of dancing in public) abilities to do so. In short, B may be powerless to dance at his prom. B lacks the volitional power (the ability to will) to dance at his prom, so this account goes, when there are no reasonable incentives that would lead him to dance at his prom. A man has the ability to will to do y if and only if there are reasonable incentives that would lead him to do y and reasonable incentives that would lead him not to do y. Thus, Gert is able to distinguish between normal people caught in extraordinary circumstances who will to do an act (or refrain from acting) because they were subjected to unreasonable incentives (in other words, because they were either coerced or they lacked reasonable opportunity) and the mentally ill who either intentionally do an act because they do not have the ability to do otherwise, or who are unable to do an act which normal persons would consider reasonable because they are unable to will to do the act.

To be perfectly precise, both the voluntary ability to do y and doing y intentionally are presupposed in claims that B did y freely or B did y unfreely. Thus we can deny that a man who does y compulsively does y freely without calling such an act unfree. Instead, we can say that because his act was not voluntary, the question as to whether or not it was free does not even arise. Only when B does y because of some unreasonable incentives should we say straightforwardly that he did not act freely. And if the unreasonable incentives were the result of threat by some other person A, then B acted under coercion.

While this brief discussion does not begin to do justice to Gert's detailed account, it will suffice for our present purposes.

The question we must ponder now is "For what reasons do we generally presume coercion to be morally objectionable?" Some have argued, wrongly I think, that coercion is necessarily evil, that like murder coercion entails the violation of a moral principle or duty.[4] My own view and what I take to be Gert's view also is that the concept identifies a class of complex actions and relationships characterized by a particular structure. Although it happens that in the great majority of situations in which this structure obtains, we find a moral trespass, such is not necessarily the case. It is not immoral, for instance, to use coercion to disarm a sniper randomly shooting passersby on a crowded city street. Nevertheless, while coercion is not necessarily evil, there does seem to be *a general presumption* against its use. The use of coercion demands some justification. That is to say, the occasion of coercion provides *prima facie* grounds for judging that the coercer has violated a moral principle such that unless some justifying reason is available, we judge the coercer's actions morally reprehensible.

Surely, the reason for presuming coercion evil is our sense that coercion is somehow diametrically opposed to the ideas of freedom and autonomy. When B is in a standard choice-situation the following obtain: (a) he has a determinate set of resources at his disposal; (b) he is confronted with a set of opportunity costs: if he pursues x he must forego y; (c) he has goals forming an ordered preference set, in the light of which he makes choices; and (d) he has a set of beliefs about (a), (b), and (c), e.g., about the relation of resources, as means, to his goals.[5] When A coerces B to do y, A affects B's options by adversely rigging (b), by attaching severe costs to not doing y that would not otherwise be present. To do so without some justifying reason is to violate what we have come to call the principle of respect for persons. Kant expressed it, somewhat cryptically perhaps, in his second formulation of the categorical imperative: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."[6] More contemporary thinkers explain that to respect a person B is to value or cherish B for what he is—and that is, a possessor of the ability to choose for himself, to formulate purposes, plans and policies in light of his own goals and to carry out these plans without undue reliance on the help of others. In a word, to respect B as a person is to respect B's right to be self-determining. Whenever

A coerces B to do y without some justifying reason, then, we hold A's conduct morally blameworthy on the ground that A's actions violate B's right to pursue, subject to certain social limitations, his own ends.

The further question, of course, is "What kinds of reasons would be sufficient to over-ride the presumption against coercion?" Now, the first thing to notice about this question is that, if Kant and his disciples were correct in claiming respect for persons the ultimate principle of morality,[7] then it would seem to be impossible to ever find a reason for acting any stronger than the principle of respect for persons and consequently, we might think, impossible to ever imagine conditions in which it would be morally permissible to over-ride the presumption against coercion. The flaw in this line of thinking (our sniper example assures us there must be *some* flaw) rests with our supposition that we need a *different* reason for over-riding the presumption against coercion than the reason we have for establishing the presumption in the first place. Consider the possibility that the reason we give *for* coercing mught be the *very same* reason we have for establishing and sustaining the presumption against coercion, and that is the value we place on self-determination. The point I want to make in this section, one which is absolutely critical to the thesis of this paper, is that reasons which support a general pattern of action may permit or even require a departure from that general pattern in special circumstances. Thus, to borrow an example used by Gregory Vlastos in a different context, my reasons for eating three meals a day are, say, pleasure and physical need; but for these same reasons I might eat on special occasions four or five meals in a single day, or two or one.[8] While the analogy is not perfect, it does provide a rough idea of how we might concede justified exceptions to the presumption against coercion without jeopardizing the ultimacy of the principle of respect for persons. In the case of our sniper, for instance, A is justified in threatening to shoot sniper B if B does not lay down his rifle, on the ground that B's actions grossly violate the rights of his victims. It is precisely because we value so highly the principle of respect for persons, then, that in this particular set of circumstances, we feel justified in coercing. No less a reason, however, because B is black, because A wants B's gun for himself, because an angry spectator may seek to harm B, or whatever, would be sufficient for justifying the coercive act.

But let us return to education. In regard to the use of coercion as a morally legitimate educational technique, the same situation would seem to obtain. The only reason which could over-ride the presumption against coercion would be the very reason we have for establishing that presumption in the first place and for affirming it after critical scrutiny, and that is the value we place on self-determination. It would appear that no theory of education could meet this condition in the case of competent adults. To defend the coercion of adults for educational purposes we would be required to demonstrate how such coercion *conforms* to the principle of respect for persons. But since what is fundamental to this principle is that persons be at liberty to formulate plans in light of their own goals, it would be self-defeating to coerce B to do y, even if we were convinced y served B's best interests. The freedom to pursue one's own ends without interference is of value quite independently of the value or disvalue of the ends opted for.[9]

In the case of children, however, while we could not properly coerce them simply on the ground that they were likely to harm themselves in the process of pursuing their own goals (the standard paternalist position), there does appear to be a compelling justification for coercion. It is proper to coerce children (and, perhaps, certain kinds of disabled adults) for educational purposes just when they lack the mature physical, intellectual and volitional abilities prerequisite to full personhood, provided that it is reasonable to view particular acts of coercion as indispensable to a comprehensive program of experiences designed to promote the development of just those mature abilities which they presently lack. Thus, while we coerce children to attend school and to "behave" in school, that is to say, we threaten them with harms (such as corporal punishment) which it would be unreasonable to expect them not to act upon, in the process, we do not, so this line of reasoning might affirm, violate the principle of respect for persons. On the contrary, it might be argued that the coercion of children for educational purposes represents the paradigm expression of a faithful adherence to that principle. Since it is unlikely that children will acquire the abilities prerequisite to personhood without some type of adult direction, to forbid adults from interfering in their affairs is, in effect, to sentence children to lives with permanent disabilities. To design for children a comprehensive program of experiences (which, on particular occasions, necessarily involves coercion), aimed at developing the abilities prerequisite to personhood, on the other hand, is to act on the understanding that "the only freedom of enduring importance is a freedom. . .which is power."[10] Coercion in the service of educational goals is not disrespectful of the persons of children but, on the contrary, the only means adults have for ensuring that the immature develop full personality.

A detractor might object to this line of reasoning on either one of two counts. First, it is simply false, he might argue, that adults must coerce children in order to educate them. There exist an indefinite number of other available means by which the job of "person building" can be accomplished. Moreover, many of these alternative techniques are patently more "humane" than coercion. Adults typically opt for coercion, he might submit, because it is easier, that is, because it requires less effort on their part than other techniques. Secondly, the picture painted here is too stark. Adults are not fully self-determining and children are not totally disabled. There exist a wide range of abilities within each classification. To lump all adults into one group and all children into another regardless of their differing abilities is to betray, on another level, the principle you have claimed to uphold.

There is something to these objections. Indeed, there are several means other than coercion by which we might seek to educate our young. We might manipulate them, for instance, by structuring their environment so as to bring about changes in their actions or beliefs in ways not apparent to the children themselves. Or, if the word "manipulation" conjures up disagreeable images, we might, as Dewey recommends, "guide" or "direct" children by structuring the objective conditions of their environment in such a way that each child's interaction with his or her environment results in the creation of worthwhile experiences. What we must notice, however, is that whatever technique we employ with children, even "direction," would, like coercion, if utilized on competent adults, be presumed morally objectionable on respect for persons grounds. Correspondingly, the one technique that we would not object to in connection with competent adults, namely the use of rational persuasion, is totally ineffectual with those incapable of rationality. Coercion is not the only technique at the disposal of the educator of children, but all effective alternative means share the same general analysis we have proposed for coercion: they stand in need of moral justification which, it would seem, could only be supplied by reference to the development of just those abilities prerequisite to full personhood.[11] (This is not to say, of course, that there may not be good reasons, say consequentialist ones, for preferring one technique over another.)

To meet our detractor's second charge we will have to explicate the distinction between adults and children. An adult is one who possesses at least the minimum capacities, abilities, and inclinations prerequisite to full personhood; a child is one who, due to physical or experiential immaturity, is not adult. Age is generally used as the criterion for distinguishing adults from children not because it is precise, but because despite its attendant injustices, it results in a relatively equitable distribution of injustice among all social classes.[12] What we must realize is that in treating adults as persons it is proper to prescribe a general rule (one of non-interference). With children, however, it is not obvious at any specific moment what action is called for in order to fully comply with the principle of respect for persons. There is no general rule. Even if we concede to parents and teachers the shared responsibility for developing the abilities prerequisite to personhood, as our detractor has correctly pointed out, there are any number of ways in which this responsibility can be discharged. Two considerations, though, would seem mandatory. No technique could be permitted which does not further the goal of the enterprise. Although perhaps obvious, this criterion is worth noting since it is the only one by which we can eliminate such practices as indoctrination and the use of hypnosis or certain drugs. It is because they do not serve to develop the abilities prerequisite to self-determination, but, on the contrary, induce bias and dependency, that such techniques must be rejected as anti-educational. Secondly, it would seem that the technique chosen must be roughly consistent with the child's present stage of development. It might be appropriate to lift a two-year old, reluctant to walk, to his feet, but such bodily force seems seriously out of place as a means of getting a high school senior to do her algebra homework. Similarly, the mother who understands that her attention can be "rewarding" to her young child, and who consequently takes care to reward, as much as is possible, only those behaviors which are conducive to that child's personal growth, is being singularly faithful to her office as educator. How we would evaluate a high school English teacher who passes out tokens for the successful completion of workbook assignments, on the other hand, is much less certain. As children develop toward full personhood, then, to be completely faithful to the principle of respect for persons, we must adjust our educational techniques to account for and accord with their maturing abilities.[13]

In conclusion, let me note how the Peters-Benson position fails. You will recall that Peters holds that the use of coercive commands is a morally legitimate educational technique because in an important sense it requires that the learner know what he is doing and act as a voluntary agent. Benson clarifies this position by arguing that B manifests the kind of voluntariness necessary for an activity or process to be educational only if B both has *the ability* to refuse to engage in y and a *reasonable opportunity* to refuse to engage in y. Conditioning, on the other hand, is illegitimate, since it treats the learner not as a person, but as a bundle of reaction tendencies.

Peters and Benson are correct only to the extent that they realize educational process must be made consistent with respect for persons criteria. As we have argued, however, doing this does not justify, unconditionally, any particular technique. With the very young, who lack almost completely the physical, intellectual, and volitional abilities prerequisite to full personhood, adherence to the principle of respect for persons obliges the educator to utilize techniques which would be unjustified in other settings. Because the child does not have the ability to refuse to engage in what is transpiring or because the technique is behavioral does not *per se* eliminate it from being educational or *per se* make it morally suspect. The criteria for judging educational techniques morally legitimate or illegitimate are (1) the extent to which said techniques promote the development of the abilities prerequisite to full personhood, and (2) the extent to which said techniques accord (roughly) with the individual's present stage of development. As the child approaches adulthood, consequently, educators should more and more depend on those techniques which would be appropriate with competent adults, namely techniques of rational persuasion. The goal of the enterprise of educating children, of course, is the formation of a fully competent, mature person, able to determine for him or herself, among other things, whether he or she should continue his or her formal education or not.

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1. Peters, R.S., *Ethics and Education* (Atlanta: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1967).

2. Benson, Thomas, "On Making Offers That Can't Be Refused," *Educational Theory*, Vol. 24, 1974, pp. 219-75.

3. Gert,Bernard, "Coercion and Freedom," *Coercion*, Pennock and Chapman, eds. (Chicago: Aldine, Atherton, Inc., 1972), pp. 30-48.

4. See, for instance, Wolf, R.P., "Is Coercion 'Ethically Neutral'?", *ibid.*, pp. 144-147, and Haksar, Vinit, "Coercive Proposals," *Political Theory*, Vol. 4, 1976, pp. 65-79.

5. I am indebted to Stanley Benn for both this insightful analysis of the standard choice situation and his provocative account of the notion of autonomy. See Benn, S.I., "Freedom, Autonomy and the Concept of A Person," *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, 1975-76, pp. 109-130.

6. Kant, Immannuel, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Paton, H.J. (New York: Harper, 1964), p. 96.

7. The most successful attempt to argue for the ultimacy of the principle of respect for persons is found in Downie, R.S., and Telfer, Elizabeth, *Respect for Persons* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969), ch. II.

8. Vlastos, G., "Justice and Equality," *Human Rights*, Melden, A.I., ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 83-84.

9. See Mill's classic explication of this in Mill, J.S., *On Liberty* (Indianapolis: Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956), pp. 58-59.

10. Dewey, J., *Experience and Education* (New York: Collier-MacMillan, 1938), pp. 61-64.

11. I can imagine a second defense of the coercion of children which turns on the idea that, lacking the intellectual abilities of competent adults, children must be protected from the harm which might result from acting, without regard to consequences, solely on impulse or desire. I examine this version of the standard paternalist theme in Sutton, Thomas L., "Human Rights and Children" *Educational Theory*, Spring, 1978. There would appear to be no reason for regarding adult-child interactions justified in this manner as essentially educational, however. Consequently, because we are concerned in this essay with the moral status of *educational* techniques, such a defense, while perhaps cogent, is irrelevant.

12. For a detailed defense of this position see Schrag, Francis, "From Childhood to Adulthood: Assigning Rights and Responsibilities," unpublished article, forthcoming.

13. I realize that this second criterion is quite general, but short of cataloguing all possible techniques against an index of the stages of child development, I do not see an easy alternative. The point I want to make is that just as our obligation to forebear from interfering in the affairs of adults is based, in part, on recognition of their mature abilities, so our choice of educational techniques for children must rest on a recognition of their *maturing* abilities.

(Fourth Concurrent Session)

Response to Sutton

DO WORTHY EDUCATIONAL GOALS JUSTIFY COERCIVE TECHNIQUES?

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1. Introduction

In an important, interesting and elegant paper, Thomas Sutton argues for an affirmative answer to the question: Do worthy educational goals justify virtually any coercive techniques (with the possible exception of conditioning)? In doing so, Sutton argues against a rather fashionable and entrenched view held by Peters and more recently by Benson to the effect that education rules out some techniques as morally and educationally impermissible. Peters, you may recall, holds that two criteria, wittingness and voluntariness, restrict what counts as educational. Sutton proposes two competing criteria, Respect for Persons and Readiness, which may override wittingness and voluntariness. Sutton finds that wittingness and voluntariness are too underdeveloped to be serviceable in distinguishing morally legitimate from morally illegitimate educational techniques. Sutton does not tell us under what conditions to invoke wittingness and voluntariness. Moreover, underdeveloped criteria may be underserviceable but being underserviceable does not entail unserviceable, analogous to the way "life" and "human" may be underdefinable but are not for that reason undefinable.

What makes Sutton's paper interesting—and somewhat perplexing—is that Sutton seems to imply that the Kantian Principle of Respect for Persons may justify the use of a narrow and even harmful kind of coercion as "educational." I will try to show that harmful coercion and not rigorously invoking wittingness and voluntariness are inconsistent with and not conducive toward achieving Respect for Persons. Finally, I will question Respect for Persons itself.

2. At Stake

At stake are meanings of key terms in education. Whether Sutton is right or wrong depends, it seems, on defensible usage. According to Sutton, the standard account of coercion, for example, entails threat of harm. However, as my colleague Robert Olson has put it, "'I coerced X but didn't threaten him' is no contradiction." While Sutton chooses the example of threatening to harm a sniper or unruly child, other writers pick different examples of coercion, such as "imprisonment"[1] and "taxation,"[2] which need not entail threat of harm. Still other writers, such as Bentham, Hohfeld and Dewey identify coercion not as the opposite but as the correlative of freedom.

The prevention of harm to onself and others rather than the threat of harm is accordingly identified by some writers as a "liberty-limiting principle."[3] An officer guarding an unsafe bridge, according to Mill, may forcibly restrain a person who does not know from crossing. These and other examples, such as a mother forcing a child out of the way of harm, show that coercion need not entail threat. Nor does coercion need to involve a breach of Peters' criteria of wittingness and voluntariness. Invoking a liberty-limiting principle of avoiding harm to onself or others supplemented with some sort of benefit principle such as the good taxation brings may also justify a not so pejorative form of coercion. When coercion is viewed as the correlative, not the opposite of freedom, concern with overriding the presumption against coercion need not arise, analogous to the way a desirable purchasable commodity entails a price.

We might distinguish between (at least) two kinds of coercion, harmful and beneficial, noting that Peters, for example, argues that corporal punishment (which Sutton does not rule out) is "unlikely to be beneficial." Harmful coercion, such as threatening a sniper or unruly child, far from being conducive to liberty, seems to be antithetical to the development of Respect for Persons.

Sutton's offending sentence then seems to be this: "Thus, while we coerce children to attend school and to 'behave'. . .that is. . .we threaten them with harms (such as corporal punishment). . .in the process we do not. . .violate the principle of respect for persons". Plato in the *Republic* (355e) affirms that to do justice is never to do harm. The first rule of medicine is: Do no harm. It is also the first rule of education as well as of justice. Coercion that threatens or does harm is a breach of Respect for Persons. On the other hand, coercion on behalf of wittingness and voluntariness, such as making students aware of what they need to know in order to achieve Respect for Persons may be viewed as a beneficial form of coercion.

There may, however, be some exception to imparting wittingness and voluntariness as a necessary condition for developing Respect for Persons- and this I think is the interesting and plausible part of Sutton's paper. We may recall an example suggested by Michael Tooley.[5] If we could give a cat an injection thereby making a cat's brain the equivalent of a human brain, Tooley would attribute to such a cat the serious right to live which we now only confer upon persons. Adapting Tooley's example, if we could inject people with Respect for Persons but do so without asking them and not let them know this was being done, such an injection would show how a worthy educational goal could justify virtually any coercive techniques. This would, however, even include conditioning (as in *Clockwork Orange*), hypnosis, ritalin, electric shock, giving placebos and deception. We could even in some instances retain wittingness and voluntariness and inject Respect for Persons with consent as we now perform surgically beneficial procedures with consent. What adapting Tooley's cat example to Sutton's question shows, I think, is that some aspects of development necessary for Respect for Persons may not make wittingness and voluntariness necessary. Tooley's adapted example may reveal an important truth about the periphery of "education," that some commonly accepted (beneficially) coercive measures such as toilet training and other forms of habituation contribute to Respect for Persons. But are such coercive techniques at the center of educational and morally permissible techniques, ones centrally pertinent to developing Respect for Persons? The answer, it seems, depends on defensible definitions and uses of key terms in education.

To resolve the problem of defining key terms in education, such as "coercion," "morality" "Respect for Persons," and "education," we may adopt a distinction made by Joel Feinberg between the scope of a term and its inner core, which Feinberg applies to First Amendment freedoms.[6] According to this distinction, exceptions may be made to the scope but not the core of a term such as "free speech," where tampering with the core of free speech would undermine the Constitution itself.

On this view, the scope of "coercion" may include harmful and threatening forms but not its inner core. There may be force and coercion in education, but while these may be educational within the scope of "education," coercion and especially harmful coercion and coercion which does not invoke wittingness and voluntariness, however underdefined these criteria are, would not, on this view, be regarded within the core of "education." Nor does one achieve the core of Respect for Persons by not explicitly invoking wittingness and voluntariness. Threatening children with harms, such as corporal punishment, undermines the core of what constitutes an educational activity. On this view, the core of an educational activity rules out coercion in the negative sense outlined by Sutton; and this core of education also rules out activities that waive wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the student. For at the heart of the meaning of "education" are rational activities, both those that are in themselves rational and that are conducive to the achievement of rational aims, such as Respect for Persons. Coercing a sniper or child by threatening harms as well as waiving wittingness and voluntariness may fall within the scope of "coercion," "morality," "Respect for Persons," and "education," but to coerce a child by threatening harm is ruled out by the core of what is educational and morally permissible. Techniques for inculcating Respect for Persons by Tooley type injections, as with ritalin and the use of other tranquilizing drugs as well as toilet training accordingly fall within the scope but not the core of "education".

The scope of "education" may be singled out, in particular, to include "culturation," "initiation," "socialization," "indoctorination," "training," and on some accounts may even include negative and harmful coercion. In this connection, Thomas Green, for example, argues that education is "like an instrument. It may be used to barbarize or civilize."[7] In this sense, one may speak of a Spartan or Nazi educational system. This distinction shows that although the use of "education" to denote a particular educational system, one that uses harmful coercion, may fit within the scope of education, such a use of "education" is ruled out by the inner core of "education," which implies normative restrictions against irrational and harmful techniques. Education at its core, like justice and medicine, rules out harm. Unwitting and involuntary techniques of transmission are harmful to the core of "education" and are therefore ruled out. And even beneficial coercion, such as toilet training or preventing a child from walking in front of a car etc. are also ruled out from the core unless accompanied—at least retrospectively—by wittingness and voluntariness.

Ample arguments and evidence cited by Dewey as well as before and since his work, shows that harmful coercion and waiving wittingness and voluntariness are not conducive to Respect for Persons; and to put this point positively, the way to teach democracy, freedom and Respect for Persons is to practice these.

3. *Respect for Persons is not the Only Goal*

There are other difficulties besides Sutton's inconsistency between harmfully coercive techniques and Respect for Persons. Sutton assumes that Respect for Persons is a defensible goal of education, suggesting at times that it is an ultimate or exclusive goal. This assumption is not fully supported, namely that there are no other overriding goals of education. Respect for Persons moreover presupposes the fulfillment of economic conditions. These conditions of autonomy seem to be glossed over.

"Respect for Persons" is plural and questions fester. How many persons shall be respected? Due to acute scarcities in the world, Respect for Persons is not possible to achieve for most people. The question Sutton's criterion does not help us with is: Which persons are to be respected? Whichever the answer, there will not be respect for every person. Hence, Respect for Persons is at least partly an underdefinable, possibly even an incoherent notion.

This leads to the point that however laudable Respect for Persons may be or appear, Respect for Persons is not necessarily the ultimate or exclusive goal of education. Another at least equally important goal is social and economic justice, which Rawls' work shows is a condition for making Respect for Persons possible in the first place.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, Sutton identifies an important problem, viz, whether an educational goal presumed worthy justifies virtually any coercive techniques. But I contend, contra Sutton, that Respect for Persons or any other worthy goal is not achievable by harmful coercion or by not explicitly invoking wittingness and voluntariness, however underdefined these criteria are. Underdefined criteria need not be unserviceable. The core of "education" rules out harmful coercion and breaches of wittingness and voluntariness. The way to learn Respect for Persons, democracy, freedom and decision-making is to practice these. An exception is presented by adapting the example of Tooley's cat; and it shows that some aspects that contribute to Respect for Persons such as toilet training have a role in personality development. But this type of exception to the way we develop, as illustrated in *Clockwork Orange* and in *One Flew Over the Cookoo's Nest*, such as psychosurgery or certain drugs, is peripheral, not central to the core of "education." Respect for Persons is moreover not the only goal of education. Living together with social and economic justice is another and possibly more vital educational goal. I conclude accordingly that any worthy educational goal, such as Respect for Persons, at its core, rules out harmful coercion and entails wittingness and voluntariness. In the presence of harmful coercion or the absence of wittingness and voluntariness, Respect for Persons is vacuous.

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1. Virginia Held, "Coercion and Coercive Offers" in J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds.) *Coercion* (New York: Atherton, 1972), p. 54. Held is quoting J.R. Lucas.

2. Joel Feinberg, *Social Philosophy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 29-30 and 54.

3. This account is heavily indebted to Joel Feinberg's *Social Philosophy*, Chapters 2 and 3.

4. R.S. Peters, *Ethics and Education* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966, p. 276.

5. Michael Tooley, "Abortion and Infanticide" in S. Gorovitz et al. (eds.) *Moral Problems in Medicine* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 314-15.

6. Joel Feinberg, *Social Philosophy*, pp. 80-82.

7. Thomas F. Green, "A Topology of the Teaching Concept" in B. Bandman and R.S. Guttchen (eds.) *Philosophical Essays on Teaching* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1969), p. 65.

CAN ROBIN BARROW BE HAPPY AND NOT KNOW IT?

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I think so. He thinks not.

Barrow does not analyse "happiness" in his book *Plato, Utilitarianism, and Education*[1] as an end in itself, but in order to address several other theses which include: (1) that Plato was a utilitarian in the Republic, (2) that Plato's implicit view of happiness is consistent with his (i.e., Barrow's), and (3) that the "liberal-democrats", (e.g., Karl Popper, Bertrand Russell and R.H.S. Crossman) fail to recognize that Plato makes his totalitarian proposals in the *Republic* for the sake of happiness, and that might justify them. All of these, however, are intended to support Barrow's central and overarching view, namely, that *happiness*, not freedom nor autonomy, is the only ultimate end towards which education should be directed. (p. 198)

Barrow's objections to the defenders of 'autonomy' and 'self-development' in education are essentially the same objections he has against the "liberal-democrats" in the social and political spheres. He argues that it is not possible to hold "freedom," "equality" and "happiness" as ultimate first principles of equal weight, as the "liberal-democrats" do, without having these principles conflict in every significant case, or without being arbitrary, or usually both. He also argues that freedom (and/or autonomy) is not a coherent *end* in itself, but can only be pursued as a *means* to something else. And that something, for Barrow, is happiness. He is therefore quite prepared to sacrifice autonomy as an educational aim.

It is clear, then, that Barrow's analysis of happiness is of considerable importance to his overall argument. I shall, therefore, restrict myself to an examination of Barrow's analysis of "happiness," and to a discussion of why I find this view wanting.

Barrow's Analysis of Happiness

It may help to understand what Barrow means by "happiness" to consider what he thinks is wrong with earlier attempts to analyze the concept. He points out, for example, that a frequent gambit is to provide content to "happiness" by listing certain external conditions such as health, wealth, companionship, or a job of work to do, as constituting the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for being happy. But Barrow points out that no such list, *nor indeed this procedure,* will do the job, since it is *not* logically odd to say such things as: "I am healthy but not happy," or "I am rich and unhappy," or "I like my job, but I am unhappy." There is considerable evidence to suggest that people can be, and are, happy in "the most bewildering variety of circumstances." And as Barrow says: "If Diogenes says that he is happy in his barrel, and the martyr on the cross, our analysis of 'happy' must take account of these examples before we rule them out." (p. 52)

Similarly, Barrow argues against any set of "mental attitudes" as being either necessary or sufficient for happiness. One might, for example, suggest certain characteristics such as curiosity, clerverness, being long-suffering, or dull, etc., as either necessary or sufficient for happiness. But, as Barrow points out, we could in fact find people with none of these traits who might be said to be happy. Again, it is neither contradictory nor odd to say such things as: "He is dull but happy," or "He is intellectually curious and clever but unhappy." Thus, as Barrow argues, no list of specific external circumstances, nor list of specific mental attitudes will suffice as an analysis of "happiness," because there can always be cases in principle and in fact where these conditions are fulfilled but happiness is not present, and vice versa.

In general, the reason, such analyses fail is that "happiness" is not a description of a set of *circumstances* nor of certain *character traits,* but rather "happiness involves a *relation* between two variables, the person and his circumstances." And since peoples' characters and circumstances differ indeterminately, it is futile to attempt to specify the absolute combinations of these which guarantee happiness.

This is a sketch of what I take to be Barrow's objections to analyses of "happiness" which specify positive content (or *absolute conditions*) as either necessary or sufficient for "happiness."[2]

Barrow now remarks that, although there are no

> . . .necessary factors in a man's situation for happiness, there are nonetheless some necessary conditions for attributing happiness and they are the absence of certain conflicting attitudes to one's situation such as frustration, loneliness, agitation, depression, annoyance, irritation, guilt, remorse, regret and resentment, or, more generally, missery. (p. 54)

Barrow also adds several (proper) qualifications to the effect that (a) his list is not exhaustive, (b) there is no principle of unity that links these words, (c) the list says nothing about the *causes* of these feelings (nor need it), (d) one cannot argue for happiness by inferring the direct opposite of these words since it is unclear what their opposites would be, and "finally misery seems to be one of the generic words, synonymous of our purposes with unhappy, covering all the more specific words and obviously, by definition, incompatable with happiness" (p. 55). Thus Barrow backs in, as it were, to his conception of happiness by pointing out those things which are logically incompatible with it, viz., general sorts of misery, or discontent.[3]

He proceeds to argue for additional logical properties which can be asserted to happiness:

> More generally we may state that if a man is making a positive attempt to extricate himself from or alter his situation he is not happy; the fact that we might judge him as ill-advised to alter what we regard as a favourable situation is, of course, neither here nor there, even if he later implicitly endorses our judgment (pp. 56-57).

Here Barrow moves toward the view that happiness consists in being satisfied or content with the way things are, and that *unhappiness* is characterized by the desire or impulse to alter one's situation in some way. He claims that "people are happy in so far as they feel happy, and people feel happy in so far as they feel that things are as they should be. This, it should be stressed, is not a psychological but a definitional point" (p. 62).

Thus far, I have tried to use largely Barrow's words to convey his views about the logical properties of happiness. I have only stepped on every third stone, so to speak, but I hope the absence of the intervening argument has not deterred too much from understanding his basic position. Perhaps the clearest positive statement which summarizes his view on the logical properties of "happiness" is as follows:

> Happiness, I am suggesting, means an absence of such things as anxiety, depression or frustration. To be happy is to be devoid of such feelings as those that indicate a desire that the world as it impinges on oneself should be in some respect otherwise. The individual who is devoid of such feelings I characterize as *enmeshed* with his surroundings (p. 64).

The notion of "enmeshment" is crucial to Barrow's analysis of "happiness." He says, for example: "This is not to say that happiness is identical with enmeshment, but rather that happiness is the feeling that arises out of and is dependent upon enmeshment" (p. 62). And further that:

> It follows logically from the fact that happiness is a feeling dependent on enmeshment that, in order to promote happiness, we have to correlate the aspirations, attitudes, beliefs, desires and so on of the individual with the demands and the ethos of the circumstances in which he finds himself (p. 64).

For the moment, I want to call attention to the fact that *enmeshment* is not itself a feeling, nor is it identical with happiness. Rather it is a *state-of-affairs* or *circumstance* which enables one to feel happy. Later, I shall want to call attention to the nature of the relationship between enmeshment and happiness.

Now that we know what "happiness" *is*, at least *logically* speaking, how do we know when we have it, epistemologically speaking? Barrow's answer is refreshingly straight-forward:

> (a) If a man feels happy, he is happy, although he may later discover that he is capable of more intense feelings.
>
> (b) Conversely, if he does not feel happy, he is not happy (p. 60).

Elementary logic allows us to show that Barrow therefore must regard "feeling happy" and "being happy" as logically *equivalent*.[4] This alleged logical equivalence between *feeling* happy and *being* happy guarantees that we cannot be mistaken about our own happiness according to Barrow—all one need do is feel it.[5] The relationship between the *feeling* and the *state of being* is incorrigible for Barrow.[6] This is why Robin Barrow does not think he can *be* happy and not *know* or *feel* it.

The reasons Barrow offers to support this alleged incorrigibility between *feeling* and *being* happy are several, but I think the essence of his reasoning is captured in the following:

> We can tell when we ourselves are happy. We cannot assess how happy we are in relation to others, nor in relation to our own potential, but we can recognize when we are happy rather than unhappy. The happier we are, the easier it is to recognize it, no doubt, but we can always recognize "happiness" by an absence of its opposites . . . In short, although I may not know *why*, I always know *that* I am frustrated, anxious, afraid, miserable, lonely, depressed, etc., and when I am any one of these I am not happy. My fight for "happiness" is therefore a fight against these enemies (p. 61).

Further:

> More to the point, since "being happy" cannot be divorced from "feeling happy" and since the same applies to those predicates that are incompatible with "happy," we can always find out whether X is happy or not by asking him whether he feels happy or not (p. 61).

and so he claims

> It follows that if a person feels happy he is happy, however insensitive, blind, lacking in forethought, etc., he may be. It may be possible for us to scorn him for feeling happy in a given situation, but we cannot deny that he is happy (p. 60).

In short, Barrow views happiness to be very much like *pain*: if you have it (i.e., either pain or happiness) you *feel* it; and if you don't feel it, you don't have it.

In summary, he has attempted to give us both the logic and epistemology of "happiness":

(I) The *Logic* of "happiness" = enmeshment; which is fitting-in satisfactorily with one's situation, or circumstance

and

(II) The *Epistemology* of "happiness" = *incorrigibility* of the feeling; if you feel it, you have it, and vice versa.

I would like to note, in passing, that if Barrow's view is correct it is maximally liberal and tolerant about other people's tastes and desires, thus minimizing condescension and judgement of other people's customs, habits, and activities; it also avoids the nasty traditional problem of having to specify the attributes or positive content which is supposed to be universally necessary for "happiness." Nevertheless some difficulties lie buried in his position.

Some Critical Observations

As my discussion proceeds, I think it will become apparent that each of the difficulties which I call attention to are instances of (or at least symptoms of) a more general confusion that runs through Barrow's arguments, that is, a constant confusion between the *logic* of happiness and the *epistemology* of "happiness." Barrow does not sufficiently recognize the difference between these different claims. He repeatedly switches, (sometimes in mid-sentence) from one sort of claim to the other.

The first point to be made about Barrow's position on "happiness" is that as it stands it is inconsistent. It has already been shown through a formal argument, (see footnote 4) that "being" happy and "feeling" happy are equivalent for Barrow, whether he realizes it or not. In addition, he claims that "happiness" means "being enmeshed." It follows from this that if "being happy" and "feeling happy" are equivalent, and if "being happy" means "being enmeshed," then both "being happy" and "feeling happy" are equivalent to "being enmeshed." But this contradicts the many statements of his which say "Happiness is a feeling dependent on enmeshment . . . though happiness is not identical with enmeshment" (pp. 62, 64, and 76). Presumably, the class of "enmeshed" things is larger than the class of "happy" things; or at least that is the import of the statement above. Therefore, he cannot hold that either "being happy" or "feeling happy" is *equivalent* to "being enmeshed," or that they *mean* "being enmeshed."[7]

Barrow should have said that neither happiness nor the feeling of happiness is equivalent to "enmeshment." Rather enmeshment is a *condition* or state-of-affairs which brings them about. His statements which say "Happiness is a feeling dependent on enmeshment" would support this interpretation. Moreover, this interpretation would not only make his position consistent (hence clearer), but it would also allow him to escape the alternative which would lead to an infinite regress of feelings (e.g., happiness feels like enmeshment, and enmeshment feels like X, and X feels like Y, etc. etc.) Since I take this interpretation to be Barrow's intention I will overlook his occasional lapses into locutions such as "feeling enmeshed" which are "logically odd" (as Barrow would put it!) since enmeshment is not a feeling.

I would now like to make my first substantive criticism about his view that being happy is incorrigible. Insofar as enmeshment is a description of a *condition* or *state-of-affairs* (and not a feeling) it is the kind of thing which we must make empirical judgements about. That is, we must make judgements about being enmeshed in much the same way that we must make judgements about being healthy (or not), or being (really) in Cincinnati, or indeed like judging we have a broken leg (as opposed to a bruise or contusion), etc. These are all judgements which people can and do make mistakes about. And few people, let alone epistemologists, would ever claim that these judgements are incorrigible. I do not see why, therefore, a judgement about whether one is *really* enmeshed, as opposed to just believing that one is enmeshed, is not inherently fallible. We are often mistaken about such judgements. "Enmeshment," as it turns out, functions like "health" in the sense that they both involve judgements about a person's *condition* (even in the first person), and they are both fallible. Insofar as enmeshment is a necessary condition of happiness (to wit: "happiness is dependent on enmeshment"), and insofar as we can be mistaken about whether that condition is fulfilled, we can, therefore, be mistaken about whether we are really happy or not.

Moreover, I would think that it is this obvious possibility (i.e., that we might be mistaken) which renders the common English expression "I think that I am happy" (or "I believe that I am happy") sensible. There is nothing odd nor contradictory about saying "I think that I am happy." This is because we know (though Barrow apparently does not) that we could be mistaken about such judgements. It is significant that Barrow does not treat experssions such as "I think that I am happy" or "I believe that I am happy" in his discussion of "happiness." Presumably, on his analysis such experssions would be *nonsense* in much the same way as "I think that I am in pain" might be nonsense. The fact remains, however, when anyone asks me if I am happy I often say "I don't know." The reason Barrow would treat this reply (and similar expressions) as *nonsense* is because, as I suggested earlier, he has collapsed the *logic* of "happiness" with the *epistemology* of "happiness."[8]

I would also like to call attention to an oddity in his view of "happiness" which renders it systematically unclear from an epistemological point of view. The point here is that "feeling happy" is for Barrow the epistemological touchstone for "being happy." That is, the way one is supposed to tell whether he is happy or not is whether he *feels* so. But there is an important sense in which even on Barrow's account happiness is no particular feeling at all. It is unclear what we are supposed to be feeling when we feel happy. Barrow goes on at great length to argue that happiness is not a "whoopee" feeling, nor necessarily joy nor elation; and he in fact says "that we cannot reasonably do more than characterize happiness as a feeling dependent on enmeshment" (p. 81). Recall, however, that enmeshment is not a feeling but a condition or state-of-affairs. Moreover, it is a condition or state-of-affairs *defined* as the *absence of feelings* such as anger, frustration, pain, and general misery, etc. The fact is that the list of undesirable feelings precluded by enmeshment is indeterminately long. Thus, we can get no guidance from "enmeshment" as to what kind of positive feeling we are supposed to have when we are happy.

I am not suggesting that Barrow's reluctance to tell us what kind of feeling happiness is renders his analysis wrong. But I am suggesting that an analysis of "happiness" which rests everything on the *feeling* of happiness, but can say nothing about this alleged feeling, renders the analysis seriously deficient.

I would now like to move on to a more general criticism of Barrow's view that "to be happy is to feel happy" and "to feel happy is to be happy." My approach here involves considering our knowledge of feelings and emotions generally, and then examining the extent to which Barrow's thesis about the incorrigibility of "happiness" stacks-up against these considerations.

In numerous places throughout Barrow's account he refers to "happiness" as being a feeling, while elsewhere he refers to it as an emotion (e.g., p. 76). I have no objection to this, providing he is willing to extend the same privilege to others.

As I have already pointed out, the logic of "is happy" is different from the logic of "is in pain." They are different because it is not odd nor contradictory to say "I think I am happy," but it is odd to say "I think I am in pain." "I think I am in pain" is odd because "I am in pain but I don't feel anything" is self-contradictory. Perhaps the reason is that "pain," unlike "happiness," denotes a specific sensation. (Even Barrow would admit that "happiness" is not a specific sensation.) The logic of "happiness," therefore, is more akin to other emotions (or feelings) such as love, or jealousy, or anxiety, insofar as they do not denote specific sensations.

I would like to suggest that emotions or feelings such as anger, jealousy, anxiety, frustration, etc., are corrigible (i.e., we can make mistakes about them). It is, after all, well known that we can make mistakes about our own emotions, and that in this matter a man is not the final court of appeal in his own case. For example, those who are jealous or anxious are often the last, instead of the first, to recognize that they are. Indeed, helping others to understand their own emotions is the *raison d'etre* of psychiatrists, as well as counsellors and priests.[9]

In general, I think the above considerations show that *having* a certain emotion (e.g., anxiety, etc.) does not entail that the person will necessarily feel it, nor indeed does it entail having any other feeling. Thus it is not true that being happy entails feeling happy. Nor does *being unhappy* (if this is an emotion) entail *feeling unhappy*.

It would seem, therefore, that the onus is on Barrow to show why "happiness" is significantly different from these other emotions which we can be mistaken about. Until this is done I think it reasonable to believe that: "Robin Barrow could be happy and not know it."

The difference between Barrow and myself can be partially summarized by having a brief look at one of his examples. He says:

> the Indian squaw, for instance, is not happy because women fundamentally desire to be downtrodden or relegated to the home, but because she does not entertain any assumption that her way of life could or should be different to what it is (p. 88).

I gather we are to infer that the squaw is happy because she is enmeshed. She is enmeshed because she could not imagine her situation any better. I, on the contrary, would argue two things about this example: (1) that she merely *thinks* or *believes* that she is enmeshed, but she is probably mistaken (since *ex hypothesi* "down-troddenness" is undesirable); and (2) she might in fact *be* unhappy even though she does not *feel* unhappy. Moreover, to assume that the Indian squaw is happy in every such case, might easily stand as a moral justification for not introducing her to possible alternatives. We would always be constrained to "let sleeping squaws lie." Such constraint would seem to involve a denial of what most of us understand by education and an effective end to any concern to improve mankind's lot.

Conclusion

I have tried to show that Barrow's conception of "happiness" has both a logical and epistemological dimension to it. Its logic is characterized by "enmeshment," and its epistemology by "incorrigibility." I have argued that he frequently collapses this distinction unwittingly, and as a result his position, as it stands, is inconsistent. When the inconsistency is removed, it turns out that "being enmeshed" is corrigible, hence "being happy" is corrigible. I have also argued that "being happy" does not entail "feeling happy," thus vitiating his claim that the two are equivalent. I have not argued that "feeling happy" does not entail "being happy," but I have pointed out that it is systematically unclear what "feeling happy" is like, and that it is not any *particular* feeling at all. Hence, one cannot *know* when they feel "happy," as opposed to "whoopee," elated, or joyous.

Despite these reservations, I am inclined to agree with Barrow's logical characterization of "happiness." It does appear to be something very close to his notion of *enmeshment*. But I deny that one can *know* whether they are enmeshed or not—such judgements are inherently fallible. Moreover, these judgements are fallible whether one is speaking in the first person or the third person.

In light of this fallibility, I would be extremely reluctant to allow someone else (e.g., the State or government) to decide for me what *might* make me enmeshed. Not that my decisions about my own preferences are necessarily more accurate than someone else's (e.g., the State, or Philosopher King's) judgements about how I might get enmeshed; but at least now I take some pride, and get a certain amount of pleasure, in trying to be "master of my own enmeshment." At the moment, I have little reason to believe that the State's ignorance of me and my desires is any less than my own. I would, therefore, opt for making decisions about my own enmeshment for myself. I presume that others should be allowed to do likewise. Considerations such as these are what I think lie behind the liberal-democrats' distrust and opposition to totalitarianism of any form.

It might be true, as Barrow has argued, that freedom and autonomy are not ends-in-themselves, but are only pursued for the sake of happiness (which is an end). It does not follow from this however that we ought to design our society and educational system for the direct pursuit of happiness. Indeed, if my observations about the inherent fallibility of happiness judgements are correct, general happiness might better be served through the pursuit of autonomy.

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1. Robin Barrow, *Plato, Utilitarianism and Education*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. All page references are from this volume.

2. These objections, if valid, would, of course, apply to Aristotle's famous analysis of happines.

3. In many ways Barrow's view of happiness is like the Stoic's famous "Happiness is the absence of pain." It is less well known that this view was held earlier by Epicurus 342 B.C.

4. Let: "F" stand for "*feeling* happy"
"B" stand for "*being* happy"

Then statement "(a)" above gives us: (1) $F \rightarrow B$
and statement "(b)" above gives us: (2) $\sim F \rightarrow \sim B$
then: (3) $B \rightarrow F$ (2)trans.
(4) $(B \rightarrow F) \cdot (F \rightarrow B)$ (1),(3)conj.
$\therefore$(5) $F \equiv B$ (4)equiv.

5. Barrow allows *degrees* of happiness, and even allows that it might be the case that no one is ever completely happy. But this does not deter from his position in any way.

6. He holds the same view about "pain." (Personal Communication) I tend to agree about the incorrigibility of "pain," though I am worried about "I dreamed I was in pain"; but I do not think "happiness" is incorrigible.

7. This confusion could be viewed as symptomatic of his general confusion between logic and epistemology, which I have charged, if one thinks of *feeling* happy from an epistemological perspective like "thinking I am happy" of "believing I am happy," and *enmeshment* as a logical characteristic of happiness (as Barrow asserts).

8. My colleague, James Sanders, has suggested that the sentence "I think that I am happy" might be just an elliptical way of saying "I cannot assess how happy I am in relation to others or my own potential," and not, as I suggest "I do not know if I am happy." I have no doubt that the expression "I do not know if I am happy" very often does mean what Sanders suggests. But I deny that it could *always* mean this, or that it *must* mean this. Eventually, on any analysis, we will want to know just what *it* is that we have more or less of. We cannot be elliptical forever. In short, I think this an "elliptical" way of avoiding the problem.

9. This should not be taken to mean that I endorse the *effectiveness* of these members of the community in helping us understand our feelings. In fact, I am skeptical of them. But I do think they are working on real problems, which often involves confusion about one's emotional states.

Response to McPeck

BEING AND FEELING HAPPY

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I am grateful to John McPeck for drawing attention to the wider context in which I first introduced my analysis of happiness. I shall follow him, however, in concentrating on the analysis and the being/feeling question.

In my view happiness is a degree *word*, by which I mean that, although we can conceive of the completely happy man, in practice we use the word "happy" of those who are happy to a significant degree or in important respects. Happiness is, furthermore, a broad *concept*. It is not, for example, to be identified with any specific feeling, such as that of contentment, ecstasy or what I have termed whoopee feeling. Rather, being happy involves a preponderant experience of one or more feelings anywhere on a continuum between contentment and whoopee. The important point here is the claim that we must regard the permanently ecstatic man and the permanently contented man as equally happy. They are not, of course, equally ecstatic. As McPeck correctly observes, I then argue that no specific material conditions or human characteristics are logically necessary for happiness. Rather, I conclude, a happy man is one whose feelings are drawn from the continuum referred to, as a result of his being enmeshed with his circumstances. The argument for that conclusion derives from certain observations about the logic of concepts that are necessarily incompatible with happiness. (e.g., anxiety, frustration, loneliness). One mistake of interpretation McPeck has made. He claims that enmeshment for me is "a *state of affairs* or *circumstance* which enables one to feel happy." That is not the case. Enmeshment as I use it, is a relational term, comparable, though not equivalent, in its logic to loneliness, as opposed to being alone, or frustration, as opposed to being thwarted. Therefore to describe someone as a happy man is to say that, preponderantly or in respect of important aspects of his life, he has feeling(s) on the continuum from contentment to whoopee, as a result of seeing his situation as he would want it to be (which, crudely, is to say as a result of being enmeshed).[1]

Turning to the main issue, I wonder whether there is not more confusion than disagreement between McPeck and myself. I did write "we can always find out whether X is happy . . . by asking him whether he feels happy."[2] That claim is untrue, I agree. But it is also inconsistent with and not central to my general argument. I am concerned not about knowing, but about feeling happy. I suspect that the problem here lies in the ambiguity of the phrase "feeling happy": it might mean either "believing that one is happy" or "having the sort of experience that is normally associated with happiness."[3] My concern is with the latter sense of the phrase, since I am resisting the view of people, such as Austin, that people might be induced to feel happy (i.e., experience what happy people experience) by means of drugs, but that that would not count as really being happy. Not only has McPeck said nothing to upset the identification of being happy and feeling happy in that sense, but it should also be noted that were he to do so, he would have to withdraw his approval of my rejecting any specific material conditions as necessary. For, of course, it is precisely the purpose of people like Austin and Kenny to suggest that certain limits have to be set on the terms on which people could be happy as a matter of logic.[4]

What McPeck shows is that a person may be mistaken about whether he is happy (and *a fortiori* whether he feels happy, in my sense of the phrase). Despite my solitary contradictory remark quoted above, I agree. But I would add that I think it possible to be mistaken only in one of two ways. (1) One may be ignorant of the meaning and proper application of the term "happy." (2) Because it is a degree word, one may employ it in situations that one later comes to regard as inappropriate, because subsequent experience shows them to have been relatively underserving of the epithet.[5] Now, in the case of some of the concepts that are logically incompatible with happiness one may add a third way of being mistaken. Thus (3) a person may mistakenly claim to be lonely, because he wrongly attributes his dissatisfaction to being alone. He wrongly diagnoses the cause of his misery. But this third kind of mistake can only be made in respect of terms, such as loneliness, which logically imply a determinate kind of cause. It cannot be made in respect of the generic term happiness, precisely because, as McPeck is keen to accept, happiness does not logically entail any specific kind of cause for the feelings it involves. The same, incidentally, is surely true of jealousy. I may be mistaken in thinking that I have grounds for being jealous, but that will not stop me being/feeling jealous. I may be deluded or crazy to think that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds, but, if I think that, I am at least happy.

A comment, if I may, on the Indian Squaw. She is slightly ill-used by McPeck. First, reference to the immorality of treating her thus, though timely in a political way, is irrelevant to the matter in hand. The question is whether she is happy, not whether she should be allowed to be on those terms. McPeck suggests that "she merely thinks. . .that she is enmeshed, but she is probably mistaken." However, it should now be clear that (provided we are not talking about the meaning of the word or the problems of comparative judgements) that is impossible. To be fully enmeshed *is* to believe that the world is as you would like it to be and to feel that all is well. You can therefore be enmeshed as a result of delusion, but that does not stop you being enmeshed. McPeck feels the squaw must be mistaken, since downtroddenness is undesireable. But it is McPeck and other observers who apply the emotive term "downtrodden" to her situation. She sees the same state of affairs as we do, but she does not view it in the same way. *Ex hypothesi* she does not see herself as downtrodden, but as carrying out her proper role. (If a particular squaw were to see her role as inevitable but repugnant, she would not be enmeshed.) McPeck's second argument (that "she might in fact *be* unhappy even though she does not *feel* unhappy") would seem merely to beg the question at issue.

In conclusion let me anticipate one possible line of objection. "Is not all of what you say true by definition?" Of course it is. All analysis leads to definitional truths—tautologies or logical entailment. The important things is to recognize such truths and to have a precise grasp of them. In this instance the observation that enmeshment involves thinking that all is well is tautological. Enmeshment is not identical to happiness, however. The term "enmeshment" puts the emphasis on the equilibrium of the relationship between individual and circumstance. The term "happiness" puts the emphasis on the state of mind that is the inevitable adjunct of that relationship.

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1. For the arguments leading to these conclusions, see Robin Barrow, *Plato, Utilitarianism and Education* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), Chapters 4 and 5.

2. Ibid., p. 61.

3. I am grateful to Maryann Ayim for first raising this suggestion.

4. Jean Austin "Pleasure and Happiness" in *Philosophy*, Vol. XLIII, No. 163. Anthony Kenny "Happiness," P.A.S., Vol. 66 (1965-6).

5. See my treatment of remarks such as "I didn't realize how happy I was then" in *Plato, Utilitarianism and Education*, op. cit., pp. 56 ff and pp. 80 ff.

(Fifth Concurrent Session)

PAIN AND ANGUISH: THE NEED FOR CORPORAL PUNISHMENT

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I. Barbarians and Others

An educational theory, currently vociferously propounded, divides humanity into three camps: the first, the barbarians who advocate or at the very least condone corporal punishment; the second, the civilized—proponents of the trisecting theory; the third, the unillumined, who provide the civilized reason for and object of their proselytizing efforts. In the restricted universe which excludes the unillumined, we find the civilized class to be merely the complement of, with seldom a compliment for, the barbarian. The theory relegates insensitivity, cruelty and child abuse to the practice of the barbarians, insinuating of its own proponents that theirs is a civilization lacking such discontents.[1]

Having chosen reason, however, to guide my thoughts on these matters, I must make my plea for the barbarian. I submit that observing a banal distinction between pain and anguish deflates the self-righteousness of the civilized. Indeed, their arguments crumble, if we eschew the politically clever conflation of the concepts *punishment*, *cruelty*, and *causing of pain*. It may be advisable to restrict corporal punishment, but *not* for solely moral reasons. Although it is a mistake to think punishment *per se* is educative, it may—even as corporal punishment—be a developmental necessity; to deprive certain groups of it may be, so to speak, "ethnicidal." The civilized rhetoric of "humane" treatment masks an interest in social control which undermines pluralism. Finally, we can avoid using punishment altogether, but only at the risk of a monstrosity: a civilized, subtly cruel yet profound immorality the mere contemplation of which would dismay a barbarian even crueler than this one.

II. Pain and Anguish

Two aspects of ordinary pain are of interest here: the first is a sensory-informative component which I will refer to as "sensory pain." The second aspect involves an emotional component and I will refer to this aspect as "anguish." Pain, like color, is generally not sensed to be a mixture—as the term "component" might suggest—yet sensory pain and anguish, like the hue and brightness of a patch of color, are to a great extent independent and, in fact, involve different physiological mechanisms.[2] We can ignore sensory pain, or be distracted from its full appreciation by music or hypnosis; it does not cease to exist, rather we just experience less or no concommitant anguish. But humiliation, unlike a toothache, will go away if one puts it out of one's mind. We do not think it strange to console persons suffering the anguish of vexation, embarrassment, chagrin or remorse that they not let themselves be so bothered. For sensory pain, such a suggestion is not appropriate.

You may cause me sensory pain and yet no anguish as we play some rough sport together. Your disdaining my work may cause me great anguish yet no particular sensory pain. Inasmuch as most of us would prefer even severe sensory pain to public humiliation, it seems clear that the profoundest cruelities can as easily be practiced by the civilized opponents of corporal punishment as by its barbarian advocates: I may vex, embarrass, abash, revolt, humiliate, mortify or terrorize you without ever causing you an ache, a pang, a prick, a sting or a burn. My cruelty may be none the less for my refraining from such corporal infliction.

III. Punishment and Cruelty

To shorten the exposition I will borrow criteria for punishment from Flew which have been extended by Benn and Peters.[3] A standard case of punishment, Flew offers

a. must involve an unpleasantness to the victim,
b. must be for an offense (real or supposed),

c. must be of an offender (real or supposed),
d. must be the work of personal agencies and not merely the consequences of an action,
e. must be imposed by authority (real or supposed) conferred by the system of rules against which the offense has been committed.

Benn and Peters add that the unpleasantness should be an essential part of what is intended and not merely incidental to some other aim. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, presumably non-partisan here, cruelty is a disposition to inflict suffering, or the indifference to or delight in the pain and misery of others. So as not to importune the more technically adept, the minor exercise of demonstrating that punishment and cruelty are conceptually independent will be left as therapy for those who have gone beyond freedom and dignity. Clearly, to punish need not be to exercise cruelty.

But what of Benn's and Peter's extention that the unpleasantness be an essential part of what is intended; doesn't this mean that cruelty is necessary to punishment? No. I may inflict an unpleasantness upon someone intending to punish him, that is, with the intent that the conditions for punishment be fulfilled. This is not to say that I have inflicted it intending merely that he suffer unpleasantness. A parallel may help: in some circumstances to try to hit baseballs out of the park may be to practice; in others, it may constitute an attempt to get a home run. It does not follow that practice is a constituent or necessary condition of home-run attempts.

What is important to note about the criteria given for punishment is that the unpleasantness involved may well be a supposed unpleasantness. If in fact a particular felon enjoys his stay in prison, he has not thereby gone unpunished. This is a problem if punishment is thought to need be a deterrent; such an effect may be at best statistical. Specific individuals may not be deterred by anything less than the near certainty of suffering sanctions more severe than we might wish to set for the general populace. If deterrent effect is a consideration in the setting of punishment, one can appreciate the rationality of Edward Banfield's suggestion that small crimes of opportunity, e.g., purse-snatching, be summarily punished by police beating. A major problem with corporal punishment is that to be effective as a deterrent it probably requires the maintainance of an extensive executioner-class. But only wait! If our language of reward and punishment continues in its Skinnerian degeneration, the executioner and the therapist *will* be indistinguishable.

IV. Infliction and Punishment

Inflicting pain or anguish is, in and of itself, neither cruel nor either necessary nor sufficient to constitute punishment. A doctor may hurt me in the course of treatment; I may hurt you in a scrimmage. Neither punishment nor cruelty need have occurred. I do not think, however, that the point of corporal punishment is made if the appropriate anguish is not felt by the sufferer. Indeed, the anguish and not the physical trauma is the rational aim of corporal infliction—this is apparently missed by the proponents of a paddle in every classrom. Justifying the use of much punishment is the notion that anguish or its threat restructures our "hierarchy of motives." Thus, rather severe legal penalties may be imposed for morally trivial offenses, e.g., mail theft, to rationalize our refraint. And strong enforcement maintains the deterrent threat.

I don't think this theory of punishment is of educational value. It is only a philosophical fetish that punishment confirms for the learner the disutility of an act. Why do we punish? It is important to avoid forcing the traditional alternatives. We need not punish for either retribution or inhibition. We may punish for edification. Punishment edifies when it brings about something akin to "cognitive dissonance," a judgmental conflict caused by the fact that a loved or respected person has inflicted anguish. Only in such a circumstance can it be clear that the cause for the punishment derives from the misdeed and not from the antipathy of the punisher.

It might well be the case that the threat of corporal punishment is the only effective motivational counter to certain impulses; that its use is necessary at certain stages in the development of autonomous, i.e., self-controlled, rational individuals. However, a problem with corporal punishment is that the punisher may be seen as the cause of pain rather than as an agent of punishment; this may enable the punished to avoid remorse and to indulge in self-pity. It is harder to identify the cause of anguish as a particular person where non-corporal punishment is used; the punisher "induces" anguish, so to speak, and runs less a risk, both of retaliation and of feeling guilty for having inflicted pain upon another. Civilized refraint from corporal punishment may be merely faint-heartedness.

It is only human to feel displeasure at inflicting anguish upon another, even if we are justified in doing so. In unsophisticated speech this displeasure is mislabeled guilt or remorse. It is neither of these. Where one in fact commits no transgression there cannot be guilt or remorse: perhaps only *feelings* of guilt. We may experience feelings normally associated with guilt despite the fact we are correctly performing our duty. The punisher who lacks the courage to face up to such feelings may protect himself by becoming insensitive to the misery of the punished: this is a cowardice that begets cruelty.

Medical personnel are thought cruel because they do not seem to react with the layman's intensity of feeling to the suffering of their charges. Their professional training enables them to carry on with their duties, despite the suffering their ministrations may cause. To recall a point made earlier: the widespread use of corporal punishment—perhaps any punishment at all– may require the "professionalization" of the punisher. But executioner becomes therapist by a simple reconceptualization: one refocuses one's attention beyond the punishment to some purported future benefit. Skinner, for example, distinguishes between one who punishes and one who "aversively conditions" in that he regards punishment as essentially backward looking, ignoring, as is his wont, an obvious counterexample: the utilitarian conception of punishment.[4] Indeed, the therapist who accepts the dogma that internal states are a function of past or present environments has no theoretical reason to be concerned with the anguish of his client. Anguish is epiphenomenal so far as the control of behavior is concerned. Some day we may, as some theorists hope, go beyond the punitive society. We will not thereby have gone beyond cruelty.

V. A Potential For "Ethnicide"

In many an educational circle "assimilation" is a taboo word and lip service is given to the notion that ours is or ought to be a pluralistic society. However, the educational system continues to function more or less surreptitiously as a homogenizer. Academic achievement is the reward for adaptibility to what is still essentially an Anglo-Germanic, middle-class ethos. We see the pressure for uniformity in the development of "needs assessments"—one talks about "needs" in this context as though one could identify them independently of what would be politically controversial goals.[5] The same impulse towards homogeneity manifests itself as an intense interest in a psychology of universally invariant cognitive development, which in other places becomes a theory of universal moral development. Commitment, that all-too-individualistic foundation of morality, is replaced by acquiescence in the support of particular institutions.[6] In the teaching of morality no man need remain a partisan, because the legitimacy of moral education, we are told, is no less than the legitimacy of teaching the causal principle or the conservation of matter.[7]

As a teacher in a bilingual program, it is my experience that cultural differences among people result in their being. . .very different. This is not merely to sound that tedious theme of neo-humanistic pluralism: I eat *kielbasa*, you eat *alcapurrias*, but we can all agree that it's different strokes for different folks. A realistic pluralism would own up to the fact that different strokes for different folks is likely to be the one thing *not* agreed upon. But a realistic pluralism will not find its voice in policy debate, for its words are these: you are different from me, therefore not quite so good. The public school homogenizes, willy-nilly, because the differences among people that matter, matter too much for the school to pursue their cultivation. Ethnicity undermines social control. One ethnic "quirk" is the belief that it is the teacher's perogative—duty, even—to administer corporal punishment. Should he shirk it, he risks losing face, the foundation of the teaching encounter. What is critical in a confrontation is that one avail oneself of all the behavioral signs by which that particular cultural group marks each stage in an escalation to the point requiring corporal punishment. The violation of certain norms in the presence of a teacher produces a tension which only physical trauma may release. The blow, if stuck, must not be too light, lest it betoken fear or lack of conviction; nor too heavy, lest it be cruel. "Respect" is what distinguishes punishment from assault; it carries a heavy conceptual burden. This is a ritual which sweeps along all participants, and its unsuccessful completion may occasion a breakdown in the respect relationships among teacher and student to the extent that learning is impeded. Such a social situation is delicate beyond the fine-tuning skills of educational policymakers at even the district level. To announce a policy forbidding corporal punishment is to place impediments upon sizeable numbers of the school population; such a policy takes no consideration of the conceptions of personhood and authority that may underlie the social stability of the classroom. Children—adults, even—who depend upon authority figures to wean them of their need for instant gratification, to deliver them of their whims and impulses, such children are disadvantaged in their development toward rational self-control, deprived of their achievement by the policies of those self-righteous, ethnocentric, civilized persons who worry so much about their bodies and let their souls go to hell. Many a student receives a frivolous notion of the wages of sin from that supposed unpleasantness that is part of the acceptable non-corporal punishment of the school: the individual attention of a respected adult. It is common, therefore, that children misbehave in order to be punished. In the schools, what is hardly an offense is dealt with by administering what is hardly punishment. Conceptually all the criteria may be met; but the existential core is too often hollow.

One worries about those advocating corporal punishment; just as one worries about those who oppose it. One should worry that the advocate be self-indulgent and cruel, becoming dependent upon what is at its best a weak medicine not to be used regularly. One should worry about the opponent because he has already shown himself to be uninterested in questions of justice and all to willing to employ dangerous means to assure control, for example, drugging hyperkinetic children or inducing vomiting in prisoners. Will problematic cultural differences merit similar "therapy"?

VI. The Scientism of Social Control

It is not the barbarian but the civilized whose theory is based on an atavism. Two assumptions, a psychological and normative, merge to form what I will call here *the premise of externality:* human behavior is (should be) entirely dependent upon environmental determinants. Two quite independent queries are met with this premise. Is human behavior autonomous? Answer: no. Should people be permitted independence of the control of particular environments? Answer again: no. On the premise of externality, social control becomes the predominant, if not the only rational educational interest.

We have been assured for decades that autonomy is impossible[8]; but it is easy to program a computer to be autonomous, i.e., to produce outputs that are not a function solely of past or present inputs. Skinner, for example, dismisses information theory because it postulates inner processors, which he takes to be ghosts in the machine.[9] But so far as machines are concerned, they are indeed "haunted"; and cognitive theorists plausibly postulate similar inner processors for humans. The nub of it is this: there is a strong, empirically-established relationship between the use of non-corporal punishment and social dependence. In general, the more punishment tends to be non-corporal, the more socially dependent is the child.[10] Children who are brought up so as to be controllable by non-corporal means (often confused with rational self-control) tend to conform readily to adult standards and are more dependent upon "social reinforcers." In the Soviet school system, for example, where social control interests predominate, corporal punishment is strongly proscribed.[11]

There is obviously something of a symbiosis here: the psychological assumption of lack of autonomy provides the "scientific" base and consequent persuasive force for the normative assumption which justifies the social control efforts of a particular institution. The institution in turn protects the psychological assumption from obsolescence. Behaviorism thrives in the intellectual backwaters of Education and Public Health. The fact that the psychological assumption is false and that the normative one has competitors is ignored by policymakers who, bereft of their scientism would suffer the anguish of a confrontation with that most unpolitical of animals, a moral decision. It is the profoundest of errors to see the dispute over corporal punishment as a confrontation between proponents of a reflective, humane, independent rationality and those of a brutish, pain-induced conformity. Both the facts and the plausible theories suggest otherwise.

VII. Avoiding the Use of Punishment

It is easy to avoid using punishment: one uses any treatment lacking a critical number of the conditions set out above for the standard case of punishment. The results, however, are not inviting. If, for example, we ignore the condition that the person who would punish have the proper authority, then we have mere assault, perhaps, or an act of revenge. Lacking an offense, the treatment is again assault, the crueler for wanting justification. Suppose there has been an offense; if the victim is not the offender, he is a hostage. The treatment is at best reprisal. Without personal agency, there is just no treatment. Perhaps those who invite us to go beyond punishment have in mind merely ridding the treatment of its unpleasantness. Would could we say against a treatment, *T*, which was not unpleasant and which strongly disinclined the offender from repeating the offense? It is here we run into difficulties, impelled, I suspect, by both humane sentiments and the belief that causing anguish always needs justification. In response we could ask, "What is the deterrent value of *T*?" and we might imagine the following dialectic: to prevent, say, murder, were *T* to replace punishment, we would have to allow each person so inclined one murder, so we could impose *T*. But then, we could "pre-treat" potential offenders. However, *T* though painless is still an imposition; we would need to change considerably our notions of personal liberty. And consider how, in fact, potential medicines are tested, i.e. often inadequately and on coerced populations; imagine what kind of testing program it would require to establish the effectiveness of *T*. At this point, the disease begins to appear preferable to the cure. And we begin to suffer the suspicion that there may be a fundamental conflict between humanitarian and civil-libertarian concerns. But these difficulties can be avoided if, when we are initially asked to entertain the possibility of *T*, we reject it as *morally* undesirable. It is morally wrong for an offender to escape the anguish of remorse, to be allowed to become remorseless, as it were. Any treatment, pleasant or not, which deprives the offender of suffering the appropriate anguish, the proper remorse, is immoral. This is true not only of the "therapies" of would-be behavioral engineers, but also of the random tortures that pass for punishment in everyday life.

I have ignored the literature of behavior modification on these many points as at worst vacuous and at best unfeasible. The concepts *reinforcer*, *behavior*, and *stimulus* remain the slogan words of an otiose empiricism; recent literature reveals little consensus on their meaning even among those who attempt to employ them empirically.[12] If we take the concepts in their popular interpretation—which alone keeps the theory alive—then it seems unlikely that in a world of scarcity there are enough reinforcers available to keep people from behavior which derives from that very scarcity. This is by no means to underestimate the influence of theorists like Skinner in popularizing a "paradigm shift" by which formerly merely undesirable behavior is widely seen as "behavior disorder" to be "treated." As we wind down our exploration of the conceptual terrain of which our idea of punishment is a part, it is fitting that this particular concern be reencountered: in 1970, *Ramsey vs. Ciccone*, the court stated

> Even though the treatment is usually painful or causes unusual mental suffering, it may be administered to a prisoner without his consent if it is recognized as appropriate by recognized medical authority or authorities.[13]

Having read Kuhn, dare we be sanguine about the judgment of medical authorities?[14]

VIII. He Who Loveth Chasteneth

Why the general unease with corporal punishment? I'm not sure it isn't an honest reaction by those who unwilling to face the anguish of a rational examination of their basic values are thus disinclined to cause another anguish in their behalf. Where opinion replaces moral judgment and all opinions are of equal status, there is no misbehavior. Then the subtle intimidation of "love-withdrawal" techniques avoids the questions of justice that present themselves so cogently where there is a hide to be tanned. But another line of speculation may also shed some light.

It is a commonplace among bilingual educators that Anglos are less tolerant of physical contact than are Hispanics. The smell, the body warmth, the touch of a non-intimate is considered a contamination. Many people may be discomfitted by the thought of corporal punishment for the same reason as by the thought of sweat, garlic or kidney beans: these things—or their effects upon our bodies—violate our contact taboos. Mary Douglas in *Purity and Danger* argues that our germ theory (Watch out, you'll get his germs!) merely rationalizes these ritual concerns.[15] From the ritual, the Law has distilled theory: in 1973 the court in *Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental Health* wrote

> The keystone to any intrusion upon the body of a person must be full, adequate and informed consent. The integrity of the individual must be protected from invasion into his body and personality not voluntarily agreed to. Consent is not an idle or symbolic act; it is a fundamental requirement for the protection of the individual's integrity.[16]

The obverse of contamination is intimacy. The contaminator rapes; the intimate makes love. To share a glass, a sandwich or a cigarette manifests intimacy. Ideally, the punisher and the punished should be intimates. Punishment then edifies because it demonstrates commitment; the punisher shows himself willing to undergo the anguish of seeing those he loves suffer, even from his own hand. As intimacy decays, punishment degenerates into its utilitarian form: at best it deters. We encounter now the utility-maximization game. Here punishment is not so much an expression of commitment and concern for an intimate as a payoff for a particular course of action. In this game, the individual is less an end and more a means. He is an example, if punished, by which the credibility of the payoff matrix is maintained.

The scale of public education, an ethic of professionalism which disdains intimacy, and the adversary rights awarded the student by the courts[17] all work to the degeneration of punishment from an educational process to a mere mechanism of a hedonistic free-market. The flap over corporal punishment is a red herring: it serves the same end as does the compulsive interest in behavior control that mistakes the mummy of Behaviorism for living theory. That end is to obscure the fact that we no longer can nor care to educate; we have lost that tolerance of intimacy necessary to perform in a properly educative role.

It is no longer a novel scenario that depicts our American fetish for oderlessness bringing us to commit grave ecological damage in the pursuit of olfactory neutrality: great waste of ever scarcer potable water, the contamination of stream and river with detergent residues, whiter whites and brighter colors and deader lakes. Like the soap suds in your favorite fishin' hole, the corporal punishment debate signals the ruin of a larger system.

1. Examples are legion; the bias ranges from blatant to subtle: Mary Ann Levine, "Are Teachers Becoming More Humane?" Research Notes, *Phi Delta Kappan* January 1978; Tobyann Boonin, "The Case Against Corporal Punishment", *School Board Journal*, August 1977; Fritz Redl, "The Concept of Punishment" in Nicholas J. Long, William C. Morse and Ruth G. Newman, eds., *Conflict in the Classroom: the Education of Children with Problems* (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1971) pp. 434-41.

2. Ernest R. Hilgard, "Neodissociative Theory of Multiple Cognitive Control Systems" in Gary E. Schwartz and David Shapiro (eds.) *Consciousness and Self-Regulation: Advances in Research*, Vol. 1 (New York; Plenum, 1976) 137-71.

3. S.I. Benn and R.S. Peters, *The Principles of Political Thought*, (New York: Free Press, 1965) p. 202.

4. B.F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Bantam, 1971) p. 57.

5. Cf. Jerry L. Patterson and Theodore J. Czajkowski, "District Needs Assessment: One Avenue to Program Improvement", *Phi Delta Kappan*, December 1976, p. 327 for nuts-and-bolts naivete. For general criticism, see Eric Straumanis, "'Need' in Needs Assessment Studies" in *Proceedings of the 1972 Annual Meeting of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society* (Terre Haute, Ind., School of Education, Indiana State Unviersity, 1973) pp. 104-116.

6. A reconceptualization attempted in Solon T. Kimball and James E. McClellan, Jr., *Education and the New America* (New York: Vintage, 1966).

7. Michael Schleifer, "Moral Education and Indoctrination", *Ethics*, 86, 2, p. 159.

8. Independent internal states are excluded as a possibility in Kenneth W. Spence, "The Postulates and Methods of 'Behaviorism'" in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (eds.) *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953) 571.

9. Skinner, *Beyond*, p. 15.

10. F.R. Stiphs and R.H. Walters, "Anxiety, Birth Order and Susceptibility to Social Influence", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 62, 716. L. Rainwater, "A Study of Personality Differences Between Middle and Lower Class Adolescents: the Szondi test in culture-personality research", *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 1956, 54, 3.

11. Urie Bronfenbrenner, *Two Worlds of Childhood/U.S. and U.S.S.R.*, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970) p. 12. Susan Jacoby, *Inside Soviet Schools*, (New York: Schocken, 1975) offers a less enamoured view.

12. There is rarely a conception of reinforcement shared by the many contributors to Robert Glaser (ed.) *The Nature of Reinforcement* (New York: Academic Press, 1971). Also, Aubrey J. Yates, *Theory and Practice in Behavior Therapy* (New York: Wiley, 1975) presents behavior therapy as theoretically eclectic.

13. *Ramsey vs. Ciccone*, 310 Supp. 600, 605 (W.D. Mo. 1971) quoted in *Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification*. A study prepared by the staff of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety Third Congress, Second Session, November 1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1974) p. 8.

14. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, second edition, (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1970)

15. Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966).

16. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973) quoted in *Individual Rights and the Federal Role in Behavior Modification*, p. 6.

17. At the behest of the courts, many school districts have developed guidlines guarding the students' rights to due process with respect to corporal punishment. Due process in respect to non-corporal punishment is apparently not a worry.

ON ROZYCKI'S "PAIN AND ANGUISH. . ."

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The main concern of Rozycki's paper is that if we give up punishment, and corporal punishment in particular, we will have to turn to methods of social control which are morally repugnant, namely, those that a behaviorist might use in order to re-channel our behavior. Those of us who have seen/read *Clockwork Orange* or *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* can readily understand the concern.

Essentially, Rozycki develops a theory of punishment against the background of the practices of social control just mentioned. It is this theory that we must briefly examine. He begins by claiming that distinguishing between pain and anguish will make the arguments of those who believe punishment to be cruel, i.e., those who consider themselves the "civilized," crumble. He defends the "barbarian" principle that punishment is defensible and preferable. The distinction between pain and anguish is, I believe, certainly legitimate; it is not clear, however, that drawing such a distinction is sufficient to destroy the position of those who are opposed to corporal punishment—especially corporal punishment as used in schools. There are certainly arguments, as we shall see shortly, against the use of corporal punishment other than that it is cruel.

First, however, it is not clear what Rozycki's position is regarding certain of his basic premises. It is not clear, for example, whether he accepts or rejects the deterrence theory of punishment. He writes, "It is only a philosophical fetish that punishment confirms for the learner the disutility of an act." He also claims, however, that "it might well be the case that the threat of corporal punishment is the only effective motivational counter to certain impulses; that its use is necessary at certain stages in the development of autonomous, i.e. self-controlled, rational individuals." The picture here is not at all clear.

Rozycki claims that punishment "may—even as corporal punishment—be a developmental necessity." This claim is supported by an example drawn from his own experience as a bilingual teacher in a school with a large number of Latinos. The scenario is that the teacher is confronted by an unruly student; the situation demands, because of the student's expectations, that the teacher respond by striking the student but neither too hard nor too softly. The teacher saves face; the student is suitably chastised and order is restored.

Now, I am willing to grant that the corporal punishment administered in this case *might* have not been a bad thing. It might have efficiently and efficaciously restored order so that an important lesson could continue. It is not clear at all that the example shows that corporal punishment is a developmental necessity. Such an argument would be a very difficult one to build since it would require showing that one particular type of experience is necessary for development rather than another. Whether corporal punishment is advisable or not in a particular case, however, does not decide the policy question: Should corporal punishment be permitted in public schools? That question requires us to take a number of considerations into account: Who would administer corporal punishment? What do we know about such people? Can they be trusted to do so responsibly, etc.? At the present time we know that there are enough sadistic types in the schools at all levels to suggest that the best policy is probably one which forbids corporal punishment. Furthermore, we would be putting the teacher in the role of judge and jury regarding student behavior, and it is not at all clear that that is the best policy. In any case, it becomes clear that there are arguments against a corporal punishment policy, so we should not think that the explanation for the aversion, on the part of some of us to corporal punishment, is the Anglo belief that physical contact leads to contamination.

We need now to turn to Rozycki's belief that if one is against corporal punishment one must resort to dangerous means to assure control. Rozycki seems to assume that corporal punishment is *not* a means of social control. Punishment and behavioral manipulation, however, *both* need to be seen as forms of social control. Also, if one rejects corporal punishment, or even punishment, one need not *necessarily* resort to dangerous forms of social control. One might, for example, engage in rational discussion.

What Rozycki is fundamentally concerned about are the behaviorists' forms of social control. It is the subtle manipulation of people that concerns him, as it should all of us. It is also the philosophical assumptions which underly behaviorism, viz., that human behavior is simply determined by environmental factors that can be adjusted by those in power to suit their ends, that Rozycki wants to undermine. I applaud such efforts. Not all people who opposed corporal punishment in schools, however, are behaviorists, so to reject behaviorism is not thereby to reject all arguments against the use of corporal punishment.

Rozycki claims in his discussion of behaviorism that there is "a strong empirically established relationship between the use of non-corporal punishment and social dependence." It follows that if we want independent children, then we should, for example, spank them, rather than, say, tell them to go stand in the corner. Suppose, however, that instead of spanking the child his punishment was to memorize the argument (we could make it a complicated argument, and that would probably make the punishment "unpleasant") for why he should not use daddy's hammer to play the piano. Surely, the use of corporal punishment in this case is understandable, perhaps even justifiable, but non-corporal punishment might also be justifiable, and it is not clear why the latter would necessarily lead to social dependence. If the empirical studies show that non-corporal punishment is linked with social dependence, then, in order for the studies to be slightly plausible, it would seem that what non-corporal punishment would refer to would be certain manipulative techniques that are used to control. That is, it might be reasonable to suspect a correlation between people's social dependence and people being the object of, say, behaviorist manipulation, but the general claim that there is a correlation between non-corporal punishment and social dependence is suspect, in part because the claim is so general.

Rozycki further criticizes behavioristic notions in this regard by suggesting that we imagine a treatment T that meets two conditions: (i) it is not unpleasant, but (ii) it disinclines repetition of the offense. He claims that such treatment is undesirable because it is imposition that would require us to change our notions of personal liberty. He also claims that any treatment *T* which deprives the offender of suffering the appropriate anguish is improper. This is much too general, however, because we can think of various cases that meet these conditions, yet fail to be undesirable. For example, for certain types of offenses, the treatment might be to perform certain exercises which increase one's rational capacities to deal with a certain sort of problem. Such treatment would not be unpleasant, but would, we can imagine, disincline repetition. It is not obvious that such treatment is undesirable even it if is an imposition. Of course, treatments which would require us to change our notions of personal liberty are undesirable, assuming such notions are well-founded, but to add this criterion to the first two makes the first two superfluous with respect to the moral desirability of treatment.

Finally, Rozycki makes a series of remarks which essentially describe the punisher's relationship with the punished. The punisher should be, he claims, an intimate with the punished. That norm seems reasonable for the family and perhaps in some areas of school life, but it would be neither efficient nor efficacious to require that in general those who act as our punishers also be our intimates. If we limit the issue to punishment in schools, it is still not clear that the punisher needs to be an intimate. A principal might, with justification, punish a student by detention who has caused a problem in the classroom, and yet not be an intimate.

In sum, I have argued that Rozycki has not been entirely consistent in discussing certain of his principles of punishment, and that others are stated in such general terms that we can find cases which meet his criteria but which we would not want to treat according to his principles. I would like to say to Ed, "Go stand in the corner", but in accord with his principles perhaps we should assign him five lashes.

ILLICH AND KIERKEGAARD COMBINED: A RESPONSE TO THE TRAP

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Recently, upon his retirement as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Arthur Burns proffered a very interesting response when asked to comment on the economic future of America. He replied that he really did not know if the American people had the will that would be needed to prevent the kind of disastrous inflation which overwhelmed Germany after World War I. Over a hundred years ago Soren Kierkegaard was lamenting the slakening of the "springs of the spirit" brought on, he sensed, by the excessive use of reflection. Nineteenth century man was so adept at reflection and talk, the pensive Dane observed, but so ill at ease when called upon to put thought into action. Much like "The Professor" he was so adept at playing with ideas and mouthing profundities but so inept at living his ideas and insights. Today this slackening of the springs of the spirit has reached critical proportions. Illich views modern man as being so addicted to the goods and services provided him by his machines and institutions that he has succeeded in reducing himself to a single function: "Man now defines himself as the furnace which burns up the values produced by his tools."[1] Moreover, warns Illich, our lack of will to end this mindless glutting and stuffing of commodities will inevitably lead to a complete moral collapse.[2] Increasingly, in the Western world, it is man's spirit that is being questioned in the last quarter of the Twentieth Century.

What America needs today is to re-direct some of its educational energies toward a program dedicated to the strengthening of the purpose and will of individual man, a program where individual differences are prized, cognitive dissonance encouraged, and decisive choosing rewarded. For the most part education has always been viewed from the perspective of society. In the modern world of mass education, however, with its ever increasing tendency toward mechanization, specialization, organization, and standardization, we desperately need to complement this traditional conservative view with an additional perspective of education based upon a *radical* humanism that focuses not on generic man but on individual man in his becoming. Our modern world needs men and women who have learned how to take charge of their own education and destiny. This will require a radical shift in focus from teaching to learning. Such a program, dedicated as it is to the fostering of self-motivated deschooled learning is, at the same time, a program dedicated to the planned obsolescence of teachers. Education, which at its deepest and most significant level touches man's individual soul, is far too important a process to be left to teachers and schoolmen.

The ultimate purpose of this kind of program is to put the student in touch with his own development as a self; and to indicate how, through a process of self-initiated individuation, he can become himself through choosing himself. We know how to move the world; now we must learn how to move ourselves. Ivan Illich will provide us with a discussion of the "why" of the need for such a program, as well as point to the direction we must go to meet that need, while Kierkegaard will provide the necessary theoretical formulation to make such self-instruction possible. Together they will point the way to an escape from the trap that has so weakened our will and spirit.

Assuming the need of a certain homeostasis for a quality life, Ivan Illich identifies a number of areas where he sees this delicate balance breaking down. He mentions, among others, the balance between tradition and change, between the rich and the poor, (both monetarily and knowledge-wise), and between man and his earth. The problem that concerns us in this paper, however, involves those areas in life where, because of the development of radical monopolies in the provision of certain goods and services, the delicate balance between what people can do for themselves and what tools and institutions can do for people is breaking down. The most pernicious feature of these monopolies is their tendency, because of their potential for addicting the users, to impose compulsory consumption upon the public, and thereby restrict personal autonomy. Radical monopolies promote institutional values; they substitute a standard package for a personal response and thereby exercise a special kind of social control.[3]

As examples of these radical monopolies Illich cites medicine, burial procedures, and the automobile industry; however schooling, with its monopoly over the teaching-learning function, represents the paradigm example of these manipulative institutions of the right. Illich wants to break the monopoly the institution of schooling holds over "education" so that we can again realize a better balance between what people can learn from their own self-motivated deschooled learning and what they can learn from intentional teaching. He is attempting to strengthen the hand and will of each individual person by promoting a community of "responsibly *limited* tools" and institutions where priority is given to the protection and maximum use of "personal energy under personal control."[4] In his message Illich is appealing to each individual in the western world to "take the cure" and again assume his rightful control over the system. And the place to begin is with his own education.

Why does modern society need deschooling? Because "school has become the planned process which tools man for a planned world, the principal tool to trap man in man's trap."[5] Man's basic trap is the modern rationalized world which he has created and within which he lives, a world of specialization of function, institutionalization of values, and standardization through measurement. However, man must be made ready for this entrapment. People cannot "lead an absurd life" unless they are carefully programmed for it." So man traps himself in this trap by confusing the process, or *form*, of schooling with the *substance* of learning. The special processing called schooling conditions man to accept and conform to institutional values rather than to develop and reflect upon his own personal values. It alienates man from his own individual learning. In school he learns not to trust his own judgement; "and, even if he resents the judgement of the educator, he is condemned to accept it"[6] and to believe himself incapable of improving it. Schooling confuses the "ritual" with the substance. Illich is not against schools or intentional teaching but he is against the institution of schooling because of its manipulative, addictive character. Education is an individual matter. We must again assume responsibility for our own learning and growth.

One of the primary reasons why Illich singles out the institution of schooling for criticism is because the schools serve as the major myth-producing and myth-sustaining institution of modern society: it represents the *grand rationale* of modern society. Much like the church of yesterday, schooling "is the advertising agency which makes one believe that society is needed as it is." The myths of schooling are many. We shall only mention a few: the myth of equal educational opportunity, the myth of institutional values and the possibility of their measurement, the myth of unending consumption of services, and the myth that most learning is the result of teaching. This mythology as well as other dimensions of the schooling structure together produce the hidden curriculum which "conveys indelibly the message that only through schooling can an individual prepare himself for adulthood in society, that what is not taught is of little value, and that what is learned outside of school is not worth knowing."[7] Students also learn from the hidden curriculum to become dependent upon teachers and other authorities, to rank themselves and others, to treat unmeasured experience as unimportant, and to see knowledge as a commodity. To go through the ritual is to go through the motions of schooling uncritically, unthinkingly, and passively. It is to be indoctrinated in the myths and to be "taught" through the "invariant structure" of schooling.

There is, however, a still more pervasive effect of this ritual dance of schooling. It not only tools the student, but it also, in the process, provides him with a ready-made self-image. During the processing he gradually begins to accept the idea that he is an interchangeable working part of a larger whole, a "tool of tools" whose distinguishing characteristic is accommodation to the system. Who is man? Man is what he does. Ultimately our student turned adult can only find himself in his function. Herein lies the real danger: *for man is what he thinks he is.* "Man depends, to a very great degree, on the idea he has of himself," says Gabriel Marcel, "and . . . this idea cannot be degraded without at the same time degrading man."[8]

How does Illich respond to the trap and the principal tool used to trap man in man's trap? Illich wants to turn the Industrial-Technological-Scientific Revolution around and bend the structural items of the dynamic so as to accrue, not to man's immediate gratification born of addiction, but to man's long-term interests as man. He wants to de-school, de-tool, and de-institutionalize our modern society, not in the sense of getting rid of, but in the sense of restructuring, so that man can again realize maximum use of personal energy under personal control. Illich is also concerned, however, in an even more fundamental way, with changing man's conception of himself vis-a-vis that world. Both *the environment and man's attitude toward himself and the environment* must change.

Illich is trying to rise above the whole I-T-S mentality and look at man and the world afresh. He is not trying to solve the problems of the planned world with yet another social plan as much as he is trying to respond to man's predicament as he finds himself in that planned world. The most striking feature of man's predicament today is that he has been taken over by the world, and in the process of allowing himself to be appropriated by the world of his objects, modern man has altered his self-image. Our conception of ourself as a *homo faber* is structurally deficient; it is less than human. Our self-image is badly in need of review and upgrading.[9]

Illich's response to Western man's predicament involves two developmental phases, both of which should be going on simultaneously. Most importantly man must relcaim his birthright as man. For then, and only then, will he be in a position to get control of this revolution and guide and direct it so as to accrue to his long-term benefit. Surely we must expose the ritualization of progress and the mythology of schooling for what it is; we must, when possible, disestablish the present schooling system setting up in its stead learning webs for man's self-motivated learning pleasure; we must search out the hidden curriculum and make it explicit; we must unlock the secrets of the specialist, re-structure an open learning environment rich and available with things, tools, and people who want to share their knowledge and expertise. But in order to do this we must first reaffirm our faith in ourselves as human beings with the power of choice and thus in reclaiming our birthright as human beings again assume responsibility for ourselves and our world.

What we need, according to Illich, is a new man with a new vision of himself and what is possible in the world. Illich calls this new man a "cultural revolutionary;" and the key to his character is that he realizes that most learning occurs without teaching; that the only real learning is self-motivated learning; and that he has the power within himself, by deschooling his environment and himself, to transform "both public and private reality." "Each of us is personally responsible for his or her deschooling, and only we have the power to do it."[10] Man must become educated in this idea. He must discover it himself. Illich is staking his future and the future of man on this kind of learning power which he calls the "educability of man." "The political revolutionary concentrates on tooling and schooling . . . (but) the cultural revolutionary risks the future on the educability of man."[11]

Deschooling society, (note that it is not deschooling the schools but deschooling society that Illich speaks of) does not mean getting rid of schools and replacing them with learning webs. Deschooling does not refer to a policy of excising schools from society, but rather it refers to an individual *metanoia*, a transformation of our attitude towards ourselves and our world. This is the first critical step towards realizing that we can change public and private reality—not through something else, but through educating ourselves and individually assuming responsibility for our attitude toward our world.

At this point one might well ask, "How can we educate ourselves to change our own self-image?" "How can one get sufficient leverage on one's conception of oneself in order to start the re-education process, and in what direction is the process to proceed?" "Who will provide us with a conceptual model for this new vision?" Here Kierkegaard, as well as other more contemporary European philosophers, can help to implement Illich's message.

First of all we must become more understanding of and sensitive to the prevailing view of man that is current today. Tracing the development of our modern self-image from the past would be a great help; for we are, both individually and collectively, our past. Heidegger, Husserl, and Marx, among others, have made extensive, in-depth analyses of how our modern image has developed over the last 2300 years. This is just a beginning, however, because our re-education of the self in a new vision of man is largely an individual matter, and each individual self-image is going to vary from the norm. Knowing about the predominant self-image is helpful, but knowing my individual self is essential. But how can I actually get on top of anything as close to me as my self-image in order to recognize and monitor it for what it is?

If we are to re-educate ourselves vis-a-vis our self-image we can no longer continue to just live our lives implicitly. We must make our existence explicit and then learn how to monitor it from within the activity itself. We must learn how to "split the ego"; to catch ourselves in the act while we are acting and then describe that activity as it presents itself and only in so far as it presents itself.[12] Learning to use this technique will not only help us to get on top of our present self-image but it will also help us to check out any progress we might make in changing it. Phenomenological thinking should become an integral part of any deschooling program.

This leaves us with our final question; "How are we to conceptualize this new image?" Of one thing we may be certain. Presuming that most people today hold to a predominantly mechanical, functional concept of themselves, before we can change to a new self-concept we need to be able to visualize a new thinking model that will illustrate how it is possible to change our existing self-image. What we need is a new model of being human, a model that will show us how, through our own efforts, we can again get control over our own education by getting control over our own self-becoming. In the modern world we have a conception that tells us that man is what he does. In order to transform our own self-concept, and, as a result, transform public reality as well, we need a new conception that tells us that man is *also* what he wills through choice. Kierkegaard's description of the self will provide us with this new vision of man.[13]

The Greeks were able to explain intellectually the sharply differing worlds of the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the external, the necessary and the possible by keeping them apart. It was Kierkegaard's genius to realize that in the lived reality of the becoming of a self, which is significantly different from any cognized formulation, they cannot be separated but must be lived together in some sort of synthesis. The basic structure of the self, according to Kierkegaard, consists (1) of a *relation*, (2) *which relates itself to its own self*, (3) but in relating itself to its own self ultimately is led to despair and the recognition of a need for a Power outside itself. (In this paper we shall only consider the first two parts of the structure.) The "original" relation is a relation between two opposing sets of forces or needs: the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, necessity and freedom, and body and soul. These incompatible, opposing needs or forces must be lived together in some sort of synthesis in order for the self to become itself. However, man is not simply a relation, or "synthesis" of these conflicting forces or needs. The self is a relation, but merely as a relation "man is not yet a self." "The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self."[14]

But how is it possible that the original relation can relate itself to itself? Because, like no other being, human being is conscious of itself. "Body and soul make a sentient being but not a man, until they are united in what comprehends the meaning and possibility of both," that is, self consciousness. "This is the factor that relates both to itself and to each other."[15] Self-consciousness "is the decisive criterion of the self. The more consciousness the more self. . . . The self is the conscious synthesis of infinitude and finitude which relates itself to itself, whose task is to become itself."[16]

This Kierkegaardian description of the self suggests that the self is the stand that it (finding itself as a relation) takes on itself.[17] The becoming of the self involves the taking of a position on the given oppositions of the self. It is a relation that relates itself to its own self by taking a stand on itself. Another way to describe this "dialectic of relationships" is to refer to the self as a "self-interpretive being."[18] The self is the interpretive stand that it takes in relation to the sets of contradictory forces in its life. The relation between necessity and possibility, for example, represents the structural given; and the self, to be a self, must act on the given. Though it is true that, for the most part, this self interpretative activity remains implicit, in order to get any leverage on our becoming, as we shall soon see, it must be made explicit. The becoming of a self involves action and choice.

As with all creative thinkers, Kierkegaard had a problem with the language. It is almost impossible to find the correct word to adequately describe his concept of "relationship." Even the term "synthesis," which Kierkegaard uses, presents difficulties because the relationship both is and is not a "synthesis." Necessity and possibility for example, represent two opposing forces that by their very nature cannot be rationally synthesized; yet in order to live a fulfilled life they must be synthesized. Moreover, if they could be harmoniously synthesized there would be no need for the third step where the self must identify with a Power outside itself. They do represent a synthesis in that the self, in order to be a self, must continually take a stand on them, and in taking a stand some sort of a synthesis is realized. At the same time, rationally they are completely contradictory.

Although man has often desperately tried to rid himself of one of the two opposing sets of forces, like Plato's attempt to get rid of the finite and temporal, or Lucretius' attempts to deny the spiritual and take a stand only on the bodily and material, this is an impossibiliy.[19] "Man is a synthesis of the soulish and the bodily," the temporal and the eternal, the finite and the infinite; and anyone "who thinks he can be fulfilled by satisfying one part of his self without also satisfying the other is making the mistake of seeing his self as an accidental combination of two things, one of which can be done away with."[20] It is impossible to get rid of either aspect of the self, because the self is both of these conflicting, contradictory, clashing sets of forces in some sort of relationship. All we can do is live in the tension. But how?

Let us take the necessity-possibility opposition and see how Kierkegaard works it out.[21] The necessity facet suggests that the self is always stuck with certain fixed and limiting characteristics that are not of his own choosing. When we are born we are thrown into a particular familial-cultural context from which we just naturally pick up a particular set of cultural determinants. In conjunction with a certain conceptual schema, including a particular vocabulary configuration, we just naturally pick up a particular way of perceiving the world. We pick up certain ways of doing things and ways of behaving, certain dexterities, skills, sensitivities, and attitudinal sets. None of these characteristics, moreover, are chosen; they are determined by "throwness." In short, we acquire from the particular social-cultural context into which we have been thrown the wherewithal with which and through which we live and comport ourselves in the world—that is, initially. But, contrary to Skinner, to be fully human is to be more than sheer necessity. Man is both necessity and possibility; he is both determined and free. But how can Kierkegaard insist that *it is by choice that the self becomes itself.*[22] What is it that I am choosing when I choose myself and how is the original self constituted?

The self which is chosen in the initial choosing of the self is what Kierkegaard calls the "finite self," a self which, in fact, is not yet a self since it is, up until this point, constituted and controlled by the cultural determinants it has picked up. There are actually two "selves" involved in Kierkegaard's description of the self. There is the finite self which refer to the "so-called self" of the person prior to the absolute choosing of the self, and then there is the "absolute self" of one's eternal validity which one "gets" through choosing the "finite self" absolutely. When we make the absolute choice of the self, which action, in effect, constitutes the self, we choose our "finite self" absolutely and completely—warts, dents, and all. Before this choice the self is merely something with certain predispositions, tendencies and habits resulting from its conditioning up to this point; and as long as this state of being remains implicit we are at the complete mercy of our cultural determinants. So the first step in activating the "dialectic of relationships" that constitutes a self is to become aware of one's cultural determinants. Then they must be accepted, appropriated, and chosen absolutely *as constituting my self.* At this moment of absolute choice the self, for the first time, realizes itself as a relation of two opposing sets of forces taking a position on itself; and as being so constituted it can now consciously choose the stand that it will take on any given set of opposites. By acknowledging, accepting and choosing its facticity, the self, at the same time frees itself from sheer implicity and habituality. Now the self, which is necessity and freedom relating itself to itself, is in a position to become itself through choice.

As you gradually gain in clarity concerning the what and the how of your cultural determinants, that is, as you get to know yourself better, you also gradually gain confidence in your ability to separate the important from the unimportant in your life. Accordingly, you start to minimize your weaknesses and accentuate your strengths. If, for example, you decide that the familial religious influence was, in some respects, the wrong kind of influence, you can choose to subordinate that influence to the more positive religious predispositions in your life. Then, even though the negative influences are still a part of your facticity, for example, feeling melancholy and generally miserable every Sunday afternoon, you are at least in a position to get on top of that situation and to mediate it. Your Sunday afternoon moods are still a part of you, but their importance has been neutralized. To choose oneself absolutely is to place oneself in a position to edit the text.[23]

There is one final feature of this process that needs to be noted. The net affect of this becoming through choice is to narrow down the personality. You gradually become more and more centered. Kierkegaard talks about frugality as "a prime characteristic of everything ethical, a characteristic which may seem strange to one who comes from the abundance of the aesthetical."[24] On the lower aesthetic level, where one's implicit cultural determinants prevail, there is nothing to give one's life continuity or centeredness. There is no ground or direction. One is always open to any new pleasure, any new opportunity to satisfy one's desires. The finite self will entertain any and all new ideas; he is open to everything and anything. This is "the abudance of the aesthetical;" the more the possibilities the better. But when one chooses oneself absolutely, one becomes frugal and starts to economize, carefully selecting out the important from the unimportant. One begins to specialize, as it were, on the positive determinants of his life, scaling down the view of oneself to its basic essentials. This is how man takes charge of his own self education.

In his description of the"how" of the becoming of a self, Kierkegaard goes beyond the age-old "free will-determinism" controversy. The question is no longer "Is man free to choose?" or "Is man determined by the antecedent forces in his life?" He is both. He is determined by his past. He is limited by the givens of his life: his physical construction, his cultural determinants, the influence of his parents, etc. We do not choose our parents, our culture, or our tradition before birth. When born we are helpless creatures at the complete mercy of our environment, our family, and the cultural-social context into which we have been thrown. But man is not only determined. The necessity pole of the opposition only makes sense in conjunction with its opposite, freedom or possibility. The self is bound by limitations; but at the same time it has the power to project and choose certain possibilities within the parameter of those limitations. *There is some wriggle room.* Moreover, as you continue to choose yourself, the givens in the facticity—possibility dialectic change somewhat. Even though ever so slightly each choice does represent a movement in your self-becoming. Each chosen possibility affirms and/or reconstructs your facticity which in turn alters your future possibilities. Each time you extend your horizon of intelligibility, each time you extend your range of social, physical, or artistic competence, you alter the givens in your facticity—possibility dialectic. So the authentic self is always in a state of becoming. It is only the person who lives his life implicitly, in sheer habituality, that is stuck in his cultural determinants. We can be in control of our lives, including our education, providing we are willing to choose.[25]

Soren Kierkegaard, the 19th Century thinker, like Illich, was a radical humanist with a serious concern about what the modern world was doing to the spirit of man. He also tried to get man to face up to himself, to become aware of the meaning of being human and to accept the responsibility for his own becoming. Kierkegaard, again like Illich, also stressed the importance of self-motivated deschooled learning, a kind of education that would redress the imbalance between what man can learn for himself from his own experiences, and what man can learn from intentional teaching. In fact it was Kierkegaard who discovered that the highest and most meaningful experiences in life, like love and faith, cannot be articulated into concepts; hence cannot be taught but only learned.[26]

Illich points to the road while Kierkegaard shows us how to make the journey. By combining Illich's deschooling with Kierkegaard's existential education, it is possible to realize an educational program of radical individuation where individual differences are prized and hope has supplanted expectation. In such a program, each student would be put in touch with his own existential education. Each student would become his own teacher. Moreover, such an education can be taught. It is just as possible for self-sacrificing teachers to teach students how to learn for themselves as it is for self-serving teachers and administrators to teach students how to be taught. Before we can do this, however, many of us need to re-educate ourselves to the belief that we can choose and that our choices do make a difference. In this age of over-communication and over-choice we need to get back to the basics of human existence, and once again realize what it means to be a human being. There is no other way to escape the trap.

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1. Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 164.

2. Richard Ballard, "The Testimony of Ivan Illich," *Human Behavior*, February, 1977, pp. 26-27.

3. For a further discussion of these imbalances, see Ivan Illich, *Tools of Conviviality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973).

4. Ibid., pp. xiii, 12.

5. Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society*, p. 159.

6. Ivan Illich, "Breakdown of Schools: A Problem of a Symptom?", *Journal of Research and Development in Education*, Spring 1972, Vol. 5, p. 9.

7. Ivan Illich, "The Alternative to Schooling," *Saturday Review*, June 19, 1971, p. 45.

8. As quoted in Philip Rhinelander, *Is Man Incomprehensible to Man?* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1973), p. 8.

9. Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society*, p. 165.

10. Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society*, p. 69.

11. Ivan Illich, *Celebration of Awareness: A Call for Institutional Revolution* (New York: Doubleday, 1971), p. 173.

12. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 35.

13. The interpretation of Kierkegaard found in this paper, in many respects closely parellels the "Berkeley interpretation" as developed and taught by Professor Hubert Dreyfus. See Fybate Lecture Notes: *Philosophy 152a, Backgrounds of Existentialism and Phenomenology* (Berkeley, Calif., 1972).

14. Sören Kierkegaard, *The Sickness Unto Death* (New York: Doubleday, 1941), p. 146.

15. George Price, *The Narrow Pass: A Study of Kierkegaard's Concept of Man*. (London: Hutchinson & Company, 1963), p. 37.

16. Soren Kierkegaard, *Sickness Unto Death*, p. 162.

17. Although it is here being used in a slightly different sense, the phrase "dialectic of relationships" comes from George Prince, *The Narrow Pass*, p. 36.

18. These phrases, "a self interpretive being" and "taking a stand on oneself," are from Professor Dreyfus' instruction.

19. *Fybate Lecture Notes*, p. 27.

20. Ibid.

21. Later Heidegger will use the terms "facticity (or "throwness") and "projection" to describe Kierkegaard's "necessity" and "possibility."

22. Soren Kierkegaard, *Either/Or, Volume II* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press), p. 181.

23. "The principle difference, and one on which everything hinges," according to Kierkegaard, "is that the ethical individual (that is, the one who has chosen himself absolutely and in repentance) is transparent to himself." (Ibid., p. 262). Transparency involves knowing oneself, but it also involves choosing oneself in the sense of acting on one's choice of oneself. It is not a case of mere reflection, of becoming aware of "where one is at" and "what one is doing," but of *acting* and behaving in a certain way, said activity and said behavior being based upon the clarity one has about oneself. "The ethical individual knows himself, but this knowledge is not a mere contemplation. . .*it is a reflection upon himself which itself is an action*, and therefore I have deliberately preferred to use the expression 'choosing oneself' instead of 'know oneself.'" (Ibid., p. 263. Underscoring supplied.)

24. Ibid., p. 233.

25. The self is a continual becoming spurred on by an activity of the will. "A man who has no will at all is no self; the more will he has, the more consciousness of self he has also." (Soren Kierkegaard, *Sickness Unto Death*, p. 162)

26. See Soren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling* (New York: Doubleday, 1941).

Response to Troutner

ILLICH AND KIERKEGAARD RECOMBINED

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Professor Troutner is dealing with important issues in education and a number of questions at different levels can be raised about what he says. However, I wish to focus on certain aspects of his main theme involving the relation of Kierkegaard's structuring of human existence to the idea of deschooling as discussed in the writings of Ivan Illich: "Illich points to the road while Kierkegaard shows us how to make the journey." I agree with Professor Troutner that attempting to relate the thinking of Kierkegaard and Illich can lead to some interesting comparisons and results. However, I see the connection somewhat differently and will attempt to develop briefly this difference.

In discussing the journey outlined by Kierkegaard, Professor Troutner focuses on the "ethical" stage on life's way. It is here, for Kierkegaard, that the self emerges from the "aesthetic" mode of existence, one in which life consists of a series of happenings or episodes, leading to boredom, melancholy, and despair, to one of committed choice. In moving from a set of outward manifestations to inward decisiveness one becomes a particular individual through an exercise of will. Since "it is by choice that the self becomes itself," Professor Troutner's emphasis on this aspect of Kierkegaard is understandable. Yet, as he notes, this is not sufficient for Kierkegaard. The ethical stage provides no resolution for the inevitable conflict of principles and duties that arises, as illustrated by the story of Abraham and Isaac. Guilt and a deeper sense of despair are the result and require a "leap of faith" to that which is rationally absurd, the paradox of Christianity. As Professor Troutner points out, the self must advance to a "religious" stage and "recognize a need for a Power outside of itself" to achieve fulfillment.

The point here is that on the one hand Kierkegaard is concerned to break from the abstract systematizing of philosophers such as Hegel and also the levelling, patterned tendencies of "the present age." These characteristics of modern life ignore "what it means to be a human being. Not indeed, what it means to be a human being in general; for this is the sort of thing that one might even induce a speculative philosopher to agree to; but what it means that you and I and he are human beings, each one for himself."[1] For Kierkegaard there are no outward benchmarks to guide us in choosing to become a "single one," no rational criteria to which one can appeal. One's "education" is to be evaluated by the intensity of individual will in response to inward signs. It would appear that what one chooses is arbitrary and how one chooses is crucial.

On the other hand, Kierkegaard attempts to develop a hierarchy of levels that would be found on this journey if one were to explore the nature of human existence. He saw his own struggle in life to be that of becoming a Christian. But this is also the task of "everyman" if he would be true to himself. It is, in short, the task of human beings in general. Of course, the specific manner in which this might occur would be quite unique and different for each person. But this is true for each stage of existence. Don Juan can appear in an infinite variety of forms. However, the authentic pattern would be characteristic of all. If someone were to protest that his lived existence is not as Kierkegaard describes it, that his task in life is not to become a Christian, and in fact attempt to critique rationally the structure outlined and the epistemological bases of it, he would have missed the point for Kierkegaard and be "hung up" somewhere along the way. Unless he had gone through the stages of life and passed beyond the realm of reason to a passionate belief in the God-Man and unquestioning trust in his Word he would not be truly "free." So, while appealing to the unique and individual nature of being human, Kierkegaard has mapped out the essential route that the self-educational journey to this goal must take. It is fundamentally a religious trip that divorces reason from the will and renders the itinerary rationally uncriticizable.

This may serve as a point of transition to Illich, since the religious concern underlying Kierkegaard's analysis of human existence informs Illich's discussion of deschooling and appeal to individual autonomy as well. Professor Troutner points out that the term "deschooling" is to be understood in the context of an attack upon the manipulative institutionalization of twentieth century society as a whole. But, as can be seen in *Celebration of Awareness*, it was the structure of the church and the problems he found therein that led Illich to examine schooling and draw frequent analogies between the two. Kierkegaard found it practically impossible to become a Christian in a Christian land and Illich (in a different way) found a similar difficulty in his own work. Both seek a return to Christian roots in order to become born again. Kierkegaard points inward and Illich directs our attention outward toward the establishment of convivial institutions to facilitate the development of a way of life that would deal with pressing world problems and also provide human fulfillment for all. And, as Professor Troutner has indicated, schooling deserves primary attention, for it, like the church in the Middle Ages, has become the dominant monopolistic institution that makes us passive and impotent as individuals and from which we must be liberated if our genuine human nature is to grow and develop.

There seem to be two separate, though interconnected, centers of concern underlying Illich's critique of schooling. First, he claims that the international movement toward developing and extending compulsory schooling as a means of equalizing educational and economic opportunity is doomed to failure. Primarily through its certification function, schooling preserves and even escalates the disparity and inequity among social groups, even though its defenders have received much of their support by claiming that the opposite is the case. Connected with this, contemporary problems such as overpopulation, food supply, and the energy crisis further exacerbate inequality between the haves and have nots and raise serious questions about the prospects for human survival. And these are difficulties that cannot be attacked through schooling, because schooling engenders a mentality of unending industrial production and consumption that can only intensify such problems. Second, the "hidden curriculum" of schooling functions in a dehumanizing way that addicts people to dependence upon schooling for learning. And this serves as the base for becoming dependent upon an interconnected set of institutions for dealing with personal as well as larger social problems. While the poor are taught to think that their salvation is to be found through the schools, those who become successfully schooled are typically trained for a kind of life that not only cannot be tolerated in this day and age, but also is in conflict with the fulfillment of basic human needs that center around the self-determination of one's own manner of living.

So, even if the first type of concern were addressed politically in terms of achieving somehow a reasonable degree of social and economic equality worldwide, the second would remain as long as schooling and other similar institutions monopolize the way we grow up and live. (It is this on this point that I think Illich would attempt to counter critics such as Herbert Gintis.[2]) As Professor Troutner notes, Illich is primarily interested in a cultural revolution, one that cannot be achieved by means of social planning through the kinds of institutions under critique. Liberation must come about through a personal "conversion," a self-initiated transformation in which one educates oneself.

Whether or not Illich is correct in his diagnosis and analysis of our social and educational ills is not the main issue I wish to pursue here. Rather, it is that the liberation he seeks requires certain kinds of choices as opposed to others and certain ways of living as opposed to others if we are to become fulfilled as persons and also deal with contemporary world problems. Illich's vision of the "good life" for everyone (a life illustrated by Jesus[3]) is characterized by equality among persons, an austere and simplified life style, and the taking of personal responsibility for one's own learning and living. As he says, we need "the protection of three values: survival, justice, and self-defined work. I take these values to be fundamental to any convivial society, however different one such society might be from another in practice, institutions, or rationale."[4] These may well be highly desirable values, but the point is that we must be converted to choose these rather than others. Thus, for example, in discussing birth control, Illich says:

> People must learn to live within bounds. This cannot be *taught*. Survival depends on people *learning* fast what they *cannot* do. They must *learn* to abstain from unlimited progeny, consumption, and use. It is impossible to *educate* people for voluntary poverty or to manipulate them into self control. . . . The universal practice of effective contraception is a necessary premise for the limitation of tools which I advocate. But equally, the psychological inversion that will accompany a limitation of tools is a premise for the convivial psychological pressure necessary for effective contraception.[5]

The paradoxical features of such typical statements by Illich would indicate that a new kind of "convivial psychological pressure" is needed to convince people that they are educating themselves, autonomously learning what they want to learn, while at the same time choosing and learning what is required for their own good and that of the world.

So, on the one hand, Illich constantly stresses his concern to "protect the autonomy of the learner—his private initiative to decide what he will learn and his inalienable right to learn what he likes rather than what is useful to somebody else."[6] On the other hand, the learner's growth is to be measured against the values necessary for him and the world today. If Illich had his way it would not be likely that the "new man" of which Professor Troutner speaks would want to learn how to become a missionary for the church among impoverished people, raise a large family, become wealthy, or extend current health care facilities and procedures. As Illich admits, he is interested in "a radical program of deschooling[that] could train youth in the new style of revolution needed to challenge a social system featuring obligatory 'health,' 'wealth,' and 'security.'"[7] If youth fail to recognize their obligation to challenge this system and its values either they would not have been adequately trained or the program would not have been sufficiently radical.

But what of those who see the development of intellectual autonomy as a precondition for being educated, taking control of one's destiny, and attempting to assess the best way to deal with social problems? In an early planning seminar conducted with Everett Reimer, Illich's words are encouraging:

> We began by reaffirming our primary interest in education defined as the cognitive development of the individual. . . .[N]othing seems to us more crucial than to try to provide optimum conditions for the development of all men's minds. Thus, even if it should be determined that schools must continue to give priority to functions other than cognitive development, this would require that other institutional means be developed to achieve the cognitive aims of education.[8]

Here, it seems to me, is one of the most potentially valuable features of the concept of deschooling. In this statement Illich is challenging the assumption that intellectual development has to be pursued through the institution of schooling if at all. Later he goes on to question whether schooling is even amenable to such a pursuit. We have uncritically accepted these assumptions for too long and searching for alternative ways of developing the mind and independent thought may be one of the most important educational tasks for the future.

Unfortunately, when the "system" is attacked, appeal is often made to a deceptive sense of "freedom" understood as finding oneself through choosing and doing one's own thing(s) which conceals a larger purpose. And this appears to be what is taking place in Illich's picture of deschooling society. The learning webs or networks he proposes focus upon the kind of basic skills, resources, and relationships that would fit into the "simple and transparent"[9] environment he envisions for us. Although the development of the mind and critical thinking would be possible, it is not emphasized and, in any event, could not be "required." What emerges is more a stress upon the feeling of freedom and self-determined decision making than upon developing the types of tools that would give substance to these notions and lead to intellectually independent individuals. Putting people into a position whereby they might not only understand and appreciate the questions that Kierkegaard and Illich raise and the views they espouse, but also thoughtfully and critically examine these views and the assumptions underlying them would not be a dominant feature along Illich's road and in fact would be precluded by Kierkegaard's mapping of the journey. Both, in rather different ways, reveal the seductive trap implicit in the idea that "the (subjective) truth shall make you free."

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1. Soren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 109.

2. See Herbert Gintis, "Toward a Political Economy of Education: A Radical Critique of Ivan Illich's *Deschooling Society*," in *After Deschooling, What?*, ed. Alan Gartner, et al. (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

3. John L. Elias, *Conscientization and Deschooling*, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976), p. 36.

4. Ivan Illich, *Tools for Conviviality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 13.

5. Ibid., pp. 70-72. (Emphasis in original.)

6. Ivan Illich, "After Deschooling, What?," in *After Deschooling, What?*, p. 2.

7. Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 49.

8. Everett Reimer and Ivan Illich, "Proposal for a Planning Seminar Aimed at the Development of Basic Educational Alternatives," in *Farewell to Schools???*, ed. Daniel U. Levine and Robert J. Havighurst, (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 6-7.

9. Ivan Illich, "Political Inversion," in *Imprisoned in the Global Classroom*, by Ivan Illich and Etienne Verne, (London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1976), p. 30.

THE DILEMMA OF VALUES CLARIFICATION

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The areas of values education and moral education have grown significantly in the last several years. The values clarification movement, led by Sidney Simon and Howard Kirschenbaum, has been one of the most active.[1] The values clarification movement (VC) claims to offer a solution to a kind of problem that is not otherwise addressed. Often, it says, people are afflicted with problems which are neither problems of learning (and hence cannot be helped by teaching) nor problems of an emotional nature (and hence not appropriately treated by counseling). Rather, VC proponents claim, these problems must be treated by engaging the people in values clarification activities. Such activities, it is claimed, help people with symptoms such as apathy, flightiness, uncertainty, inconsistency, drift, over-conformity, dissentiousness, and role-playing.[2]

According to VC theory, what is important is not the values one has but rather the process whereby one arrives at these values. VC is relativistic in that it claims that there is no one set of values which is true, valid or right for everyone. VC is also subjectivistic, in that it claims that, if a person has gone through the right process, the values he comes out with are correct or right for him (i.e., one's believing a certain value judgment makes it true). VC does maintain, however, that it is important that one follow the right process if one's values are to be valid. Thus they place heavy emphasis on the valuing *process*. Essentially, VC involves activities designed to get people to follow the proper valuing process.

That valuing process involves seven aspects. (These are discussed extensively in Raths et al. (op. cit.) and in many other

VC publications.) To arrive at a "good" or "valid" value, one should use a process that includes choosing freely, choosing from among alternatives, choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative, prizing and cherishing, publicly affirming one's position, and acting on one's choices. Only if something satisfies these seven criteria is it a value. VC, then, is a set of activities designed to get a person to engage in a certain form of decision making which, it is claimed, will result in the person's having clear values and thus becoming more "positive, purposeful, enthusiastic, and proud" rather than showing the symptoms noted above (apathy etc.).

Thus VC claims to occupy a middle road, being neither teaching nor therapy.[3] Yet it does involve the process of trying to get people to achieve or come to have the proper values. So in a broad sense, at any rate, it is concerned with values education. And since moral values are among the values with which it is concerned, it is legitimate to consider VC as a form of moral education and to evaluate it in that light. Not only is it taken as moral education by the people who use it, but the leaders themselves make this claim for it:

> Use of the valuing process helps individuals (and groups) to develop and clarify their values in such a way that they are more likely to. . .act more constructively in the social context.
>
> To be socially constructive is to act in a way that promotes the values of life, liberty (i.e., freedom, justice, equality), and the pursuit of happiness. To state it differently, to be socially constructive increases the likelihood that others will have lives that have value to *them*, so long as they do not infringe on the rights of others.[4]

Is VC an acceptable form of moral education (or of any kind of values education)? There is one passage in *Values and Teaching* which many who write on VC pick on. I, too, want to base my discussion on this passage, for I believe that it illustrates a basic problem with VC theory that has not yet been pointed out. The passage illustrates the VC method of handling situations in which one feels one ought to limit behavior while not imposing values on the student. I will argue that it is much more problemmatical than the authors recognize.

> TEACHER: So some of you think it is best to be honest on tests, is that right? (Some heads nod affirmatively.) And some of you think dishonesty is all right? (A few hesitant and slight nods.) And I guess some of you are not certain. (Heads nod.) Well, are there any other choices or is it just a matter of dishonesty *vs.* honesty?

SAM: You could be honest some of the time and dishonest some of the time.

TEACHER: Does that sound like a possible choice, class? (Heads nod.) Any other alternatives to choose from?

TRACY: You could be honest in some situations and not in others. For example, I am not honest when a friend asks about an ugly dress, at least sometimes. (Laughter.)

TEACHER: Is that a possible choice, class? (Heads nod again.) Any other alternatives?

SAM: It seems to me that you have to be all one way or all the other.

TEACHER: Just a minute, Sam. As usual we are first looking for the alternatives that there are in the issue. Later we'll try to look at any choice that you may have selected. Any other alternatives, class? (No response.) Well, then, let's list the four possibilities that we have on the board and I'm going to ask that each of you do two things for yourself: (1) see if you can identify any other choices in this issue of honesty and dishonesty, and (2) consider the consequences of each alternative and see which ones you prefer. Later, we will have buzz groups in which you can discuss this and see if you are able to make a choice and if you want to make your choice part of your actual behavior. That is something you must do for yourself.

GINGER: Does that mean that we can decide for ourselves whether we should be honest on tests here?

TEACHER: No, that means that you can decide on the value. I personally value honesty; and although you may choose to be dishonest, I shall insist that we be honest on our tests here. In other areas of your life, you may have more freedom to be dishonest, but one can't do *anything any time*, and in this class I shall expect honesty on tests.

GINGER: But then how can we decide for ourselves? Aren't you telling us what to value?

SAM: Sure, you're telling us what we should do and believe in.

TEACHER: Not exactly. I don't mean to tell you what you should value. That's up to you. But I do mean that in this class, not elsewhere, necessarily, you have to be honest on tests or suffer certain consequences. I merely mean that I cannot give tests without the rule of honesty. All of you who choose dishonesty as a value may not practice it here, that's all I'm saying. Further questions anyone? (*Values and Teaching*, pp. 114-115)

The class may not have any more questions, but I certainly do. Why do we and the authors find this exchange between teacher and pupils strange? Well, clearly, because on the one hand we tell students that they must make their own value judgments and that these are valid, while on the other hand we tell them that those judgments are not valid (that the teacher will not respect them), in that, if they make the "wrong" choice, they will not be permitted to act on that choice in the teacher's class. If we define a paradox as an apparent contradiction, then

VC has got a paradox, for it is apparently contradictory to hold that children should be free to choose their own values, but not free to act on them. While Raths et al. believe that they can dissolve the paradox by drawing a distinction between imposing *values* and imposing "behavior rules that are not defended as values, but merely as devices for protecting individuals and groups against pressure from others,"[5] I do not believe that they are successful. A closer look at the paradox will show that there is a real contradiction, a real dilemma, and that VC cannot with consistency continue to affirm both horns of that dilemma.

Immediately following their scenario quoted above, Raths et al. attempt to analyse the situation in this manner:

> Thus in this discussion a teacher who is concerned that students develop an intelligent and viable relationship with their words, that is, develop clear values, (1) helps them to examine alternatives and consequences in issues, (2) does not tell them, directly or indirectly, what is "right" for all persons and for all times, (3) is candid about his own values but insists that they not be blindly adopted by others, (4) sometimes limits behavior that he considers ill-advised but never limits the right to believe or the right to behave differently in other circumstances, and (5) points to the importance of the individual making his own choices and considering the implications for his own life. (p. 115)

Points (2) and (4) are directly relevant to our considerations here. The authors try to avoid the difficulty by distinguishing between limiting someone's behavior and limiting belief or values. They say it is quite compatible with the theory and objectives of VC to impose limits on children's behavior in certain situations, as long as it is made clear to them that this is not meant to imply anything as to what they ought to believe. Thus the authors believe the paradox is resolved. We can do justice both to the claims of common sense and to the desire to allow children to develop their values through free choice among alternatives.

But the problem is not resolved. Simply saying that one can draw this distinction does not make it in fact a distinction that avoids the problem. VC wants to do two things. On the one hand, the value theory and the values of its proponents require recognition of the autonomy of the individual. According to VC, individuals cannot develop "healthy" values if those values are imposed from the outside. Not only will one not have a proper "value" if she/he acts on another's say-so, but there is no objective basis for values whereby the teacher could even know what values the other person should have. Hence people must be free to choose their own values. A basic element in VC theory then is the commitment to extreme moral autonomy, which is part of a basic commitment to respecting individuals. The second thing VC wants to do, however, is to put certain constraints on the behavior of children. They find that they must not allow children to cheat, that "one cannot do *anything any time.*"

My thesis is that VC cannot consistently pursue both of these goals. By imposing their "behavior rules," they subvert their effort to respect individuals: they end up with what has been called an "arbitrary authoritarianism." Their treatment of the young is arbitrary in that no good reason can be given for it. The teacher simply says "one can't do *anything any time*" and, later, "I cannot give tests without the rule of honesty." In their commentary, Raths et al. speak of the fact that the teacher "limits behavior which he considers ill-advised." But ill-advised by whose lights? Who or what gives the teacher the right to decide for the student what is ill-advised? Who or what gives the teacher the right to make students take tests under certain circumstances? Unless one argues that in some objective sense the teacher probably knows better than the student what is "ill-advised" and that in some objective sense it is good for the teacher to give those tests, her/his doing so is arbitrary (there is no good reason for it).

To this criticism the values clarifier might reply that his/her behavior is not arbitrary, since it is justified by his/her values. "I am acting on my value, which is that the individuals should behave in such and such a way." But this won't do. According to VC theory, the teacher's values have no more objective basis than anyone else's, so there is and can be no good reason for the teacher to impose them on the student. So the charge of arbitrary abuse of others cannot be avoided by VC.

Thus VC sets out to absolutize the autonomy and dignity of the child. It believes, as we have seen, that the individual can and should be allowed to discover goodness by him or herself.[6] But by a strange turn of events, something (common sense?) ends up convincing values clarifiers that they must do just the opposite, that they must use their strength and authority to force students to follow a line of behavior for which no good reason can be given. So the paradox of VC turns out to be this:

VC is commited to absolutizing the individual's dignity and autonomy but also to the use of behavior rules which, in a VC context, submerge autonomy under authority and destroy dignity with arbitrariness. In other words, the imposing of behavior rules is incompatible with the basic philosophy of VC.

There is a second serious difficulty which arises from VC's imposing behavior rules. For, to impose the rules is, in effect, to impose values by virtue of the psychological authority of one's position.

The main idea in all of VC is that one should not *impose* values. (By "imposing values" is meant causing the young to adopt certain values because of one's authority or prestige rather than because the young freely choose the values by their own moral reflection.) This concern arises from two sources. One is theoretical: According to VC theory, values are the kinds of things which one cannot simply "get," which cannot be given to or imposed on one. They have to be "worked out in fear and trembling," that is, the individual has to clarify her/his own values if they are to be valid.[7] VC says that only if one goes through the right process does one have a "value." (What does one have if one does not clarify one's values? Surely, in ordinary language anyway, one also has values but not perhaps the correct values.) VC's claim is that if one is to avoid apathy etc. and to become "positive, purposeful, enthusiastic, and proud" and if one is to be "socially constructive," then one must use the seven steps of VC. So the theory of VC requires that we not impose values on persons.

There is also a practical reason for the concern that values not be imposed. Kirschenbaum, Harmin, Howe, and Simon, in an article in *Phi Delta Kappan*, indicate that they are very concerned to avoid "the heavy 'moralizing, inclucating, and indoctrination' that dominated values education before World War II and, in its extreme form, led to the horrors of the Nazi regime."[8] One could well ask whether *any* form of *moral* education or *moral* indoctrination was involved in what led to the horrors of the Nazi regime, but the important point here is that the VC leaders also have a practical motivation for opposing indoctrinating or forcing values on the students.

However, the "common sense" requirement that there be behavior rules again causes problems for VC. For it seems that they cannot impose these rules without imposing values. I would suggest that the use of these behavior rules, enforced by the greater power, authority, and prestige of the teacher, constitutes the imposition of values in violation of VC principle. The approach advocated by VC will not achieve the objective of being completely non-directive and "client-centered." For, to force children to behave in one way rather than another is to signal loudly and clearly what they should do. It is to violate the rule that Raths et al. imply (in the passage quoted above from page 115 of *Values and Teaching*), not to "tell them, directly or indirectly, what is 'right' for all persons and for all times." That is, not only is the recommended procedure for handling cases like honesty on tests not consistent with the philosophy underlying VC, it is also, as a matter of psychological fact, inconsistent with the theory's prohibition of interfering with the student's free "clarification" of his values. While not everyone will accept the message sent by the teacher, what we know about values being "caught not taught," about actions speaking louder than words, about processes of identification and internalization, indicates that if a teacher enforces a certain line of behavior, many students will conclude that that that must be the right thing to do. Walter Mischel and Harriet Mischel write: "children tend to adopt the performance standards displayed by adult models who are rewarding and powerful, but tend to reject the same standards when they are modeled by adults who are low in those attributes."[9]

The point is this: VC wants to avoid imposing values. But it also wants to limit the behavior of the young. It must by strength and authority require that children follow certain rules. But now the children are wondering why they should obey those rules and they will, regardless of the intentions of the teacher, conclude that they should obey them because they reflect correct values. By their behavior teachers are signaling to the young which values they should choose, and thus doing implicitly what they refuse to do explicitly—guiding the young towards certain values and away from others.

It seems, then, that the feeling of paradox which is raised by the scenario concerning honesty is well-founded. For VC faces a real dilemma and tries to have it both ways. Either it must take seriously its commitment to autonomy and dignity in the children, to not imposing values, in which case it must refrain from using authority to arbitrarily limit children's behavior, or it must choose the demands of "common sense," and decide that it has to change its theory in order to accommodate the running of children's lives and the implicit teaching of values.

Can VC choose the first horn of the dilemma and decide to stop imposing behavior rules? It seems unlikely. But the reasons why it cannot do so are obscured by VC theory. Briefly (this is another paper), it is because those rules are not simply requirements of "common sense." Rather, we are talking about imposing rules which reflect objective moral standards. Cheating on tests is wrong. If the student, after properly clarifying his values, comes to a different conclusion, then the student has made a mistake. Perhaps the VC process is not a guarantee of achieving the correct values. VC cannot give up the imposing of behavior rules because cheating is wrong and should be prohibited.

If VC cannot give up behavior rules, it must give up its "nondirective therapy." Something of the concept of autonomy and freedom has to be modified. But here too VC seems to be in a bind. Surely autonomy and freedom *are* important. Surely we should not brainwash or indoctrinate the young. Surely they must at some point adopt morality for themselves and for reasons they see as good. Is the dilemma then universal, one in which everyone, and not just VC proponents, is stuck?

I would argue that the paradox can be solved, but not on VC's grounds. For VC's difficulties arise from its assumption that values are not objective, that there can be no truth or falsity, correctness or incorrectness concerning values. From this ethical subjectivism it follows that we cannot possibly *teach* values. We must either impose them or leave students to their own devices with no more help than values clarification activities.

But now we see how to avoid VC's dilemma. If we take a different approach, if we say that VC's intuitions that "one cannot do *anything any time*" are correct because there is some objective basis for good and bad, for right and wrong, then we can develop a view of moral education that is consistent with imposing behavior rules.[10] We can do two things with an objectivist view of morality that VC cannot do with its view. First, we can begin to teach values (including moral values). If values are objective, then we can help the young learn the good reasons for the values. That is, we can have value education rather than value indoctrination or inculcation. Furthermore, we can legitimately impose behavior rules where VC cannot do so. For if there is some objective basis for morality, then we have good reason for imposing the rules on the young when they do not yet have a complete understanding. The validity of the rules means that our action is no longer arbitrary authoritarianism. Likewise, if there is an objective basis for morality, then moral education does not require the absolute form of moral autonomy that VC sets up. Moral autonomy is not then a matter of freely and totally on one's own creating a set of values. Rather, the freedom comes in deciding which moral principles are in fact correct.

The preceeding paragraphs sketch out the manner in which I would resolve the dilemma of VC. In effect, I am saying that the dilemma of VC indicates something seriously wrong with its theory, and I have sketched what I think is wrong. The point of the paper has been to establish that the dilemma is real, given VC value theory. I hope in a later paper to defend the suggested resolution.

But where does this leave us and where does it leave VC? VC has been subject to a lot of criticism, but the criticisms seem like to much water off a duck's back. In response to a very significant set of criticisms in a *Phi Delta Kappan* article by John Stewart (op. cit.), Sidney Simon wrote:

> If John Stewart had been less petulant and cranky, I might be willing to listen to him, but as it is, I don't trust him. I don't think he is really concerned with making his life better for teachers and children.
>
> His real interest seems to be with dazzling his academic, ivory tower peer group. I find that a useless recreation and reactive rather than directive. It is like the kid in the neighborhood who can't play baseball and so stands two streets away mumbling deprecations out of earshot at the kids who are having a marvelous, joyful, funfilled ball game.
>
> On the other hand, perhaps he is envious about the many ways we in the values clarification movement have been useful to thousands of teachers. Our popularity makes some stuffy people rage for our jugular veins. More likely it is simply his propensity for splitting hairs.
>
> Well, while he mouths his philosophical pretentions, I will continue to devote my own energies to inventing more and more creative ways for people to look at their lives and for making this world better for kids who have to go to school.[11]

When I read this statement, it blew my mind. It's too bad that Richard Hofstadter is not around to be revising his anti-intellectualism book, for this is a prime exhibit. It is also not a bad example of an *ad hominem* argument for a logic text. The one point that Simon makes that we should consider is that he knows, without reflection or theory, that what he does is good for kids.

But can we or should we try to argue, debate, explore issues with someone like Simon? Regardless of our motives, are we as irrelevant to his ballgame as the kid standing two blocks away? I can only hope that we are not. Perhaps we can get nowhere with him. He has his movement, his books, his workshops. But we must get somewhere with the teachers and parents who are attracted to him. We must manage to get the public somehow to see philosophy as more valuable than Simon sees it.

The key, I think, has to be this: Simon claims that he is making life better for kids and teachers who have to go to school. Is he? If my criticisms are correct, then he is doing so only accidentally, for bad theory sooner or later results in bad practice. If we cannot get him to look back, to be honestly critical of his own movement, at least we had better figure out ways to get his customers to examine his wares. For we would be simple, were we to do as Simon says.

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1. John Dewey, *Theory of Valuation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939) is cited as the inspiration for the theory of values clarification, which was most fully laid out in Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmon, and Sidney Simon, *Values and Teaching* (Columbus, Oh.: Charles E. Merrill, 1966). Other writings of the movement include Sidney Simon, Leland Howe, and Howard Kirschenbaum, *Values Clarification* (New York: Hart, 1972); Sidney Simon and Howard Kirschenbaum, eds., *Readings in Values Clarification* (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1973); and Howard Kirschenbaum, *Advanced Value Clarification* (San Diego, Ca.: University Associates, 1976).

Many criticisms of VC have been written. One can start with these: Bruce D. Johnson and Bryce Nelson, "Values Clarification: A Critical Perspective," in Lindley J. Stiles and Bruce D. Johnson, eds., *Morality Examined: Guidlines for Teachers* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Book Co., 1977); A.C. Kazepides, "The Logic of Values Clarification," *The Journal of Educational Thought* XI (1977), pp. 99-111; Alan Lockwood, "A Critical View of Values Clarification," *Teachers College Record* LXXVII (September 1975), pp. 35-50; and John B. Stewart, "Clarifying Values Clarification: A Critique," in *Phi Delta Kappan* LVI (June 1975), pp. 684-88.

2. Raths et al., op. cit., chpts 1-4.

3. Alan Lockwood, op. cit., argues that VC is really client-centered therapy rather than values education.

4. Howard Kirschenbaum, Merrill Harmin, Leland Howe, and Sidney B. Simon, "In Defense of Values Clarification," *Phi Delta Kappan* LVIII (June 1977), pp. 743-44.

5. Merrill Harmon and Sidney Simon, "Values," in Kirschenbaum and Simon, eds., *Readings in Values Clarification* (op. cit.), p. 11.

6. See Carl Rogers, "Towards a Modern Approach to Values: The Valuing Process in the Mature Person," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* LXVIII (1964), pp. 160-67; reprinted in Kirschenbaum and Simon, eds., *Readings* (op. cit.), pp. 75-91. VC is clearly in the Rogerian camp. (See note 3 above.)

7. What does it *mean* to speak of "clarifying" one's values? Kazepides explores this question in "The Logic of Values Clarification" (op. cit.), pp. 101-102.

8. Kirschenbaum, Harmin,Howe, and Simon, "In Defense" (op. cit.), p. 744.

9. "A Cognitive Social-Learning Approach to Morality and Self-Regulation," in Thomas Lickona, ed., *Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research, and Social Issues* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1976), p. 90.

10. I am not arguing that such a view is correct because it is thus consistent with behavior rules. Rather, I would say that there is a correct view which enables us to avoid the paradox of VC.

11. "Sidney Simon's Response," *Phi Delta Kappan* LVI (June 1975), p. 688.

(Sixth Concurrent Session)

RESPONSE TO BEVERSLUIS

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I will admit at the outset that it is hard for a philosopher of education to be friends with values clarificatin (VC) people. Though they are fond of paying homage to Dewey, one sometimes gets the impression that they often understood little and misunderstood a lot and that, at best, he was the only philosopher that ever read. VC theory is plagued with hidden assumptions, vaguely defined terms, occasionally inconsistent use of the word "values," and contradictions; in general, it is philosophically naive. Of all the howlers in their history, one of the more pernicious and invidious is their claim to being value-neutral. They are no such thing in regard to many values; that is to say the procedures of VC, not simply the proponents of VC, embody certain value commitments to such things as tolerance, ethical relativity, freedom of expression, and the like.

Eric has tried to give us one more reason for not being friendly with VC. He has attempted to show us that the theory is bad because there is a paradox at its heart. The importance of this, he suggests, is that the practice of VC can only have good results accidentally and that, in fact, "bad theory sooner or later results in bad practice."

Well, I don't agree that bad theory sooner or later results in bad practice. I am unconvinced that an objectivist view of morality, as teasingly, though vaguely, described as it is, is necessary to save VC. Finally, and this will be the focus of my remarks, I do not believe Eric has presented us with a valid argument against VC.

Eric attempts to show that the discussion about honesty and not cheating on tests illustrates a general problem in VC. The problem is that in doing VC in classrooms in which there are behavior rules, there is, what he variously calls, a "paradox," a "real contradiction," and a "real dilemma."

Eric wants to prove that VC has the following contradiction: "it is apparently contradictory to hold that children should be free to choose their own values, but not free to act on them." Eric's argument has eight steps.

Step 1. VC claims one can distinguish "between limiting someone's behavior and limiting belief or values."

Step 2. VC wants to both recognize the individual as autonomous and limit the individual's behavior.

Step 3. Without an "objective" basis for deciding what behavior is ill-advised, a teacher's limiting behavior is "arbitrary", i.e., "no good reason can be given." for barring that form of behavior deemed ill-advised.

Step 4. Treating students in this arbitrary way "submerges autonomy under authority and destroys dignity."

Steps 3 and 4 are the first argument, or first part of the argument.

Step 5. In VC "one should not *impose* values."

Step 6. "To impose rules is, in effect, to impose values by virtue of the psychological authority of one's position."

There are then various restatements of step 6.

Step 7. VC cannot give up behavior rules.

Step 8. VC cannot give up its commitment to autonomy.

I will not be concerned with Eric's resolution of the paradox by an appeal to an "objectivist view of morality."

The first step is quite right. It is a fair summary of one aspect of the quote and the quote is representative of the VC position in this area.

The second step is mostly right, and wrong only in a picky, non-consequential way which I won't even bother to go into.

The third and fourth steps are the first part of his critique of the VC position and here is where the trouble starts. In step 3 Eric argues that "unless one argues that on some objective sense the teacher probably knows better than the student what is "ill-advised" and that in some objective sense it is good for the teacher to give those tests, her/his doing so is arbitrary (there is no good reason for it)." At the very least, this statement is unclear for we never know what Eric means by "objective sense." There are many meanings to the word "objective," and in trying to make this into an argument, it is crucial to know which one Eric has in mind. Furthermore, even if the teacher did not know better than the students in an objective sense, why would this imply that there is no good reason that the teacher could offer? Even in the subjectivity of Sartrean existentialism there are good reasons and bad ones.

Even if the statement in the third step is not false, and even if Eric does substantively clarify "objective sense," the fourth step is problematic. I feel like I am treated arbitrarily by many people around me almost every day. Yet that doesn't destroy my dignity. In fact, it uplifts it by making dignity an achievement in the face of such arbitrariness. While I will not carp on the word "destroy," and while I do think things do happen in some schools to seriously damage the dignity of students, Eric gives no reason or argument to think that dignity is lost or damaged merely by being confronted with arbitrariness. I believe it is the particular content of rules, and not their arbitrariness, that works against dignity, and autonomy. Rules generated in "democratic classrooms," which I take it Eric would not describe as arbitrarily imposed by teachers, can and do often have the same effect on dignity as teacher imposed rules. While I don't disagree that a school system with a large set of rules imposed on students, without any attempt to justify those rules to the students, has an aggregate negative effect, this isn't Eric's point. I don't believe teacher imposed rules, per se, without regard to their content have this effect by virtue of their being teacher imposed, arbitrary, or non-objective. But perhaps more to the central point of criticism of Eric's remarks, he has given us no reasons for thinking there is any such relation. Therefore, his first argument is not valid because there is no argument, only assertion.

Going to steps 5 and 6, Eric states "to impose rules is, in effect, to impose values." I have a number of objections to this. First, this statement of Eric's can only be true if he uses a different meaning for the term "values" than the one most clearly recommended by VC. That is, as Eric states in one place but appears to forget elsewhere (as indicated in step 5), "According to VC theory values are the kinds of things which one cannot simply "get," *which cannot be* given to or *imposed on one.*" They cannot be imposed for, by definition, anything imposed on one, which entails its not being chosen freely, would not be a value. Eric is clearly confused on this point for earlier in the same paragraph from which I have just quoted he states: "The main idea in all of VC is that one should not *impose* values." Putting aside whether or not this is a "main idea", the point I wish to make is that VC does not recommend against imposing values (for doing so is simply impossible). Rather, VC recommends against *trying to* impose values. Such efforts, in the view of VC, could only eventuate in "value indicators," at best, which are often not as useful or as significant as values. Since value imposition is impossible, the imposition of rules, which clearly is possible, could never have the effect of imposing values.

Second, even given some plausible notion of "values," his claim that imposing rules imposes values is totally unsubstantiated. It is merely asserted as true. Third, there is some reason to doubt its truth. He claims that "if a teacher enforces a certain line of behavior, many students will conclude that that must be the right thing to do." First off, I know many teachers who only wish that were true. Second, the best one is likely to get from most students is that they will conclude that that is the right thing to do in that teacher's classroom, but not necessarily in any one else's. In fact, students, particularly our "better" students, are quite adept at doing different things in different classes, depending upon what kind of behavior a teacher enforces. Therefore, for these students at least, the most that could be said is that they value that form of behavior as a way of avoiding undesirable consequences and when no undesirable consequences are foreseeable for misbehavior, they cease to value the prescribed behavior. Third, unruly students, a nice phrase for this discussion, are unlikely to be bothered at all by the imposition of rules, many of which they break at will. These are students especially targeted by VC for the process and their very unruliness suggests this apparent contradiction will have no practical effect. Therefore, the second argument can be seen as: (1) involving an illegitimate shift in the meaning of "values," (2) not presenting us with an argument at all, and (3) being doubtful on the basis of some common knowledge of student behavior.

In conclusion, I think Eric has hit upon a problematic area in VC theory, one which is worthy of further exploration. A good deal more could be said about that dialogue concerning cheating that stimulated Eric's paper and I would hope some of our discussion time might be spent in a re-analysis of it.

MISUNDERSTANDING EDUCATIONAL METAPHOR

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I. Introduction

I.A. Richards said that "Rhetoric. . .should be a study of misunderstanding and its remedies. We struggle all our days with misunderstandings, and no apology is required for any study which can prevent or remove them."[1]

It seems to me that the rhetoric of educational discourse is incomplete, to the extent that some commonly occuring misunderstandings in that discourse, namely some involving metaphor, go completely unnoticed. In fact, unfortunately, these misunderstandings often provide the basis for accepted and very compelling moves in the criticism of educational policy and doctrine; as well as criticism of those who make that policy and doctrine.

I would like to offer an account of these misunderstandings, which I'll give the general names of mode-mistake and type-confusion. I think that such an account, to be intelligible, will need to be seen within the context of encompassing theories of metaphor and of language use, and I'll try to sketch such theories here as well.

First, however, here are some rather striking examples of the sorts of misunderstandings of metaphor we find in educational talk:

1. (from a graduate seminar) "You said that your school produced 250 graduates last year. Can't you stop talking of schools as though they were factories?"

2. (Luis Valdez, quoted in "Cultural Democracy: A New Philosophy for Educating the Mexican American Child", by Manuel

Ramirez, III) "They say this is the melting pot. I wonder who invented the melting pot. Horrible term! You melt people down, God! It shouldn't be that way. Our country should be a place where the individual is sacred. We have so many different sorts of people. Every man has his own heart. Who gives you the right to cut out a man's heart and put it in a melting pot?"[2]

3. (from an exchange in which Neil Postman attacks Harold Ladas' ideas on grading students) "'The way we grade today,' he (Ladas) says, 'is as if each instructor used his own foot to establish the length of his own ruler.'. . .What he fails to ask himself is this: If the judgements of a teacher are to be like a rigid measuring stick, then what does this conceive the student to be? After all, what does a ruler tell us? How long something is. Can it tell us how deeply someone feels? Or how inspired someone is? Or even how "long" someone is going to be? This metaphor, on which his entire argument rests, tells us much more about Mr. Ladas than he probably wished to reveal."[3]

Perhaps you'll share my initial reaction to each of these: that the author may in some way be confused in his criticism of the use of the particular metaphor involved. But what to *say* about that confusion is a bit confusing in itself.

What I'd like to do now is briefly to outline a theory of metaphor that I think will allow us to say pretty clearly what may be wrong in cases like the above; a theory within which I can intelligibly account for misunderstanding of educational metaphor. In order to do this, I'd like to postpone the discussion of the above items for just awhile, in order to provide a more general context within which to discuss them.

One very basic reason why many studies of metaphor are confused and at cross purposes is a lack of clarity in those studies about the nature and range of the thing to be studied. What is metaphor? Before I attempt to answer this question, I need to disambiguate it somewhat: for writers on metaphor have understood this question in any of several different senses.

II. What Is Metaphor?

I think there are a number of readings of this question which would be of interest here. One reading of the question 'What is metaphor?' is 'What is the scope or range of metaphor?", i.e., what *things* are to be included as instances or examples of metaphor? Writers in various fields have insisted on labeling as metaphor a wide variety of phenomena—linguistic, literary, psychological, etc.: Such things as hyperbole, allegory, myth, dance, art objects of many sorts, models, analogies, even thought itself. It may prove necessary for any account of metaphor to be extended to cover what gets called metaphor in many non-linguistic settings like art and music. However, in this essay I will be restricting myself to considering metaphor in what I take to be its usual context of oral and written speech.

Two other important readings of the question are, for my purposes, closely related, but still to be answered separately. The first is this: "How do we identify cases of metaphor?" The second is "What may be effected by the use of metaphor?" Many classic accounts of metaphor deal with the first of these—Aristotle said, "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else."[4] Samuel Johnson's *Dictionary* entered this for 'metaphor': "The application of a word to an use to which in its original import it cannot be put."[5] Many of these same accounts also deal with the second reading. Aristotle, for example, thought that what was effected was pleasure through comparison.

Most accounts on the first reading fail to distinguish metaphor from other linguistic phenomena, notably from nonsense. Most accounts on the second reading are inadequate for reasons Max Black discusses in his essay called "Metaphor,"[6] or for other reasons, which I will discuss in a moment. I think we must have clear answers to both of these readings of the question in order to see how metaphor can confuse us.

III. Metaphor And Speech Acts

There needs to be examined yet another troublesome feature of building an account of metaphor. I suppose we might construe this problem as one of answering still another version of the question 'What is metaphor?' where this question is to be read as "What is the unit of speech we must isolate to study metaphor?" We need to know whether an account of metaphor is to be an account of particular words or phrases, of sentences, or of something else.

If we examine most traditional talk about metaphor, e.g., the several "definitions" I mentioned earlier, we notice that it is usually assumed that individual words or phrases are metaphors. And indeed, it is a matter of common usage to say things such as this: "When you said that your school produced 250 graduates last year, was "produced" a metaphor?"

But, it is also common usage to speak of this or that *sentence* as "metaphorical." Max Black attempted to find a way out of the dilemma common usuage provides us by suggesting that "although we point to the whole sentence as an instance (a "clear case") of metaphor, our attention quickly narrows to a single word, whose presence is the proximate reason for the attribution."[7]

This compromise won't entirely serve. One objection educationists would surely put forward is that often, in educational talk, we make reference to "educational metaphors" in terms that go further than single words, or even sentences. For instance, if we mention "the production metaphor," or "the growth metaphor," or "the melting pot metaphor" it is often clear that we are referring to rather complex schemes, consisting of metaphorical sentences and quite elaborate explanations and interpretations of those sentences.

What is the proper unit of study for metaphor? Common usage provides us with another way of talking about metaphor, a way which also accounts, I think, for all of the items I just mentioned. We say that someone is "speaking metaphorically"—we say that "When I used that term I was speaking metaphorically; "When I wrote that sentence I was speaking metaphorically;" even "When I was talking all last hour about education as gardening I was speaking metaphorically." There are reasons to suspect that the proper unit of study for metaphor is not the word, the sentence or even the elaborate schema or model, but instead what J.L. Austin and later John R. Searle called the "speech act." As Austin put it. . ."what we have to study is not the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech situation."[8] Now, the simplest way I can think of to argue this position is to try to show that the speech act is the basic unit of *all* linguistic communication. As Searle explained it, the difference between considering something as linguistic communication and not so considering it involves, among other things, the question of whether some being with certain kinds of intentions produced it. If we take the noise we hear to be a natural phenomenon like the wind blowing, we don't ordinarily count it as linguistic communication. What's more, this intentional behavior must be of a special sort to be considered a speech act.

> For example, it would be possible to communicate by arranging items of furniture, in certain ways. The attitude one would have to such an arrangement of furniture, if one 'understood' it, would be quite different from the attitude I have, say, to the arrangement of furniture in this room, even though in both cases I might regard the arrangement as resulting from intentional behavior.[9]

It is these "certain kinds of intentions," which make an act a speech act, and thus an instance of linguistic communication. And it is these intentions that make it possible both to account for metaphor as speech and to account for it as a special sort of speech, i.e., the special sort we make reference to when we say "I am speaking metaphorically."

I won't attempt to summarize what for many of you would be a quite familiar account of speech act theory. But I need to touch on and even to expand those portions of speech act theory which make explicit the sorts of intentions involved in speaking metaphorically. Very generally, when we speak we utter certain noises or make certain marks which are, and are intended to be, part of a language. Our utterance not only has a more or less certain sense in the language, but also a certain force: that is, we always intend our words to warn, or promise, or assert, etc. What Searle called a "complete speech act" involves all of this, and it's in this sense of 'speech acts' that he argues that "Speaking a language is performing speech acts."[10] Other writers, like Austin, want also to call a speech act the consequences of an utterance—we may, for instance, succeed by our utterance in convincing, alerting, offending, etc.

What is very important to note is that Searle thinks the performance of speech acts is rule-bound. He claims that the sematic structure of a language conventionally realizes sets of underlying "constitutive rules," and "speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with these sets of constitutive rules."[11]

Searle is a bit fuzzy on what he means by "constitutive rules," but, very roughly, these are rules which create or define forms of behavior: rules of the game, so to speak. Just as specifying someone as "playing basketball" is only possible in virtue of the existence of the constitutive rules of basketball, so specifying someone as "promising" or "requesting" is only possible in virtue of the constitutive rules of those speech acts.

Critics of Searle have better formalized the notion of constitutive rules in speech acts.[12] To summarize, what seems to be needed to describe a given speech act is (1) the set of pre-conditions necessary to identify the act; and (2) the set of conditions which mark the upshot or effect of identifying the act. The form of constitutive rules for speech acts is then a conditional claim: "If certain identifying conditions obtain, then a certain upshot is called for." Thus, in basketball to give the rule for "traveling," we need to specify both the conditions that identify traveling—taking more than a certain number of steps with the ball without dribbling—and what the upshot conditions are—e.g., losing possession of the ball immediately to the opposing team.

We can discover constitutive rules of speech if we have what Ryle called procedural knowledge of language; if we can, for instance, recognize departures from the rules as somehow faulty, or if we're able to project the rules onto new cases. We get propositional knowledge of the rules by examining our practice.

There are many constitutive rules which make up the many speech acts possible in speech, but it seems to me that if Searle and others are correct in stating that speech acts are rule-bound, then there must be a more general class of such rules, one which makes it possible to recognize speech acts as being performed in standard ways and also in non-standard ways, e.g. "literally" or "non-literally." There must be identifying and upshot conditions for these "modes" of speech act as well. The literature on speech acts rarely mentions the possibility of different sets of rules for these different "modes" of speaking. It seems to assume that speech acts are performed in one standard mode. Indeed, Searle, in *Speech Acts*, goes so far as to imply that any non-literal or non-serious utterance is, as such, a defective speech act.[13] And yet, it seems to be the case that we can succeed in performing what we normally think of as illocutionary and perlocutionary acts by, say, speaking sarcastically, or by teasing, or by speaking metaphorically. I recall a fifth grade teacher of mine who watched me fall down nearly half a flight of stairs one day as I tried, for some pressing reason I now can't remember, to descend them backwards. She waited until I hit bottom in front of her and said, "I can't tell you how much I enjoyed your show. You *are* coordinated, aren't you?" This was a rebuke. But rebuking is an illocutionary act, and never mind that the utterance with which she performed it was not a literal one. The words hurt more than the fall.

What this suggests to me is that we must extend speech act theory to account for (instead of merely discounting), non-standard modes of speech. And one such non-literal mode, I think, is the metaphorical.

When I earlier asked the question "What is metaphor?" I said that one important reading of the question was "How do we identify cases of metaphor?" Part of the answer to this question must be in terms of what allows us to recognize utterances as being in the mataphorical mode rather than in the standard, literal mode. Searle, I think, unwittingly provides us with a clue to this problem's solution by insisting, in keeping with his ideas about non-defective speech acts as literal and serious ones, that a general condition on any successful speech act is, in his words, that "S utters sentence T and means it (i.e. means literally what he says)." It is worth reproducing Searle's explication of this rule. For him, S meaning (literally) what he says involves:

> (a) S intends (i-I) the utterance U of T to produce in H the knowledge (recognition, awareness) that the states of affairs specified by (certain of) the rules of T obtain. (Call this effect the illocutionary effect, IE) (b) S intends U to produce IE by means of the recognition of i-I. (c) S intends that i-I will be recognized in virtue of (by means of) H's knowledge of (certain of) the rules governing (the elements of) T.[14]

Now it seems clear that such a condition must apply to utterances in the standard mode. If, for instance, S does not intend that the words of his sentence should be understood as they are commonly understood, but instead in some way known only to S, then S's utterance will not be understood. In any of a number of ways, if this general condition does not apply, the standard speech act becomes defective. It is, in fact, a condition of recognizing the standard mode.

But it seems equally clear that it is possible to perform speech acts even if this condition does not obtain. In fact, what makes an utterance non-literal seems to be just the deliberate violation of the condition that S means what he says.

So we may identify non-literal utterances by the condition that S does not mean what he says, and metaphorical utterances are non-literal. But we also need to ask: In virtue of what does some S intend some H to recognize his utterance as metaphorical rather than as some other non-literal mode? To be brief, I think the answer involves S intending H to realize that S does not mean what he says, *but* this in virtue of H's recognition that what S utters is, to use Monroe Beardsley's term, "logically absurd, i.e., self-contradictory, obviously false, curiously trivial or irrelevant. When I say that the country is a melting pot, I say what in most contexts is obviously false. When I say that teachers' judgements are rigid measuring sticks. I utter what is probably self-contradictory. What separates this situation from mere nonsense, or from merely failed standard utterance, is the fact that metaphorical utterance, like all speech, is rule-bound. S intends H to recognize S's utterance as metaphorical in virtue of the fact that (a) H knows that logical absurdity is sometimes an identifying condition for a certain mode of performing speech acts, and (b) H has no reason to suspect that S is linguistically incompetent or otherwise indisposed.

I'd like to deal now with the reading of the question "What is metaphor?" as, "What is effected by metaphor," or "What's the upshot of identifying an utterance as metaphorical?" One classic study of the question is Max Black's article, "Metaphor." Here he argues for an "interaction view" of metaphor in which, for example, "The effect of (metaphorically) calling a man a 'wolf' is to evoke the wolf-system of related commonplaces. If a man is a wolf, he preys upon other animals, is fierce, hungry, engaged in constant struggle, a scavenger, and so on. Each of these implied assertions has now to be made to fit the principle subject (the man)."[15]

What's important here, I think, is that Black's account implies *two* parts to the upshot of a metaphorical utterance: (1) In speaking metaphorically, S's utterance counts as an attempt to "evoke" in the hearer a set of features that ordinary speakers hold the wolf to possess. (2) By succeeding at (1), S can get H to construct and consider certain assertions. But this means that the upshot of metaphorical speech is, most immediately, something *other* than H recognizing an assertion. In fact, it seems quite wrong to suppose that S is asserting anything when he speaks metaphorically. Consider such utterances as "I promise you I did it," or "I beg you to get well."[16] As literal promising or begging, these utterances are faulty—we can't promise what's past, nor beg something of one who has no power to grant it. As metaphor, they're understandable, but what is *asserted* by either?

Black's account highlights the fact that if assertion can come into the upshot of metaphor, it is only as a secondary effect. *By* evoking in H a "system of commonplaces," S gets H to do something else. Ina Loewenberg put this point clearly, saying that a metaphorical utterance counts as a "proposal to consider the constituent terms of p according to p,"[17] where p is a proposition. But since this involves considering something which is logically absurd, Loewenberg must mean that the utterance counts as a proposal to H to act *as if* the utterance were not in violation of the rules of standard speech.

And this, I think, is not to assert anything. It is to invite not belief, but pretense. If I say to you that "This country is a melting pot" and I am speaking metaphorically, then I am proposing that you pretend it is indeed a melting pot—I want you to act in certain ways, say or think certain things, perhaps profess to believe certain things. But this is, in a sense, to start a game, to play. It is not yet to invite the hearer to construct and consider assertions, though the secondary effect of speaking metaphorically *may* be just this. But we also may intend these secondary effects to include the understanding of some illocutionary act other than asserting (by speaking metaphorically we may promise, or accuse, or request, etc.); or we may want mere enjoyment—some pretenses are to have fun with; and sometimes we intend H to pretend something so that by merely *acting* in that way something useful in itself will be obtained.

Now, so far, I've discussed the rules for understanding someone's utterance *as* metaphorical. But this is only part of understanding someone's metaphorical utterance. What's left is a discussion of the rules for understanding the *particular* pretense S means by MU; and also what S means to happen as a result of H pretending.

It is here that Black's somewhat fuzzy notion of "evoking a system of related commonplaces" becomes valuable. For, though it's clear that what MU means it does *not* mean in virtue of rules governing the standard use of that utterance, still, what it means can't be achieved by fiat, solely in virtue of S's intentions. What in particular S intends H to pretend as a result of MU still depends, in a way, upon the standard uses of the utterance's constituent parts. To return to the concept of pretending for a moment, we may notice that when we pretend something, say that we are airplanes, we try, among other things, to isolate and do something with what we take to be distinctive features of airplanes. We make certain noises, arrange our arms a certain way, move forward. We don't pretend to be airplanes by just sitting there, though airplanes sometimes do that. Sitting quietly isn't what we take to be distinctive of airplanes, so we don't do that when we pretend to be one, especially if someone else has to guess what we're doing.

Likewise, if in speaking metaphorically S proposes that H pretend x, H typically understands the meaning of the utterance in terms of the distinctive features of x. What Black called "commonplaces," and Osborn and Ehninger called "communal qualifiers"[18] seem to be those features of x which people commonly think of when x is mentioned. So on this theory, if I ask you to pretend that your country is a melting pot, what you pretend will probably be determined by the features of melting pots that we all typically think of as distinctive.

IV. Open, Closed, and Post-Metaphor

We might wonder, given this account, whether such pretense must involve all possible commonplaces; and if not, then which set; or whether commonplaces are the only features which figure in metaphorical meaning. It seems to me that no previous account of metaphor has considered these last questions seriously. To answer them we must realize that the understanding of metaphorical utterances depends, in part, on H recognizing the nature and the extent of the pretense S proposes that he engage in. That this is so, and that overlooking it can cause considerable misunderstanding of metaphorical utterances, I will try to show.

The distinction I want to suggest concerns what I name open metaphor, closed metaphor, and post-metaphor. The distinctions are based upon the various intentions a given S might have for the nature and extent of the pretense he proposes.

1. *Open Metaphor.*—It seems to me that we often make metaphorical utterances aimed at getting our audience (and often this includes ourselves) to engage in what might be called open-ended pretending. The point of making some metaphorical utterances seems to be to construct as elaborate and detailed a pretense as possible, to "play" with the situation, to constantly return to it. Some writers on metaphor, like Max Black, write as though they believed open metaphor is the only type, or the most "important" type. Black, in the passage I read earlier, writes as though the meaning of a metaphor is to be uncovered by applying all the commonplaces of the "focus" of the metaphor one can think of to the "principle subject." Israel Scheffler

simply states that "metaphor is in the nature of an invitation to search for (analogy)."[19] Other writers echo this form, which I may be presumptuous in characterizing as open-ended, but which at least does not explicitly limit the pretense.

One reason why a view of a metaphorical meaning as open seems to make metaphorical utterances "important" is that open metaphor can be highly suggestive, and productive of several sorts of things: of behaviors that may be found useful, of assertions and theories that may be tested. In some areas of education, people are now beginning to realize that by developing what I'm calling open metaphor, by constantly seeking to expand a pretense, useful new conceptions of their tasks can be constructed. This is the case with some "reconceptualist" approaches to curriculum theory, for example. James B. MacDonald described a need for curriculum theorizing to seek "new ways of talking about curriculum." He saw reconceptualists as advocating "a much more playful, freefloating process" in their work.[20]

2. *Closed Metaphor.*—But one thing that is sometimes overlooked by writers on metaphor (or sometimes overstressed) is the fact that metaphorical meaning is often intended to encompass only certain features. Properly considered, the upshot of the metaphorical utterance in those cases goes no further than pretending these particular things.

There are several ways in which S may signal a closed metaphor. The first is by specifying in the co-text of the metaphorical utterance those features that H is to pretend. Closed metaphors of this "explicit" variety may be as simple in scope as a single feature, more elaborate, as in "extended" metaphorical treatments in poetry, e.g., conceits; or enormously complicated, like Plato's metaphor of society as a republic.

Max Black mentions, in passing, that "Metaphors can be supported by specially constructed systems of implications, as well as by accepted commonplaces; they can be made to measure and need not be reach-me-downs."[21] Especially when the pretense S intends involves features other than the most common of related commonplaces, explicit closed metaphor is often used. I heard Reggie Jackson, the baseball player, respond to a question about his reaction to the news that his wife had narrowly escaped death. Jackson said, "Life is a train. You expect to be delayed, but you do not expect to be derailed." I think that if he had merely said, "Life is a train," without the clarifying and limiting co-text, I would have been confused about how pretending that life is a train would suggest a relevant reply to the question. Or I might have engaged in the wrong pretense, which might have resulted in my constructing the wrong assertion: e.g., from pretending that life keeps on rolling down the track toward its destination, and never gets off that narrow track, I might have constructed the assertion that life is predetermined, and what will be will be. But that's not what Jackson had in mind.

Oftentimes, however, the clarification that explicitly closed metaphor offers is not needed, or at least not provided. If we make metaphorical utterances that are rather well recognized in a given language community, our audience may make use of its previous experience with the utterance to interpret it on this occasion. This sort of "implicitly" closed metaphorical utterance is what we usually call a cliché. Though context and co-text also may help to limit the pretense of implicitly closed metaphor, it's more usual to rely on H's experience with the metaphor.

I want to point out that a given metaphorical utterance *need* not be of any given type. We should recognize that a given metaphorical utterance, e.g., "The U.S. is a melting pot," even if well known, *could* be an open metaphor, rather than an implicitly or explicitly closed one. As closed metaphor, it would require the understanding of some particular and limited pretense. Not so if it is open metaphor: it then would require an ongoing search for ways to develop the pretense.

3. *Post-Metaphor.*—There is yet a third way in which related commonplaces and other sorts of qualifiers may be used to determine the meaning of a "metaphorical" utterance. In some ways this last category is the most difficult to describe, and at points I must remain rather irritatingly vaue.

Consider these sentences: (a) this piece of rubber is certainly flexible. (b) Teachers should be flexible in their disciplinary procedures.

I think it is clear that to say or write (a) would be to make what we would call a literal utterance. We would also say that in this utterance "flexible" is used literally. What would we say about the utterance of (b)? I think I would say that if (a) is literal utterance, then (b) seems, by contrast, perhaps metaphorical, due to the less "central" use of "flexible." But on what basis could I make such a claim? Though we do not doubt that (a) is literal, how does it contrast with (b) in such a way as to make (b) metaphorical? For it is not at all clear that using "flexible" as we do in (b) makes the utterance misfire as standard literal utterance. In fact this term is used in (b) in quite a common and ordinary way. It is listed in most dictionaries as an entry under the heading of "flexible," just as the use of the term in (a) is listed. Analysis of both uses of "flexible" would undoubtedly reveal many identical and several different conditions for use, for most English speakers, over a considerable period of time. How is it that we still have at least a feeling that (b) is somehow metaphorical?

Perhaps the answer involves the fact that implicitly closed metaphors are often understandable because they are so often used to propose the same pretense—they are, in that case, cliched. Perhaps some cliched implicitly closed metaphors become so unvarying in their use that after a time there ceases to be any variation at all in the pretenses they propose. They become, like calling teachers "flexible," well established, generally used, and consistently delimited—only problematically distinguishable from the literal. There are lots of common examples in current educational talk: saying that a paper "covers" metaphors, that two classroom problems are "linked," that one policy seems to "parallel" another.

Perhaps we can account for the fact that we often feel such talk to be still, somehow, metaphorical in the following way. First, for these expressions we still recognize their origins as signals, in certain contexts, of metaphorical utterance. We can still remember that other uses were literal when these were not. We say they are less "central" or something of the sort. Secondly, it is still easy, with such expressions, to, as it were, "remetaphorize" them, i.e. treat them as signals of metaphor—treat the utterances in which they appear as proposals to pretend.

Since I hope that it may eventually be shown that this in-between status of some terms in some utterances marks, historically, an actual shift from metaphorical to literal use, I call such examples, "post-metaphor."

V. Misunderstanding Metaphor

If I'm even nearly right in my ideas about how we understand metaphor, then I ought to be in a position to say something useful about how we can misunderstand it. And generally, I think that this misunderstanding takes either of two forms. First, we often, in one way or another, confuse metaphorical utterances with utterances of other modes—usually with standard, literal utterances. Secondly, we often find ourselves confused in any of several ways about the particulars of the pretense a metaphorical utterance proposes. I would like to call the first source of misunderstanding (with apologies to Ryle and Colin Turbayne) "mode-mistake." The second general category I call "type-confusion."

One common sort of mode-mistake involving metaphorical utterance, that of taking metaphorical utterance to be standard, literal utterance, has been examined at some length by several authors, notably Colin Turbayne.[22] There are other mode-mistakes available for study, but in this already over-long paper, I would like to mention only the converse of the one I just noted: taking literal utterance to be metaphorical.

I mentioned that post-metaphor in most crucial respects is literal utterance, however vague or ambiguous it may be. But since we still recognize the metaphorical origin of such utterance, we are often tempted, as hearers, to remetaphorize such talk, despite the speaker's intention for that talk. This leads to confusion and sometimes irrelevant criticism of the speaker. Consider the first of our cases: "Our school produced 250 graduates last year." It seems to me that to say that something "produced" something else is often (though of course not always) to utter a post-metaphor. There is a legitimate "sense" of "produces" which is roughly synonymous with "results in." Both terms are ways of indicating relationships between things that come before and things that come after. But however fuzzy this sense of "produced" might be, it is very commonly post-metaphorical, to be treated literally. In such cases, it would be a mistake to treat the utterance "Our school produced 250 graduates last year" as an invitation to pretend that schools are factories, or to suppose that the speaker or author so pretends.

To change over to the other problem, one variety of type-confusion involves misunderstanding about whether a given metaphor is open or closed. Often we take what is intended to be closed metaphor to be open metaphor. This is a practice so common in the evaluation of educational talk that it is tacitly accepted as worthwhile criticism. It often is simply unrecognized that not every instance of metaphorical utterance is intended to provoke an ongoning search for ways to pretend something. Yet writers categorically urge, as Israel Scheffler does, that the way to criticize a metaphorical utterance is to see where it "breaks down." Such writers appear to be saying that we need to see how far we can take each pretense proposed, though every metaphorical pretense must of necessity fall short of being an infallible guide to action or truth. It appears to be an accepted criticism of *any* metaphorical utterance to point out where it "breaks" down, and this, I think, is a mistake.

If I should say the following, I might well be making an explicitly closed metaphor: "We should realize that in education we play a teaching game, in that there are rules for teachers to learn and penalties for violating the rules." Long habit of obscuring the difference between closed and open metaphor makes it a temptation for most of us to ignore the rather obvious clues that this is closed metaphor, in favor of considering the worthwhileness of pretending, in any ways we can develop, that teaching is a game. It is probably wrong in this case to hold me responsible for "the game view of teaching," where this term refers to an open ended pretense. Yet, most of us are not accustomed to at least seeking clarification from the speaker as to the type of metaphor intended. Especially, when closed metaphors are left implicit, a speaker runs the risk that his utterance will be taken to be open metaphor.

One rather typical example of this type-confusion occurs in the Neil Postman quote I read earlier. "This metaphor," Postman insisted, "tells us much more about Mr. Ladas than he probably wished to reveal." Well, perhaps it does tell us a lot about Ladas, and perhaps it doesn't. Ladas uses the measuring-stick metaphor twice in his article, both times, I take it, as a vehicle for complaining about the ambiguity of most grades and graders' equivocation from one sense to an "A" to another. There is no clue that Ladas is explicitly proposing that we view the whole of the educative process as the usual environment in which a ruler is useful, nor that he himself views education in this way. It's likely that Postman has fallen into the type-confusion of taking a closed metaphor to be open.

A second typical type-confusion involves us in taking a metaphorical utterance to be proposing one closed metaphor when it is actually intended to propose another closed metaphor. As a basic example of this type-confusion, consider this utterance of one of my colleagues: "The world of the schoolchild is not a controlled environment like the infant's nursery: it's a jungle."

Now, assuming this is an explicitly closed metaphor, we should consider the child's world as an uncontrolled jungle. But what sort of uncontrollability is this? For there are several sets of commonplaces that come to mind readily: (a) the jungle uncontrolled in its impenetrability, denseness, our ignorance of it; (b) the jungle uncontrolled in its ruthlessness, competitiveness, treachery; (c) the jungle uncontrolled in its wild beauty, unregulated colorfulness.

In this example, to suppose that we understand the speaker's utterance to propose one of these rather than the others *may* be to misunderstand the utterance. We need to seek clarification. In other instances, such as Ramirez's quote criticizing the "melting pot" metaphor, it seems to be type-confusion to ignore the rather clichéd use of the metaphor to propose one thing, in favor of supposing that it *usually* means us to pretend something else entirely. It's not that we couldn't use the metaphor to propose what Ramirez objects to; it's just that we usually don't, and Ramirez, who must be aware of this, is then equivocating.

As a final note, let me say that a good deal of the confusion we have with educational metaphor comes about because speakers or authors, unaware of how their metaphor can be misunderstood, fail to take steps to avoid such misunderstanding. I hope that this paper will provide some clues for makers of metaphor in this regard. We can't usefully criticize metaphorical speech in education unless we are sure that what we're prepared to criticize *is* metaphor and unless we're sure what sort of metaphor it's intended to be. If this paper helps set up useful clarifying questions about these things, then it will qualify, under Richards' definition, as a successful piece of educational rhetoric.

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1. I.A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (London: Oxford U. Press, 1936), p. 63.

2. Manuel Ramirez III, "Cultural Democracy: A New Philosophy For Educating the Mexican American Child," *The National Elementary Principal,* 50, November, 1970, p. 45.

3. Neil Postman, "A D+ for Mr. Ladas," *Phi Delta Kappan,* November, 1974, pp. 187-88.

4. Aristotle, *Poetics,* 1457b.

5. Samuel Johnson, *Dictionary,* 1755 (New York: AMS Press, 1967).

6. Max Black, "Metaphor," in *Models and Metaphors,* (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1962).

7. Ibid., p. 27.

8. J.L. Austin, *How To Do Things With Words,* J.O. Urmson, ed., (New York: Oxford U. Press, 1962), p. 138.

9. John R. Searle, *Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1969), pp. 16-17.
10. Ibid., p. 16.
11. Ibid., p. 37.
12. Cf. Joseph Ransdell, "Constitution Rules and Speech-Act Analysis", *Journal of Philosophy*, 68, 1971, pp. 385-399.
13. Searle, op. cit., p. 57.
14. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
15. Black, op. cit., p. 41.
16. The examples are from Ted Cohen, "Figurative Speech and Figurative Acts," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 72 (November 6, 1975).
17. Ina Loewenberg, "Identifying Metaphors," *Foundations of Language*, 12, 1975, p. 337.
18. M.M. Osborn and D. Ehninger, "Metaphor in Public Address", *Speech Monographs*, 29, August, 1962, pp. 223-234.
19. Israel Scheffler, *The Language of Education* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1960), p. 48.
20. James B. MacDonald, "Curriculum Theory", in Wm. Pinar, ed., *Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists* (Berkeley: McCutcheon, 1975), p. 6.
21. Black, op. cit., p. 43.
22. Colin M. Turbayne, *The Myth of Metaphor* (Columbia, S.C., University of South Carolina Press, 1970).

(Sixth Concurrent Session)

Response to Broidy

METAPHOR AND SPEECH ACTS

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I. Introduction

In his paper, Steve Broidy tries to extend speech-act theory in order to account for certain features of metaphorical speech. In so doing, he hopes to account also for several mistakes which are commonly made, he says, when metaphorical speech is criticized. He distinguishes carefully between "open metaphor" and "closed metaphor," and, with apologies for vagueness, he describes what he calls "post-metaphor." Generally speaking, he argues that mistakes occur in the criticism of a metaphor when the intentions of the person who utters the metaphor or post-metaphor are misunderstood.

I am going to urge three propositions which, if they are true, will do a good deal of damage to Steve's paper. These are the three propositions:

1. Speech-act theory *does not* provide an adequate account of metaphorical speech;
2. Speech-act theory *cannot* provide an adequate account of metaphorical speech; and
3. Speech-act theory *need not* provide an adequate account of metaphorical speech.

When I say "speech-act theory," I mean the account, explanation, or theory put forth by John R. Searle in *Speech Acts.*[1]

I believe that Steve agrees with me that the first of the propositions is true, the proposition that speech-act theory does not provide an adequate account of metaphorical speech; however, I also believe that my reasons for thinking it true are much different from Steve's reasons, as I will try to explain presently. I do not intend that the second proposition, that speech-act theory cannot provide an adequate account, should suggest any weakness in speech-act theory, which, in my view, is not designed to provide an account of metaphorical speech. With the help of Searle, I'll try to explain why. The third proposition, I believe, is especially damaging to Steve's paper. Searle does not need to bother with an explanation of metaphorical speech because, so far as speech-act theory is concerned, metaphorical speech is completely unnecessary and could be dispensed with. One might argue that, if understanding is important in serious discourse, then metaphorical speech ought to be eschewed—or at least clarified. In other words, contrary to the general thrust of Steve's paper, the speaker, and not the hearer, is primarily responsible for proper understanding of metaphorical speech.

II. The First Proposition: Speech-Act Theory Does Not Provide an Adequate Account of Metaphorical Speech

Steve seems to puzzle over the fact that Searle excludes nonliteral utterances from the account of speech acts. Speech-act theory ought to "account for (instead of merely discounting)" the nonliteral mode of speech, Steve says, inasmuch as illocutionary and perlocutionary acts can be performed by speaking nonliterally. He claims that Searle "goes so far as to imply that any non-literal. . .utterance is, as such, a defective speech act."

Now, if I read Searle correctly, I do not believe he says that nonliteral utterances are defective. His notion of a defect, he says, is closely related to what Austin calls an "infelicity,"[2] i.e., something that can be wrong or something that can go wrong.[3] We cannot say that a speech act miscarries because it is nonliteral; for, *ex hypothesis*, a speech act cannot be nonliteral. Searle provides us with two reasons for excluding nonliteral utterances from speech-act theory. First, according to Searle, speech acts are the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication.[4] Nonliteral utterances cannot meet this criterion of being basic or minimal units of linguistic communication, for they represent a parasitic mode of discourse, a mode that depends for its existence upon the basic mode, namely, literal discourse.[5] It seems obvious that a metaphorical utterance (or any other nonliteral utterance) would be impossible were it not for the existence of literal language and that in this sense metaphorical speech is parasitic. The second reason that Searle excludes nonliteral utterances from speech-act theory is that, according to his principle of expressibility, whatever can be meant can be said in literal language. "Cases where the speaker does not say exactly what he means—the principal kinds of cases of which are nonliteralness, vagueness, ambiguity, and incompleteness—are not theoretically essential to linguistic communication."[6] And Searle does exclude from his speech-act theory that which is not theoretically essential. I will return to the principle of expressibility shortly.

III. The Second Proposition: Speech-Act Theory Cannot Provide an Adequate Account of Metaphorical Speech

According to Steve, "the proper unit of study for metaphor is not the word, the sentence or even the elaborate schema or model, but instead. . .the 'speech act.'"; and his reason for making this claim is "that the speech act is the basic unit of *all* linguistic communication." But I must ask for clarification. In what sense is the speech act *the* proper unit of study for metaphor? And why "proper"? As Steve points out, words are said to be metaphorical. Why is the word not the proper unit of study? Or the sentence perhaps? Steve tells us it is because the speech act is the basic unit of all linguistic communication. But I am not sure what this fact has to do with determining *the* proper unit of study for metaphor. Now, we use expressions such as "speaking literally" and "meaning literally." Does this mean that the speech act is the proper unit of study to determine what it means to be literal? Well, probably not, for whether a word is literal or nonliteral is a contingent fact within a particular language. And contingent matters such as this, of course, are not the business of speech-act theory.

If we consider that "metaphorical" is a semantic predicate of the same type as "literal" and "nonliteral," we are faced with the possibility that metaphorhood, too, is at least dependent upon the contingent facts of a particular language; and, to the extent that metaphorical language is a contingent matter, it is beyond the ken of speech-act theory, which cannot account for contingent facts within a language. It is interesting to note, returning to Steve's paper, that the point at which he is most unsure of himself is just when he is attempting to explain post-metaphor. "In some ways this. . .category is the most difficult to describe, and at points I must remain rather irritatingly vague," he says. His obvious uneasiness is quite understandable, of course, in light of the fact that speech-act theory provides nothing whatever to help determine if the use of "flexible" in "Teachers should be flexible in their disciplinary procedures" is literal, nonliteral, or somewhere in between.

IV. The Third Proposition: Speech-Act Theory Need not Provide An Adequate Account of Metaphorical Speech

Now, I return to Searle's principle of expressibility, which, according to Searle, means that nonliteral utterances are not theoretically essential to linguistic communication. With the principle of expressibility in mind, I find it interesting to note that the types of metaphors Steve discusses can rather easily be translated into literal terminology, seemingly without loss of meaning.[7] Consider this "open metaphor": "Life is a train." I believe we could say the same thing literally: "Life is similar to a train. Think about it." Next, consider the following "closed (explicit) metaphor": "Life is a train: you expect to be delayed, but you do not expect to be derailed." Again, I believe this can be rendered literally as follows:

> Life is similar to a train: you expect to experience occasional temporary disappointments in life; and, comparably, you expect that a train will be delayed. But you do not expect death, just as you do not expect that a train will be drailed.

And, finally, a "closed (implict) metaphor," such as "Life is just a bowl of cherries," might be stated literally in the following manner: "Life is similar to a bowl of cherries (in the way which we all are thinking)." The "post-metaphor" which Steve mentions is literal, of course, and therefore needs no literal translation.

V. Conclusion

I want to say that I believe there is merit in the attempt to understand metaphor by examining it in part from the standpoint of speech-act theory. As I have argued, however, I do not believe that speech-act theory does provide an adequate account of metaphor, I do not believe it can provide an adequate account, and I do not believe it needs to provide such an account. Speech-act theory, for example, cannot help in the least to distinguish between literal and nonliteral expressions. However, speech-act theory does provide some illumination regarding what I would call the nonlogical features of metaphor, e.g., the intentions of the speaker who utters a metaphor and the infelicities which may beset the attempt to communicate with the use of metaphor. The latter features, it seems to me, ought to be studied within the context of speech-act theory or some other theory which emphasizes the linguistic interchange between a speaker and a hearer.

I must point out, in closing, that my remarks above are only echoes of Searle's own words: "A great deal can be said in the study of language without studying speech acts," he says, "but any such purely formal theory is necessarily incomplete. It would be as if baseball were studied only as a formal system of rules and not as a game."[8]

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1. John R. Searle,*Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
2. Searle, *Speech Acts*, p. 54.
3. J.L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, J.O. Urmson, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 14.
4. Searle, *Speech Acts*, p. 16.
5. See Searle, *Speech Acts*, pp. 78-79.
6. Searle, *Speech Acts*, p. 20.
7. Here I assume Searle's distinction between what a speaker means and certain kinds of effects he intends to produce in his hearers. As Searle says, "the principle of expressibility does not imply that it is always possible to find or invent a form of expression that will produce all the effects in hearers that one means to produce; for example, literary or poetic effects, emotions, beliefs, and so on. We need to distinguish what a speaker means from certain kinds of effects he intends to produce in his hearers" *(Speech Acts*, p. 20).
8. Searle, *Speech Acts*, p. 17.

V. TOPICAL SEMINAR: JOHN DEWEY–CRITICO-PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

(Topical Seminar, on Dewey, Part One)

DEWEY, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND THE MATTER OF CONSCIOUSNESS

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A number of writers have noted connections between aspects of John Dewey's philosophy and modern phenomenology. Richard Bernstein has called attention to the critique of dualisms that appear in both modes of thinking, and to the possible resemblance between the concept of the *lebenswelt* and Dewey's concept of the situation.[1] Paul Tibbetts has laid stress on similar treatments of the "subject-object" relation, of a perceived reality underlying what is known and named, and of the role played by bodily activity in constituting the perceptual world.[2] More recently, Victor Kestenbaum has written about Dewey's conception of habit as the basis of "lived meanings," about the place of the pre-reflective and pre-objective intentionality in his thinking, and about the "phenomenological sense" revealed in his writing about the arts.[3] My interest is in trying to understand why Dewey did not follow the "indicators"[4] in this way of thinking to a phenomenological conception of social reality.

As Alfred Schutz explains it, such a conception involves a recognition of the intersubjective life-world as "a system of reciprocal social relations, all of them built up by mutual subjective interpretations of the actors within it."[5] I want to explore the possibility that a continuing ambivalence with respect to the meaning and significance of subjectivity and, most particularly, consciousness prevented Dewey from coming fully to terms with constitutive thinking where the social life-world was concerned. This held consequences for the kind of social philosophizing in which he engaged; and I think it made a difference to his educational approach. In fact, if he had worked more consistently from a phenomenological ground, Dewey might not have communicated to so many people the idea that he was predominantly concerned about group membership, mutual adjustment, and social control.[6]

Some of this, of course, is due to the various ways in which he interpreted his social and intellectual environments at various moments in cultural history, and the ways in which he chose to define social requirements and demands. Some of it is certainly due to what Sidney Morganbesser calls his "explanatory naturalism,"[7] an orientation that moved him to try to integrate scientific knowledge and moral theory as a ground for social action. His respect for scientific experiment, his emphasis on the "supremacy of method,"[8] and his naturalistic tendency to presuppose the occurrence of transactions within a social matrix made it unlikely that he would stress (in the manner of Schutz) the importance of self-interpretation on the part of a social scientist or an observer or an educator. Schutz asked:

> Do not the concepts of meaning, of motives, of ends, of acts, refer to a certain structure of consciousness, a certain arrangement of all the experiences in inner time, a certain type of sedimentation? And does not interpretation of the Other's meaning and of the meaning of his acts and the results of these acts presuppose a self-interpretation of the observer or partner?

It is well known that Dewey repeatedly criticized diverse critical realists for positing a "disinterested spectator" when it came to perceiving physical objects. Morganbesser reminds us that Dewey "often argued that the notion of a disembodied perceiver is incoherent and that perception is a form of action. . . ."[10] Nevertheless, he did not appear to apply this to the interpretation of social or educational situations. His good society was not composed of self-reflective (self-interpreting) partners or observers, each one of whom was aware that all his or her acts, thoughts, and feelings originated in his or her previous acting, thinking, and feeling. His "great community" was to be built after the model of a community of scientists committed to an ideal of inquiry.[11] The members were all to have a voice in identifying and selecting possible ways of proceeding, even possible ways of living. But there is no mention of the "articulate public" building up the community be means of "mutual subjective interpretations." What Dewey called "*the* problem of the public" was to improve "the methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion."[12] He spoke of moral principles being real as "other forces are real. . .inherent in community life,"[13] without talking about how they came to be. He commented at another point on the need to accept "the corporate and industrial world in which we live,"[14] as if indeed it could all be presupposed. The interest in constitutive thinking so apparent in his discussions of knowing and the known visibly declined when the problems of the public came into the fore. Again, I believe this to be a consequence of his neglect of the centrality of consciousness as much as it is a consequence of his location in the social world he constructed around himself.

Preoccupied as he was with epistemological dualism, he began by associating the concept of consciousness with a notion of interiority, of mind cut off from nature and the world. In his *Logic*, he was still calling 'consciousness' "a purely mentalistic name."[15] In *Knowing and the Known*, he associated it with "awareness" and found no value in it, "or in its disguises, or in the attitudes of inquiry it implies."[16] I would agree that the issue is purely semantic were it not for such comments as the one in *Human Nature and Conduct*, where he wrote that "if consciousness exists at all. . .it seems natural that it should take the form of an emotion, belief, or purpose that reflects the interaction (of various factors), that it should be an 'our' consciousness or a 'my' consciousness."[17] And, in *The Public and Its Problems*, he said that, even if 'consciousness' referred to something purely private, it would still be "of objects, not of itself."[18] Not only was he recognizing the phenomenon of intentionality; he was touching upon the way in which consciousness thrusts into and indeed constructs the world.

It is clear enough that Dewey was acquainted with other than idealist discourse on the subject. William James wrote the essay, "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" in 1904. He objected to the notion that there was an "inner duplicity" in experience, or a splitting into "consciousness and what consciousness is 'of'."[19] He said that the "entity" called "consciousness" was fictitious, "while thoughts in the concrete are fully real."[20] The next year, James made it clearer. "Consciousness as it is ordinarily understood does not exist," he wrote. And then: "What does exist and constitutes the portion of truth covered over by the word 'consciousness' is the susceptibility possessed by the parts of experience to be reported or known." He concluded, as he had before, that "things and thought. . .are made of one and the same stuff. . .the stuff of experience in general."[21] Dewey, in some sense always ambivalent about James's pluralism, wrote that James's ideas of novelty, individuality, and the rest were all connected "with his feeling for the qualities and traits of that which lives." Contrasting him with philosophers who took a more static view, Dewey said that it was reserved for James "to think of life in terms of life in action."[22] The idea of the "stream of consciousness,"[23] however, by which human beings dealt transitively with "life in action" troubled Dewey because of its "subjective tenor."[24] I am not sure how he reacted to James's celebration of possibility: "Other sculptors, other statues from the same stone! Other minds, other worlds from the same monotonous and inexpressive chaos! My world is but one in a million alike embedded, alike real to those who may abstract them. How different must be the worlds in the consciousness of ant, cuttle-fish, or crab!"[25] Would Dewey's concern for the common rather than the plural, for initiation of diverse persons into a norm-governed community, have made it impossible for him to accept the notion of consciousness if that was what consciousness implied? James's notion of selective abstraction, teleological conception, and the stream of consciousness "must be," Dewey wrote in 1904, "either true or false in psychology—and, if true. . .must modify in some way or other the conception of thought that obtains in logic."[26] But how could experimental psychology prove them true or false?

It is interesting to note that Alfred Schutz, expressing his debt to Whitehead, Bergson, Husserl, James, and Dewey, "roughly" formulated a view he believed was shared by all of them. He presented what was, in effect, the conception of constructed knowledge and the idea that we grasp only aspects of our world, "namely those which are relevant to us either for carrying on our business of living or from the point of view of a body of accepted rules of procedure or thinking called the method of science."[27] Implicit in what Schutz wrote is a view of consciousness much influenced by Husserl and James; and I am not sure if he actually found this expressed in Dewey's work or was drawing out what he saw latent beneath the manifest content. In any case, Schutz believed that, when immersed in the "stream of consciousness" or the "flow of duration," we encounter but undifferentiated experiences. Only when we turn back against the stream and reflect upon it, do we bring our experiences into relief. At that point they become "objects of attention as constituted experiences."[28] Unlike Dewey, Schutz was convinced that the "subjective point of view" and its accompanying questions were vital for social scientists. The questions concern the meaning for various actors of the acts they perform, or the meaning of those acts for the observer, the inquirer,—perhaps even the educator. Only if this point of view is accepted, Schutz believed, can those attempting to make sense of a social scene ever be sure they are dealing with "the real social life-world."[29] It seems evident to me that Dewey's hesitancy with respect to the subjective as well as to the stream of consciousness limited his opportunities to consider, not merely the constitution of social reality, but the ways in which persons with diverse biographical backgrounds (or diverse backgrounds in "associated living"[30]) came to know or to interpret their worlds. When I consider his preoccupation with the perceiver's vantage point upon physical reality, I find it hard to see how this approach to social reality would have been dissonant with his thought.

So it is with the matter of "bracketing out" and the disclosures made possible by certain kinds of phenomenological reduction. Schutz talked often about the need to bracket or to put in parentheses what is taken for granted about reality, including the presumed objective existence of the outer world. What is left after the bracketing out, he explained, is "the stream of thought in its integrity, with all its activities and with all its cogitations and experiences."[31] If our cogitations and our perceptions are intentional, what is left after the bracketing is the *object* of our cogitation or our perception. That which we know, say, about the community of which we are a part is made visible. The faces of the children in the classroom, as they have become present to us, become visible. We can begin to reflect upon what we know and perceive; and, in the course of reflecting, we can endow what has become present to us with meaning.

Schutz suggested that Dewey had little thought of bracketing out the taken-for-granted in this fashion. Dewey understood about the need to "stop and think" when an obstacle arose.[32] He knew that the self was created by means of action, that the individual was in no sense a "self-enclosed way of acting."[33] But he never arrived at the point of turning acts of reflection *from* the objects of his acts and thoughts *to* his acting and thinking—grasping his own acting and thinking objects by reflective thought and thereby allowing his "Self" (hidden, Schutz would say, by the objects of his acts and thoughts) to emerge.

For Schutz, however, the Self constituted a field of consciousness; and he could say, as Dewey could not, that "all the performed acts, thoughts, feelings reveal themselves as originating in *my* previous acting, *my* thinking, *my* feeling. The whole stream of consciousness is through and through the stream of my personal life, and my Self is present in any of my experiences."[34]

Dewey's interest in social inquiry, along with his stress on the enrichment of perceptible meanings, may still provide a ground for interpretive, even emancipatory education. It seems clear that he did not follow the clues in his own phenomenological explorations to the point of developing a selfinterpretive approach to the social inquiry he so prized. It may well be that his unwillingness to accept the notion of consciousness made it difficult for him to break effectively with what have been called "mainstream" notions of empiricism and rationality.[35] Would it, after all, have meant a contradiction for Dewey to say something like the following?

> I experience a fellow-man directly if and when he shares with me a common sector of time and space. The sharing of a common sector of time implies a genuine simultaneity of our two streams of consciousness: my fellow-man and I grow old together. The sharing of a common sector of space implies that my fellow-man appears to me in person as he himself and non other. (36)

There is no point in "correcting" Dewey after all the years, nor in exposing him for too uncritical a response to problematic aspects of what we perceive as our social reality. But there is a point in identifying some of the indicators in his work and trying ourselves to find out where they might lead. There is a point in rereading and perhaps reconstituting what he wrote about growth and communication and the expansion of meanings in experience. And then there is the obligation to move from there to develop a notion of critical consciousness as essential to the concept of growth—a consciousness that will make the Self present in experience and, at once, demystify what is proposed as social science. There remains, I think, an alternative reality in Dewey's work, a reality heretofore unexplored. It is up to us to see if there are possibilities for us to choose and act upon, as conscious beings in an increasingly complicated world.

1. Richard Bernstein, *John Dewey* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), p. 178.

2. Paul Tibbetts, "John Dewey and Contemporary Phenomenology on Experience and the Subject-Object Relation," *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1971), pp. 250-275.

3. Victor Kestenbaum, *The Phenomenological Sense of John Dewey: Habit and Meaning* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: The Humanities Press, 1977).

4. John Dewey, "The Experience of Knowing," in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, Vol. I, ed. J. McDermott (New York: Capricorn Books, 1973), p. 163.

5. Alfred Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation," in *The Problem of Social Reality, Collected Papers I* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), p. 60.

6. See, e.g., Walter Feinberg, *Reason and Rhetoric* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975); Clarence J. Karier, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring, *Roots of Crisis* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1973).

7. Sidney Morganbesser, Introduction, *Dewey and His Critics*, ed. Sidney Morganbesser (New York: The Journal of Philosophy, Inc., 1977), p. xxxvii.

8. See Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (London: George Allen Unwin, 1929), pp. 213-41.

9. Schutz, "Some Leading Concepts," in *The Problem of Social Reality*, *op. cit.*, p. 105

10. Morganbesser, op. cit., p. xxiii.

11. See Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1954), pp. 153-155.

12. Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems, op. cit.*, p. 208.

13. Dewey, *Individualism Old and New* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1962), p. 171.

14. Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

15. Dewey, Logic: *The Theory of Inquiry* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1938), p. 106.

16. Dewey and Arthur K. Beattey, *Knowing and the Known* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 291.

17. See Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: The Modern Library, 1957), p. 59.

18. Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, op. cit., p. 22.

19. William James, "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?", in *The Writings of William James*, ed. John J. McDermott (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), p. 172.

20. James, op. cit., p. 183.

21. James, "The Notion of Consciousness," in McDermott, op. cit., p. 193.

22. Dewey, "From Absolutism and Experimentalism," in *On Experience, Nature, and Freedom*, ed. Richard J. Bernstein (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1960), p. 16.

23. See James, "The Stream of Thought," in *Principles of Psychology* I (New York: Dover Publications, 1950), pp. 224-90.

24. Dewey, "The Development of American Pragmatism," in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, op. cit., p. 52.

25. James, "The Stream of Thought," op. cit., p. 289.

26. Dewey, "Notes on Logical Topics" (Feb. 4, 1904), in Morganbesser, op. cit., p. 488.

27. Schutz, "On the Methodology of the Social Sciences," in *The Problem of Social Reality*, op. cit., p. 5.

28. Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. 47.

29. Schutz, "Social World and Social Action," in *Studies in Social Theory*, Collected Papers II (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 16.

30. See Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems, op. cit.*, pp. 22-24, pp. 190-191.

31. Schutz, "Some Leading Concepts," op. cit., p. 105.

32. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, op. cit., p. 152.

33. Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, op. cit., p. 88.

34. Schutz, "Scheler," in *The Problem of Social Reality*, op. cit., p. 169.

35. See Richard J. Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1976), pp. 113-114.

36. Schutz, "Social World and Social Action," op. cit., p. 23.

(Topical Seminar, on Dewey, Part Two)

MERLEAU-PONTY AND DEWEY ON THE "MIND-BODY" QUESTION

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In this paper, I will demonstrate how phenomenology is aligned with pragmatism by showing the convergence between the pragmatist John Dewey, and the phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Specifically, I will reconstruct their joint criticism of the reflex-arc in order to provide an alternative to the behaviorist learning model.

The issue which both confront has been a central concern for modern western philosophy from Descartes to Wittgenstein, namely the "mind/body" problem. Emerging from this dualism are the following questions:

A. What is the relationship between body and mind in the generation of meaning?
B. How are the external objective world and the internal subjective experience of the knower united in cognition?
C. What kind of causality best describes the knowing situation?
D. What are the ultimate irreducible elements of experience from which descriptions of cognitive activity must begin?

For philosophers operating within the British empiricist tradition all forms of human behavior including the "mental events" of remembering, judging and perceiving are explicable either as physical behaviors or dispositions to behave. These behaviors are formed out of the causal conditioning associations between the human organism and its physical environment, and fall under the explanatory model of physics. A "mind" activity then, is explained by the isolation of a specific physical causal event which is regularly observed to precede another specific behavioral event. A complete explanation of "mind" activity shows the constituent parts of the behavioral event. These parts of behavior are exposed in a mechanically joined, linear cause-effect relationship.

Throughout the history of the "empiricist" paradigm the "reflex-arc" has remained central. Originally appropriated from physiology (and transmuted in radical behaviorism) the reflex paradigm describes the irreducible elements of cognition in terms of sensations and stimulus-response components. Following upon this, is the view that the human organism's behavior is fundamentally shaped through the external controls of its environment. The argument denies that human behavior is teleological.

Dewey's critique is expressed in his essay "The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology." His central theme is that the reflex-arc paradigm falsifies because it describes human behavior according to rigid distinctions between "sensations, thoughts and acts. Sensory stimulus is one thing, the central activity standing for the idea is another thing, and the motor discharge standing for the act proper is a third."[1] Dewey argues that the fundamental wrongheadedness of this paradigm is repeated in the analysis of human learning as a non-teleological conjunction of two separate entities, "body and mind," what he considers the erroneous description of the human, as a cognitive spectator passively controlled by the environment. Dewey's alternative is to define "mind" behavior as a holistic structure of action. In his own words "S and R are not distinctions of existence but. . .are distinctions of function or part played with reference to reaching or maintaining an end."[2] Using the previously mentioned organic paradigm Dewey reconstitutes the meaning of S and R. He says first that the discrete sensation is never experienced and that it accounts for nothing. Instead as we have seen, analysis begins with an assessment of the purposes which motivate and are intrinsic to human action. Sensation or stimulus must be seen as an organic phase of action; it involves the organism's attention to a situational problem. Stimulus is that phase which demands completion. What counts as the response phase is correlative to the function to be played in an organic S-R coordination. Indeed, it is more correct to say that the S is the problematic situation acted upon; R is the environment reconstructed. Let me repeat: S and R form a dialectical relationship. Neither S nor R are separate events; as S defines the problem it determines R. But an R phase suffices only insofar as it continues as a goal which the human organism moves to achieve. Dewey cites two important cases from the reflex-arc literature. The first case is the Jamesian analysis of a child reaching for the flame of a lighted candle. The second is Balwin's analysis of what happens when one hears a sound.

The "child-candle" argument follows these lines: first the child receives the sensation of the candle's flame as "light stimulus." Next, his grasping towards the flame is labeled the response. The burn he receives acts as a stimulus to the withdrawal motion act. In Dewey's words, "The reflex-arc proceeds on the tacit assumption that the outcome of a response is a totally new experience, i.e., the substitution of a burn sensation for a light sensation through the intervention of motion."[3] Dewey rejects this, and describes the response as a teleological phase of the child's original act of seeing. He argues that the organic movement of eye-arm-hand is what structures the act of vision. And the creation of the perceptual spectacle itself, is later subsumed under a new phase and a new end-that of "seeing for reaching." Sensation as stimulus must be understood as that phase of the act which demands a completion. With respect to the child's situation, the "stimulus" phase of his activity is the problematic to be resolved by action. The problem posed is "what sort of light have we here?" Completion means either reaching or choosing not to. The "stimulus" phase sets the conditions for action; it initiates the coordinated act. Likewise, the response is not mechanical but functional. Function here describes the autochthonous organization of experience. That is, experience is originally of things. Things are experienced as having a whole configuration; parts are already organized and gain meaning from the whole. That is, the whole contextual transaction between the organism and the environment– the organism's coordinated perceptual and manipulatory acts cohere as one; and it is this figure-ground organization which defines the meaning of the object. S and R then are phases of an experience whose meaning is contructed by the organism's doing something and then undergoing the experience of a reconstituted environment. Thus, when the child gets burned, he learns that seeing the light of the candle and then touching that light is painful because the whole sensory-motor configuration has changed its value. What he experiences isn't mere sensation but a certain completion of the previous eye, arm, hand coordination.

It is only "because heat-pain quale enters into the same circuit of experience with optical, ocular and muscular quales does the child learn from the experience and get ability to avoid the experience in the future. The so-called response is not merely to the stimulus it is into it."[4] Dewey's insistence upon the organic teleological activity of mind and body is reiterated in his criticism of Balwin's analysis of hearing a sound. According to Balwin three elements are involved: "first, the receiving consciousness of a stimulus,—say a loud unexpected sound; second, attention involuntarily drawn, registering the element and third, the muscular reaction."[5] This description ignores physical, biological and functional values.

On the physical side, Balwin's analysis is wrong because it designates the sound in isolation and suppresses it's function within a social context. The sound is not "ex abrupto" from the outside but finds its place in a prior coordination. Dewey emphasizes the meaning of a sound is mediated by its prior status. When one is "reading a book;. . .hunting. . .watching in a dark place; performing a chemical experiment; noise has a different psychical value."[6] If the sound were not to some degree the ground of prior coordination, Dewey concludes that it could not now come into prominence.

On the biological side, Dewey says that the sound "must stand in the strictest histological and physiological connexion with the eye, or hand, or leg or whatever organ has been the overt center of the action. . .it is impossible to think of the eye as monopolizing consciousness and the ear apparatus as wholly quiescent."[7] On the functional side, Dewey suggests that Balwin has reversed what happens. Attention does not follow the sound stimulus and the sound itself is not simply a physical event. Attention is a sensory-motor act "which constitutes that which becomes S to another act."[8]

Dewey's conclusion is that there is nothing in the process "from the standpoint of description which entitles us to call this reflex. In the physical process, as physical there is nothing which can set off as stimulus, nothing which reacts, nothing which is response. There is just a change in the system of tensions."[9] The reflex-arc is faulty because it suppresses the teleology of action. The arc is comprized of two segments which have to mechanically joined.

Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Behavior

Merleau-Ponty's version of the phenomenological reduction would be as foreign to Dewey as the primary of Dewey's scientific method would be to Merleau-Ponty. But what counts is in Merleau Ponty's similar criticism of the reflex arc. The central theme is: Body and mind are one in the generation of meaning; and the world takes on meaning through "a dialectic of human milieu and human action." The issues treated by Dewey are reiterated by Merleau-Ponty. In both are found:

A. The rejection of a paratitive analysis of human action. Included is a repudiation of the causal associationism of sense data and ideas as well as the linear causality of S/R.

B. The description of human behavior is holistic and teleological.

Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the reflex-arc appears in his *The Structure of Behavior and the Phenomenology of Perception*. The former work is a detailed rebuttal of the physiological-atomist prototype of human behavior. Merleau-Ponty's convergence with Dewey is in the phenomenological description of the act of perception. Special attention is given to the gestalt contexture of perceptual meanings which are constructed by the movements of the body. Out of this analysis, Dewey's replacement of S/R causality with the "sensory-motor circuit" is reaffirmed in Merleau-Ponty's terms. Both Dewey and Merleau-Ponty were responding to the notion of the reflex as "the action of a defined receptor which evokes a defined response."[10] Merleau-Ponty gives the following example:

> "If I am hungry and, absorbed in my work, I extend my hand toward a piece of fruit placed near me by change and lift it to my mouth, the piece of fruit does not act as an object invested with a certain value; what releases my motor reaction is an ensemble of colors and lights, a physical and chemical stimulus. . .[in sum, behavior] is defined by the mutual exteriority of parts and processes.[11]

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological attack on reflex theory begins with the description of the meaning structure of consciousness in the perceptual act. He takes the notion that consciousness is always consciousness of something to its logical conclusion. That is, direct experience at its irreducible is never of pure impressions or isolated sensations. Instead, what we find is a gestalt context: "a figure on a background. . .the perceptual 'something' is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 'field.' A really homogeneous area offering nothing to perception cannot be given to any perception."[12] Merleau-Ponty's point is that colors and sounds are neither sensations nor elements of consciousness. Rather, colors and sounds are the in-separable qualities of the things themselves. Direct experience is not mediated by the build-up of sense impressions into an idea. I do not perceive the bulkiness of the refrigerator and then add its whiteness. The white expanse of bulkiness is immediate. And further to describe this experience in gestaltist terms is not only to deny any isolable sensation or stimulus, it is also to say that a color or sound appears against a lived horizon. That is, colors or sounds are of things whose meaning is mediated situationally. The redness of blood means one thing if I begin to cut my steak; it means something quite different if I am clumsy with my knife and cut my hand. In the first instance, I continue to eat and satisfy my need for sustenance. In the second case, I immediately press my napkin against the wound to stop the flow of blood.

Merleau-Ponty's rejection of the isolable sensation together with the situational context of meaning establishes one convergence with Dewey. But the focal convergence is in the dialectical relationship between the human organism and its environment. In its most general terms, the dialectic when applied as a description of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of behavior denotes the following: first, humans are agents whose actions are not simply complex movements but are motivated by purposes or goals. Second, activity is organic because it takes place in structural unities which return to an equilibrium througnout change. These structural unities are of course the human and the natural social world; neither of which can be adequately represented via mechanical relationships. Third, the activity includes a negation of the given. Action is motivated by a limitation which must be overcome. Any phase or movement of experience gives rise to new moments which transcend the former. Fourth, nature demands that the human work. Ideas are realized in their concrete expression of words, objects and actions. The dialectical process is a continuing unfolding of new possibilities delivered in a human world.

Merleau-Ponty and Dewey, describe the perceptual act as a construction made by the body. But this is the body of the human *subject* as it acts, not the human body as it is portrayed in physiology, i.e., a system of chemical and physical processes. Dewey says, [intelligence] "is immanent in the body, not by virtue of the body, but because being transcendent it has expressed and manifested its nature in the body."[13]

And for Merleau-Ponty, the argument that the body-subject confers the meaning of the perceptual act is that it reasserts that experience is actively structured or has "form." Form occurs "whenever the properties of a system modify themselves for every change effected upon a single one of its parts, and on the contrary conserve themselves when they all change by maintaining the same relationship between themselves."[14] The body-subject is the form-giver. But "form" comes out of movement and action in the world. With Dewey, Merleau-Ponty is saying that objects exist in the world as solicitations for action. The world demands a practical answer; it demands that something be done. We do not represent objects to consciousness; we act upon them.

> In the action of the hand which is raised towards an object is contained a reference to the object, nto as an object represented, but as that highly specific thing towards which we project ourselves, near which we are.[15]

But, the "ground" of meaning is both the physical and cultural world which have opened up to me because I have a life of consciousness through which I hold onto my past. Consciousness is ordered "because it cannot be consciousness without playing upon significances either in the absolute past of nature or in its own personal past, and because any form of lived experience tends towards a certain generality."[16] Further, what we have seen in Dewey reappears with Merleau-Ponty: the human organism is polarized into action which is specific and particular to a situation. That is, only the correct choice of behavior will restore equilibrium. Human behavior is signification in which the coordinated organism modifies its environment in accordance with the norms of its activity. Environment and response are formal oppositions within the same structure of *praxis*.

Human behavior is symbolic. Symbolic behavior is improvisatory, dialectical, and meaningful in itself. This means that once the human deciphers the internal structure of his situation he can substitute varied perspectives and varied expressions on that same theme. For example, Merleau-Ponty considers a musical performance dialectical:

> The character of the melody, the graphic configuration of the musical text, and the unfolding of the gestures (the playing of chords or

the striking of keys) participate in a single structure which have in common a nucleus of signification.[17]

Indeed, this is what allows the possibility of improvization. Here there is no mechanical connection between the score, the instrument and the performer's bodily activity. Rather, it is this possibility of substitution in points of view which removes stimuli from the restrictions of a present "here and now" situation.

In summary, I have appealed to John Dewey to help clarify my own understanding of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I would not want to argue that they are saying the same things, only that they share a quite similar critique of the reflex-arc. On the one hand, the convergence between pragmatism and phenomenology emerges from the common rejection of: the mind-body dualism, as well as the assumption that discrete stimulus/response associations mechanically activate a mind device. On the other hand, the convergence emerges from the common view that the human being actively structures his environment and can intercede his purposes, so as to define what phases of experience will stand as S and R. Indeed, my overarching purpose has been to recapture human activity as an act of praxis.

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1. John Dewey, "The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology" Psychological Review (July 1896) pp. 357-370. Reprinted in and quoted from *Philosophy, Psychology, and Social Practice*, ed. by Joseph Ratner (New York: G.P. Putnam's Son's, 1963) pp. 252-266.
2. Ibid. p. 260.
3. Ibid. p. 255.
4. Ibid. p. 254.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid. p. 256.
7. Ibid. p. 257.
8. Ibid. p. 258.
9. Ibid. p. 257.
10. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, trans. by A.L. Fisher (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 9.
11. Ibid.
12. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. by C. Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1967), p. 4.
13. John Dewey, "Soul and Body," *The Bibliotheca Sacra* (April 1886), pp. 239–263. Reprinted in and quoted from *Philosophy, Psychology and Social Practice*, op. cit. p. 69.
14. Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, p. 47.
15. Ibid. p. 50.
16. Merleau-ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*. p. 138.
17. Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior*, p. 120.

(Topical Seminar, on Dewey, Part Three)

ON THE NEGLECTED CONTENT OF DEWEY'S IDEA OF HUMAN NATURE

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In this brief paper I shall speak to an aspect of John Dewey's idea of human nature that is generally neglected, if seen at all, by his advocates, his critics, or those presenting his thought in non critical exposition. My thought is that this neglected content can tell us something of import about the meaning and significance of Dewey's philosophical and educational thought, and also about ourselves since Dewey is a giant in our field and, therefore, like it or not, is always a presence among us. Once again we must reread and rethink this great source of grey enchantment.

The format in which this paper is presented, a topical seminar, and the strict space limitations imposed upon it, work in favor of an exploratory examination of ideas, the full significance of which has yet to be worked out. In any case, the topic, as I see it, needs extended treatment and this piece is to be taken for what it is, an early, brief, approximation of a final form and conclusion.

The neglected content of Dewey's idea of human nature is very simply this: its conservative social and political content. Dewey's mature works such as *Experience and Nature, The Quest for Certainty, Human Nature and Conduct,* among others, are loaded with statements ascribing to human nature a content and dynamic which, it can be argued, work constantly against the realization of his liberal political and educational goals. (Perhaps we should say that this content and dynamic give a more true definition of his political and educational goals.) Dewey ascribes to human nature an inclination, so strong as to warrant being called a desire, for psychological inertia and a constancy of function and content. When these are coupled with the constant psychological displacement of affect and impulse which he describes it is clear that a most serious obstacle to change and social progress is human nature itself. Dewey's liberalism is a complex standpoint.

It may be the case that there are two Dewey's at work within a Deweyan psychology or within a Deweyan notion of human nature. One would be a quasi-Freudian pessimist, the other, a functionalist or soft-behaviorist optimist. Or if there is only one Dewey, his idea of human nature must be understood to contain a depth of content and dynamic which is simultaneously protective and destructive and which makes his social meliorism more subdued than his advocates are wont to acknowledge. If the latter is the case, i.e., there is only one Dewey, his social psychology still remains as described by C. Wright Mills, a "model for liberals,"[1] but we now see more clearly the conservative dimension of his liberality. Or, to put it another way, Dewey's optimism is strongly mediated by a realism or even pessimism that one disregards at the great risk of falsifying Dewey.

That the idea of human nature has both political and scientific meaning and significance was clear to Dewey. In his piece, "Human Nature," he claims that the ". . . significance of the idea of human nature for the social sciences gathers about three questions."[2] The questions are

> (1) Are contemporary political and economic institutions necessary products of human nature? Or more generally, does the very constitution of human nature show that certain social arrangements are likely to be successful while others are doomed to failure? . . . (2) How far is human nature modifiable by deliberate effort? . . . (3) How great and how fixed is the range of variations in human nature between individuals and between groups?[3]

That the answers to questions two and three are as "political" in implication as the answer to the first will be self evident to readers of these *Proceedings*.

Dewey goes on to say that the above questions are "bound up with controversies involving intense feelings. They largely condition the differences between conservatives and liberals, between aristocrats and democrats, between nationalists and internationalists."[4] He further recognizes the political dimension of the idea of human nature when he claims that "It is demonstrable that many of the obstacles to change which have been attributed to human nature are in fact due to the inertia of institutions and to the voluntary desire of powerful classes to maintain the existing status."[5]

Dewey does not limit his understanding of the idea of human nature to its political function. He recognizes its centrality in th cognitive function of the sciences. What he says about David Hume respecting the importance of a theory or knowledge of human nature can be seen to hold for Dewey himself. According to Dewey, Hume's

> constructive idea is that a knowledge of human nature provides a map or chart of all humane and social subjects, and that with this chart in our possession we can find our way intelligently about through all the complexities of the phenomena of economics, politics, religious beliefs, etc. Human nature is at least a contributing factor to the *form* which even natural science takes, although it may not give the key to its *content* in the degree which Hume supposed. But in the social subjects, . . . we are in the presence of facts in which human nature is truly central and where a knowledge of human nature is necessary to enable us to thread our way through the tangled scene. If Hume erred in his use of his key, it was because he failed to note the reaction of social institutions and conditions upon the ways in which human nature expresses itself . . . He failed to see that custom is essentially a fact of associated living whose force is dominant in forming the habits of individuals.[6]

We see that according to Dewey the idea of human nature is an essential ingredient of political theory and a necessary component of a theory of knowledge. Now we can ask where the quasi-Freudian content (the protective-dynamic displacement of affect and impulse), the subdued meliorist Dewey, enter his mature thought and how does he handle this material? First of all, the content is always present. It is frequently not seen, or recognized for what it is, I suggest, because it is often presented in strange form, largely in a body of asides, *apercus*, common sense observations which appear on the basis of form alone not to be integral to his more systematic thought about human nature. I give this content a centrality of place for several reasons. Its constant assertion suggests to me that Dewey meant what he was saying, and further, the content can be joined systematically to his theoretical work in social psychology. The content does appear in *Human Nature and Conduct*, for example.

Why is it not seen by those who speak seriously about Dewey?

The reason, I believe, is largely ideological. This troublesome side to Dewey at first glance appears to be working against the more optimistic Dewey who does believe in the malleability of human nature as fact and as essential foundation to his educational and political theories. The full bodied Dewey presents us with a world that is more complex and harsh than his advocates want to see or that his critics are willing to recognize as following from his thought.

What actually is the neglected content that I have referred to in the abstract? Dewey tells us that

> Perfect certainty is what man wants, . . . We long, amid a troubled world, for perfect being . . . (T)here is a 'primitive credulity,' a natural tendency to believe anything that is suggested unless there is overpowering evidence to the contrary . . . In the face of a problem, thought always seeks to unify things otherwise fragmentary and discrepant.[7]

This creature of longing and credulity is also, as all know, a creature of activity. Dewey tells us that "It is absurd to ask what induces a man to activity generally speaking. He is an active being and that is all there is to be said on that score . . . In truth man acts, . . . he can't help acting."[8]

The relation of the necessity for action and the longing for certainty, the relation of a "primitive credulity" and the ability to change beliefs and achieve knowledge, the rational-irrational move to seek unity in the fragmentary and discrepant constitute a major content of Dewey's dialectic. What holds these contradictory moves or dispositions together is the historical and present vulnerability of the human being in a world which is far from benign, but which is our only home.

The theme Deweyan educationists ignore is made clear in *The Quest for Certainty*. Consider the first sentence, it can be seen to contain all. "Man who lives in a world of hazards is compelled to seek for security."[9] This is the human condition for Dewey. There is not just activity. There is human activity compelled to seek security. Historically this activity has taken two basic forms. One is "the method of changing the world through action, . . . the other is the method of changing the self in emotion and idea." The first method includes the inventions of those arts which "turn the powers of nature to account." The second begins with attempts to "propitiate the powers which environ (human beings) and determine (their destiny)."[10]

Dewey's historical and social psychology asserts the reasonableness (the rationality) of human irrationality and the opening pages of *The Quest for Certainty* help clarify this. (*Human Nature and Conduct* is incomplete as the statement of Dewey's psychology unless it is coupled with the *Quest.*)

Consider. Dewey's human being is a physical organism, a cultural creature with psychic energy. Of psychic energy Dewey says "Suppression is not annihilation. 'Psychic' energy is no more capable of being abolished than the forms we recognize as physical. If it is neither exploded nor converted, it is turned inwards, to lead a surreptitious, subterranean life."[11] And of the impulse which is "a demand for an object which will enable it to function," Dewey says "Denied an object in reality it tends to create one in fancy, as pathology shows."[12]

The human resistance to change is further asserted by Dewey in the following. As we know, according to Dewey the human being "is a creature of habit, not of reason nor yet of instinct." Habits are not given but are formed by existing institutions which "impose their stamp, their superscription, upon impulse and instinct. . . . Habits once formed perpetuate themselves by acting unremittingly upon the native stock of activities. . . . They create out of the formless void of impulses a world made in their image. . . . No matter how accidental and irrational the circumstances of its origin, no matter how different the conditions which now exist to those under which the habit was formed, the latter persists until the environment obstinately rejects it."[13] Habits, whether intelligent or unintelligent, strive for stability in Dewey.

A further example of Dewey's belief in the strength of human resistance to change is found in his assertions that go a long way toward explaining why he believed it is education as the reconstructing of the very dispositions of human beings that is "the fundamental method of social progress and reform."[14] Dewey claims

> Actual social change is never so great as is apparent change. Ways of belief, of expectation, of judgment and attendant emotional dispositions of like and dislike, are not easily modified after they have once taken shape. Political and legal institutions may be altered, even abolished; but the bulk of popular thought which has been shaped to their pattern persists. . . . Habits of though outlive modifications in habits of overt action.[15]

The relation of resistance to change to fear and horror is clearly stated by Dewey when he asserts that

> In human affairs and in relations that range extensively and penetrate deeply the mere idea of invention awakens fear and horror, being regarded as dangerous and destructive. This fact, which is important but which rarely receives notice, . . . testifies both to the reconstruction to be undertaken and to the extreme difficulty of every attempt to bring it about.[16]

That kind of education which can function as the "fundamental method of social progress and reform" will not be easy to establish in both form and content (or practice) is quite clear to Dewey. He states realistically, cynically, or both, that

> A new generation must come upon the scene whose habits of mind have been formed under the new conditions. There is pith in the saying that important reforms cannot take real effect until after a number of influential persons have died.[17]

It is this insight that led Plato to posit the necessity of the noble lie. In Dewey we do not see the need for a noble lie but we find a man for whom "continuity" is a basic trait of existence forced to recognize the importance of discontinuity, or, a break with history, for his educational theories to be realized in practice.

What is to be made of the preceding material? One response is to change our interpretation of Dewey. One possibility is that he possessed insights of greater power than recognized by most of his readers but for philosophical and political reasons he was unable to use them to their fullest in his critique of society. It is clear that he was no simplistic reformer. And it is also clear that his dialectic captured much, but not all, of the harsh antihuman aspect of our culture. He could have used what I have called the rational-irrational (the reasonable but self defeating or self destructive) aspects of human nature to make a stronger attack on the institutions comprising American society.

What I have called the quasi Freudian content of human nature certainly posed a problem to his followers. Its existence made the liberal hopes of Deweyan educational reform more difficult and complex to hold to. This content could also have changed the nature of his educational theory to one that was more explicitly a therapeutic (psycho therapeutic?) theory of education.

If the theme of *The Quest for Certainty* were given greater prominence of place Dewey's educational theory would have been improved. I have related the self-protective and at times self defeating aspects of human nature to Dewey's notion that one way the human being seeks security in the world of hazards is to change "... the self in emotion and idea." This can be viewed as a formal condition of being human. The actual, the concrete, forms in which it exists and is discerned is a specific historical determination for Dewey. Again, recognition of this move determined by human nature undercuts a simplistic ideology of liberal education and political reform. But recognition of this move by human nature makes concrete and more understandable the great human detour, which is history, to democracy and intelligence which are Dewey's goals.

A peculiar thing happens when one joins the displacement of psychic energy and impulse as formal conditions of human existence (as permanent human potential) to concrete historical developments. Dewey emerges as the kind of philosopher that he really is—one who cannot be comprehended unless it is understood that his method entails the methods of the sociology of knowledge, the critique of ideology, and a social pathology with a strong "depth" component. This is what I find him to be. I think Dewey's major texts always tell us this about his method. Specific weaknesses in his method will then tell us something of significance about his metaphysics, his theory of knowledge, his factual judgments about the nature of our society and what is possible and/or desirable in it as a course of political action. Those who do want to understand him and those critics who want "to do him in" will do well to read him more carefully respecting his idea of human nature. For one thing they will find that he had at his fingertips materials leading to a devastating critique of culture, but materials which he was unable to use for methodological reasons. The critique of Dewey becomes in this way better informed and more harsh.

The conclusion to this brief topical seminar report is that Dewey is simultaneously both better and worse than he is. Explication of this conclusion entails the lengthier treatment of Dewey referred to at the beginning of the paper. If a critical philosophy of education is to be grounded in a naturalist or even a materialist base and if it is to ground itself in the concept of praxis, as I think it must, a rereading of Dewey is essential.

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6. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: The Modern Library, 1950), pp. vi-vii.
7. John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960), p. 21; John Dewey, *Experience and Nature, Second Edition* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958), p. 63; John Dewey, *How We Think, New Edition* (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1933), p. 24; *Experience and Nature*, p. 26.
8. *Human Nature*, pp. 119, 118.
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13. *Human Nature*, pp. 125-26.
14. John Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed," in *Dewey on Education, Selections with an Introduction and Notes* by Martin S. Dworkin (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, 1959), p. 30.
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CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS
OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Constitution of the Society

Article I

Name

The name of this organization shall be "The Philosophy of Education Society."

Article II

Purposes

The purposes of this organization are (1) to promote the fundamental philosophic treatment of the problems of education, (2) to promote the clarification of agreements and differences among the several philosophies of education through the opportunities for discussion afforded by annual meetings, (3) to advance and improve teaching in the philosophy of education both in schools for the education of teachers and in other educational institutions, (4) to cultivate fruitful relationships between workers in general philosophy and workers in philosophy of education, (5) to cultivate fruitful realtions between scholars in philosophy of education and those in other areas of education, and (6) to encourage promising young students in the field of philosophy of education.

Article III

Membership

Section 1. There shall be two classes of member: Fellow and Associate.

Section 2. A Fellow is one whose manifest interest and scholarly contribution is in the philosophy of education. The Executive Board shall take into account the following criteria in determining whether or not an application as Fellow will be approved: (1) publications in the field of philosophy of education, (2) the teaching of collegiate courses in this field, (3) the completion of a doctoral degree and dissertation in this field.

Section 3. An Associate is one who has a demonstrated interest and competence in philosophy of education but who does not meet the criteria for Fellow. Graduate students meeting these qualifications shall be eligible for membership as Associate.

Section 4. Both classes of members shall enjoy the right of the floor at all meetings of the Society and the right to vote on all matters that are decided by a vote of the membership.

Section 5. Nominations for membership as Fellow or Associate shall be sponsored by two members in good standing. Nominations for membership in the Society shall be submitted to the Executive Board and evidence shall be provided that the nominee essentially fulfills the qualifications for the class of membership to which he is nominated.

Section 6. A candidate properly nominated shall be accepted into membership by a favorable vote of at least fou members of the Executive Board.

Article IV

Officers and Executive Board

Section 1. The elected officers of the Society shall be a President, a President-Elect, and a Secretary-Treasurer. Only Fellows of the Society may serve as officers. There shall be an Executive Board, the members of which shall be the elected officers of the Society, the immediate past President of the Society, and two members elected from the membership at large.

Section 2. The President-Elect of the Society shall be elected for a one-year term, immediately after which he shall automatically become the President of the Society for a one-year term. Any Fellow who holds these offices may not be reelected to succeed himself until after at least two years from his retirement as President. The duties of the President-Elect shall be to serve as a regular member of the Executive Board. He shall also assume the duties of the President whenever a majority of the Executive Board votes that the current President is unable to perform his duties.

Section 3. The duties of the President shall include (1) presiding at the annual general meeting, (2) appointing, with the approval of a majority of the Executive Board, a Program Committee for the year of his office and serving as *ex officio* member of that committee, (3) making appointments with the approval of a majority of the Executive Board to fill vacancies which may occur in the unexpired term of any office except his own, (4) supervising arrangements for the annual general meeting of the Society, and (5) proposing the names of nine members from which five will be chosen as members of the Nominating Committee in accordance with the By-Laws.

Section 4. The Secretary-Treasurer of the Society shall be elected yearly provided that a successful candidate may not hold office more than two years in succession. His duties shall include (1) maintaining records of the minutes of the annual meeting, of the deliberations of the Executive Board, and of the official correspondence of the Society, (2) collecting dues from the membership and executing the expenditure of funds for the Society, (3) circulating official notices to the members regarding time and place of meetings, new members accepted, and other matters of general concern, (4) conducting the elections of the Nominating Committee members, officers, other elected members of the Executive Board, and members of the Commission of Professional Affairs in the manner provided in the By-Laws, and (5) presiding at the annual meeting in the absence of the President and President-Elect.

Section 5. The Executive Board shall consist of the elected officers of the Society, the immediate past President, and two members elected to staggered terms of two years. The duties of the Executive Board shall include (1) passing upon nominations for membership in the Society, (2) authorizing and approving expenditures of the Society's funds, (3) acting upon any resignation submitted by officers of the Society, (4) deciding upon the time and place of the meeting of the Society, and (5) creating *ad hoc* committees as it may think appropriate to carry on the work of the Society. *Ad hoc* committees created by the Board may continue to stand beyond the end of the fiscal year succeeding the one in which they are formed only on a favorable vote of the membership at the first annual business meeting following their creation.

Article V

Commission on Professional Affairs

Section 1. There shall be a Commission on Professional Affairs the function of which is to examine for the Society all issues related to the conduct of its professional affairs, and in consultation with the President and Executive Board, to take relevant action, subject to review by the Society.

Section 2. Members of the Commission shall be the President of the Society, *ex officio*, and five members elected to staggered terms of five years from the membership of the Society. No elected member of the Commission may hold another elective office of the Society while a member of the Commission. Members shall be elected in the same manner as provided in the By-Laws for the election of officers of the Society.

Article VI

Amendments

This Constitution may be amended in whole or in part by the following process: (1) proposed changes in the Constitution must have the endorsement of at least two members and must be submitted in writing to the Secretary-Treasurer; (2) at least one month before the annual general meeting the Secretary-Treasurer shall mail to all members of the Society an account of the proposed changes; (3) discussion of these changes shall be an order of business at the regular business session of the Society during the annual general meeting; (4) after the annual general meeting the Secretary-Treasurer shall mail ballots concerning the aforesaid proposed changes in the Constitution to all members in good standing; (5) the proposed amendments which receive a favorable vote from the majority of ballots returned shall be incorporated in the Constitution. The Executive Board shall fix the limit within which ballots on the proposed amendment must be returned to the Secretary-Treasurer in order to count in the official voting.

By-Laws of the Society

Committees

The Standing Committees of the Society shall be:

1. A Program Committee of at least three members appointed each year by the incoming President. The President shall appoint the chairman of the committee. The program chairman shall supervise the editing of the *Proceedings*.

2. A Nominating Committee of five members who shall be elected in the following manner: At least four months before the annual business meeting of the Society the Secretary-Treasurer shall mail to each member a list of names of nine members

of the Society selected by the President as candidates for the Nominating Committee. Each member shall be asked to vote for five of the persons whose names are on the list, and to return his ballot to the Secretary-Treasurer not later than three months before the annual business meeting. The five persons receiving the most votes shall constitute the Nominating Committee, and the Secretary-Treasurer shall notify the President of the names of the members elected. The President shall appoint one of the elected members chairman of the Nominating Committee. That committee shall confer immediately and, in accordance with the Constitutional provisions for eligibility, select two nominees for each place to be filled in a given year, except the Secretary-Treasurer may be nominated for a second term unopposed. The Chairman of the Nominating Committee must also seek suggestions for nominations from the Society's membership at large. At least one month before the annual business meeting a ballot on which is listed the names of the nominees for each place shall be mailed to each member of the Society. Ballots shall be returned to the Secretary-Treasurer prior to the annual business meeting, and the Secretary-Treasurer shall cause the ballots to be counted. The President shall announce the persons elected at the annual business meeting.

II

Meetings

The Society shall have at least one general meeting each year.

III

Affiliation

A Region may apply to the Executive Board of the Society for affiliation by submitting evidence that the requirements for affiliation have been met. To be eligible for such affiliation it must meet the following criteria: (1) Not fewer than three, preferably five or more, Fellows shall have constituted themselves into a Region. (2) A Region shall appoint a Regional Representative to the Society, and he shall be selected from among the Fellows of the Regional Society. (3) Qualification for membership shall be determined by the Region. (4) The Constitution of the Region shall incorporate the statement concerning Purposes from the Constitution of the Society.

The Region shall have the right to use the name of the Society on its letterhead.

IV

Dues

The annual dues shall be set, with the restrictions set out below, by a majority vote of the Executive Board, but no change in the amount of dues shall apply until the fiscal year following that in which dues are set. Dues generally shall be the same for Fellows and Associates, but the Executive Board may set dues for members retired from academic positions and for student members at such lower rates as it deems appropriate. Failure to pay dues for two years in succession is to be treated as a termination of membership. Former members may regain membership on the same basis as new applicants.

V

Fiscal Year

The fiscal year of the Society shall begin on July 1 and end on the next June 30.

VI

By-Laws

By-Laws of the Society may be changed by a majority of those voting at any annual business meeting of the Society.

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